View source for Artificial consciousness

{{short description|Field in cognitive science}}
'''Artificial consciousness'''<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Thaler | first1 = S. L. | year = 1998 | title = The emerging intelligence and its critical look at us | journal = Journal of Near-Death Studies | volume = 17 | issue = 1| pages = 21–29| doi = 10.1023/A:1022990118714 | s2cid = 49573301}}</ref> ('''AC'''), also known as '''machine consciousness''' ('''MC'''),{{sfn|Gamez|2008}}{{sfn|Reggia|2013}} '''synthetic consciousness'''<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Smith |first1=David Harris |last2=Schillaci |first2=Guido |date=2021 |title=Why Build a Robot With Artificial Consciousness? How to Begin? A Cross-Disciplinary Dialogue on the Design and Implementation of a Synthetic Model of Consciousness |journal=Frontiers in Psychology |volume=12 |page=530560 |doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2021.530560 |pmid=33967869 |pmc=8096926 |issn=1664-1078 |doi-access=free}}</ref> or '''digital consciousness''',<ref>{{Cite book |last=Elvidge |first=Jim |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kIqttQEACAAJ |title=Digital Consciousness: A Transformative Vision |date=2018 |publisher=John Hunt Publishing Limited |isbn=978-1-78535-760-2 |language=en}}</ref> is the consciousness hypothesized to be possible in [[Artificial intelligence|artificial intelligence]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chrisley |first1=Ron |title=Philosophical foundations of artificial consciousness |journal=Artificial Intelligence in Medicine |date=October 2008 |volume=44 |issue=2 |pages=119–137 |doi=10.1016/j.artmed.2008.07.011 |pmid=18818062 |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0933365708001000}}</ref> It is also the corresponding field of study, which draws insights from [[Philosophy:Philosophy of mind|philosophy of mind]], [[Philosophy:Philosophy of artificial intelligence|philosophy of artificial intelligence]], [[Cognitive science|cognitive science]] and [[Biology:Neuroscience|neuroscience]]. The same terminology can be used with the term "[[Philosophy:Sentience|sentience]]" instead of "[[Philosophy:Consciousness|consciousness]]" when specifically designating phenomenal consciousness (the ability to feel [[Philosophy:Qualia|qualia]]).<ref>{{Cite web |last=Institute |first=Sentience |title=The Terminology of Artificial Sentience |url=http://www.sentienceinstitute.org/blog/artificial-sentience-terminology |access-date=2023-08-19 |website=Sentience Institute |language=en}}</ref>

Some scholars believe that [[Philosophy:Consciousness|consciousness]] is generated by the interoperation of various parts of the [[Biology:Brain|brain]]; these mechanisms are labeled the [[Philosophy:Neural correlates of consciousness|neural correlates of consciousness]] or NCC. Some further believe that constructing a [[Philosophy:System|system]] (e.g., a [[Computer|computer]] system) that can emulate this NCC interoperation would result in a system that is conscious.{{sfn|Graziano|2013}}

==Philosophical views==
As there are many hypothesized [[Philosophy:Consciousness#Types of consciousness|types of consciousness]], there are many potential implementations of artificial consciousness. In the philosophical literature, perhaps the most common taxonomy of consciousness is into "access" and "phenomenal" variants. Access consciousness concerns those aspects of [[Philosophy:Experience|experience]] that can be apprehended, while phenomenal consciousness concerns those aspects of experience that seemingly cannot be apprehended, instead being characterized qualitatively in terms of "raw feels", "what it is like" or qualia.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Block |first=Ned |date=2010 |title=On a confusion about a function of consciousness |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/behavioral-and-brain-sciences/article/abs/on-a-confusion-about-a-function-of-consciousness/061422BF0C50C5FF00927F9B6E879413 |journal=Behavioral and Brain Sciences |language=en |volume=18 |issue=2 |pages=227–247 |doi=10.1017/S0140525X00038188 |s2cid=146168066 |issn=1469-1825}}</ref>

=== Plausibility debate ===
[[Philosophy:Type physicalism|Type-identity theorists]] and other skeptics hold the view that consciousness can only be realized in particular physical systems because consciousness has properties that necessarily depend on physical constitution.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Block |first=Ned |date=1978 |title=Troubles for Functionalism |journal=Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science |pages=261–325}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Bickle |first=John |url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-94-010-0237-0 |title=Philosophy and Neuroscience |date=2003 |publisher=Springer Netherlands |isbn=978-1-4020-1302-7 |location=Dordrecht |language=en |doi=10.1007/978-94-010-0237-0}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Schlagel | first1 = R. H. | year = 1999 | title = Why not artificial consciousness or thought? | journal = Minds and Machines | volume = 9 | issue = 1| pages = 3–28 | doi=10.1023/a:1008374714117| s2cid = 28845966}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Searle | first1 = J. R. | year = 1980 | title = Minds, brains, and programs | url = http://cogprints.org/7150/1/10.1.1.83.5248.pdf| journal = Behavioral and Brain Sciences | volume = 3 | issue = 3| pages = 417–457 | doi=10.1017/s0140525x00005756| s2cid = 55303721}}</ref>

In his article "Artificial Consciousness: Utopia or Real Possibility," Giorgio Buttazzo says that a common objection to artificial consciousness is that "Working in a fully automated mode, they [the computers] cannot exhibit creativity, unreprogrammation (which means can no longer be reprogrammed, from rethinking), emotions, or [[Philosophy:Free will|free will]]. A computer, like a washing machine, is a slave operated by its components."<ref>[http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/login.jsp?tp=&arnumber=933500&url=http%3A%2F%2Fieeexplore.ieee.org%2Fiel5%2F2%2F20203%2F00933500 Artificial consciousness: Utopia or real possibility?] Buttazzo, Giorgio, July 2001, Computer, ISSN 0018-9162</ref>

For other theorists (e.g., [[Philosophy:Functionalism (philosophy of mind)|functionalists]]), who define mental states in terms of causal roles, any system that can instantiate the same pattern of causal roles, regardless of physical constitution, will instantiate the same mental states, including consciousness.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Putnam |first=Hilary |title=The nature of mental states in Capitan and Merrill (eds.) Art, Mind and Religion |publisher=University of Pittsburgh Press |year=1967}}</ref>

==== Computational Foundation argument ====
One of the most explicit arguments for the plausibility of artificial sentience comes from [[Biography:David Chalmers|David Chalmers]]. His proposal is roughly that the right kinds of computations are sufficient for the possession of a conscious mind. Chalmers proposes that a system implements a computation if "the causal structure of the system mirrors the formal structure of the computation", and that any system that implements certain computations is sentient.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=David J. Chalmers |date=2011 |title=A Computational Foundation for the Study of Cognition |url=https://www.ida.liu.se/divisions/hcs/seminars/cogsciseminars/Papers/Chalmers_Computational_foundations.pdf |journal=Journal of Cognitive Science |volume=12 |issue=4 |pages=325–359 |doi=10.17791/JCS.2011.12.4.325|s2cid=248401010}}</ref>

The most controversial part of Chalmers' proposal is that mental properties are "organizationally invariant". Mental properties are of two kinds, psychological and phenomenological. Psychological properties, such as belief and perception, are those that are "characterized by their causal role". Aided by previous work,<ref>{{Cite book |last=Armstrong |first=D. M. |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/ARMAMT-5 |title=A Materialist Theory of the Mind |date=1968 |publisher=New York: Routledge |editor-last=Honderich |editor-first=Ted}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Lewis |first=David |date=1972 |title=Psychophysical and theoretical identifications |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00048407212341301 |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |language=en |volume=50 |issue=3 |pages=249–258 |doi=10.1080/00048407212341301 |issn=0004-8402}}</ref> he says that "[s]ystems with the same causal topology…will share their psychological properties".

Phenomenological properties, unlike psychological properties, are not definable in terms of their causal roles. Establishing that phenomenological properties are a consequence of a causal topology, therefore, requires argument. Chalmers provides his Dancing Qualia argument for this purpose.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html|title=Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia|access-date=12 April 2016|date=1995|first=David|last=Chalmers}}</ref>

Chalmers begins by assuming that his principle of organization invariance is false: that agents with identical causal organizations could have different experiences. He then asks us to conceive of changing one agent into the other by the replacement of parts (neural parts replaced by silicon, say) while preserving its causal organization. The experience of the agent under transformation would change (as the parts were replaced), but there would be no change in causal topology and therefore no means whereby the agent could "notice" the shift in experience; Chalmers considers this state of affairs an implausible ''reducto ad absurdum'' establishing that his principle of organizational invariance must almost certainly be true.

Critics{{who|date=May 2023}} of artificial sentience object that Chalmers begs the question in assuming that all mental properties and external connections are sufficiently captured by abstract causal organization.

==== Controversies ====
In 2022, Google engineer Blake Lemoine made a viral claim that Google's [[LaMDA]] chatbot was sentient. Lemoine supplied as evidence the chatbot's humanlike answers to many of his questions; however, the chatbot's behavior was judged by the scientific community as likely a consequence of mimicry, rather than machine sentience. Lemoine's claim was widely derided for being ridiculous.<ref>{{cite news |date=14 August 2022 |title='I am, in fact, a person': can artificial intelligence ever be sentient? |language=en |work=the Guardian |url=https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2022/aug/14/can-artificial-intelligence-ever-be-sentient-googles-new-ai-program-is-raising-questions |access-date=5 January 2023}}</ref> Philosopher [[Biography:Nick Bostrom|Nick Bostrom]] said that he thinks LaMDA probably is not conscious, but asked "what grounds would a person have for being sure about it?" One would have to have access to unpublished information about LaMDA's architecture, and also would have to understand how consciousness works, and then figure out how to map the philosophy onto the machine: "(In the absence of these steps), it seems like one should be maybe a little bit uncertain... there could well be other systems now, or in the relatively near future, that would start to satisfy the criteria."<ref>{{cite news |last1=Leith |first1=Sam |date=7 July 2022 |title=Nick Bostrom: How can we be certain a machine isn't conscious? |work=The Spectator |url=https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/nick-bostrom-how-can-we-be-certain-a-machine-isnt-conscious/}}</ref>

=== Testing ===
The most well-known method for testing machine intelligence is the [[Turing test]]. But when interpreted as only observational, this test contradicts the philosophy of science principles of [[Philosophy:Theory-ladenness|theory dependence of observations]]. It also has been suggested that Alan Turing's recommendation of imitating not a human adult consciousness, but a human child consciousness, should be taken seriously.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Mapping the Landscape of Human-Level Artificial General Intelligence |url=http://web.eecs.utk.edu/~itamar/Papers/AI_MAG_2011.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170706102159/http://web.eecs.utk.edu/~itamar/Papers/AI_MAG_2011.pdf |archive-date=2017-07-06 |access-date=2012-07-05}}</ref>

Qualia, or phenomenological consciousness, is an inherently first-person phenomenon. Although various systems may display various signs of behavior correlated with functional consciousness, there is no conceivable way in which third-person tests can have access to first-person phenomenological features. Because of that, and because there is no empirical definition of sentience,<ref>"Consciousness". In Honderich T. The Oxford companion to philosophy. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-19-926479-7}}</ref> a test of presence of sentience in AC may be impossible.

In 2014, Victor Argonov suggested a non-Turing test for machine sentience based on machine's ability to produce philosophical judgments.<ref>{{cite journal |author=Victor Argonov |year=2014 |title=Experimental Methods for Unraveling the Mind-body Problem: The Phenomenal Judgment Approach |url=http://philpapers.org/rec/ARGMAA-2 |journal=Journal of Mind and Behavior |volume=35 |pages=51–70}}</ref> He argues that a deterministic machine must be regarded as conscious if it is able to produce judgments on all problematic properties of consciousness (such as qualia or [[Binding problem|binding]]) having no innate (preloaded) philosophical knowledge on these issues, no philosophical discussions while learning, and no informational models of other creatures in its memory (such models may implicitly or explicitly contain knowledge about these creatures' consciousness). However, this test can be used only to detect, but not refute the existence of consciousness. A positive result proves that machine is conscious but a negative result proves nothing. For example, absence of philosophical judgments may be caused by lack of the machine's intellect, not by absence of consciousness.

=== Ethics ===

If it were suspected that a particular machine was conscious, its rights would be an [[Philosophy:Ethics|ethical]] issue that would need to be assessed (e.g. what rights it would have under law). For example, a conscious computer that was owned and used as a tool or central computer within a larger machine is a particular ambiguity. Should [[Philosophy:Law|law]]s be made for such a case? Consciousness would also require a legal definition in this particular case. Because artificial consciousness is still largely a theoretical subject, such ethics have not been discussed or developed to a great extent, though it has often been a theme in fiction (see below).

In 2021, German philosopher [[Biography:Thomas Metzinger|Thomas Metzinger]] argued for a global moratorium on synthetic phenomenology until 2050. Metzinger asserts that humans have a duty of care towards any sentient AIs they create, and that proceeding too fast risks creating an "explosion of artificial suffering".<ref>{{cite journal | doi=10.1142/S270507852150003X | title=Artificial Suffering: An Argument for a Global Moratorium on Synthetic Phenomenology | year=2021 | last1=Metzinger | first1=Thomas | journal=Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness | volume=08 | pages=43–66 | s2cid=233176465 | doi-access=free}}</ref>

== Aspects of consciousness considered necessary ==
[[Biography:Bernard Baars|Bernard Baars]] and others argue there are various aspects of consciousness necessary for a machine to be artificially conscious.{{sfn|Baars|1995}} The functions of consciousness suggested by Baars are: Definition and Context Setting, Adaptation and Learning, Editing, Flagging and Debugging, Recruiting and Control, Prioritizing and Access-Control, Decision-making or Executive Function, Analogy-forming Function, Metacognitive and Self-monitoring Function, and Autoprogramming and Self-maintenance Function. Igor Aleksander suggested 12 principles for artificial consciousness:<ref>{{Cite book |last=Aleksander |first=Igor |title=From Natural to Artificial Neural Computation |chapter=Artificial neuroconsciousness an update |date=1995 |editor-last=Mira |editor-first=José |editor2-last=Sandoval |editor2-first=Francisco |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/3-540-59497-3_224 |series=Lecture Notes in Computer Science |volume=930 |language=en |location=Berlin, Heidelberg |publisher=Springer |pages=566–583 |doi=10.1007/3-540-59497-3_224 |isbn=978-3-540-49288-7}}</ref>The Brain is a State Machine, Inner Neuron Partitioning, Conscious and Unconscious States, Perceptual Learning and Memory, Prediction, The Awareness of Self, Representation of Meaning, Learning Utterances, Learning Language, Will, Instinct, and Emotion. The aim of AC is to define whether and how these and other aspects of consciousness can be synthesized in an engineered artifact such as a digital computer. This list is not exhaustive; there are many others not covered.

=== Awareness ===
[[Philosophy:Awareness|Awareness]] could be one required aspect, but there are many problems with the exact definition of ''awareness''. The results of the experiments of neuroscanning on monkeys suggest that a process, not only a state or object, activates neurons. Awareness includes creating and testing alternative models of each process based on the information received through the senses or imagined,{{clarify|date=June 2023}} and is also useful for making predictions. Such modeling needs a lot of flexibility. Creating such a model includes modeling the physical world, modeling one's own internal states and processes, and modeling other conscious entities.

There are at least three types of awareness:<ref>Joëlle Proust in ''Neural Correlates of Consciousness'', Thomas Metzinger, 2000, MIT, pages 307–324</ref> agency awareness, goal awareness, and sensorimotor awareness, which may also be conscious or not. For example, in agency awareness, you may be aware that you performed a certain action yesterday, but are not now conscious of it. In goal awareness, you may be aware that you must search for a lost object, but are not now conscious of it. In sensorimotor awareness, you may be aware that your hand is resting on an object, but are not now conscious of it.

Because objects of awareness are often conscious, the distinction between awareness and consciousness is frequently blurred or they are used as synonyms.<ref>Christof Koch, ''The Quest for Consciousness'', 2004, page 2 footnote 2</ref>

=== Memory ===
Conscious events interact with [[Memory|memory]] systems in learning, rehearsal, and retrieval.<ref>Tulving, E. 1985. Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology 26:1–12</ref>
The IDA model<ref>Franklin, Stan, et al. "The role of consciousness in memory." Brains, Minds and Media 1.1 (2005): 38.</ref> elucidates the role of consciousness in the updating of perceptual memory,<ref>Franklin, Stan. "Perceptual memory and learning: Recognizing, categorizing, and relating." Proc. Developmental Robotics AAAI Spring Symp. 2005.</ref> transient [[Biology:Episodic memory|episodic memory]], and [[Procedural memory|procedural memory]]. Transient episodic and declarative memories have distributed representations in IDA, there is evidence that this is also the case in the nervous system.<ref>Shastri, L. 2002. Episodic memory and cortico-hippocampal interactions. Trends in Cognitive Sciences</ref> In IDA, these two memories are implemented computationally using a modified version of Kanerva’s [[Sparse distributed memory]] architecture.<ref>Kanerva, Pentti. Sparse distributed memory. MIT press, 1988.</ref>

=== Learning ===
Learning is also considered necessary for artificial consciousness. Per Bernard Baars, conscious experience is needed to represent and adapt to novel and significant events.{{sfn|Baars|1995}} Per [[Biography:Axel Cleeremans|Axel Cleeremans]] and Luis Jiménez, learning is defined as "a set of philogenetically {{sic}} advanced adaptation processes that critically depend on an evolved sensitivity to subjective experience so as to enable agents to afford flexible control over their actions in complex, unpredictable environments".<ref>{{Cite web |title=Implicit Learning and Consciousness: An Empirical, Philosophical and Computational Consensus in the Making |url=https://www.routledge.com/Implicit-Learning-and-Consciousness-An-Empirical-Philosophical-and-Computational/Cleeremans-French/p/book/9781138877412 |access-date=2023-06-22 |website=Routledge & CRC Press |language=en}}</ref>

=== Anticipation ===
The ability to predict (or [[Anticipation (artificial intelligence)|anticipate]]) foreseeable events is considered important for artificial intelligence by [[Biography:Igor Aleksander|Igor Aleksander]].<ref name="Aleksander 1995">Aleksander 1995</ref> The emergentist multiple drafts principle proposed by [[Biography:Daniel Dennett|Daniel Dennett]] in ''Consciousness Explained'' may be useful for prediction: it involves the evaluation and selection of the most appropriate "draft" to fit the current environment. Anticipation includes prediction of consequences of one's own proposed actions and prediction of consequences of probable actions by other entities.

Relationships between real world states are mirrored in the state structure of a conscious organism, enabling the organism to predict events.<ref name="Aleksander 1995" /> An artificially conscious machine should be able to anticipate events correctly in order to be ready to respond to them when they occur or to take preemptive action to avert anticipated events. The implication here is that the machine needs flexible, real-time components that build spatial, dynamic, statistical, functional, and cause-effect models of the real world and predicted worlds, making it possible to demonstrate that it possesses artificial consciousness in the present and future and not only in the past. In order to do this, a conscious machine should make coherent predictions and contingency plans, not only in worlds with fixed rules like a chess board, but also for novel environments that may change, to be executed only when appropriate to simulate and control the real world.

=== Subjective experience ===
Subjective experiences or [[Philosophy:Qualia|qualia]] are widely considered to be ''the'' [[Philosophy:Hard problem of consciousness|hard problem of consciousness]]. Indeed, it is held to pose a challenge to [[Physicalism|physicalism]], let alone computationalism.

==Implementation proposals==
===Symbolic or hybrid===
====Intelligent Distribution Agent====
[[Biography:Stan Franklin|Stan Franklin]] (1995, 2003) defines an [[Autonomous agent|autonomous agent]] as possessing [[Philosophy:Consciousness|functional consciousness]] when it is capable of several of the functions of consciousness as identified by [[Biography:Bernard Baars|Bernard Baars]]' Global Workspace Theory.{{sfn|Baars|1995}}<ref>{{Cite book |last=Baars |first=Bernard J. |title=In the theater of consciousness: the workspace of the mind |date=2001 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-510265-9 |location=New York Oxford}}</ref> His brainchild IDA (Intelligent Distribution Agent) is a software implementation of GWT, which makes it functionally conscious by definition. IDA's task is to negotiate new assignments for sailors in the US Navy after they end a tour of duty, by matching each individual's skills and preferences with the Navy's needs. IDA interacts with Navy databases and communicates with the sailors via natural language e-mail dialog while obeying a large set of Navy policies. The IDA computational model was developed during 1996–2001 at Stan Franklin's "Conscious" Software Research Group at the [[Organization:University of Memphis|University of Memphis]]. It "consists of approximately a quarter-million lines of [[Java (programming language)|Java]] code, and almost completely consumes the resources of a 2001 high-end workstation." It relies heavily on ''codelets'', which are "special purpose, relatively independent, mini-agent[s] typically implemented as a small piece of code running as a separate thread." In IDA's top-down architecture, high-level cognitive functions are explicitly modeled.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Franklin |first=Stan |title=Artificial minds |date=1998 |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=978-0-262-06178-0 |edition=3rd print |series=A Bradford book |location=Cambridge, Mass.}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Franklin |first=Stan |date=2003 |title=IDA: A Conscious Artefact |journal=Machine Consciousness}}</ref> 

While IDA is functionally conscious by definition, Franklin does "not attribute [[Philosophy:Consciousness|phenomenal consciousness]] to his own 'conscious' software agent, IDA, in spite of her many human-like behaviours. This in spite of watching several US Navy detailers repeatedly nodding their heads saying 'Yes, that's how I do it' while watching IDA's internal and external actions as she performs her task." IDA has been extended to [[LIDA (cognitive architecture)|LIDA]] (Learning Intelligent Distribution Agent).

====CLARION cognitive architecture====
{{main|CLARION (cognitive architecture)}}
The CLARION cognitive architecture posits a two-level representation that explains the distinction between conscious and unconscious mental processes. CLARION has been successful in accounting for a variety of psychological data. A number of well-known skill learning tasks have been simulated using CLARION that span the spectrum ranging from simple reactive skills to complex cognitive skills. The tasks include serial reaction time (SRT) tasks, artificial grammar learning (AGL) tasks, process control (PC) tasks, the categorical inference (CI) task, the alphabetical arithmetic (AA) task, and the Tower of Hanoi (TOH) task.<ref>{{Harv|Sun|2002}}</ref> Among them, SRT, AGL, and PC are typical implicit learning tasks, very much relevant to the issue of consciousness as they operationalized the notion of consciousness in the context of psychological experiments.

====OpenCog====
[[Biography:Ben Goertzel|Ben Goertzel]] made an embodied AI through the open-source [[Software:OpenCog|OpenCog]] project. The code includes embodied virtual pets capable of learning simple English-language commands, as well as integration with real-world robotics, done at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University.

===Connectionist===
====Haikonen's cognitive architecture====
Pentti Haikonen considers classical rule-based computing inadequate for achieving AC: "the brain is definitely not a computer. Thinking is not an execution of programmed strings of commands. The brain is not a numerical calculator either. We do not think by numbers." Rather than trying to achieve [[Philosophy:Mind|mind]] and [[Philosophy:Consciousness|consciousness]] by identifying and implementing their underlying computational rules, Haikonen proposes "a special [[Cognitive architecture|cognitive architecture]] to reproduce the processes of [[Perception|perception]], [[Mental image|inner imagery]], inner speech, [[Medicine:Pain|pain]], [[Philosophy:Pleasure|pleasure]], emotions and the cognitive functions behind these. This bottom-up architecture would produce higher-level functions by the power of the elementary processing units, the [[Artificial neuron|artificial neuron]]s, without algorithms or [[Computer program|programs]]". Haikonen believes that, when implemented with sufficient complexity, this architecture will develop consciousness, which he considers to be "a style and way of operation, characterized by distributed signal representation, perception process, cross-modality reporting and availability for retrospection."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Haikonen |first=Pentti O. |title=The cognitive approach to conscious machines |date=2003 |publisher=Imprint Academic |isbn=978-0-907845-42-3 |location=Exeter}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2019-09-08 |title=Pentti Haikonen's architecture for conscious machines – Raúl Arrabales Moreno |url=https://www.conscious-robots.com/2009/12/10/pentti-haikonens-architecture-for-conscious-machines/ |access-date=2023-06-24 |language=en-US}}</ref> 

Haikonen is not alone in this process view of consciousness, or the view that AC will spontaneously emerge in [[Autonomous agent|autonomous agent]]s that have a suitable neuro-inspired architecture of complexity; these are shared by many.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Freeman |first=Walter J. |title=How brains make up their minds |date=2000 |publisher=Columbia University Press |isbn=978-0-231-12008-1 |series=Maps of the mind |location=New York Chichester, West Sussex}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Cotterill |first=Rodney M J |date=2003 |title=CyberChild - A simulation test-bed for consciousness studies |url=https://orbit.dtu.dk/en/publications/cyberchild-a-simulation-test-bed-for-consciousness-studies |journal=Journal of Consciousness Studies |volume=10 |issue=4–5 |pages=31–45 |issn=1355-8250}}</ref> A low-complexity implementation of the architecture proposed by Haikonen was reportedly not capable of AC, but did exhibit emotions as expected. Haikonen later updated and summarized his architecture.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Haikonen |first1=Pentti O. |title=Consciousness and robot sentience |last2=Haikonen |first2=Pentti Olavi Antero |date=2012 |publisher=World Scientific |isbn=978-981-4407-15-1 |series=Series on machine consciousness |location=Singapore}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Haikonen |first=Pentti O. |title=Consciousness and robot sentience |date=2019 |publisher=World Scientific |isbn=978-981-12-0504-0 |edition=2nd |series=Series on machine consciousness |location=Singapore Hackensack, NJ London}}</ref>

====Shanahan's cognitive architecture====
[[Biography:Murray Shanahan|Murray Shanahan]] describes a cognitive architecture that combines Baars's idea of a global workspace with a mechanism for internal simulation ("imagination").<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Shanahan |first=Murray |date=2006 |title=A cognitive architecture that combines internal simulation with a global workspace |url=https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16384715 |journal=Consciousness and Cognition |volume=15 |issue=2 |pages=433–449 |doi=10.1016/j.concog.2005.11.005 |issn=1053-8100 |pmid=16384715|s2cid=5437155}}</ref>{{sfn|Gamez|2008}}{{sfn|Reggia|2013}}<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Haikonen |first1=Pentti O. |title=Consciousness and robot sentience |last2=Haikonen |first2=Pentti Olavi Antero |date=2012 |publisher=World Scientific |isbn=978-981-4407-15-1 |series=Series on machine consciousness |location=Singapore |chapter=chapter 20}}</ref>

====Takeno's self-awareness research====
Self-awareness in robots is being investigated by Junichi Takenoat Meiji University in Japan.<ref>{{cite web| url=http://robonable.typepad.jp/robot/2_/index.html |title=Robot |access-date=3 July 2007 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070703091242/http://robonable.typepad.jp/robot/2_/index.html |archive-date=3 July 2007}}</ref> Takeno is asserting that he has developed a robot capable of discriminating between a self-image in a mirror and any other having an identical image to it.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.rs.cs.meiji.ac.jp/Takeno_Archive.html |title=Takeno – Archive No... |access-date=7 January 2010 |archive-date=7 November 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181107185222/http://www.rs.cs.meiji.ac.jp/Takeno_Archive.html |url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20090203193304/http://www.mimed.mw.tum.de/06-12-18_MIMED_LUETH-002918.PDF The world first self-aware robot and The success of mirror image cognition], Takeno</ref>{{sfn|Takeno|Inaba|Suzuki|2005}} Takeno asserts that he first contrived the computational module called a MoNAD, which has a self-aware function, and he then constructed the artificial consciousness system by formulating the relationships between emotions, feelings and reason by connecting the modules in a hierarchy (Igarashi, Takeno 2007). Takeno completed a mirror image cognition experiment using a robot equipped with the MoNAD system. Takeno proposed the Self-Body Theory stating that "humans feel that their own mirror image is closer to themselves than an actual part of themselves." The most important point in developing artificial consciousness or clarifying human consciousness is the development of a function of self-awareness, and he claims that he has demonstrated physical and mathematical evidence for this in his thesis.<ref>[http://www.s2is.org/Issues/v1/n4/papers/paper4.pdf A Robot Succeeds in 100% Mirror Image Cognition] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170809015521/http://s2is.org/Issues/v1/n4/papers/paper4.pdf |date=9 August 2017}}, Takeno, 2008</ref> He also demonstrated that robots can study episodes in memory where the emotions were stimulated and use this experience to take predictive actions to prevent the recurrence of unpleasant emotions (Torigoe, Takeno 2009).

====''Impossible Minds: My Neurons, My Consciousness''====
[[Biography:Igor Aleksander|Igor Aleksander]], emeritus professor of Neural Systems Engineering at Imperial College, has extensively researched [[Artificial neural network|artificial neural network]]s and wrote in his 1996 book ''Impossible Minds: My Neurons, My Consciousness'' that the principles for creating a conscious machine already exist but that it would take forty years to train such a machine to understand [[Social:Language|language]].<ref>Aleksander I (1996) ''Impossible Minds: My Neurons, My Consciousness'', Imperial College Press {{ISBN|1-86094-036-6}}</ref> Whether this is true remains to be demonstrated and the basic principle stated in ''Impossible Minds''—that the brain is a [[Finite-state machine|neural state machine]]—is open to doubt.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Wilson | first1 = RJ | year = 1998 | title = review of ''Impossible Minds'' | journal = Journal of Consciousness Studies | volume = 5 | issue = 1| pages = 115–6}}</ref>

====Creativity Machine====
Stephen Thaler proposed a possible connection between consciousness and creativity in his 1994 patent, called "Device for the Autonomous Generation of Useful Information" (DAGUI),<ref>Thaler, S.L., "[https://web.archive.org/web/20170313064154/http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO2&Sect2=HITOFF&p=1&u=%2Fnetahtml%2FPTO%2Fsearch-bool.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&co1=AND&d=PTXT&s1=5659666.PN.&OS=PN%2F5659666&RS=PN%2F5659666 Device for the autonomous generation of useful information]"</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Marupaka | first1 = N. | last2 = Lyer | first2 = L. | last3 = Minai | first3 = A. | year = 2012 | title = Connectivity and thought: The influence of semantic network structure in a neurodynamical model of thinking | url = http://www.ece.uc.edu/~aminai/papers/marupaka_creativity_NN12.pdf | journal = Neural Networks | volume = 32 | pages = 147–158 | doi = 10.1016/j.neunet.2012.02.004 | pmid = 22397950 | access-date = 2015-05-22 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20161219210132/http://www.ece.uc.edu/~aminai/papers/marupaka_creativity_NN12.pdf | archive-date = 2016-12-19 | url-status = dead}}</ref><ref>Roque, R. and Barreira, A. (2011). "O Paradigma da "Máquina de Criatividade" e a Geração de Novidades em um Espaço Conceitual," 3º Seminário Interno de Cognição Artificial – SICA 2011 – FEEC – UNICAMP.</ref> or the so-called "Creativity Machine", in which computational critics govern the injection of synaptic noise and degradation into neural nets so as to induce false memories or confabulations that may qualify as potential ideas or strategies.<ref>{{Cite book | doi=10.1007/0-387-28898-8_4|chapter = Mistake Making Machines|title = Systemics of Emergence: Research and Development| url=https://archive.org/details/systemicsemergen00mina| url-access=limited| pages=[https://archive.org/details/systemicsemergen00mina/page/n81 67]–78|year = 2006|last1 = Minati|first1 = Gianfranco| last2=Vitiello| first2=Giuseppe| isbn=978-0-387-28899-4}}</ref> He recruits this neural architecture and methodology to account for the subjective feel of consciousness, claiming that similar noise-driven neural assemblies within the brain invent dubious significance to overall cortical activity.<ref>Thaler, S. L. (2013) [http://www.springerreference.com/docs/html/chapterdbid/358097.html The Creativity Machine Paradigm, Encyclopedia of Creativity, Invention, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship], (ed.) E.G. Carayannis, Springer Science+Business Media</ref><ref name="APA">Thaler, S. L. (2011). "The Creativity Machine: Withstanding the Argument from Consciousness," APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers</ref><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Thaler | first1 = S. L. | year = 2014 | title = Synaptic Perturbation and Consciousness | journal = Int. J. Mach. Conscious | volume = 6| issue = 2| pages = 75–107| doi = 10.1142/S1793843014400137}}</ref> Thaler's theory and the resulting patents in machine consciousness were inspired by experiments in which he internally disrupted trained neural nets so as to drive a succession of neural activation patterns that he likened to stream of consciousness.<ref name="APA" /><ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Thaler | first1 = S. L. | year = 1995 | title = "Virtual Input Phenomena" Within the Death of a Simple Pattern Associator | journal = Neural Networks | volume = 8 | issue = 1| pages = 55–65 | doi=10.1016/0893-6080(94)00065-t}}</ref><ref>Thaler, S. L. (1995). Death of a gedanken creature, ''Journal of Near-Death Studies'', 13(3), Spring 1995</ref><ref>Thaler, S. L. (1996). Is Neuronal Chaos the Source of Stream of Consciousness? In Proceedings of the World Congress on Neural Networks, (WCNN’96), Lawrence Erlbaum, Mawah, NJ.</ref><ref>Mayer, H. A. (2004). [http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.89.5420&rep=rep1&type=pdf A modular neurocontroller for creative mobile autonomous robots learning by temporal difference], Systems, Man and Cybernetics, 2004 IEEE International Conference(Volume:6 )</ref>

==== Attention schema theory ====
{{Main|Philosophy:Attention schema theory}}
In 2011, Michael Graziano and Sabine Kastler published a paper named "Human consciousness and its relationship to social neuroscience: A novel hypothesis" proposing a theory of consciousness as an attention schema.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Graziano|first1=Michael|title=Human consciousness and its relationship to social neuroscience: A novel hypothesis|journal= Cognitive Neuroscience|date=1 January 2011|volume=2|issue=2|pages=98–113|pmc=3223025|doi=10.1080/17588928.2011.565121|pmid=22121395}}</ref> Graziano went on to publish an expanded discussion of this theory in his book "Consciousness and the Social Brain".{{sfn|Graziano|2013}} This Attention Schema Theory of Consciousness, as he named it, proposes that the brain tracks attention to various sensory inputs by way of an attention schema, analogous to the well-studied body schema that tracks the spatial place of a person's body.{{sfn|Graziano|2013}} This relates to artificial consciousness by proposing a specific mechanism of information handling, that produces what we allegedly experience and describe as consciousness, and which should be able to be duplicated by a machine using current technology. When the brain finds that person X is aware of thing Y, it is in effect modeling the state in which person X is applying an attentional enhancement to Y. In the attention schema theory, the same process can be applied to oneself. The brain tracks attention to various sensory inputs, and one's own awareness is a schematized model of one's attention. Graziano proposes specific locations in the brain for this process, and suggests that such awareness is a computed feature constructed by an expert system in the brain.

=== "Self-modeling" ===
[[Biography:Hod Lipson|Hod Lipson]] defines "self-modeling" as a necessary component of self-awareness or consciousness in robots. "Self-modeling" consists of a robot running an internal model or [[Software:Robotics simulator|simulation of itself]].<ref>{{Cite web|last=Pavlus|first=John|title=Curious About Consciousness? Ask the Self-Aware Machines|url=https://www.quantamagazine.org/hod-lipson-is-building-self-aware-robots-20190711/|access-date=2021-01-06|website=Quanta Magazine|date=11 July 2019|language=en}}</ref><ref>Bongard, Josh, Victor Zykov, and Hod Lipson. "[http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.460.1526&rep=rep1&type=pdf Resilient machines through continuous self-modeling]." Science 314.5802 (2006): 1118–1121.</ref>

== In fiction ==
{{Main|Simulated consciousness in fiction}}

* In [[Biography:Arthur C. Clarke|Arthur C. Clarke]]'s ''The City and the Stars'', Vanamonde is an artificial being based on quantum entanglement that was to become immensely powerful, but started knowing practically nothing, thus being similar to artificial consciousness.

==See also==
{{div col|colwidth=30em}}
* '''General fields and theories'''
** [[Artificial intelligence]]
*** [[Artificial general intelligence]] (AGI) – some consider AC a subfield of AGI research
**** [[Philosophy:Intelligence explosion|Intelligence explosion]] – what may happen when an AGI redesigns itself in iterative cycles
** {{Annotated link |Brain–computer interface}}
** {{Annotated link |Cognitive architecture}}
** [[Philosophy:Computational philosophy|Computational philosophy]] – the area of philosophy in which AI ponder their own place in the world
** {{Annotated link |Computational theory of mind}}
*** {{Annotated link |Consciousness in animals}}
*** {{Annotated link |Simulated consciousness (science fiction)}}
** {{Annotated link |Hardware for artificial intelligence}}
** {{Annotated link |Identity of indiscernibles}}
** {{Annotated link |Mind uploading}}
** {{Annotated link |Neurotechnology}}
** {{Annotated link |Philosophy of mind}}
** {{Annotated link |Quantum cognition}}
** {{Annotated link |Simulated reality}}
* '''Proposed concepts and implementations'''
** [[Philosophy:Attention schema theory|Attention schema theory]]
** [[Software:ADS-AC|ADS-AC (system)]]
** [[Biography:William Grey Walter#Brain waves|Brain waves]] and [[Engineering:Turtle (robot)|Turtle robot]] by [[Biography:William Grey Walter|William Grey Walter]]
** [[Philosophy:Conceptual space|Conceptual space]] – conceptual prototype
** [[Software:Copycat|Copycat (cognitive architecture)]]
** [[Philosophy:Global workspace theory|Global workspace theory]]
** [[Philosophy:Greedy reductionism|Greedy reductionism]] – avoid oversimplifying anything essential
** {{Annotated link |Hallucination (artificial intelligence)}}
** [[Philosophy:Image schema|Image schema]] – spatial patterns
** [[Engineering:Kismet (robot)|Kismet (robot)]]
** [[LIDA (cognitive architecture)]]
** [[Memory-prediction framework]]
** [[Philosophy:Omniscience|Omniscience]]
** [[Psi-theory]]
** [[Physics:Quantum mind|Quantum mind]]
** [[Philosophy:Self-awareness|Self-awareness]]

{{div col end}}

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==Further reading==
* {{cite book |last=Aleksander |first=Igor |chapter=Machine Consciousness |doi=10.1002/9781119132363.ch7 |editor1-last=Schneider |editor1-first=Susan |editor2-last=Velmans |editor2-first=Max |editor1-link=Susan Schneider |editor2-link=Max Velmans |title=The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness |date=2017 |pages=93–105 |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |isbn=978-0-470-67406-2 |edition=2nd}}
* {{cite journal | last1 = Baars | first1 = Bernard | last2 = Franklin | first2 = Stan | year = 2003 | title = How conscious experience and working memory interact | url = http://cogprints.org/5854/1/TICSarticle2003.pdf| journal = Trends in Cognitive Sciences | volume = 7 | issue = 4| pages = 166–172 | doi=10.1016/s1364-6613(03)00056-1| pmid = 12691765 | s2cid = 14185056 }}
* Casti, John L. "The Cambridge Quintet: A Work of Scientific Speculation", Perseus Books Group, 1998
* Franklin, S, B J Baars, U Ramamurthy, and Matthew Ventura. 2005. [http://www.brains-minds-media.org/archive/150 The role of consciousness in memory]. Brains, Minds and Media 1: 1–38, pdf.
* Haikonen, Pentti (2004), ''Conscious Machines and Machine Emotions'', presented at Workshop on Models for Machine Consciousness, Antwerp, BE, June 2004.
* McCarthy, John (1971–1987), [http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/generality/generality.html ''Generality in Artificial Intelligence'']. Stanford University, 1971–1987.
* Penrose, Roger, [[The Emperor's New Mind]], 1989.
* Sternberg, Eliezer J. (2007) ''Are You a Machine?: The Brain, the Mind, And What It Means to be Human.'' Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
* Suzuki T., Inaba K., Takeno, Junichi (2005),'' Conscious Robot That '''Distinguishes Between Self and Others''' and Implements Imitation Behavior'', ('''Best Paper of IEA/AIE2005'''), Innovations in Applied Artificial Intelligence, 18th International Conference on Industrial and Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems, pp.&nbsp;101–110, IEA/AIE 2005, Bari, Italy, June 22–24, 2005.
* Takeno, Junichi (2006), [https://web.archive.org/web/20070927130938/http://www.d6.dion.ne.jp/~takenof/SAR-LAL-Takeno.pdf ''The '''Self-Aware Robot''' -A Response to Reactions to Discovery News-''], HRI Press, August 2006.
* Zagal, J.C., Lipson, H. (2009) "[http://ccsl.mae.cornell.edu/sites/default/files/GECCO09_Zagal.pdf Self-Reflection in Evolutionary Robotics]", Proceedings of the Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference, pp 2179–2188, GECCO 2009.

==External links==
* [http://www.slideserve.com/astro/artefactual-consciousness-depiction-and-an-example-in-robot-usable-models-of-visual-consciousness-igor-aleksander-intelligent-and-interactive-systems-group Artefactual consciousness depiction by Professor Igor Aleksander]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20110719195048/http://www.aco.gatech.edu/conference/focs-aco/abstracts.html FOCS 2009: Manuel Blum – Can (Theoretical Computer) Science come to grips with Consciousness?]
* [http://www.Conscious-Robots.com www.Conscious-Robots.com], Machine Consciousness and Conscious Robots Portal.


[[Category:Artificial intelligence]]
[[Category:Consciousness]]
[[Category:Computational neuroscience]]

{{Sourceattribution|Artificial consciousness}}