View source for Engineering:USS Liberty incident

{{Short description|1967 Israeli attack on American navy ship}}
{{pp-extended|small=yes}}
{{DISPLAYTITLE:USS ''Liberty'' incident}}
{{Infobox military conflict
| conflict          = USS ''Liberty'' incident
| partof            = the Six-Day War
| image             = SH-3A Sea King hovers over the damaged USS Liberty (AGTR-5) on 8 June 1967 (USN 1123118).jpg
| image_size        = 300px
| caption           = Damaged USS ''Liberty'' on 9 June 1967, one day after attack
| date              = 8 June 1967
| place             = [[Place:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean Sea]] near the [[Place:Sinai Peninsula|Sinai Peninsula]]<ref name=Wikimapia>{{cite web |title=Wikimapia.org Tag |url=http://www.wikimapia.org/#lat=31.3935021&lon=33.3888245&z=10&l=0&m=b |access-date=17 June 2010 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061214000013/http://www.wikimapia.org/#lat=31.3935021&lon=33.3888245&z=10&l=0&m=b |archive-date=14 December 2006 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref>
| coordinates       = {{Coord|31.39|N|33.38|E|source:wikidata|display=ti}}
| map_type          = Egypt Sinai#Egypt
| map_relief        = 
| latitude          = 
| longitude         = 
| map_size          = 
| map_marksize      = 
| map_caption       = 
| map_label         = 
| territory         = 
| result            = Official apology issued by Israeli government; financial restitution made to victims, victim's families, and the U.S. government (see ''Aftermath of the attack'')
| status            = 
| combatants_header = Participants
| combatant1        = {{flag|Israel}}
| combatant2        = {{flag|United States}}
| commander1        = Captain Iftach Spector<br /> Lieutenant Commander Moshe Oren
| commander2        = Commander William L. McGonagle
| strength1         = 2 [[Engineering:Dassault Mirage III|Mirage IIIs]]<br /> 2 [[Engineering:Dassault Mystère IV|Mystère IVs]]<br />3 [[Engineering:Motor torpedo boat|motor torpedo boat]]s
| strength2         = 1 [[Engineering:Technical research ship|Technical research ship]]
| casualties1       = None
| casualties2       = 34 killed<br />171 wounded<br /> 1 ship heavily damaged
| campaignbox       = 
}}
The '''USS ''Liberty'' incident''' was an attack on a United States Navy [[Engineering:Technical research ship|technical research ship]] ([[Engineering:Spy ship|spy ship]]), {{USS|Liberty|AGTR-5|6}}, by {{wipe|Israeli Air Force}} jet fighter aircraft and Israeli Navy [[Engineering:Motor torpedo boat|motor torpedo boat]]s, on 8 June 1967, during the Six-Day War.<ref name=NSAhistory1n2n5n25n26n28>{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|pp=1–2, 5, 25–26, 28}}</ref> The combined air and sea attack killed 34 crew members (naval officers, seamen, two marines, and one civilian [[Organization:National Security Agency|NSA]] employee), wounded 171 crew members, and severely damaged the ship.<ref name=NSAhistory292652>{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|pp=28–29, 52}}</ref> At the time, the ship was in international waters north of the [[Place:Sinai Peninsula|Sinai Peninsula]], about {{convert|25.5|nmi|mi km|lk=in|abbr=on}} northwest from the Egyptian city of [[Place:Arish|Arish]].<ref name="Wikimapia"/><ref name=NSAhistory26>{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=26}}</ref>

Israel apologized for the attack, saying that the USS ''Liberty'' had been attacked in error after being mistaken for an Egyptian ship.<ref>{{cite book|last=Cristol|first=A.Jay|title=The Liberty Incident Revealed: The Definitive Account of the 1967 Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5a1kAgAAQBAJ&pg=PT252|year=2013|publisher=Naval Institute Press|isbn=978-1-61251-387-4|pages=61, 113–114}}</ref> Both the Israeli and U.S. governments conducted inquiries and issued reports that concluded the attack was a mistake due to Israeli confusion about the ship's identity.<ref name="NSAhistory57">{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=57}}</ref> Others, including survivors of the attack, have rejected these conclusions and maintain that the attack was deliberate.<ref name=trib>{{cite news | url=http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-liberty_tuesoct02,0,66005.story | title=New revelations in attack on American spy ship | first=John | last=Crewdson | date=2 October 2007 | work=Chicago Tribune | access-date=4 October 2007 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071011020947/http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-liberty_tuesoct02,0,66005.story | archive-date=11 October 2007 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|last=Ofer|first=Aderet|date=July 11, 2017|title='But sir, it's an American ship.' 'Never mind, hit her!' When Israel attacked USS ''Liberty''|url=https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/but-sir-its-an-american-ship-never-mind-hit-her-1.5492908|website=[[Social:Haaretz|Haaretz]]|language=en}}</ref>

In May 1968, the Israeli government paid {{US$|{{Format price|3323500}}}} (equivalent to {{US$|{{Format price|{{Inflation|US|3,323,500|1968}}}}}} in {{Inflation-year|US}}) to the {{Nowrap|U.S. government}} in compensation for the families of the 34 men killed in the attack. In March 1969, Israel paid a further ${{Format price|3566457}} (${{Format price|{{Inflation|US|3566457|1969}}}} in {{Inflation-year|US}}) to the men who had been wounded. In December 1980, it agreed to pay ${{Format price|6000000}} (${{Format price|{{Inflation|US|6000000|1980}}}} in {{Inflation-year|US}}) as the final settlement for material damage to the ship plus 13 years of interest.<ref name=NSAhistory64>{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=64}}</ref>

==USS ''Liberty''==
{{Main|Engineering:USS Liberty (AGTR-5)}}
{{USS|Liberty|AGTR-5|6}} was originally the {{convert|7725|LT|t|abbr=on}} (light) civilian cargo vessel ''Simmons Victory'', a mass-produced, standard-design [[Engineering:Victory ship|Victory ship]], the follow-on series to the famous [[Engineering:Liberty ship|Liberty ship]]s that supplied the Allies with cargo during World War II. It was acquired by the United States Navy and converted to an auxiliary technical research ship (AGTR),<ref name=NSAhistory2>{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=2}}</ref> a cover name for [[Organization:National Security Agency|National Security Agency]] (NSA) "spy ships" carrying out [[Signals intelligence|signals intelligence]] missions. It began its first deployment in 1965, in waters off the west coast of Africa. It carried out several further operations during the next two years.

==Attack on the ''Liberty''==
===Events leading to the attack===
During the Six-Day War between [[Place:Israel|Israel]] and several Arab nations, the United States of America maintained a [[Social:Neutral country|neutral country]] status.<ref name=NSAhistory1>{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=1}}</ref> Several days before the war began, the USS ''Liberty'' was ordered to proceed to the eastern [[Place:Mediterranean Sea|Mediterranean]] area to perform a signals intelligence collection mission in international waters near the north coast of Sinai, Egypt.<ref name=NSAhistory5>{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=5}}</ref> After the war erupted, due to concerns about its safety as it approached its patrol area, several messages were sent to ''Liberty'' to increase its allowable closest point of approach (CPA) to Egypt's and Israel's coasts from {{convert|12.5|and|6.5|nmi|mi km}}, respectively, to {{convert|20|and|15|nmi|mi km}}, and then later to {{convert|100|nmi|mi km}} for both countries.<ref name=NSAhistory21>{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=21}}</ref> Due to ineffective message handling and routing, these messages were not received until after the attack.<ref name="NSAhistory21"/>

According to Israeli sources, at the start of the war on 5 June, General [[Biography:Yitzhak Rabin|Yitzhak Rabin]], {{wipe|Israeli Air Force}} (IAF) chief of staff informed Commander Ernest Carl Castle, the American naval attaché in [[Place:Tel Aviv|Tel Aviv]], that Israel would defend its coast with every means at its disposal, including sinking unidentified ships. He asked the U.S. to keep its ships away from Israel's shore or at least inform Israel of their exact positions.{{sfn|IDF History Report|1982|page=22}}{{efn |The failure of the Israeli navy's attacks on Egyptian and Syrian ports early in the war did little to assuage Israel's fears. The U.S. had previously rejected Israel's request for a formal naval liaison. On 31 May, Avraham Harman, Israel's ambassador to Washington, had warned Under Secretary of State Eugene V. Rostow that if war breaks out, "we would have no telephone number to call, no code for plane recognition, and no way to get in touch with the U.S. Sixth Fleet". {{harv|Oren|2000}} }}

American sources said that no inquiry about ships in the area was made until after the attack on ''Liberty''. In a message sent from U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk to U.S. Ambassador Walworth Barbour in Tel Aviv, Israel, Rusk asked for "urgent confirmation" of Israel's statement. Barbour responded: "No request for info on U.S. ships operating off Sinai was made until after ''Liberty'' incident." Further, Barbour stated: "Had Israelis made such an inquiry it would have been forwarded immediately to the chief of naval operations and other high naval commands and repeated to dept [Department of State]."<ref name="JamesScottBookp197">{{harvnb|Scott|2009|p=197}}</ref>

With the outbreak of war, Captain William L. McGonagle of ''Liberty'' immediately asked Vice Admiral William I. Martin at the United States Sixth Fleet headquarters to send a destroyer to accompany ''Liberty'' and serve as its armed escort and as an auxiliary communications center. The following day, Admiral Martin replied: "''Liberty'' is a clearly marked United States ship in international waters, not a participant in the conflict and not a reasonable subject for attack by any nation. Request denied."<ref>{{harvnb|Ennes|1987|pages=38–39}}</ref> He promised, however, that in the unlikely event of an inadvertent attack, jet fighters from the Sixth Fleet would be overhead in ten minutes.<!-- 5 Jan 2012: no reference to a primary source (e.g., copy of messages or official report) seems to exist that supports statements in this paragraph. Thus, these secondary source claims cannot be verified. -->

Meanwhile, at the United Nations on 6 June, U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg told the United Nations Security Council that vessels of the Sixth Fleet were several hundred miles from the conflict, in response to Egyptian complaints that the United States was supporting Israel in the conflict.<ref name=NSAhistory21/> When this statement was made, it was in fact true; ''Liberty'', now assigned to the Sixth Fleet, was in the central Mediterranean Sea, passing between Libya and Crete.<ref name=NSAhistory20>{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=20}}</ref> It would ultimately steam to about {{convert|13|nmi|mi km|abbr=on}} north of the Sinai Peninsula.<ref name=NSAhistory25>{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=25}}</ref>

On the night of 7 June Washington time, early morning on 8 June, 01:10 [[Physics:Coordinated Universal Time#Time zones|Zulu]] or 3:10&nbsp;a.m. local time, the Pentagon issued an order to Sixth Fleet headquarters to tell ''Liberty'' to come no closer than {{convert|100|nmi|mi km}} to Israel, Syria, or the Sinai coast (Oren, p.&nbsp;263).<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.nsa.gov/liberty/51668/3084841.pdf |title=Chronology of Events |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070628075318/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty/51668/3084841.pdf |archive-date=28 June 2007 |url-status=dead |access-date=17 June 2007}}</ref>{{rp|5, 58 (Exhibit N)}} According to the Naval Court of Inquiry<ref name=USNCOIreport>[http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/CourtOfInquiry.pdf U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061219235857/http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/CourtOfInquiry.pdf |date=19 December 2006 }} Court of Inquiry for USS ''Liberty'' attack, Record of Proceedings, 18 June 1967</ref>{{rp|23 ff, 111 ff}} and the National Security Agency official history,<ref name=NSAhistory2123>{{harvnb|NSA History Report|pp=21–23}}</ref> the order to withdraw was not sent on the radio frequency that ''Liberty'' monitored for her orders until 15:25 Zulu, several hours after the attack, due to a long series of administrative and message routing problems. The Navy said a large volume of unrelated high-precedence traffic, including intelligence intercepts related to the conflict, were being handled at the time; and that this combined with a shortage of qualified radiomen contributed to the delayed transmission of the withdrawal message.<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|111 ff}}

===Visual contact===
Official testimony combined with ''Liberty''{{'}}s deck log establish that throughout the morning of the attack, 8 June, the ship was overflown, at various times and locations, by IAF aircraft.<ref name=NSAhistory25/> The primary aircraft type was the [[Engineering:Nord Noratlas|Nord Noratlas]]; there were also two unidentified delta-wing jets at about 9:00&nbsp;a.m. Sinai time ([[Greenwich Mean Time|GMT]]+2).<ref name=NSAhistory25/> ''Liberty'' crewmembers say that one of the Noratlas aircraft flew so close to ''Liberty'' that noise from its propellers rattled the ship's deck plating, and that the pilots and crewmembers waved to each other.<ref>{{harvnb|Ennes|1987|p=62}}</ref> It was later reported, based on information from IDF sources, that the over-flights were coincidental, and that the aircraft were hunting for Egyptian submarines that had been spotted near the coast.

At about 5:45&nbsp;a.m. Sinai time, a ship-sighting report was received at Israeli Central Coastal Command (CCC) in respect of ''Liberty'', identified by an aerial naval observer as "apparently a [[Engineering:Destroyer|destroyer]], sailing {{convert|70|miles|disp=sqbr}} west of Gaza".<ref>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|pp=6–7}}</ref> The vessel's location was marked on a CCC control table, using a red marker, indicating an unidentified vessel.<ref name=IDFHR7>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=7}}</ref> At about 6:00&nbsp;a.m., the aerial naval observer, Major Uri Meretz, reported that the ship appeared to be a U.S. Navy supply ship; at about 9:00&nbsp;a.m. the red marker was replaced with a green marker to indicate a neutral vessel.<ref name=IDFHR7/> About the same time, an Israeli jet fighter pilot reported that a ship {{convert|20|miles}} north of Arish had fired at his aircraft after he tried to identify the vessel.<ref name=IDFHR7/> Israeli naval command dispatched two destroyers to investigate, but they were returned to their previous positions at 9:40&nbsp;a.m. after doubts emerged during the pilot's debriefing.<ref name=IDFHR7/> After the naval observer's Noratlas landed and he was debriefed, the ship he saw was further identified as the USS ''Liberty'', based on its "GTR-5" hull markings.<ref>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|pp=7–8}}</ref> USS ''Liberty''{{'s}} marker was removed from CCC's Control Table at 11:00&nbsp;a.m., due to its positional information being considered out of date.<ref name="IDFHR8">{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=8}}</ref>

At 11:24&nbsp;a.m., the Israeli chief of naval operations received a report that Arish was being shelled from the sea.<ref name="IDFHR8"/> An inquiry into the source of the report was ordered to determine its validity.<ref name=IDFHR8/> The report came from an air support officer in Arish.<ref name=IDFHR10>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=10}}</ref> Additionally, at 11:27&nbsp;a.m. the Israeli Supreme Command head of operations received a report stating that a ship had been shelling Arish, but the shells had fallen short.<ref name=IDFHR10/> (The investigative journalist James Bamford points out that ''Liberty'' had only four [[Engineering:M2 Browning|.50 caliber machine guns]] mounted on her decks and thus could not have shelled the coast.<ref name="Bamford, Body of Secrets">Bamford, Body of Secrets</ref>) The Head of Operations ordered that the report be verified, and that it be determined whether or not Israeli Navy vessels were off the coast of Arish.<ref name=IDFHR10/> At 11:45&nbsp;a.m., another report arrived at Supreme Command saying two ships were approaching the Arish coast.<ref name=IDFHR10/>

[[File:Tsqd914.jpg|thumb|right|Israeli Motor Torpedo Boats (MTBs) in formation, c. 1967. These were the MTBs that attacked USS ''Liberty''.]]
The shelling and ship reports were passed from Supreme Command to Fleet Operations control center.<ref name=IDFHR10/> The Chief of Naval Operations took them seriously, and at 12:05&nbsp;p.m. torpedo boat Division 914 was ordered to patrol in the direction of Arish.<ref name=IDFHR10/> Division 914, codenamed "Pagoda", was under the command of Commander Moshe Oren.<ref name=IDFHR10/> It consisted of three torpedo boats numbered: T-203, T-204 and T-206.<ref name=IDFHR10/> At 12:15&nbsp;p.m., Division 914 received orders to patrol a position {{convert|20|miles}} north of Arish.<ref name=IDFHR10/> As Commander Oren headed toward Arish, he was informed by Naval Operations of the reported shelling of Arish and told that IAF aircraft would be dispatched to the area after the target had been detected.<ref name=IDFHR10/> Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin was concerned that the supposed Egyptian shelling was the prelude to an amphibious landing that could outflank Israeli forces. Rabin reiterated the standing order to sink any unidentified ships in the area, but advised caution, as Soviet vessels were reportedly operating nearby. At 1:41&nbsp;p.m., the torpedo boats detected an unknown vessel 20 miles northwest of Arish and {{convert|14|miles}} off the coast of Bardawil.<ref name="Wikimapia"/><ref name=IDFHR11>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=11}}</ref> The ship's speed was estimated on their radars.<ref name=IDFHR11/> The combat information center officer on T-204, Ensign Aharon Yifrah, reported to Oren that the target had been detected at a range of {{convert|22|miles}}, that her speed had been tracked for a few minutes, after which he had determined that the target was moving westward at a speed of {{convert|30|knots}}. These data were forwarded to the Fleet Operations control center.<ref name=IDFHR11/>

The speed of the target was significant because it indicated that the target was a combat vessel.<ref name=IDFHR11/> Moreover, Israeli forces had standing orders to fire on any unknown vessels sailing in the area at over {{convert|20|knots}}, a speed which, at the time, could be attained only by warships. The Chief of Naval Operations asked the torpedo boats to double-check their calculations. Yifrah twice recalculated and confirmed his assessment.<ref name="IDFHR11"/> A few minutes later, Commander Oren reported that the target, now {{convert|17|miles}} from his position, was moving at a speed of {{convert|28|knots}} on a different heading.<ref>[http://thelibertyincident.com/docs/israeli/yerushalmi-report-en.pdf Yerushalmi Inquiry Report] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080530071820/http://thelibertyincident.com/docs/israeli/yerushalmi-report-en.pdf |date=30 May 2008 }} p 3</ref> Bamford, however, points out that ''Liberty''{{'}}s top speed was far below 28 knots. His sources say that at the time of the attack ''Liberty'' was following her signal-intercept mission course along the northern Sinai coast, at about {{convert|5|knots}} speed.<ref name="Bamford, Body of Secrets"/>

The data on the ship's speed, together with its direction, gave the impression that it was an Egyptian destroyer fleeing toward port after shelling Arish. The torpedo boats gave chase, but did not expect to overtake their target before it reached Egypt. Commander Oren requested that the Israeli Air Force dispatch aircraft to intercept.<ref name=IDFHR11/> At 1:48&nbsp;p.m., the Chief of Naval Operations requested dispatch of fighter aircraft to the ship's location.<ref name=IDFHR12>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=12}}</ref>

[[File:D2 1 b.jpg|thumb|right|Hunt-class destroyer HMS ''Blean''. The Egyptian Navy had Hunt-class destroyers in 1967.]]
The IAF dispatched a flight of two [[Engineering:Dassault Mirage III|Mirage III]] fighter jets codenamed Kursa flight which arrived at ''Liberty'' at about 2:00&nbsp;p.m.<ref name="IDFHR13">{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=13}}</ref> The formation leader, Captain Iftach Spector, attempted to identify the ship.<ref name=IDFHR13/> He radioed to one of the torpedo boats his observation that the ship looked like a military ship with one smokestack and one mast.<ref name=IDFRRIR5>{{harvnb|IDF Ram Ron Report|1967|p=5}}</ref> He also communicated, in effect, that the ship appeared to him like a destroyer or another type of small ship.<ref name=IDFRRIR5/> In a post-attack statement, the pilots said they saw no distinguishable markings or flag on the ship.<ref name=IDFRRIR5/>

At this point, a recorded exchange took place between a command headquarters weapons systems officer, one of the air controllers, and the chief air controller questioning a possible American presence. Immediately after the exchange, at 1:57&nbsp;p.m., the chief air controller, Lieutenant-Colonel Shmuel Kislev, cleared the Mirages to attack.<ref name=JamesScottBookp215>{{harvnb|Scott|2009|p=215}}</ref>

===Air and sea attacks===
After being cleared to attack, the Mirages dove on the ship and attacked with 30-mm cannons and rockets.<ref>{{harvnb|Scott|2009|p=47}}</ref> The attack came a few minutes after the crew completed a chemical attack drill, with Captain McGonagle on the command bridge.<ref>{{harvnb|Scott|2009|pp=44–46}}</ref> The crew was in "stand-down mode", with their helmets and life jackets removed.<ref>Oren, Michael B. – ''Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East''</ref> Battle readiness "modified condition three" was set, which meant that the ship's four .50 caliber machine guns were manned and ammunition was ready for loading and firing.<ref>{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|pp=25–26}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Scott|2009|p=39}}</ref> Eight crewmen either were killed immediately or received fatal injuries and died later, and 75 were wounded.<ref name="NSAhistory28">{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=28}}</ref> Among the wounded was McGonagle, who was hit in the right thigh and arm.<ref>{{harvnb|Scott|2009|p=66}}</ref> During the attack, antennas were severed, gas drums caught fire, and the ship's flag was knocked down. McGonagle sent an urgent request for help to the Sixth Fleet, "Under attack by unidentified jet aircraft, require immediate assistance".

The Mirages left after expending their ammunition, and were replaced by a flight of two [[Engineering:Dassault Super Mystère|Dassault Super Mystère]]s codenamed Royal flight. The Mysteres were armed with [[Engineering:Napalm|napalm]] bombs, and were flown by Captain Yossi Zuk and his wingman, Yaakov Hamermish. The Mysteres released their payloads over the ship and strafed it with their cannons. Much of the ship's superstructure caught fire.<ref name="IDFHR13"/> The Mysteres were readying to attack again when the Israeli Navy, alerted by the absence of return fire, warned Kislev that the target could be Israeli. Kislev told the pilots not to attack if there was any doubt about identification, and the Israeli Navy quickly contacted all of its vessels in the area. The Israeli Navy found that none of its vessels were under fire, and the aircraft were cleared to attack. However, Kislev was still disturbed by a lack of return fire and requested one last attempt to identify the ship. Captain Zuk made an attempt at identification while strafing the ship. He reported seeing no flag, but saw the ship's GTR-5 marking. Kislev immediately ordered the attack stopped. Kislev guessed that the ship was American.

The fact that the ship had Latin alphabet markings led Chief of Staff Rabin to fear that the ship was Soviet. Though Egyptian warships were known to disguise their identities with Western markings, they usually displayed Arabic letters and numbers only. Rabin ordered the torpedo boats to remain at a safe distance from the ship, and sent in two [[Engineering:Aérospatiale SA 321 Super Frelon|Aérospatiale SA 321 Super Frelon]] helicopters to search for survivors. These radio communications were recorded by Israel. The order was also recorded in the torpedo boat's log, although Commander Oren claimed not to have received it. The order to cease fire was given at 2:20&nbsp;p.m., twenty-four minutes before the torpedo boats arrived at the ''Liberty''{{'}}s position.{{efn|While Egyptian naval ships were known to disguise their identities with Western markings, they usually displayed Arabic letters and numbers only. The fact that the ship had Western markings led Rabin to fear that it was Soviet, and he immediately called off the jets. Two IAF Super Frelon helicopters were sent to look for survivors — Spector had reported seeing men overboard — while the torpedo boat squadron was ordered to hold its fire pending further attempts at identification. Though that order was recorded in the torpedo boat's log, [the commander], Oren, claimed he never received it. {{harv|Oren|2000}}}}

During the interval, crewmen aboard ''Liberty'' hoisted a large American flag. During the early part of the air attack and before the torpedo boats were sighted, ''Liberty'' sent a distress message that was received by Sixth Fleet aircraft carrier USS ''Saratoga''.<ref name="NSAhistory28"/> Aircraft carrier USS ''America'' dispatched eight aircraft. The carrier had been in the middle of strategic exercises. Vice-Admiral William I. Martin recalled the aircraft minutes later.

McGonagle testified at the naval court of inquiry that during {{Blockquote|the latter moments of the air attack, it was noted that three high speed boats were approaching the ship from the northeast on a relative bearing of approximately 135 [degrees] at a distance of about 15 [nautical] miles. The ship at the time was still on [westward] course 283 [degrees] true, speed unknown, but believed to be in excess of five knots.<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|38}}}} McGonagle testified that he "believed that the time of initial sighting of the torpedo boats ... was about 14:20", and that the "boats appeared to be in a wedge type formation with the center boat the lead point of the wedge. Estimated speed of the boats was about {{convert|27|to|30|kn|km/h|disp=sqbr}}", and that it "appeared that they were approaching the ship in a torpedo launch attitude".<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|38}}

When the torpedo boats arrived, Commander Oren could see that the ship could not be the destroyer that had supposedly shelled Arish or any ship capable of {{convert|30|kn|km/h}} speed. According to Michael Limor, an Israeli naval reservist serving on one of the torpedo boats, they attempted to contact the ship by heliograph and radio, but received no response.<ref>{{cite news|title=Israeli Seaman Describes Attack |work=Owosso Argus-Press |location=Owosso, Michigan |date=6 July 1967 |page=12 |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1978&dat=19670706&id=wnUiAAAAIBAJ&pg=595,422193&hl=en}}</ref> At {{convert|6,000|meters|sp=us}}, T-204 paused and signalled "AA", which means "identify yourself".{{Citation needed|date=July 2013}} Due to damaged equipment, McGonagle could only reply using a handheld [[Social:Signal lamp|Aldis lamp]].{{Citation needed|date=July 2013}} Oren recalled receiving a similar response from the ''Ibrahim el Awal'', an Egyptian destroyer captured by Israel during the Suez Crisis, and was convinced that he was facing an enemy ship.{{Citation needed|date=April 2013}} He consulted an Israeli identification guide to Arab fleets and concluded the ship was the Egyptian supply ship ''El Quseir'', based on observing its deckline, midship bridge and smokestack. The captain of boat T-203 reached the same conclusion independently. The boats moved into battle formation, but did not attack.{{sfn|Oren|2000}}<ref>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=16}}</ref>

[[File:USS Liberty (AGTR-5) turns while under attack by Israeli motor torpedo boats, 8 June 1967 (USN 1123754).jpg|thumb|''Liberty'' turns to evade Israeli torpedo boats]]
As the torpedo boats rapidly approached, Captain McGonagle ordered a sailor to proceed to machine gun Mount 51 and open fire.<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|38}} However, he then noticed that the boats appeared to be flying an Israeli flag, and "realized that there was a possibility of the aircraft having been Israeli and the attack had been conducted in error".<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|39}} Captain McGonagle ordered the man at gun mount 51 to hold fire, but a short burst was fired at the torpedo boats before the man understood the order.<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|39}}

McGonagle observed that machine gun Mount 53 began firing at the center torpedo boat at about the same time gun mount 51 fired, and that its fire was "extremely effective and blanketed the area and the center torpedo boat".<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|39}} Machine gun mount 53 was located on the starboard amidships side, behind the pilot house.<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|16}} McGonagle could not see or "get to mount 53 from the starboard wing of the bridge".<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|39}} So, he "sent Mr. Lucas around the port side of the bridge, around to the skylights, to see if he could tell [Seaman] Quintero, whom [he] believed to be the gunner on Machine gun 53, to hold fire".<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|39}} Ensign Lucas "reported back in a few minutes in effect that he saw no one at mount 53".<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|39}} Lucas, who had left the command bridge during the air attack and returned to assist Captain McGonagle,<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|14}} believed that the sound of gunfire was likely from ammunition cooking off, due to a nearby fire.<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|16}} Previously, Lucas had granted a request from Quintero to fire at the torpedo boats, before heat from a nearby fire chased him from gun mount 53.<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|26,27}} McGonagle later testified, at the Court of Inquiry, that this was likely the "extremely effective" firing event he had observed.<ref name=USNCOIreport/>{{rp|49}}

After coming under fire, the torpedo boats returned fire with their cannons, killing ''Liberty''{{'s}} helmsman.<ref name="Gerhard 1981 29"/> The torpedo boats then launched five torpedoes at the ''Liberty''.<ref>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=17}}</ref> At 1235Z (2:35 local time)<ref name="Gerhard 1981 29"/> one torpedo hit ''Liberty'' on the [[Engineering:Starboard|starboard]] side forward of the superstructure, creating a {{convert|39|ft|m|abbr=on}} wide hole in what had been a cargo hold converted to the ship's research spaces and killing 25 servicemen, almost all of them from the intelligence section, and wounding dozens.<ref name="Gerhard 1981 29">{{harvnb|Gerhard|Millington|1981|p=29}}</ref> It has been said the torpedo hit a major hull frame that absorbed much of the energy; crew members reported that if the torpedo had missed the frame the ''Liberty'' would have split in two. The other four torpedoes missed the ship.{{citation needed|date=May 2019}}

The torpedo boats then closed in and strafed the ship's hull with their cannons and machine guns.{{Citation needed|date=July 2013}} According to some crewmen, the torpedo boats fired at damage control parties and sailors preparing life rafts for launch. (See disputed details below.) A life raft which floated from the ship was picked up by T-203 and found to bear U.S. Navy markings. T-204 then circled ''Liberty'', and Oren spotted the designation GTR-5, but saw no flag.{{Citation needed|date=July 2013}} It took until 3:30&nbsp;p.m. to establish the ship's identity. Shortly before the ''Liberty''{{'}}s identity was confirmed, the ''Saratoga'' launched eight aircraft armed with conventional weapons towards ''Liberty''. After the ship's identity was confirmed, the General Staff was notified and an apology was sent to naval attaché Castle. The aircraft approaching ''Liberty'' were recalled to the ''Saratoga''.

===Aftermath of the attack===
[[File:USS Liberty (AGTR-5) with USS Little Rock (CLG-4) 1967.jpg|thumb|The 6th Fleet [[Engineering:Flagship|flagship]], {{USS|Little Rock|CLG-4|6}} standing by ''Liberty'']]
[[File:USS LIBERTY Memorial.jpg|thumb|USS ''LIBERTY'' Memorial<br />Arlington National Cemetery]]
According to transcripts of intercepted radio communications, published by the U.S. National Security Agency, at about 2:30&nbsp;p.m., near the beginning of the torpedo boat attack, two IAF helicopters were dispatched to ''Liberty''{{'}}s location. The helicopters arrived at about 3:10&nbsp;p.m., about 35 minutes after the torpedo hit the ship. After arriving, one of the helicopter pilots was asked by his ground-based controller to verify that the ship was flying an American flag. The helicopters conducted a brief search for crew members of the ship who might have fallen overboard during the air attack. No one was found. The helicopters left the ship at about 3:20&nbsp;p.m.

At about 4&nbsp;p.m., two hours after the attack began, Israel informed the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv that its military forces had mistakenly attacked a U.S. Navy ship. When the ship was "confirmed to be American" the torpedo boats returned at about 4:40&nbsp;p.m. to offer help;<ref name=IDFRRIR9>{{harvnb|IDF Ram Ron Report|1967|p=9}}</ref> it was refused by the ''Liberty''. Later, Israel provided a helicopter to fly U.S. naval attaché Commander Castle to the ship.<ref name=NSAhistory>{{cite web |title=NSA History Report |url=http://www.nsa.gov/liberty/liber00010.pdf |ref={{harvid|NSA History Report}} |access-date=27 September 2006 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040313000704/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty/liber00010.pdf |archive-date=13 March 2004 |url-status=dead |df=dmy-all }}</ref> (pp.&nbsp;32, 34)

In Washington, President [[Biography:Lyndon B. Johnson|Lyndon B. Johnson]] had received word from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that ''Liberty'' had been torpedoed by an unknown vessel at 9:50&nbsp;a.m. eastern time. Johnson assumed that the Soviets were involved, and hotlined Moscow with news of the attack and the dispatch of jets from ''Saratoga''. He chose not to make any public statements and delegated this task to Phil G. Goulding, who was an assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs at the time.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/USS_Liberty_Pueblo_Stark/607.pdf|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20130713013349/http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_plans/USS_Liberty_Pueblo_Stark/607.pdf|url-status=dead|title=Public Affairs in the USS ''Liberty'' Incident.|archivedate=13 July 2013}}</ref> Soon afterward, the Israelis said that they had mistakenly attacked the ship. The Johnson administration conveyed "strong dismay" to Israeli ambassador Avraham Harman. Meanwhile, apologies were soon sent by Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, Foreign Minister Abba Eban, and chargé d'affaires Ephraim Evron. Within 48 hours, Israel offered to compensate the victims and their families.{{sfn|Oren|2000}}

Though ''Liberty'' was severely damaged, with a 39&nbsp;ft wide by 24&nbsp;ft high (12 m × 7.3 m) hole and a twisted keel, her crew kept her afloat, and she was able to leave the area under her own power. ''Liberty'' was first met by Soviet Kildin class guided missile destroyer (DDG 626/4), which offered help. Subsequently it was met by the destroyers sent to it USS ''Davis'' and USS ''Massey'', and the cruiser USS ''Little Rock''. Medical personnel were transferred to ''Liberty'', and she was escorted to Malta, where she was given interim repairs. After these were completed in July 1967, ''Liberty'' returned to the U.S. She was decommissioned in June 1968 and struck from the Naval Vessel Register. ''Liberty'' was transferred to the United States Maritime Administration (MARAD) in December 1970 and sold for scrap in 1973.

From the start, the response to Israeli statements of mistaken identity ranged between frank disbelief to unquestioning acceptance within the administration in Washington. A communication to the Israeli ambassador on 10 June, by Secretary Rusk stated, among other things:

{{Blockquote|At the time of the attack, the USS ''Liberty'' was flying the American flag and its identification was clearly indicated in large white letters and numerals on its hull. ... Experience demonstrates that both the flag and the identification number of the vessel were readily visible from the air ... Accordingly, there is every reason to believe that the USS ''Liberty'' was identified, or at least her nationality determined, by Israeli aircraft approximately one hour before the attack. ... The subsequent attack by the torpedo boats, substantially after the vessel was or should have been identified by Israeli military forces, manifests the same reckless disregard for human life.<ref>{{cite web|title=Diplomatic Note From Secretary of State Rusk to the Israeli Ambassador|url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d352|website=U.S. Department of State: Office of the Historian|publisher=US Government|access-date=9 November 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160101195630/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v19/d352|archive-date=1 January 2016|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Lenczowski|1990|p=111}} citing {{harvnb|Ennes|1987|p=285|loc=appendix S}}</ref>}}

[[File:Plaquemem.JPG|thumb|left|upright=0.7|Commemorative plaque in the Israeli Clandestine Naval Museum{{efn|Translation: "We express deep sorrow for the thirty-four friends who died by our hands in combat they should not have been involved in. May their memory be blessed. Veterans of MTB squadron"}}]]
George Lenczowski notes: "It was significant that, in contrast to his secretary of state, President Johnson fully accepted the Israeli version of the tragic incident." He notes that Johnson himself included only one small paragraph about the ''Liberty'' in his autobiography,<ref>{{cite book|last=Johnson|first=Lyndon Baines|title=The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BW7jnQAACAAJ&pg=PP1|year=1971|publisher=Holt, Rinehart and Winston|pages=300–301 |quote=We learned that the ship had been attacked in error by Israeli gunboats and aircraft. Ten men of the ''Liberty'' crew were killed and a hundred were wounded. This heartbreaking episode grieved the Israelis deeply, as it did us.}}</ref> in which he accepted the Israeli explanation, minimized the affair and distorted the number of dead and wounded, by lowering them from 34 to 10 and 171 to 100, respectively. Lenczowski further states: "It seems Johnson was more interested in avoiding a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union, ... than in restraining Israel."{{sfn|Lenczowski|1990|pp=110–112}}

McGonagle received the Medal of Honor, the highest U.S. medal, for his actions.<ref>[http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/moh/moh20.htm#mcgonagle Navy Medal of Honor: Vietnam War (era) 1964–1975, citation for Captain William L. McGonagle, U.S. Navy] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060418060733/http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/moh/moh20.htm#mcgonagle |date=18 April 2006 }}. Retrieved May 15, 2006</ref><ref name="heroic" /> The Medal of Honor is generally presented by the president of the United States in the White House,<ref name="heroic" /><ref>[http://www.cmohs.org/medal.htm Congressional Medal of Honor Society] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070623031055/http://www.cmohs.org/medal.htm |date=23 June 2007 }}. Retrieved June 20, 2007</ref> but this time it was awarded at the Washington Navy Yard by the Secretary of the Navy in an unpublicized ceremony.<ref name="heroic">[http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0398/9803026.html Even as USS ''Liberty''<nowiki>'</nowiki>s Heroic Captain Receives New Honor, Coverup of Israeli Attack on His Ship Continues] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060518064155/http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0398/9803026.html |date=18 May 2006 }}, ''Washington Report on Middle East Affairs'', March 1998, pp. 26, 88</ref> Other ''Liberty'' sailors received decorations for their actions during and after the attack, but most of the award citations omitted mention of Israel as the perpetrator. In 2009, however, a Silver Star was awarded to crewmember Terry Halbardier, who braved machine-gun and cannon fire to repair a damaged antenna that restored the ship's communication; in his award citation Israel was named as the attacker.<ref>Bernton, Hal, "[http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009316427_liberty09m.html Deadly attack on USS ''Liberty'' gets new attention] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090612021322/http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009316427_liberty09m.html |date=12 June 2009 }}", ''The Seattle Times'', June 9, 2009.</ref>{{Clear}}

===U.S. government investigations===
{{Blockquote|quote=The Court produced evidence that the Israeli armed forces had ample opportunity to identify ''LIBERTY'' correctly. The Court had insufficient information before it to make a judgment on the reasons for the decision by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats to attack&nbsp;... It was not the responsibility of the Court to rule on the culpability of the attackers, and no evidence was heard from the attacking nation.|source=[[:File:DoD USS Liberty Inquiry Press Release 28 Jun 1967.djvu|U.S. Defense Department's June 28, 1967, News Release]] concerning the Naval Court of Inquiry into the attack.}}
[[File:AGTR-5 torpedo damage 8Jun67.jpg|thumb|Torpedo damage to ''Liberty''<nowiki>'</nowiki>s research compartment ([[Engineering:Starboard|Starboard]] side)]]

American inquiries, memoranda, records of testimony, and various reports involving or mentioning the ''Liberty'' attack include, but are not limited to, the following:
* U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry<ref>{{cite web |title=Court of Inquiry |url=http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/CourtOfInquiry.pdf |access-date=30 June 2022}}</ref> of June 1967
* Joint Chief of Staff's Report<ref>{{cite web |title=Report of the JCS Fact Finding Team, USS Liberty Incident, 8 June 1967 |url=http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/JCSreport.pdf |access-date=30 June 2022}}</ref> of June 1967
* CIA Intelligence Memorandums<ref>{{cite web |title=Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 |url=http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/CIAreports.pdf |access-date=30 June 2022}}</ref> of June 1967
* Clark Clifford Report<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.thelibertyincident.com/clifford.html|title=The ''Liberty'' Incident: Clark Clifford Report|website=www.thelibertyincident.com}}</ref> of July 1967
* Senate Foreign Relations Committee Testimony during hearings of the 1967 Foreign Aid Authorization bill, July 1967<ref>{{cite web |title=Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress |url=http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/SenateInvestigation.pdf |access-date=30 June 2022}}</ref>
* House Armed Services Committee Investigation of 1971<ref>{{cite web |title=Report of the Armed Services Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Second Congress, First Session |url=http://thelibertyincident.com/docs/HouseInvestigation1971.pdf |access-date=30 June 2022}}</ref>
* The NSA History Report<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/uss_liberty/|title=U.S.S. ''Liberty'' – NSA/CSS|date=24 September 2009|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090924012118/http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/uss_liberty/|archive-date=24 September 2009}}</ref> of 1981

The U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry record contains testimony by ''Liberty'' crew members, exhibits of attack damage photographs, and various reports.<ref name="JamesScottBookp265">{{harvnb|Scott|2009|p=263}}</ref> The court concluded that the testimony record revealed "a shallow investigation, plagued by myriad disagreements between the captain and his crew".<ref name=JamesScottBookp183>{{harvnb|Scott|2009|p=183}}</ref> According to the Navy Court of Inquiry's record of proceedings, four days were spent hearing testimony: two days for fourteen survivors of the attack and several U.S. Navy expert witnesses, and two partial days for two expert U.S. Navy witnesses.<ref name='A7'/> No testimony was heard from Israeli personnel involved.<ref name='A7'/><ref name='A1'>{{cite news |last1=B. Oren |first1=Michael |title=The USS Liberty Incident: 'The USS ''Liberty'': Case Closed' |url=https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/quot-the-uss-liberty-case-closed-quot |access-date=16 April 2019 |agency=Jewish virtual library |publisher=jewishvirtuallibrary.org |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190416220721/https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/quot-the-uss-liberty-case-closed-quot |archive-date=16 April 2019 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref>{{Better source needed|date=August 2023}}

The official U.S. records of the Liberty incident were designated top-secret and closed to the general public.<ref name='A1'/> The U.S. government and Israel jointly stated: "That the Israeli attack upon the USS ''Liberty'' had been the result of error, and nothing more."<ref name='A1'/> Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time of the ''Liberty'' incident, said that he, "cannot accept the claim by the Israelis that this was a case of mistaken identity".<ref name='A1'/>

The CIA Memoranda consists of two documents: one dated June 13, 1967, and the other dated June 21, 1967. The June 13 memorandum is an "account of circumstances of the attack ... compiled from all available sources".<ref name="A3">{{cite book |url=http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/CIAreports.pdf |title=Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1967 |date=2004 |publisher=Government printing Office |isbn=0-16-051513-0 |editor1-last=Schwar |editor1-first=Harriet Dashiell |location=Washington (D.C.) |page=469 |access-date=26 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190129052624/http://thelibertyincident.com/docs/CIAreports.pdf |archive-date=29 January 2019 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all}}</ref> The June 21 memorandum is a point-by-point analysis of the Israeli inquiry findings of fact.<ref name='A3'/> It concludes: "The attack was not made in malice toward the U.S. and was by mistake, but the failure of the IDF Headquarters and the attacking aircraft to identify the ''Liberty'' and the subsequent attack by torpedo boats were both incongruous and indicative of gross negligence."<ref name='A3'/>

The Clark Clifford report concluded: "The unprovoked attack on the ''Liberty'' constitutes a flagrant act of gross negligence for which the Israeli Government should be held completely responsible, and the Israeli military personnel involved should be punished."<ref name='A1'/>

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony contains, as an aside during hearings concerning a foreign aid authorization bill, questions and statements from several senators and responses from then Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, about the ''Liberty'' attack. For the most part, the senators were dismayed about the attack, as expressed by Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper: "From what I have read I can't tolerate for one minute that this [attack] was an accident." There was concern about obtaining more information on the attack, as expressed by Committee chairman J. William Fulbright: "We asked for [the attack investigation report] about two weeks ago and have not received it yet from Secretary Rusk. ... By the time we get to it we will be on some other subject." Secretary McNamara promised fast delivery of the investigation report, "...&nbsp;you will have it in four hours", and concluded his remarks by saying: "I simply want to emphasize that the investigative report does not show any evidence of a conscious intent to attack a U.S. vessel."<ref>{{cite report |title=S.1872 A Bill to Amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 |publisher=Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate |date=12 June 1967 |url=http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/SenateInvestigation.pdf |access-date=2 July 2006 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061219235027/http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/SenateInvestigation.pdf |archive-date=19 December 2006 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all |page=268}}</ref>

The House Armed Services Committee investigation report, "Review of Department of Defense Worldwide Communications"<ref name='A4'>{{cite book |last1=Harriette |first1=A. |last2=Ennes Jr |first2=J.M. |title=Assault on the ''Liberty'' |date=1979 |publisher=Рипол Классик |isbn=978-5872324027 |page=270 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ybgHAwAAQBAJ&q=Review+of+Department+of+Defense+Worldwide+Communications%2Bliberty&pg=PA269 |access-date=16 April 2019}}</ref> was not an investigation focused on the ''Liberty'' attack, although it contains a section describing the flow of communications connected with the ''Liberty'' incident.<ref name='A4'/>

The [[Organization:National Security Agency|National Security Agency]] (NSA) history report on the event included declassified documents which stated: "Every official interview of numerous ''Liberty'' crewmen gave consistent evidence that indeed the ''Liberty'' was flying an American flag—and, further, the weather conditions were ideal to ensure its easy observance and identification."<ref name='A9'>{{cite news |last1=Crewdson |first1=John |title=New revelations in attack on American spy ship |url=https://www.chicagotribune.com/chi-liberty_tuesoct02-story.html |access-date=16 April 2019 |agency=Chicago Tribune |publisher=chicagotribune.com |date=2 October 2007 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190416220719/https://www.chicagotribune.com/chi-liberty_tuesoct02-story.html |archive-date=16 April 2019 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref>

The USS ''Liberty'' Veterans Association, composed of veterans from the ship, states that U.S. congressional investigations and other U.S. investigations were not actually investigations into the attack, but rather reports using evidence only from the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry, or investigations unrelated to culpability that involved issues such as communications.<ref name='A1'/> In their view, the U.S. Navy Court of Inquiry is the only actual investigation on the incident to date.<ref name='A7'>{{cite web |title=U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry; USS ''Liberty'' |date=10 June 1967 |publisher=USS Liberty Memorial |url=http://www.ussliberty.com/nci.pdf |access-date=13 May 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100326100232/http://www.ussliberty.com/nci.pdf |archive-date=26 March 2010 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref> They say it was hastily conducted, in only ten days, even though the court's president, Rear Admiral Isaac Kidd, said that it would take six months to conduct properly.<ref name='A7'/> The inquiry's [[Social:Terms of reference|terms of reference]] were limited to whether any shortcomings on the part of the ''Liberty''{{'}}s crew had contributed to the injuries and deaths that resulted from the attack.<ref name='A7'/>

Michael Oren (a former Israeli ambassador to the United States) contends that "the United States [[National Archives and Records Administration|National Archives]] contain no evidence to suggest that information obtained by the ''Liberty'' augmented Washington's already detailed picture of events on the Golan front and of Israel's intentions there."<ref name='A1'/>

===Israeli government investigations===
According to an Israel Foreign Ministry letter to the Israeli Embassy in Washington: {{Blockquote|In the grave situation that has been created, the only way to soften the result is for us to be able to announce to the U.S. government already today that we intend to prosecute people for this disaster. We have to publicize that in Israel already tonight. ... it is crucial that our announcement about prosecuting those who are to blame be publicized before – I repeat, before – the publication of the American report here.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Aderet |first1=Ofer |title='But Sir, It's an American Ship.' 'Never Mind, Hit Her!' When Israel Attacked USS ''Liberty'' |url=https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/but-sir-its-an-american-ship-never-mind-hit-her-1.5492908 |access-date=17 April 2019 |agency=Haaretz |publisher=haaretz.com |date=11 July 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190417105511/https://www.haaretz.com/us-news/but-sir-its-an-american-ship-never-mind-hit-her-1.5492908 |archive-date=17 April 2019 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref>}}

Two subsequent Israeli inquiry reports and a historical report concluded the attack was conducted because ''Liberty'' was confused with an Egyptian vessel and because of failures in communications between Israel and the U.S. The three Israeli reports were:<ref name='A1'/>
* Fact Finding Inquiry by Colonel Ram Ron ("Ram Ron Report"—June 1967)<ref name=IDFRRIR>{{harvnb|IDF Ram Ron Report|1967}}</ref>
* Preliminary Inquiry (Hearing) by Examining Judge Yeshayahu Yerushalmi ("Yerushalmi Report"—July 1967)<ref>{{cite web |url=http://thelibertyincident.com/docs/israeli/yerushalmi-report-en.pdf |title=Yerushalmi Report |access-date=30 September 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121019013052/http://thelibertyincident.com/docs/israeli/yerushalmi-report-en.pdf |archive-date=19 October 2012 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref> (Adjudication of IDF negligence [[Social:Complaint|complaint]]s.)
* Historical Report "The ''Liberty'' Incident"—IDF History Department report (1982)<ref name='A8'>{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982}}</ref>

In the historical report, it was acknowledged that IDF naval headquarters knew at least three hours before the attack that the ship was "an electromagnetic audio-surveillance ship of the U.S. Navy" but concluded that this information had simply "gotten lost, never passed along to the ground controllers who directed the air attack nor to the crews of the three Israeli torpedo boats".<ref name='A8'/>

The Israeli government said that three crucial errors were made: the refreshing of the status board (removing the ship's classification as American, so that the later shift did not see it identified), the erroneous identification of the ship as an Egyptian vessel, and the lack of notification from the returning aircraft informing Israeli headquarters of markings on the front of the hull (markings that would not be found on an Egyptian ship). As a common root of these problems, Israel blamed the combination of alarm and fatigue experienced by the Israeli forces at that point of the war when pilots were severely overworked.<ref name='A9'/><ref name='A8'/>

After conducting his own fact-finding inquiry and reviewing evidence, Judge Yerushalmi's decision was: "I have not discovered any deviation from the standard of reasonable conduct which would justify committal of anyone for trial." In other words, he found no negligence by any IDF member associated with the attack.<ref name=JamesScottBookp265/>

==Ongoing controversy and unresolved questions==
Some intelligence and military officials dispute Israel's explanation.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.washingtonreport.me/2003-july-august/navy-captain-other-officials-call-for-investigation-of-israel-s-attack-on-uss-liberty.html |title=Navy Captain, Other Officials Call For Investigation Of Israel's Attack On USS ''Liberty'' |publisher=Washington Report on Middle East Affairs |first=Delinda C. |last=Hanley |date=July–August 2003 |pages=42, 53 |access-date=22 June 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170907022941/https://www.washingtonreport.me/2003-july-august/navy-captain-other-officials-call-for-investigation-of-israel-s-attack-on-uss-liberty.html |archive-date=7 September 2017 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref> Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary of State at the time of the incident, wrote:

{{Blockquote|text=I was never satisfied with the Israeli explanation. Their sustained attack to disable and sink ''Liberty'' precluded an assault by accident or some trigger-happy local commander. Through diplomatic channels we refused to accept their explanations. I didn't believe them then, and I don't believe them to this day. The attack was outrageous.<ref>{{cite book |last=Rusk |first=Dean |title=As I Saw it |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RKdTAAAACAAJ&pg=PP1 |year=1991 |publisher=Penguin Books |isbn=978-0-14-015391-0 |page=388}}</ref>}}

Retired naval Lieutenant Commander James Ennes, a junior officer (and off-going Officer of the Deck) on ''Liberty''{{'}}s bridge at the time of the attack, authored a book titled ''Assault on the Liberty'' describing the incident and saying, among other things, that the attack was deliberate.<ref>{{harvnb|Ennes|1987}}</ref> Ennes and Joe Meadors, also a survivor of the attack, run a website about the incident.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.gtr5.com/ |title=USS ''Liberty'' Memorial |publisher=Gtr5.com |date=8 June 1967 |access-date=26 November 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111126202048/http://www.gtr5.com/ |archive-date=26 November 2011 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref> Meadors states that the classification of the attack as deliberate is the official policy of the USS ''Liberty'' Veterans Association,<ref name="usslibertyveterans.org">{{cite web |url=http://www.usslibertyveterans.org/ |title=USS ''Liberty'' Veterans Association |publisher=Usslibertyveterans.org |access-date=26 November 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111206122547/http://www.usslibertyveterans.org/ |archive-date=6 December 2011 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref> to which survivors and other former crew members belong. Other survivors run several additional websites. Citing Ennes's book, Lenczowski notes: ''Liberty''{{'}}s personnel received firm orders not to say anything to anybody about the attack, and the naval inquiry was conducted in such a way as to earn it the name of "coverup".{{sfn|Lenczowski|1990|pp=110–112}}

In 2002, Captain Ward Boston, JAGC, U.S. Navy, senior counsel for the Court of Inquiry, said that the Court of Inquiry's findings were intended to cover up what was a deliberate attack by Israel on a ship that the Israelis knew to be American. In 2004, in response to the publication of A. Jay Cristol's book ''The Liberty Incident'', which Boston said was an "insidious attempt to whitewash the facts", Boston prepared and signed an affidavit in which he said that Admiral Kidd had told him that the government ordered Kidd to falsely report that the attack was a mistake, and that Boston and Kidd both believed the attack was deliberate.<ref name="WRMEA">{{cite web |url=http://www.washingtonreport.me/2004-march/declaration-of-ward-boston-jr.-captain-jagc-usn-ret.html |title=Declaration of Ward Boston, Jr., Captain, JAGC, USN (Ret.) |publisher=Washington Report on Middle East Affairs |date=March 2004 |page=10}}</ref> Cristol wrote about Boston's professional qualifications and integrity, on page 149 of his book:

{{Blockquote|text=Boston brought two special assets in addition to his skill as a Navy lawyer. He had been a naval aviator in World War II and therefore had insight beyond that of one qualified only in the law. Also, Kidd knew him as a man of integrity. On an earlier matter Boston had been willing to bump heads with Kidd when Boston felt it was more important to do the right thing than to curry favor with the senior who would write his fitness report.|author=A. Jay Cristol |source=The Liberty Incident}}

Cristol said he believes that Boston is not telling the truth about Kidd's views and any pressure from the U.S. government.<ref>{{cite web |title=Boston, Ward – Affidavit |date=22 October 2003 |publisher=The Liberty Incident |url=http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/boston-comments.pdf |access-date=8 April 2005 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050416213047/http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/boston-comments.pdf |archive-date=16 April 2005 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref> Cristol, who also served as an officer of the U.S. Navy's Judge Advocate General, suggests that Boston was responsible in part for the original conclusions of the Court of Inquiry and, that by later declaring that they were false, Boston has admitted to "lying under oath". Cristol also notes that Boston's statements about pressure on Kidd were hearsay, and that Kidd was not alive to confirm or deny them and that Boston did not maintain, prior to his affidavit and comments related to it, that Kidd spoke of such instructions to Boston or to others. Cristol also provides a handwritten 1991 letter from Admiral Kidd<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/Kidd.pdf |title=Letter to Cristol from Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, Jr |publisher=The Liberty Incident |date=3 August 1991 |access-date=26 November 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120307220600/http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/Kidd.pdf |archive-date=7 March 2012 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref> that, according to Cristol, "suggest that Ward Boston has either a faulty memory or a vivid imagination". According to James Ennes, however, Admiral Kidd urged Ennes and his group to keep pressing for an open congressional probe.<ref>{{cite journal |first=David C. |last=Walsh |title=Friendless Fire? |publisher=United States Naval Institute |journal=Proceedings |date=June 2003 |volume=129 |issue=6/1,204 |url=https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2003-06 |access-date=22 June 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160307230717/http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2003-06 |archive-date=7 March 2016 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref>

The following arguments, found in official reports or other sources, were published to support the hypothesis that the attack was due to mistaken identity:
* Accidents and mistakes do occur in wartime. Journalist Ze'ev Schiff gave an example of a friendly fire incident where Israeli aircraft had bombed an Israeli armored column south of the West Bank town of Jenin the day before the attack on the ''Liberty''.<ref>Hirsh Goodman and Ze'ev Schiff, "The Attack on the Liberty," ''The Atlantic Monthly'', September 1984</ref> Also given as an example was a  similar incident that took place during the Suez Crisis in 1956, when Israeli aircraft attacked and damaged the British frigate HMS ''Crane'' after mistaking it for an Egyptian warship, at a time when Britain and Israel were fighting together.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/the-lie-that-wont-die-the-u-s-s-liberty-attack-slander/|title=The Lie that Won't Die: The U.S.S. Liberty Attack Slander|website=blogs.timesofisrael.com}}</ref>
* The incident took place during the Six-Day War when Israel was engaged in battles with two Arab countries and preparing to attack a third, creating an environment where mistakes and confusion were prevalent. For example, at 11:45, a few hours before the attack, there was a large explosion on the shores of El-Arish followed by black smoke, probably caused by the destruction of an ammunition dump by retreating Egyptian forces. The Israeli army thought the area was being bombarded, and that an unidentified ship offshore was responsible.
* As the torpedo boats approached, ''Liberty'' opened fire on them. McGonagle said that he felt sure the torpedo boat captains believed they were under fire from the ''Liberty''. Ensign Lucas, testified that he gave permission for the firing of the 03 level machine gun after the torpedo boats began firing at ''Liberty''. Later, when the gun was unmanned, heat from a nearby fire apparently caused machine gun rounds at the gun to explode.<ref name=USNCOIreport />
* Admiral Shlomo Erell, head of the Israeli Navy in 1967, stated that no successful argument of benefit has been presented for Israel purposely attacking an American warship, especially considering the high cost of predictable complications that would follow an attack on a powerful ally. He also pointed out that Israel notified the American embassy immediately after the attack.<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20030618102439/https://www.bbc.co.uk/bbcfour/documentaries/features/shlomo_erell_interview.shtml Dead in the Water] BBC Interview with Former Head Israeli Navy 1967, Admiral Shlomo Erell</ref>

[[File:h97478t.jpg|thumb|Amidships starboard hull and superstructure attack damage]]
Several books and the BBC documentary ''USS Liberty: Dead in the Water'' argued that ''Liberty'' was attacked in order to prevent the U.S. from knowing about the forthcoming attack in the [[Place:Golan Heights|Golan Heights]], which would violate a cease-fire to which Israel's government had agreed.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/87/IMG/NR024087.pdf |title= Ods Home Page|website=daccessdds.un.org |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090327062036/http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/87/IMG/NR024087.pdf |archive-date=27 March 2009}}</ref> However, Syria did not accept the cease fire until 9 June, after the attack on ''Liberty''.<ref>{{cite book |last=Wellens |first=Karen |author2=T.M.C. Asser Instituut |title=Resolutions and statements of the United Nations Security Council (1946–1989): a thematic guide |publisher=Brill |year=1990 |page=447 |isbn=978-0-7923-0796-9}}</ref> Russian author Joseph Daichman, in his book ''History of the Mossad'', states Israel was justified in attacking the ''Liberty''.<ref name="Daichman">{{cite book |last=Daichman |first=Josef |title=Mossad: istoria luchshei v mire razvedki |publisher=Smolensk: Rusich |year=2001}}</ref> Israel knew that American radio signals were intercepted by the Soviet Union and that the Soviets would certainly inform Egypt of the fact that, by moving troops to the Golan Heights, Israel had left the Egyptian border undefended.<ref>[http://english.pravda.ru/main/2002/09/14/36639_.html Hot summer of 1967: The Israeli attack on America and the 'Soviet destroyer.'] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071017013724/http://english.pravda.ru/main/2002/09/14/36639_.html |date=17 October 2007 }} ''Pravda'' 14 September 2002</ref>

Lenczowski notes that while the Israeli decision to "attack and destroy" the ship "may appear puzzling", the explanation seems to be found in ''Liberty''{{'}}s nature and its task to monitor communications from both sides in the war zone. He writes that timely knowledge of their decision to invade Syria and preparatory moves toward it "might have frustrated Israeli designs for the conquest of Syria's Golan Heights" and, in the sense of Ennes's accusations, provides "a plausible thesis that Israel deliberately decided to incapacitate the signals-collecting American ship and leave no one alive to tell the story of the attack".{{sfn|Lenczowski|1990|pp=105–115}}

The U.S. ambassador to Israel, Barbour, had reported on the day of the ''Liberty'' attack that he "would not be surprised" by an Israeli attack on Syria, and the IDF Intelligence chief told a White House aide then in Israel that "there still remained the Syria problem and perhaps it would be necessary to give Syria a blow".<ref>LBJ, National Security File, Box 104/107, Middle East Crisis: Jerusalem to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1967; Barbour to Department, 8 June 1967; Joint Embassy Memorandum, 8 June 1967.</ref>

The 1981 book ''Weapons'' by Russell Warren Howe says that ''Liberty'' was accompanied by the Polaris ballistic missile-armed ''Lafayette''-class submarine {{USS|Andrew Jackson|SSBN-619|6}}, which filmed the entire episode through its periscope but was unable to provide assistance.{{efn|Several ''Liberty'' crew members testified that they had briefly seen a periscope during the attack. In 1988, the Lyndon Johnson Library declassified and released a document from the ''Liberty'' archive with the "Top Secret—Eyes Only" security caveat (Document #12C sanitized and released 21DEC88 under review case 86–199). This "Memorandum for the Record" dated 10 April 1967 reported a briefing of the "303 Committee" by General Ralph D. Steakley. According to the memo, General Steakley "briefed the committee on a sensitive DOD project known as FRONTLET 615", which is identified in a handwritten note on the original memorandum as "submarine within U.A.R. waters". Further Freedom of Information Act requests returned no information on any project called "FRONTLET 615". In February 1997, a senior member of the crew of the submarine {{USS|Amberjack|SS-522|6}} told James Ennes that he had watched the attack through the periscope and took pictures. According to the official ship's history from the Department of Defense, ''Amberjack''{{'}}s mission between 23 April and 24 July was reconnaissance within U.A.R. waters. When contacted, four crewmen stated that they were so close to ''Liberty'' when it came under attack that some of the crew believed ''Amberjack'' itself was under depth charge attack. August Hubal, Captain of the ''Amberjack'', insists that the vessel was {{convert|100|mi|km|abbr=on}} from the ''Liberty'' and when told the crew believed they were closer replied "They must be mistaken". On 2 July 2003, as a result of a lawsuit using the Freedom of Information Act by Joel Leyden on behalf of the Israel News Agency requesting any evidence that the U.S. submarine ''Amberjack'' had gathered by means of its periscope, the National Security Agency stated that there had been "no radio intercepts made by the U.S. submarine ''Amberjack''". James Ennes believes that if the submarine photography exists, it should show that the ship's flag was clearly visible to the attacking fighters and torpedo boats.}}

James Bamford, a former ABC News producer, says in his 2001 book ''Body of Secrets'',<ref name="Excerpt">[http://hnn.us/articles/191.html Excerpt] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090201115113/http://hnn.us/articles/191.html |date=1 February 2009 }} from ''Body of Secrets'' by James Bamford.</ref> that Israel deliberately attacked ''Liberty'' to prevent the discovery of what he described as war crimes, including the killing of Egyptian prisoners of war by the IDF that he alleges was taking place around the same time in the nearby town of El-Arish.<ref>[https://fas.org/sgp/eprint/bamford.html Memo] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303204918/http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/bamford.html |date=3 March 2016 }} from James Bamford regarding criticism of his charges.</ref> However, according to CAMERA, his claim that 400 Egyptians were executed has been cast into doubt since reporters present in the town claimed that there had been a large battle and this was the main cause of casualties.<ref>''New York Times'', 8 June 1967</ref> Bamford also stated that eyewitness Gabi Bron had claimed he saw 150 people executed by Israeli troops at El-Arish.<ref name="Excerpt"/> However, Gabi Bron claimed to have only seen 5 people executed by Israeli troops.<ref>''New York Times'' article by Serge Schmemann, 21 August 1995</ref><ref>[http://www.camera.org/index.asp?x_article=181&x_context=7 Bamford Bashes Israel] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140426201356/http://www.camera.org/index.asp?x_article=181&x_context=7 |date=26 April 2014 }} CAMERA</ref>

The press release for the BBC documentary film ''Dead in the Water'' states that new recorded and other evidence suggests the attack was a "daring ploy by Israel to fake an Egyptian attack" to give America a reason to enter the war against Egypt. It claimed that President [[Biography:Lyndon B. Johnson|Lyndon B. Johnson]] launched allegedly nuclear-armed aircraft targeted against Cairo from a U.S. aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean. The aircraft were recalled only just in time, when it was clear the ''Liberty'' had not been sunk and that Israel had carried out the attack. An information source for the aircraft being nuclear-armed, James Ennes later stated:

{{Blockquote|It is clear that I was mistaken about the aircraft involved, as F4s do not carry nuclear weapons. Others tell me that the aircraft that were launched carried Bullpup missiles, which might easily be mistaken for nuclear bombs. And we learned much later that the USS ''America'' was involved in a nuclear weapons loading drill at the very time the ship learned of the attack on the Liberty and that this drill is one factor that delayed ''America''{{'s}} response to our call for help. It is also possible that those were the weapons seen by our sources.

Also confusing this issue is an oral history report from the American Embassy in Cairo, now in the LBJ Library, which notes that the Embassy received an urgent message from Washington warning that Cairo was about to be bombed by U.S. forces, presumably in mistaken retaliation for the USS ''Liberty'' attack. That strange message was never explained or cancelled.<ref>[http://www.ussliberty.org/addendum.htm Addendum to 2007 Edition] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100608161826/http://www.ussliberty.org/addendum.htm |date=8 June 2010 }}, online statement, June 2007.</ref>
}}

The video also reports hearsay of a covert alliance of U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies.<ref>[http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2002/06_june/08/uss_liberty.shtml "New evidence for American cover-up of Israeli attack on U.S. warship"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040911070928/http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2002/06_june/08/uss_liberty.shtml |date=11 September 2004 }}, BBC, 6 August 2002.</ref>

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a critic of the official United States Government version of events, chaired a non-governmental investigation into the attack on the ''Liberty'' in 2003. The committee, which included former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia James E. Akins, found Israel to be culpable and suggested several theories for Israel's possible motives, including the desire to blame Egypt and so bring the U.S. into the Six-Day War.<ref name=ap2003-10-23>{{cite news |url=http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,100960,00.html |title=Ex-Navy Official: 1967 Israeli Attack on U.S. Ship Was Deliberate |access-date=16 November 2008 |date=23 October 2003 |agency=Associated Press |publisher=Fox News Channel |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080415215706/http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,100960,00.html |archive-date=15 April 2008 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref>

According to John Loftus and Mark Aarons in their book, ''The Secret War Against the Jews'', ''Liberty'' was attacked because the Israelis knew that the ship's mission was to monitor radio signals from Israeli troops and pass troop movement information to the Egyptians.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Loftus |first1=John |last2=Aarons |first2=Mark |author-link2=Mark Aarons |title=The Secret War Against the Jews: How Western Espionage Betrayed The Jewish People |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=trU7nY-T-4EC&pg=PA281 |year=1994 |publisher=St. Martin's Press |isbn=978-0-312-15648-0 |page=281}}</ref>{{Unreliable source?|date=July 2015}}

==NSA tapes and subsequent developments==
The NSA reported that there had been no radio intercepts of the attack made by the ''Liberty'' herself, nor had there been any radio intercepts made by the U.S. submarine {{USS|Amberjack|SS-522|6}}. Within an hour of learning that the ''Liberty'' had been torpedoed, the director of the U.S. [[Organization:National Security Agency|National Security Agency]], LTG Marshall S. Carter, sent a message to all intercept sites requesting a search of communications that might be connected to the attack or any reaction to it. The only such communication reported was intercepted by a U.S. Navy EC-121 aircraft that flew near the attacks from 2:30&nbsp;p.m. to 3:27&nbsp;p.m., Sinai time (1230 to 1327 [[Physics:Coordinated Universal Time|Z]]); it had collected voice conversations between two Israeli helicopter pilots and the control tower at Hatzor Airfield following the attack on the ''Liberty''.<ref>{{cite web |title=Possible Reflections of Israeli Attack Against USS Liberty |publisher=National Security Agency |url=http://www.nsa.gov/liberty/liber00007.pdf |date=8 June 1967 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070704174443/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty/liber00007.pdf |archive-date=4 July 2007 }}</ref>

On 2 July 2003, the NSA released copies of these recordings and their translations and summaries.<ref name="NSA Liberty">{{cite web |title=U.S.S. Liberty |url=http://www.nsa.gov/liberty/ |publisher=National Security Agency |date=8 June 1967 |archive-date=21 August 2007  |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070821222114/http://www.nsa.gov/liberty/}}</ref> These revelations were elicited as part of a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit by Florida bankruptcy judge and retired naval aviator Jay Cristol. Two linguists who were aboard the EC-121 when the recordings were made said separately that at least two additional tapes were made that had been withheld.<ref name=trib /> English language translations of the released tapes indicate that the Israelis spoke of hitting an Egyptian supply ship even after the end of attack.<ref>{{cite web |title=Audio Recording Labeled 104 |publisher=National Security Agency |date=8 June 1967 |url=http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/uss_liberty/audio_trans_104.pdf |archive-date=10 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121010010229/http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/uss_liberty/audio_trans_104.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |title=Audio Recording Labeled 130 |publisher=National Security Agency |date=8 June 1967 |url=http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/uss_liberty/audio_trans_130.pdf |archive-date=10 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121010010314/http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/uss_liberty/audio_trans_130.pdf}}</ref> The rescue helicopters relayed urgent requests that the rescuers ask the first survivor pulled out of the water what his nationality is; there was discussion as to whether the survivors would speak Arabic.<ref>{{cite web |title=Audio Recording Labeled 105 |publisher=National Security Agency |date=8 June 1967 |url=http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/uss_liberty/audio_trans_105.pdf |archive-date=10 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121010010703/http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/uss_liberty/audio_trans_105.pdf}}</ref>

A summary of the NSA-translated tapes<ref>{{cite web |title=SIGINT Reflection of LIBERTY Incident |publisher=National Security Agency |date=27 June 1967 |url=http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/uss_liberty/misc_reports/sigint_reflection.pdf |archive-date=10 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121010011609/http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/uss_liberty/misc_reports/sigint_reflection.pdf}}</ref> indicates that at 1234Z Hatzor air control began directing two Israeli Air Force helicopters to an Egyptian warship, to rescue its crew: "This ship has now been identified as Egyptian."  The helicopters arrived near the ship at about 1303Z: "I see a big vessel, near it are three small vessels ..."  At 1308Z, Hatzor air control indicated concern about the nationality of the ship's crew: "The first matter to clarify is to find out what their nationality is."  At 1310Z, one of the helicopter pilots asked the nearby torpedo boats' Division Commander about the meaning of the ship's hull number: "GTR5 is written on it. Does this mean something?"  The response was: "Negative, it doesn't mean anything."  At 1312Z, one of the helicopter pilots was asked by air control: "Did you clearly identify an American flag?"  No answer appears in the transcript, but the air controller then says: "We request that you make another pass and check once more if this is really an American flag."  Again, no response appears in the transcript. At about 1314Z, the helicopters were directed to return home.

On 10 October 2003, ''The Jerusalem Post'' ran an interview with Yiftah Spector, one of the pilots who participated in the attack.<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1065773796483 |title=Satellite News and latest stories &#124; the Jerusalem Post |access-date=24 April 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071016180249/http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1065773796483 |archive-date=16 October 2007 |url-status=live |df=dmy-all }}</ref> Spector said the ship was assumed to be Egyptian, stating that: "there was positively no flag". The interview also contains the transcripts of the Israeli communications about the ''Liberty''. However, the journalist who transcribed the tapes for that article, Arieh O'Sullivan, later confirmed that "the Israeli Air Force tapes he listened to contained blank spaces".<ref name=trib /> The ''Liberty''{{'}}s survivors contradict Spector. According to subsequently declassified NSA documents: "Every official interview of numerous ''Liberty'' crewmen gave consistent evidence that the ''Liberty'' was flying an American flag—and, further, the weather conditions were ideal to ensure its easy observance and identification."{{sfn|Gerhard|Millington|1981|pages=41, 49, footnote 4}}

On 8 June 2005, the USS ''Liberty'' Veterans Association filed a "Report of War Crimes Committed Against the U.S. Military, June 8, 1967" with the Department of Defense (DoD). They say Department of Defense Directive 2311.01E<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/231101.htm|title=DoD Directive 2311.01E, 'DoD Law of War Program', 5/9/2006|date=31 January 2007|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070131163517/http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/231101.htm |archive-date=31 January 2007 }}</ref> requires the Department of Defense to conduct a thorough investigation of the allegations contained in their report. DoD has responded that a new investigation would not be conducted since a Navy Court of Inquiry had already investigated the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack.

As of 2006, the NSA had yet to declassify "boxes and boxes" of ''Liberty'' documents. Numerous requests under both declassification directives and the Freedom of Information Act are pending with various agencies including the NSA, Central Intelligence Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency. "On 8 June 2007, the National Security Agency released hundreds of additional declassified documents
on the Israeli attack on the USS ''Liberty'', a communications interception vessel, on 8 June 1967."<ref name="NSA Liberty"/>

On 2 October 2007, ''The Chicago Tribune'' published a special report<ref name=trib /> into the attack, containing numerous previously unreported quotes from former military personnel with first-hand knowledge of the incident. Many of these quotes directly contradict the NSA's position that it never intercepted the communications of the attacking Israeli pilots, saying that not only did transcripts of those communications exist, but also that it showed the Israelis knew they were attacking an American naval vessel.

Two diplomatic cables written by Avraham Harman, Israel's ambassador in Washington, to Abba Eban, Israel's minister of foreign affairs, have been declassified by Israel and obtained from the Israel State Archive. The first cable, sent five days after the attack, informs Eban that a U.S. informant told Harman there was "clear proof that from a certain stage the pilot discovered the identity of the ship and continued the attack anyway".<ref name="JamesScottBookp197"/> The second cable, sent three days later, added that the White House is "very angry" because "the Americans probably have findings showing that our pilots indeed knew that the ship was American".<ref name=trib /> Documents of the Israeli General Staff meetings, declassified in October 2008, show no discussion of a planned attack on an American ship.<ref name=amiroren>{{Cite news| last = Oren| first = Amir| title = War from the bottom up| work = Haaretz| access-date = 29 November 2008| date = 30 October 2008| url = http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1030925.html| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20081027092552/http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1030925.html| archive-date = 27 October 2008| url-status=dead| df = dmy-all}}</ref>

On 30 October 2014, [[Engineering:Al Jazeera English|Al Jazeera]] broadcast a documentary film containing recent first-hand accounts by several survivors of the incident.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2014/10/day-israel-attacked-america-20141028144946266462.html |title=The Day Israel Attacked America |work=[[Engineering:Al Jazeera English|Al Jazeera English]] |date=3 October 2014 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141031063453/http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/specialseries/2014/10/day-israel-attacked-america-20141028144946266462.html |archive-date=31 October 2014 |access-date=8 November 2014 }}</ref> The documentary argues that Israel knew the ship was American, and planned to blame its sinking on Egypt in order to draw the United States into the war on the Israeli side.

==Details in dispute==
[[File:USS Liberty second ensign 2.jpg|thumb|The "Second Ensign" flown during the attack. Israel Defense Forces' investigative reports say their pilots and torpedo boat commander saw no flags during the attack.]]
[[File:SH-3A Sea King hovers over the damaged USS Liberty (AGTR-5) on 8 June 1967 (USN 1123118).jpg|thumb|Damaged USS ''Liberty'' one day after attack (9 June 1967)]]
[[File:EmiraFauzia.jpg|thumb|An [[Engineering:Auxiliary ship|auxiliary ship]] of the Egyptian Navy]]
Various details regarding the attack are the subject of controversy:
* ''Visibility of American flag:'' The official Israeli reports say that the reconnaissance and fighter aircraft pilots, and the torpedo boat captains did not see any flag on the ''Liberty''. Official American reports say that the ''Liberty'' was flying her American flag before, during and after the attack; the only exception being a brief period in which one flag had been shot down and was replaced with a larger flag. The helicopters sent to the attack site to provide assistance after the air attack noticed an American flag flying from the ship almost immediately upon their arrival at the attack site<ref>{{cite news | url=http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/07/09/uss.liberty.tapes/index.html | publisher=CNN | title=USS ''Liberty'' attack tapes released | date=9 July 2003 | access-date=1 July 2006 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060619111710/http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/07/09/uss.liberty.tapes/index.html | archive-date=19 June 2006 | url-status=live | df=dmy-all }}</ref> and informed their controller.{{citation needed|date=December 2022}}
* ''U.S. crewmen's perceptions of intent'': Surviving crewmembers of the ''Liberty'' say that Israel's attack on the ship was "deliberate" and with full knowledge that the vessel was American. Israeli investigation and history reports agree that the attack was deliberate—but against what they believed was an Egyptian vessel.{{citation needed|date=December 2022}}
* ''Distinctiveness of USS Liberty's appearance'': It is disputed whether the ''Liberty'' would have been immediately recognizable as a different vessel from the Egyptian ship ''El Quseir''. Admiral Tom Moorer stated that the ''Liberty'' was the most identifiable ship in the U.S. Navy and in an interview with the ''Washington Post'' stated that it was "ridiculous" to suggest that it would not be identified as such. Israel states in its inquiry and history reports that the identification as the ''El Quseir'' was made by the torpedo boats while the ''Liberty'' was enveloped in smoke and was based on "The Red Book", a guide to Arab fleets that did not include U.S. vessels.{{citation needed|date=December 2022}}
* ''Identification markings'': ''Liberty'' bore an eight-foot-high "5" and a four-foot-high [[Engineering:Technical research ship|"GTR"]] along either bow, clearly displaying her hull (or "pennant") number (AGTR-5) to indicate she was a technical research ship. She also had {{convert|18|in|mm|adj=on}}-high letters spelling the vessel's name across her [[Engineering:Stern|stern]]. These markings were not cursive Arabic script but in the Latin alphabet. Israeli pilots initially said they were primarily concerned with ensuring the ship was not an Israeli warship and that they ended the air attack when they noticed the Latin alphabet markings.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/liberty.html|title=The USS ''Liberty''|publisher=Jewishvirtuallibrary.org|access-date=26 November 2011|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111104195119/http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/liberty.html|archive-date=4 November 2011|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref>{{better source needed|JVL|date=December 2022}}
* ''Ship's identification known during attack'': A James Bamford book<ref>''Body of Secrets'', by James Bamford, Doubleday, 2001 ({{ISBN|0-09-942774-5}})</ref> published in 2001 said that secret NSA intercepts indicate that Israeli pilots had full knowledge they were attacking a U.S. vessel.<ref name="archives.cnn.com"/> 
* ''Effort for identification'': The American crew says the attacking aircraft did not make identification runs over ''Liberty'', but began to strafe immediately. Israel says several identification passes were made. The Naval Court of Enquiry, based on the Israeli timeline of events, found: "One may infer from the fact that within a period of approximately 15 minutes, the request was transmitted (for aircraft to be dispatched), received, a command decision made, aircraft dispatched, and the attack launched, that no significant time was expended in an effort to identify the ship from the air before the attack was launched."<ref>[http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/SalansMemo.pdf Salans Memo pdf Salans Report] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081219072344/http://www.thelibertyincident.com/docs/SalansMemo.pdf |date=19 December 2008 }} 21 September 1967</ref>{{primary source inline|date=December 2022}}
* ''Speed of the vessel'': According to Israeli accounts, the torpedo boat made erroneous measurements that indicated that ''Liberty'' was steaming at {{convert|30|kn|mph km/h|lk=in|abbr=on}}. Israeli naval doctrine at the time required that a ship traveling at that speed must be presumed to be a warship. A second boat calculated ''Liberty''{{'}}s speed to be {{convert|28|kn|mph km/h|abbr=on}}. The maximum sustained speed of ''Liberty'' was only {{convert|17.5|kn|mph km/h|abbr=on}}, {{convert|21|kn|mph km/h|abbr=on}}. According to the Court of Enquiry findings the ship was steaming at {{convert|5|kn|mph km/h|abbr=on}} at the time of the attack.{{citation needed|date=December 2022}}

[[File:Cdr. McGonagle in his cabin on board USS Liberty, June 1967.jpg|thumb|Commander W.L. McGonagle in his damaged cabin after the attack]]
* ''Motive'': James Bamford, among others, says one possible motive was to prevent the United States from eavesdropping on Israeli military activities and monitoring the events taking place in nearby Gaza.<ref name="archives.cnn.com">[http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/04/23/liberty.attack Israel's 1967 attack on U.S. ship deliberate, book says] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070103050912/http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/04/23/liberty.attack/ |date=3 January 2007 }} CNN, 23 April 2001</ref> In a study of the incident concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support either accidental or deliberate attack, Colonel Peyton E. Smith wrote: "The attack was most likely deliberate for reasons far too sensitive to be disclosed by the U.S. (or) Israeli government and that the truth may never be known".<ref>[http://www.gtr5.com/commentary/Report%20-%20ArmyWarCollege1.pdf Assault on the USS Liberty: Deliberate Action or Tragic Accident] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081219072403/http://www.gtr5.com/commentary/Report%20-%20ArmyWarCollege1.pdf |date=19 December 2008 }} Colonel Peyton E. Smith 30 March 2007</ref> Author and former crew member James M. Ennes theorized, in the epilogue of his book ''Assault on the Liberty'', that the motive was to prevent the ship's crew from monitoring radio traffic that might reveal Israel as the aggressor in its impending invasion of Syria, which the White House opposed. According to the Anti Defamation League "the argument that Israel knowingly attacked an American ship has always lacked a convincing motive".<ref>[http://www.adl.org/israel/uss.asp The USS ''Liberty'' Attack] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081114104406/http://www.adl.org/Israel/uss.asp |date=14 November 2008 }} Anti Defamation League</ref>
* ''Israeli aircraft markings'': The USS ''Liberty'' Veterans Association says that the attacking Israeli aircraft were not marked,<ref name="usslibertyveterans.org"/> but a crewmember recalls watching a Jewish officer cry on seeing the blue Star of David on their fuselages.<ref name="trib"/> The torpedo boats that attacked ''Liberty'' flew the Israeli flag.<ref name="Gerhard 1981 29"/>
* ''Jamming'': During U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry testimony, Wayne L. Smith, Radioman Chief, testified that radio communications were intermittently jammed. Rear Admiral Kidd (a senior member of Naval Court of Inquiry) reported: "''Liberty'' reported apparent discriminate jamming on certain [[Continuous wave#Radio|CW]] and voice circuits just before and during each aircraft's individual attack." None of the Israeli Defense Forces' investigations or reports confirm or deny radio frequency jamming.{{citation needed|date=December 2022}}
* ''Jamming as a motive'': A UPI report published by ''The Washington Star'' on 19 September 1977 indicated CIA documents obtained by the American Palestine Committee suggested Israeli defense minister Moshe Dayan ordered the attack, because ''Liberty'' was jamming Israeli communications. A CIA document dated 23 June 1967 said ''Liberty'' had been jamming Israeli communications. Another CIA document dated 9 November 1967 quoted unidentified agency informants as saying Dayan personally ordered the attack; the CIA said the documents were "unevaluated for accuracy".<ref>{{cite journal |date=December 1977 |title=New Light on the ''Liberty'' |journal=Proceedings |volume=103 |issue=12 |page=108 |publisher=United States Naval Institute }}</ref>
* ''Israeli ships' actions after the torpedo hit'': Officers and men of ''Liberty'' say that after the torpedo attack and the abandon ship order, motor torpedo boats strafed the ship's topside with automatic gunfire preventing men from escaping from below, and either machine-gunned or confiscated the empty life rafts that had been set afloat.<ref>
{{harvnb|Ennes|1987|pp=95–96}}

* [http://ussliberty.org/report/exhibit%252010.pdf] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090327062037/http://ussliberty.org/report/exhibit%252010.pdf|date=27 March 2009}}
* [http://ussliberty.org/report/exhibit%252011.pdf] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090327062038/http://ussliberty.org/report/exhibit%252011.pdf|date=27 March 2009}}
</ref><ref name="WRMEA"/> The IDF says that ''Liberty'' was not fired upon after the torpedo attack and that a rescue raft was fished from the water while searching for survivors.<ref name="IDF History Report 1982 19">{{harvnb|IDF History Report|1982|p=19}}</ref>
* ''Israeli offers of help'': The ''Liberty''{{'}}s captain, several of the ''Liberty''{{'}}s crewmen and the Israelis stated that help was offered, but at different times. The ''Liberty''{{'}}s Deck Log, signed by the captain, has an entry at 15:03 stating: "One MTB returned to the ship and signaled, 'Do you need help.'{{Thin space}}" The Israel Defense Forces's History Report and the Ram Ron report both say that help was offered at 16:40 and the offer was rejected.<ref name="IDF History Report 1982 19"/><ref name=IDFRRIR9/>

==See also==
*''The Attack on the Liberty: The Untold Story of Israel's Deadly 1967 Assault on a U.S. Spy Ship''

==References==

===Notes===
{{Notelist}}

===Citations===
{{Reflist}}

===Bibliography===
* {{cite book|last=Ennes|first=James, N. Jr.|title=Assault on the Liberty: The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ybgHAwAAQBAJ&pg=PP1|publisher=Random House|location=New York|date=1987|isbn=978-5-87232-402-7}}; [http://ussliberty.org/jimsbook.htm ussliberty.org] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220309141702/http://www.ussliberty.org/jimsbook.htm |date=9 March 2022 }}
* {{cite report |first1=William D. |last1=Gerhard |first2=Henry W. |last2=Millington |title=Attack on a SIGINT Collector, the USS ''Liberty'' |year=1981 |work=NSA History Report, U.S. Cryptologic History series |publisher=National Security Agency |url=http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/uss_liberty/attack_sigint.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=30 October 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121030155345/http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/uss_liberty/attack_sigint.pdf}} partially declassified 1999, 2003.
* {{cite report |ref={{harvid|IDF History Report|1982}} |title=The Attack on the 'Liberty' Incident |date=June 1982 |publisher=Israel Defence Forces, History Department |url=http://thelibertyincident.com/docs/israeli/IDF-history-report-en.pdf}}
* {{cite report |ref={{harvid|IDF Ram Ron Report|1967}}|url=http://thelibertyincident.com/docs/israeli/ram-ron-report.pdf|title=Ram Ron Report|author=Colonel Ram Ron|publisher=Israel Defense Forces Inquiry Commission Report|date=16 June 1967}}
* {{cite book |last=Lenczowski |first=George |title=American presidents and the Middle East |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vZZtAAAAMAAJ&pg=PP1 |year=1990 |publisher=Duke University Press |isbn=978-0-8223-0963-5}}
* {{cite magazine |last=Oren |first=Michael B. |title=The 'USS Liberty': Case Closed |magazine=Azure |date=Spring 2000 |issue=9 |url=https://azure.org.il/include/print.php?id=290}}
* {{cite book |last=Scott |first=James |title=The Attack on the Liberty: The Untold Story of Israel's Deadly 1967 Assault on a U.S. Spy Ship |publisher=Simon & Schuster |year=2009 |isbn=978-1-4165-5482-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Tn0pk8pVE88C&pg=PP1}}

==Further reading==
* Scott, James M. "The Spy Ship Left Out in the Cold" ''Naval History Magazine'' (June 2017) 31#3 pp 28+ [https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2017/june/spy-ship-left-out-cold online]
* {{Cite book |last=Bregman |first=Ahron |title=A History of Israel |publisher=[[Company:Palgrave Macmillan|Palgrave Macmillan]] |year=2002 |location=London |isbn=0-333-67631-9 |url=https://archive.org/details/historyofisrael0000breg }}
* {{cite book|author=Cristol, A. Jay|title=The ''Liberty'' Incident: The 1967 Israeli Attack on the U.S. Navy Spy Ship|url=https://archive.org/details/libertyincident10000cris|location=Dulles, Virginia|publisher=Brassey's|year=2002|isbn=1-57488-414-X}}
* [http://www.salon.com/books/int/2002/06/12/oren/ ''Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East''], by Michael B. Oren, Oxford University Press ({{ISBN|0-19-515174-7}})
* ''The Puzzle Palace'', by James Bamford, Penguin Books, 1982, has a detailed description of the Israeli attack on the SIGINT ship USS ''Liberty'', and the events leading up to it, on pages 279–293.
* ''Body of Secrets'', by James Bamford, devotes a detailed chapter to the incident, and concludes it was deliberate. Doubleday, 2001 ({{ISBN|0-09-942774-5}})
* Peter Hounam, ''Operation Cyanide: Why the Bombing of the USS ''Liberty'' Nearly Caused World War III'', Vision Paperbacks. 2003, {{ISBN|1-904132-19-7}},
* Anthony Pearson, ''Conspiracy of Silence: The Attack on the USS'' Liberty, 1979 {{ISBN|0-7043-2164-5}}
* {{cite book|author=Thomas, Baylis|title=How Israel Was Won: A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict|url=https://archive.org/details/howisraelwaswonc00bayl|url-access=registration|location=Lanham, Maryland| publisher=Lexington Books|year=1999|isbn=0-7391-0064-5}} In Chapter 15 on "The Six-Day War and Its Consequences", dissects the sequence of events and concurrent attacks on Arab towns and explores the possibility that the attack on this U.S. spy ship was an intentional act to prevent U.S. monitoring of Israeli military actions, and that the intent was to kill all U.S. personnel on board before any kind of communications could be sent out.

==External links==


[[Category:Signals intelligence]]

{{Sourceattribution|USS Liberty incident}}