View source for Philosophy:Contrastivism

'''Contrastivism''', or the '''contrast theory of meaning''', is an [[Philosophy:Epistemology|epistemological]] theory proposed by [[Biography:Jonathan Schaffer|Jonathan Schaffer]] that suggests that knowledge attributions have a ternary structure of the form 'S knows that p rather than q'. This is in contrast to the traditional view whereby knowledge attributions have a binary structure of the form 'S knows that p'. Contrastivism was suggested as an alternative to [[Contextualism|contextualism]]. Both are semantic theories that try to explain skepticism using semantic methods.

[[Biography:Walter Sinnott-Armstrong|Walter Sinnott-Armstrong]] proposed in a paper titled "A Contrastivist Manifesto"<ref>{{cite journal | doi = 10.1080/02691720802546120 | volume=22 | issue=3 | title=A Contrastivist Manifesto | journal=Social Epistemology | pages=257–270| year=2008 | last1=Sinnott‐Armstrong | first1=Walter | s2cid=145605445 }}</ref> a variant of contrastivism that, he argues, differs from contextualism, invariantism, and Schaffer's contrastivism.

[[Biography:Ernest Gellner|Ernest Gellner]] in ''[[Biography:Ernest Gellner#Words and Things|Words and Things]]'' "terms derive their meaning from the fact that there are or could be things which fall under them and that there are others which do not."<ref>{{Cite book|last=Gellner|first=Ernest|title=Words and Things|page=40}}</ref>

== The contrast clause ==
The '...rather than q' part of the knowledge attribution is known as the 'contrast clause'. This is what separates it from traditional binary formulations. Rather than taking the same road as [[Contextualism|contextualism]] and saying that the meaning of 'knows' can change with attributor context the contrastivist claims that it is the unspoken contrast clause that changes. This can be used to avoid skeptical problems.

==See also==

*Contrast (linguistics)
*Meaning (linguistic), meaning which is communicated through the use of language.
*[[Meaning (non-linguistic)]]

==References==
{{reflist}}

== Further reading ==
* {{cite journal | last1 = Schaffer | first1 = J | year = 2004 | title = From Contextualism to Contrastivism | journal = Philosophical Studies | volume = 119 | pages = 73–103 | doi=10.1023/b:phil.0000029351.56460.8c| s2cid = 9470281 }}
* Schaffer, J., "Contrastive Knowledge," in Gendler and Hawthorne, eds. (2005), Oxford University Press, pp. 235–71.
* Schaffer, J., "The Contrast-Sensitivity of Knowledge Ascriptions," ''Social Epistemology'' '''22'''(3):235–245 (2008).

{{philosophy of language}}

[[Category:Theories of language]]
[[Category:Epistemological theories]]
[[Category:Skepticism]]



{{Sourceattribution|Contrastivism}}