Philosophy:Raison oblige theory

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In psychology, certain seemingly-maladaptive human behaviors superficially appear to be attempts to confirm one's own self views (i.e. self-esteem, self-concept, or self-knowledge), even when this self-view is negative or inaccurate.[1] Raison oblige theory (ROT) instead explains these behaviors as consequences of a rational obligation to accept information only inasmuch as it concurs with one's current self-views.

Developed by Aiden P. Gregg (2006), the theory seeks to supplant William Swann (1983)'s self-verification theory (SVT), which takes the observed behaviors at face value.[2] Both theories provide viable accounts of observed evidence. However, what SVT identifies as confirmation-attempts, raison oblige theory instead considers attempts to accurately and honestly convey one's self-views to others.[3]

Empirical phenomena

ROT analyzes what is conventionally considered self-verifying behavior: any action which ultimately coincides with and reinforces existing self-views. Thus a person with positive self-views attempts to seek positive information, which verifies their own positivity. Likewise, people with negative self-views, including those diagnosed with depression, show a preference for negative information.

The latter case has been observed in a wide variety of contexts, including (feigned) psychological studies,[4] romantic partnerships,[5] college roommates,[6] and social groups.[7] More generally, a preference for people who share one's self view and avoidance of those who don't has been empirically replicated many times (e.g. Swann et al. 1992;[8]Gregg 2007)

A number of conditions appear to influence the likelihood of engaging in self-verification: the importance (Swann Pelham), extremity,[9] and certainty[10] of a self-view, as well as a perceived threat to identity (Swann et al., 2002), the intelligence of an evaluator,[citation needed] or the importance of the interactional partner (Swann De La Ronde).

Origins

This collective evidence discussed above is often interpreted self-verificatory motive (e.g., Giesler et al., 1996). However, as Gregg (2007) pointed out, the evidence is hardly conclusive. Just because the actions appear to be self-confirmation does not mean that they are in fact motivated so. Similarly, self-defeating behavior such as drug abuse does not certify a motive to self-defeat.

These philosophical difficulties are often explained away with the concept of affect: a person wants to act according to their best interests, but they also seek immediate relief from negative affect.[11] Gregg (2007) argues that these epicycles make the theory unparsimonious.

Underlying assumptions

Gregg (2007) argues that psychologists too often overlook rational cognition, when seeking to explain behaviors they observe. Given the traditional emphasis on self-enhancement, self-improvement and self-assessment motives, the naïve student might assume the effects of rationality small. But "rationality is pervasive and motives merely qualify it" (Gregg 2007).

In support, Gregg notes that, in the absence of rationality, we likely would not adhere to self-views at all. Instead, people would choose a self-view they liked, and behave accordingly. Grandiose delusions would dominate self-assessment, and analogous pathologies dominate self-enhancement and self-improvement.

But those behaviors are not observed. Instead, every healthy person is aware of reality and adheres to an unspoken set of rules of reason permitting them to act consistently with the physical world around them.

Consequently, Gregg argues that a psychologist's first explanation for observed behavior ought be some form of rational cognition. Until this supposition is shown false, and the only question left is to justify or interpret why the act is rational. Raison oblige theory extends this binding to self-view as well.

Hypothetical situation

Consider the choice between interaction with person (A), who shares my self-views, and person (B), who does not. Empirical evidence suggests that I would opt for person A.

ROT explains this choice in terms of whether I can earnestly believe the information so gained to be a true representation of myself. Despite the desire for positive information to be true, I will ignore it if I cannot subjectively believe it.

Importantly, this "bubbling" behavior does not demonstrate a motivational need to do so (Gregg 2007).

Common pathological states

Self-esteem

Self-esteem has a very strong influence on a person’s self-view. A person with high self-esteem is more likely to have a positive self-view, whereas a person with low self-esteem is more likely to have a negative self-view. Many studies that seemingly provide evidence for a self-verifying motive use self-esteem as an independent variable to demonstrate that people confirm a self-view that corresponds to their level of self-esteem.

However, one can argue that this behavioral evidence is circumstantial and that the correlation does not demonstrate motivation.

  • If a person with low self-esteem confirmed a self-view congruent to that of low self-esteem, it does not necessarily provide evidence for motivation to confirm a self-view.
  • ROT claims that people are aware of their self-views and believe them to be accurate. As a result, they answer questionnaires honestly, and report their self-views as they truly see them due to an obligation to reason.

people may not want self-verifying information to be true of them and may want others to view them positively rather than negatively.

Further research needs to be undertaken to fully investigate the relationship between self views and self-esteem. (see. Gregg, 2007)

  • Do people with low self-esteem want critical feedback to be true; are they motivated?
  • Do people with low self-esteem actually want their self view to be accurate, or would they prefer a more positive self view?

ROT predicts that people with low self-esteem are bound by reason to confirm their existing self view but that they don’t necessarily like it (Gregg & De Waal-Andrews, 2007).[12] If a motivation to self-verify were present then people with low self-esteem would not care about what their self-view was, they would instead focus on actively trying to confirm it.

Depression

Depression is accompanied by very low self-esteem and has therefore been a topic of strong interest for those investigating self verifying behaviors. Depression is always accompanied by low self-esteem but having low self-esteem does not necessarily mean you are depressed.

It argued that those suffering with depression, or with generally low negative self-views, will actively seek negative feedback in order to confirm their self-view; they find it more favourable. Giesler et al. (1996)[13] tested this prediction by classifying participants into three separate groups; high self-esteem, low self-esteem and depressed individuals. When offered a choice of positive or negative feedback, depressed individuals chose to receive negative feedback 82% of the time, suggesting a strong desire to negatively re-affirm their self view. The seeking of negative feedback in order to self-verify has thus been argued to maintain a depressive state.

ROT challenges this interpretation and suggests that the observed behavior and maintenance of depressive state is caused by an obligation to confirm a depressive self-concept. This particular study, and many others like it can be reinterpreted using ROT. The choice of negative feedback reflects the obligation to choose information consistent with an honestly held self view.

Correlations do not equal causation; The evidence for SVT assumptions of motivation drawn from studies on depression could be circumstantial and therefore do not provide explicit proof of a motive to self-verify.

Depression, Motivation and Desire

Motivation is interlinked with desire. I am hungry therefore I am motivated to eat food; I want to eat.

In SVT studies of depressed persons they are asked whether they would like to receive favorable or unfavorable feedback on their personality. In concurrence with SVT and ROT predictions they chose the unfavorable feedback due to a negative self-view.[14] These studies demonstrate that self-enhancement striving has been overridden by a separate cognitive process.

If a person with high self-esteem confirms their self-view this may not be self-verification as this is more likely to be due to the self-enhancement motive. Therefore, SVT and ROT studies tend to focus on depressive participants who's verification of negative information can not be attributed to self-enhancement.

  • However, Recent findings show that people with depression and high self-esteem both want to receive favorable feedback more than critical feedback.[15]
  • This suggests that people do not want to receive feedback that confirms their self-view. A lack of desire implies that motivation is not responsible for self-verification.
  • Gregg & De Waal-Andrews (2007) also show that the lower a participant's self-esteem, the less they anticipated liking critical feedback, and the less keen they were for it to be true, supporting ROT predictions.

Relationships

One example that is well explained by Raison Oblige Theory is why people stay in abusive relationships. According to Rusbult and Martz (1995) more than 40% of women who seek help from a shelter when being abused by their partner then return to living with their partner and remain in the abusive relationship.[16]

Self-verification theory would explain this by the abused partner’s need to self-verify that the way they are being treated is deserved, in order to establish an accurate self-concept (Swann & Ely, 1984).[17]

However the alternative explanation from Raison Oblige Theory is that an abused individual will rationalise the situation they are in and come to the conclusion that they themselves are in some way causing the abuse. This leads to the honest belief that they deserve the abuse and causes feelings of worthlessness. This results in the abused individual remaining loyal to their partner and failing to seek help, as they believe the abuse is their fault and that they need to improve in some way in order that the abuse will stop. Raison Oblige Theory also explains that the abused partner feels that they will gain no benefit from leaving an abusive relationship, as they see the abuse as their fault. This also explains why the abused individual may defend their partner should anyone outside the relationship become aware of the abuse.

Evidence

Motivation and affect

Behavior does not always reflect motivation;

  • we do things we don't want to do but are obliged to do (e.g. giving up leisure time to do work)
  • we voluntarily refrain from doing things that we want to do (e.g. making up qualifications to secure a job we want)

These examples demonstrate that behavior does not always reflect motivation. However, they do demonstrate a cognitive overruling of desire/motive.

  • Motivation incurs negative affect when conditions are not met; I want to improve, I fail; I feel bad.
  • Striving to self verify should have an influence on affect.
  • A person with a negative self view should therefore be less disturbed by critical feedback than a person with high self-esteem.
    Depressed
    Critical feedback negatively influences their self enhancing motive but bolsters their self verification motive.
    High self-esteem
    critical feedback negatively influences their self enhancing motive(ego) and their self verification motive.
  • High self-esteemed people should be more emotionally disturbed by critical feedback than depressed people. However, this is not the case (Jones, 1975;[18] Taylor & Brown, 1988.[19]

Obligation to ratiocinate

  • Day to day examples of obligation to reason; Grandiose delusions are rare.
  • We accept new self views after a change in appearance or capabilities; we rationalize changes and challenges.
  • People are reasonable in thought, without reason grandiose delusions would have prevented the existence of our species; I can't be killed; I can fight this mammoth alone; I can attack this man without consequence; I am the best person in the world.

The effect of rationality on motivation

Self-assessment is bound to rational perception;

  • I believe what is subjectively possible.
  • Assessment is based on accurate perception, not subjective desire: Grandiose delusions are rare

Self-enhancement is bound to rational perception;

  • The above-average effect is bound to the limits of subjective plausibility (Gregg, 2007).
  • specific compared traits succumb to the effect much less because people are aware of their ability compared to others. Commonly held traits can be exaggerated due to a larger latitude of comparison.

See also

References

  1. ↑ Swann, W. B., Jr., Rentfrow, P. J., & Guinn, J. (2002). Self-verification: The search for coherence. In M. Leary and J. Tagney, Handbook of self and identity: Guilford, New York.
  2. ↑ Swann, W. B., Jr. (1983). Self-verification: Bringing social reality into harmony with the self. In J. Suls & A. G. Greenwald (Eds.), Social psychological perspectives on the self (Vol. 2, pp. 33-66). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
  3. ↑ Gregg, A. P. (2007). "Is identity per se irrelevant? A contrarian view of self-verification effects". Depression and Anxiety 0: 1-11. 
  4. ↑ Swann, W. B., Jr., & Read, S. J. (1981b). Acquiring self-knowledge: The search for feedback that fits. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41,1119-1128.
  5. ↑ Swann, W. B., Jr.; De La Ronde, C.; Hixon, J. G. (1994). "Authenticity and positivity strivings in marriage and courtship". Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 66: 857-869. 
  6. ↑ Swann, W. B., Jr.; Pelham, B. W. (2002). "Who wants out when the going gets good? Psychological investment and preference for self-verifying college roommates.". Journal of Self and Identity 1: 219-233. 
  7. ↑ Swann, W. B., Jr., Milton, L. P., & Polzer, J.T. (2000). Should we create a niche or fall in line? Identity negotiation and small group effectiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 238-250.
  8. ↑ Swann, W. B., Jr.; Wenzlaff, R. M.; Krull, D. S.; Pelham, B. W. (1992). "The allure of negative feedback: Self-verification strivings among depressed persons". Journal of Abnormal Psychology 101: 293-306. 
  9. ↑ Giesler, R. B., Josephs, R. A. & Swann, W. B., Jr. (1996). Self-verification in clinical depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 105, 358-368.
  10. ↑ Pelham, B. W., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (1994). The juncture of intrapersonal and interpersonal knowledge: Self-certainty and interpersonal congruence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 349-357.
  11. ↑ Baumeister, R. F., Scher, S. J. (1988). Self-defeating behavior patterns among normal individuals: review and analysis of common self destructive tendencies. Psychology Bulletin, 104, 3–22.
  12. ↑ Gregg, A. P., & De Waal-Andrews W. (2007). Choices for, and perceptions of, global and specific hypothetical feedback of differential valence. Unpublished raw data, School of Psychology, University of Southampton, UK.
  13. ↑ Giesler, R. B., Josephs, R. A., & Swann, W. B. Jr. (1996). Self-verification in clinical depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 105, 358–368.
  14. ↑ Swann, W. B., Jr., Pelham, B. W., & Krull, D. S. (1989). Agreeable fancy or disagreeable truth? How people reconcile their self-enhancement and self-verification needs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 782-791
  15. ↑ Gregg, A. P., & De Waal-Andrews, W. (2007). Choices for, and perceptions of, global and specific hypothetical feedback of differential valence. Unpublished raw data, School of Psychology, University of Southampton, UK.
  16. ↑ Rusbult, C. E., & Martz, J. M. (1995). Remaining in an abusive relationship: An investment model analysis of nonvoluntary dependence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21(6), 558-571.
  17. ↑ Swann, W. B., Jr., & Ely, R. J. (1984). A battle of wills: Self-verification versus behavioral confirmation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 1287-1302.
  18. ↑ Caplan, R. D., & Jones, K. W. (1975). Effects of work load, role ambiguity and Type A personality on anxiety, depression and heart rate. Journal of Applied Psychology, 60, 713-719.
  19. ↑ Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Illusion and Well-Being - a Social Psychological Perspective On Mental-Health. Psychological Bulletin, 103(2), 193-210.



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