View source for Philosophy:Declarative knowledge

{{Short description|Awareness of facts}}

[[File:Latin dictionary.jpg|thumb|alt=Photo of the Totius Latinitatis Lexicon by Egidio Forcellini, a multi-volume Latin dictionary|Declarative knowledge can be expressed using declarative sentences stored in books.]]

'''Declarative knowledge''' is an [[Philosophy:Awareness|awareness]] of facts that can be expressed using declarative sentences. It is also called '''theoretical knowledge''', '''descriptive knowledge''', '''propositional knowledge''', and '''knowledge-that'''. It is not restricted to one specific use or purpose and can be stored in books or on computers.

[[Philosophy:Epistemology|Epistemology]] is the main discipline studying declarative knowledge. Among other things, it studies the essential components of declarative knowledge. According to a traditionally influential view, it has three elements: it is a [[Philosophy:Belief|belief]] that is [[Truth|true]] and [[Philosophy:Justification (epistemology)|justified]]. As a belief, it is a subjective commitment to the accuracy of the believed claim while truth is an objective aspect. To be justified, a belief has to be [[Philosophy:Rationality|rational]] by being based on good reasons. This means that mere guesses do not amount to knowledge even if they are true. In contemporary epistemology, additional or alternative components have been suggested. One proposal is that no [[Philosophy:Defeater|contradicting evidence]] is present. Other suggestions are that the belief was caused by a reliable cognitive process and that the belief is infallible.

Types of declarative knowledge can be distinguished based on the source of knowledge, the type of claim that is known, and how [[Philosophy:Certainty|certain]] the knowledge is. A central contrast is between [[Philosophy:A priori and a posteriori|''a posteriori'']] knowledge, which arises from [[Philosophy:Experience|experience]], and ''a priori'' knowledge, which is grounded in pure rational reflection. Other classifications include domain-specific knowledge and [[Philosophy:General knowledge|general knowledge]], knowledge of facts, [[Philosophy:Concept|concept]]s, and principles as well as [[Philosophy:Explicit knowledge|explicit]] and implicit knowledge.

Declarative knowledge is often contrasted with practical knowledge and [[Knowledge by acquaintance|knowledge by acquaintance]]. Practical knowledge consists of [[Philosophy:Skill|skill]]s, like knowing how to ride a horse. It is a form of non-intellectual knowledge since it does not need to involve true beliefs. Knowledge by acquaintance is a familiarity with something based on first-hand experience, like knowing the taste of chocolate. This familiarity can be present even if the person does not possess any factual information about the object. Some theorists also contrast declarative knowledge with conditional knowledge, prescriptive knowledge, structural knowledge, case knowledge, and strategic knowledge.

Declarative knowledge is required for various activities, such as labeling phenomena as well as describing and explaining them. It can guide the processes of problem-solving and [[Decision-making|decision-making]]. In many cases, its value is based on its usefulness in achieving one's goals. However, its usefulness is not always obvious and not all instances of declarative knowledge are valuable. A lot of knowledge taught at school is declarative knowledge. It is said to be stored as [[Biology:Explicit memory|explicit memory]] and can be learned through rote memorization of isolated facts. But in many cases, it is advantageous to foster a deeper [[Philosophy:Understanding|understanding]] that integrates the new information into wider structures and connects it to pre-existing knowledge. Sources of declarative knowledge are [[Perception|perception]], [[Philosophy:Introspection|introspection]], [[Memory|memory]], [[Philosophy:Logical reasoning|reasoning]], and [[Testimony|testimony]].

== Definition and semantic field ==
Declarative knowledge is an [[Philosophy:Awareness|awareness]] or [[Philosophy:Understanding|understanding]] of [[Philosophy:Fact|fact]]s. It can be expressed through spoken and written language using declarative sentences and can thus be acquired through verbal communication.<ref>{{multiref2 |1={{harvnb|Colman|2009a|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095705926;jsessionid=A19D30BFCF6E02A0F21A87B805F10DEE declarative knowledge]}} |2={{harvnb|Woolfolk|Hughes|Walkup|2008|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=56bOkxXZXKYC&pg=PA307 307]}} |3={{harvnb|Strube|Wender|1993|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=V1DFcqt1MXAC&pg=PA354 354]}} |4={{harvnb|Tokuhama-Espinosa|2011|p=255}} |5={{harvnb|Holyoak|Morrison|2005|p=371}} }}</ref> Examples of declarative knowledge are knowing "that Princess Diana died in 1997" or "that Goethe was 83 when he finished writing [[Unsolved:Faust|Faust]]".{{sfn|Colman|2009a|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095705926;jsessionid=A19D30BFCF6E02A0F21A87B805F10DEE declarative knowledge]}} Declarative knowledge involves [[Philosophy:Mental state|mental representations]] in the form of [[Philosophy:Concept|concept]]s, ideas, theories, and general rules. Through these representations, the person stands in a relationship to a particular aspect of reality by depicting what it is like. Declarative knowledge tends to be context-independent: it is not tied to any specific use and may be employed for many tasks.{{sfn|Morrison|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=znbkHaC8QeMC&pg=PA371 371]}}{{sfn|Reif|2008}}{{sfn|Zagzebski|1999|p=93}} It includes a wide range of phenomena and encompasses both knowledge of individual facts and general laws. An example for individual facts is knowing that the atomic mass of gold is 196.97 [[Dalton (unit)|u]]. Knowing that the color of leaves of some trees changes in autumn, on the other hand, belongs to general laws.{{sfn|Woolfolk|Margetts|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=whziBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA251 251]}} Due to its verbal nature, declarative knowledge can be stored in [[Social:Media (communication)|media]] like books and harddisks. It may also be processed using computers and plays a key role in various forms of [[Artificial intelligence|artificial intelligence]], for example, in the [[Knowledge base|knowledge base]] of expert systems.<ref>{{multiref2 |1={{harvnb|HarperCollins staff}} |2={{harvnb|Magee|Popper|1971|pp=[https://archive.org/details/modernbritishphi0000mage/page/74 74–75]|loc=Conversation with Karl Popper}} |3={{harvnb|Walton|2005|pp=59, 64}} |4={{harvnb|Leondes|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5kSamKhS560C&pg=PA804 804]}} |5={{harvnb|Kent|Williams|1993|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Rx3hqGdXcooC&pg=PA295 295]}} }}</ref>

Terms like theoretical knowledge, descriptive knowledge, propositional knowledge, and knowledge-that are used as synonyms of declarative knowledge and express its different aspects. Theoretical knowledge is knowledge of what is the case, in the past, present, or future independent of a practical outlook concerning how to achieve a specific goal. Descriptive knowledge is knowledge that involves [[Philosophy:Description|description]]s of actual or speculative objects, events, or concepts. Propositional knowledge asserts that a [[Proposition|proposition]] or claim about the world is true. This is often expressed using a that-clause, as in "knowing that kangaroos hop" or "knowing that 2 + 2 = 4". For this reason, it is also referred to as ''knowledge-that''.<ref>{{multiref2 |1={{harvnb|Sadegh-Zadeh|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=25W4gBfpX5QC&pg=PA450 450–451, 470, 475]}} |2={{harvnb|Burstein|Holsapple|2008|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=q_3sRkRKZQwC&pg=PA44 44–45]}} |3={{harvnb|Hetherington|2023|loc=[https://iep.utm.edu/knowledg/#SH1b 1b. Knowledge-That]}} |4={{harvnb|Burgin|2016|p=48}} }}</ref> Declarative knowledge contrasts with non-declarative knowledge, which does not concern the explicit comprehension of factual [[Information|information]] regarding the world. In this regard, practical knowledge in the form of [[Philosophy:Skill|skill]]s and [[Knowledge by acquaintance|knowledge by acquaintance]] as a type of experiential familiarity are not forms of declarative knowledge.{{sfn|Colman|2009b|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100237349 non-declarative knowledge]}}{{sfn|Pavese|2022|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/ introduction]}}{{sfn|Klauer|Manstetten|Petersen|Schiller|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=YjglDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA105 105–106]}} The main discipline investigating declarative knowledge is called [[Philosophy:Epistemology|epistemology]]. It tries to determine its nature, how it arises, what value it has, and what its limits are.{{sfn|Truncellito}}{{sfn|Moser|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5NJjAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 3]}}{{sfn|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/#KnowFact 2.3 Knowing Facts]}}

== Components ==
A central issue in epistemology is to determine the components or essential features of declarative knowledge. This field of inquiry is called the ''analysis of knowledge''. It aims to provide the conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for a state to amount to declarative knowledge. In this regard, it is similar to how a chemist breaks down a sample by identifying all the chemical elements composing it.{{sfn|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/ introduction]}}{{sfn|Zagzebski|1999|p=96}}{{sfn|Gupta|2021}}

[[File:Justified true belief.png|thumb|alt=Venn diagram of justified true belief|The main components traditionally associated with knowledge are belief, truth, and justification.]]
A traditionally influential view states that declarative knowledge has three essential features: it is (1) a [[Philosophy:Belief|belief]] that is (2) [[Truth|true]] and (3) [[Philosophy:Justification (epistemology)|justified]].{{sfn|Klein|1998|loc=Knowledge, concept of}}{{sfn|Zagzebski|1999|pp=99–100}}{{sfn|Seel|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=xZuSxo4JxoAC&pg=PA1001 1001]}} This position is referred to as the justified-true-belief theory of knowledge and is often seen as the standard view.{{sfn|Hetherington|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OwnFDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA219 219]}}{{sfn|Carter|Gordon|Jarvis|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=I3w7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA114 114]}} This view faced significant criticism following a series of counterexamples given by [[Biography:Edmund Gettier|Edmund Gettier]] in the latter  half of the 20th century. In response, various alternative theories of the elements of declarative knowledge have been suggested. Some see justified true belief as a necessary condition that is not sufficient by itself and discuss additional components that are needed. Another response is to deny that justification is needed and seek a different component to replace it.{{sfn|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/ 3. The Gettier Problem]}}{{sfn|Kornblith|2008|pp=[https://academic.oup.com/book/8079/chapter-abstract/153495629?redirectedFrom=fulltext 5–6]|loc=1 Knowledge Needs No Justification}}{{sfn|Hetherington|2022|loc=[https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/ introduction]}} Some theorists, like [[Biography:Timothy Williamson|Timothy Williamson]], reject the idea that declarative knowledge can be deconstructed into various constituent parts. They argue instead that it is a basic and unanalyzable epistemological state.{{sfn|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#KnowFirs 11. Knowledge First]}}

=== Belief ===
One commonly accepted component of knowledge is belief. In this sense, whoever knows that whales are animals automatically also believes that whales are animals. A belief is a mental state that affirms that something is the case. As an attitude toward a proposition, it belongs to the subjective side of knowledge. Some theorists, like Luis Villoro, distinguish between weak and strong beliefs. Having a weak belief implies that the person merely presumes that something is the case. They guess that the claim is probably correct while acknowledging at the same time that they might very well be mistaken about it. This contrasts with strong belief, which implies a substantial commitment to the believed claim. It involves [[Philosophy:Certainty|certainty]] in the form of being sure about it. For declarative knowledge, this stronger sense of belief is relevant.<ref>{{multiref2 |1={{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#BeliCond 1.2 The Belief Condition]}} |2={{harvnb|Villoro|1998|pp=144, 148–149}}  |3={{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=93}}  |4={{harvnb|Black|1971|pp=152–158}} |5={{harvnb|Farkas|2015|pp=185–200}} |6={{harvnb|Kleinman|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=fG_rDQAAQBAJ&pg=PT258 258]}} }}</ref>

A few epistemologists, like Katalin Farkas, claim that, at least in some cases, knowledge is not a form of belief but a different type of mental state. One argument for this position is based on statements like "I don't believe it, I know it", which may be used to express that the person is very certain and has good reason to affirm this claim. However, this argument is not generally accepted since knowing something does not imply that the person disbelieves the claim. A further explanation is to hold that this statement is a linguistic tool to emphasize that the person is well-informed. In this regard, it only denies that a weak belief exists without rejecting that a stronger form of belief is involved.<ref>{{multiref2 |1={{harvnb|Hacker|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ZMXUF9aGmf8C&pg=PT211 211]}} |2={{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#BeliCond 1.2 The Belief Condition]}} |3={{harvnb|Black|1971|pp=152–158}} |4={{harvnb|Farkas|2015|pp=185–200}} }}</ref>

=== Truth ===
Beliefs are either true or false depending on whether they accurately represent reality. Truth is usually seen as one of the essential components of knowledge. This means that it is impossible to know a claim that is false. For example, it is possible to believe that Hillary Clinton won the 2016 US Presidential election but nobody can know it because this event did not occur. That a proposition is true does not imply that it is [[Philosophy:Common knowledge|common knowledge]], that an irrefutable [[Proof (truth)|proof]] exists, or that someone is thinking about it. Instead, it only means that it presents things as they are. For example, when flipping a coin, it may be true that it will land heads even if it is not possible to predict this with certainty. Truth is an objective factor of knowledge that goes beyond the mental sphere of belief since it usually depends on what the world outside the person's [[Philosophy:Mind|mind]] is like.{{sfn|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#TrutCond 1.1 The Truth Condition]}}{{sfn|Villoro|1998|pp=199–200}}{{sfn|Tolliver|1989|pp=29–51}}

Some epistemologists hold that there are at least some forms of knowledge that do not require truth. For example, Joseph Thomas Tolliver argues that some mental states amount to knowledge only because of the causes and effects they have. This is the case even if they do not represent anything and are therefore neither true nor false.{{sfn|Tolliver|1989|pp=29–51}}{{sfn|Villoro|1998|pp=206–210}} A different outlook is found in the field of the [[Philosophy:Knowledge#Anthropology|anthropology of knowledge]], which studies how knowledge is acquired, stored, retrieved, and communicated. In this discipline, knowledge is often understood in a very wide sense that is roughly equivalent to understanding and [[Social:Culture|culture]]. In this regard, the main interest is usually about how people ascribe truth values to meaning-contents, like when affirming an assertion, independent of whether this assertion is true or false.{{sfn|Cohen|2010|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/40606072 S193–S202]}}{{sfn|Barth|2002|pp=1–18}}{{sfn|Allwood|2013|pp=[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025 69–72]|loc=Anthropology of Knowledge}} Despite these positions, it is widely accepted in epistemology that truth is an essential component of declarative knowledge.{{sfn|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#TrutCond 1.1 The Truth Condition]}}

=== Justification ===
In epistemology, justification means that a claim is supported by [[Philosophy:Evidence|evidence]] or that a person has good reasons for believing it. This implies some form of appraisal in relation to an evaluative standard of [[Philosophy:Rationality|rationality]].{{sfn|Watson|loc=[https://iep.utm.edu/epi-just/ Introduction]}}{{sfn|Goldman|1992|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=McV7NyYDmG4C&pg=PA105 105–106]}} For example, a person who just checked their bank account and saw that their balance is 500 dollars has a good reason to believe that they have 500 dollars in their bank account.{{sfn|Evans|Smith|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rETofJsbbDEC&pg=PT32 32–33]}} However, justification by itself does not imply that a belief is true. For example, if someone reads the time from their clock they may form a justified belief about the current time even if the clock stopped a while ago and shows a false time now.{{sfn|Pritchard|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=hB22EAAAQBAJ&pg=PT38 38]}} If a person has a justified belief then they are often able to articulate what this belief is and to provide arguments stating the reasons supporting it. However, this ability to articulate one's reasons is not an essential requirement of justification.{{sfn|Goldman|1992|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=McV7NyYDmG4C&pg=PA105 105–106]}}

Justification is usually included as a component of knowledge to exclude lucky guesses. For example, a compulsive gambler flipping a coin may be certain that it will land heads this time without a good reason for this belief. In this case, the belief does not amount to knowledge even if it turns out that it was true. This observation can be easily explained by including justification as an essential component. This implies that the gambler's belief does not amount to knowledge because it lacks justification. In this regard, mere true opinion is not enough to establish knowledge. A central issue in epistemology concerns the standards of justification, i.e., what conditions have to be fulfilled for a belief to be justified. [[Philosophy:Internalism and externalism#Epistemology|Internalists]] understand justification as a purely subjective component, akin to belief. They claim that a belief is justified if it stands in the right relation to other mental states of the believer. For example, perceptual experiences can justify beliefs about the perceived object. This contrasts with externalists, who claim that justification involves objective factors that are external to the person's mind. Such factors can include [[Causality|causal]] relations with the object of the belief or that reliable cognitive processes are responsible for the formation of the belief.{{sfn|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#cond3 1.3 The Justification Condition]}}{{sfn|Poston|loc=[https://iep.utm.edu/int-ext/ introduction]}}

[[File:Foundationalism, coherentism, infinitism.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Diagram showing the differences between foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism|Foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism are theories about how justification arises. The black arrows symbolize how one belief supports another belief.]]
A closely related issue concerns the question of how the different mental states have to be related to each other to be justified. For example, one belief may be supported by another belief. However, it is questionable whether this is sufficient for justification if the second belief is itself not justified. For example, a person may believe that Ford cars are cheaper than BMWs because they heard this from a friend. However, this belief may not be justified if there is no good reason to think that the friend is a reliable source of information. This can lead to an [[Infinite regress|infinite regress]] since whatever reason is provided for the friend's reliability may itself lack justification. Three popular responses to this problem are [[Philosophy:Foundationalism|foundationalism]], [[Philosophy:Coherentism|coherentism]], and [[Infinitism|infinitism]]. According to foundationalists, some reasons are foundational and do not depend on other reasons for their justification. Coherentists also reject the idea that an infinite chain of reasons is needed and argue that different beliefs can mutually support each other without one being more basic than the others. Infinitists, on the other hand, accept the idea that an infinite chain of reasons is required.<ref>{{multiref2 |1={{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=Knowledge, concept of}} |2={{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020}} |3={{harvnb|Lehrer|2015|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yKG9CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1. The Analysis of Knowledge]}} |4={{harvnb|Cameron|2018}} }}</ref>

Many debates concerning the nature of declarative knowledge focus on the role of justification, specifically whether it is needed at all and what else might be needed to complement it. Influential in this regard was a series of thought experiments by Edmund Gettier. They present concrete cases of justified true beliefs that fail to amount to knowledge. The reason for their failure is a type of epistemic luck. This means that the justification is not relevant to whether the belief is true. In one thought experiment, Smith and Jones apply for a job and before officially declaring the result, the company president tells Smith that Jones will get the job. Smith saw that Jones has 10 coins in his pocket so he comes to form the justified belief that the successful candidate has 10 coins in his pocket. In the end, it turns out that Smith gets the job after all. By lucky coincidence, Smith also has 10 coins in his pocket. Gettier claims that, because of this coincidence, Smith's belief that the successful candidate has 10 coins in his pocket does not amount to knowledge. The belief is justified and true but the justification is not relevant to the truth.{{sfn|Hetherington|2022|loc=[https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/#H3 3. Gettier’s Original Challenge]}}{{sfn|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#GettProb 3. The Gettier Problem]}}

=== Others ===
[[File:Edmund L Gettier III ca 1960s umass.jpg|thumb|alt=Photo of Edmund Gettier|The thought experiments by Edmund Gettier influenced many epistemologists to seek additional components of declarative knowledge.]]
In response to [[Gettier problem|Gettier's thought experiments]], various further components of declarative knowledge have been suggested. Some of them are intended as additional elements besides belief, truth, and justification while others are understood as replacements for justification.{{sfn|Borges|Almeida|Klein|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=mhBADwAAQBAJ&pg=PA180 180]}}{{sfn|Broadbent|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_GSFCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA128 128]}}{{sfn|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#DoinWithJust 6. Doing Without Justification?]}}

According to defeasibility theory, an additional factor besides having evidence in favor of the belief is that no [[Philosophy:Defeater|defeating evidence]] is present. Defeating evidence of a belief is evidence that undermines the justification of the belief. For example, if a person looks outside the window and sees a rainbow then this impression justifies their belief that there is a rainbow. However, if the person just ate a [[Chemistry:Psychedelic drug|psychedelic drug]] then this is defeating evidence since it undermines the reliability of their experiences. Defeasibility theorists claim that, in this case, the belief does not amount to knowledge because defeating evidence is present. As an additional component of knowledge, they require that the person has no defeating evidence of the belief.{{sfn|Craig|1996|loc=[https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/knowledge-defeasibility-theory-of/v-1 Knowledge, defeasibility theory of]}}{{sfn|Lee|2017|pp=[https://surface.syr.edu/etd/765/ 6–9]}}{{sfn|Sudduth|loc=[https://iep.utm.edu/defeaters-in-epistemology/ Introduction; 1. The Concept of Defeasibility]}} Some theorists demand the stronger requirement that there is no true proposition that would defeat the belief, independent of whether the person is aware of this proposition or not.{{sfn|Sudduth|loc=[https://iep.utm.edu/defeaters-in-epistemology/#SH2b 2b. Defeasibility Analyses and Propositional Defeaters]}} A closely related theory holds that beliefs can only amount to knowledge if they are not inferred from a falsehood.{{sfn|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#NoFalsLemm 4. No False Lemmas]}}

A further theory is based on the idea that knowledge states should be responsive to what the world is like. One suggested component in this regard is that the belief is safe or sensitive. This means that the person has the belief because it is true but that they would not hold the belief if it was false. In this regard, the person's belief tracks the state of the world.{{sfn|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#ModaCond 5. Modal Conditions]}}

Some theories do not try to provide additional requirements but instead propose replacing justification with alternative components. For example, according to some forms of [[Philosophy:Reliabilism|reliabilism]], a true belief amounts to knowledge if it was formed through a reliable cognitive process. A cognitive process is reliable if it produces mostly true beliefs in actual situations and would also do so in counterfactual situations.
{{sfn|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#DoinWithJust 6. Doing Without Justification?]}}{{sfn|Bernecker|Pritchard|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=MmrFBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT266 266]}}{{sfn|Becker|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=flt3vRPDlukC&pg=PA12 12]}} Examples of reliable processes are perception and reasoning.{{sfn|Crumley|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OX-7AAAAQBAJ&pg=PT117 117]}} An outcome of reliabilism is that knowledge is not restricted to humans. The reason is that reliable belief-formation processes may also be present in other animals, like dogs, apes, or rats, even if they do not possess justification for their beliefs.{{sfn|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#DoinWithJust 6. Doing Without Justification?]}} [[Philosophy:Virtue epistemology|Virtue epistemology]] is a closely related approach that understands knowledge as the manifestation of [[Philosophy:Epistemic virtue|epistemic virtue]]s. It agrees with regular forms of reliabilism that knowledge is not a matter of luck but puts additional emphasis on the evaluative aspect of knowledge and the underlying skills responsible for it.{{sfn|Turri|Alfano|Greco|2021|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/#Know 5. Knowledge]}}{{sfn|Baehr|loc=[https://iep.utm.edu/virtue-epistemology/ introduction; 2. Virtue Reliabilism]|ref=Baehr2}}{{sfn|Battaly|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=bkBvDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT772 772]}}

According to causal theories of knowledge, a necessary element of knowing a fact is that this fact somehow caused the knowledge of it. This is the case, for example, if a belief about the color of a house is based on a perceptual experience, which causally connects the house to the belief. This causal connection does not have to be direct and can be mediated through steps like activating memories and drawing [[Philosophy:Inference|inference]]s.{{sfn|Schelling|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=UQLpBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA55 55–56]}}{{sfn|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#DoinWithJust 6. Doing Without Justification?]}}

In many cases, the goal of suggesting additional components is to avoid cases of epistemic luck. In this regard, some theorists have argued that the additional component would have to ensure that the belief is true. This approach is reflected in the idea that knowledge implies a form of certainty. But it sets the standards of knowledge very high and may require that a belief has to be infallible to amount to knowledge. This means that the justification ensures that the belief is true. For example, Richard Kirkham argues that the justification required for knowledge must be based on [[Self-evidence|self-evident]] premises that [[Deductive reasoning|deductively]] entail the held belief. Such a position leads to a form of [[Skepticism|skepticism]] about knowledge since the great majority of regular beliefs do not live up to these requirements. It would imply that people know very little and that most who claim to know a certain fact are mistaken. However, a more common view among epistemologists is that knowledge does not require infallibility and that many knowledge claims in everyday life are true.<ref>{{multiref2 |1={{harvnb|Kirkham|1984|pp=503, 512–513}} |2={{harvnb|Hetherington|2023|loc=[https://iep.utm.edu/knowledg/#H6 6. Standards for Knowing]}} |3={{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|pp=97–98}}  |4={{harvnb|Christensen|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=BxUU-23ESeUC&pg=PA29 29]}} }}</ref>

== Types ==
Declarative knowledge arises in many forms. It is possible to distinguish between them based on the type of content of what is known. For example, empirical knowledge is knowledge of [[Observation|observable]] facts while conceptual knowledge is an [[Philosophy:Understanding|understanding]] of general categorizations and theories as well as the relations between them.{{sfn|Campbell|O'Rourke|Silverstein|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2SgTDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}}{{sfn|Cassirer|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zEIiEAAAQBAJ&pg=RA2-PA208 208]}}{{sfn|Freitas|Jameson|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=hmESBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA189 189]}} Other examples are ethical, religious, scientific, mathematical, and logical knowledge as well as [[Philosophy:Self-knowledge (psychology)|self-knowledge]]. A further distinction focuses on the mode of how something is known. On a causal level, different sources of knowledge correspond to different types of declarative knowledge. Examples are knowledge through [[Perception|perception]], [[Philosophy:Introspection|introspection]], [[Memory|memory]], reasoning, and [[Testimony|testimony]].{{sfn|Campbell|O'Rourke|Silverstein|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2SgTDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}}{{sfn|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/#SourKnowJust 5. Sources of Knowledge and Justification]}}{{sfn|Blaauw|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=s28xEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA49 49]}}

On a logical level, forms of knowledge can be distinguished based on how a knowledge claim is supported by its premises. This classification corresponds to the different forms of [[Philosophy:Logical reasoning|logical reasoning]], such as deductive and [[Philosophy:Inductive reasoning|inductive reasoning]].{{sfn|Campbell|O'Rourke|Silverstein|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2SgTDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}}{{sfn|Flick|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=R-6GAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA123 123]}}{{sfn|Bronkhorst|Roorda|Suhre|Goedhart|2020|pp=1673–1676}} A closely related categorization focuses on the strength of the source of the justification. It distinguishes between probabilistic and apodictic knowledge. The distinction between [[Philosophy:A priori and a posteriori|''a priori'' and ''a posteriori'']] knowledge, on the other hand, focuses on the type of the source. These classifications overlap with each other at various points. For example, ''a priori'' knowledge is closely connected to apodictic, conceptual, deductive, and logical knowledge. ''A posteriori'' knowledge, on the other hand, is linked to probabilistic, empirical, inductive, and scientific knowledge. Self-knowledge may be identified with introspective knowledge.{{sfn|Campbell|O'Rourke|Silverstein|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2SgTDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}}{{sfn|Moser}}

The distinction between ''a priori'' and ''a posteriori'' knowledge is determined by the role of [[Philosophy:Experience|experience]] and matches the contrast between empirical and non-empirical knowledge. ''A posteriori'' knowledge is knowledge from experience. This means that experience, like regular perception, is responsible for its formation and justification. Knowing that the door of one's house is green is one example of ''a posteriori'' knowledge since some form of sensory observation is required. For ''a priori'' knowledge, on the other hand, no experience is required. It is based on pure rational reflection and can neither be verified nor falsified through experience. Examples are knowing that 7 + 5 = 12 or that whatever is red everywhere is not blue everywhere.<ref>{{multiref2 |1={{harvnb|Moser}} |2={{harvnb|Hamilton|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=xkrq8TypPmcC&pg=PA23 23]}} |3={{harvnb|Barber|Stainton|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2boGE2NKtpsC&pg=PA11 11]}} |4={{harvnb|Baehr|loc=[https://iep.utm.edu/apriori/ 1. An Initial Characterization]|ref=Baehr1}} }}</ref> In this context, experience means primarily sensory observation but can also include related processes, like introspection and memory. However, it does not include all [[Philosophy:Consciousness|conscious]] phenomena. For example, having a [[Intuition|rational insight]] into the solution of a mathematical problem does not mean that the resulting knowledge is ''a posteriori''. And knowing that 7 + 5 = 12 is ''a priori'' knowledge even though some form of consciousness is involved in learning what symbols like "7" and "+" mean and in becoming aware of the associated concepts.{{sfn|Baehr|loc=[https://iep.utm.edu/apriori/ 1. An Initial Characterization]|ref=Baehr1}}{{sfn|Russell|2020}}{{sfn|Moser}}

One classification distinguishes between knowledge of facts, concepts, and principles. Knowledge of facts pertains to the association of concrete information, for example, that the red color on a traffic light means ''stop'' or that Christopher Columbus sailed in 1492 from Spain to America. Knowledge of concepts applies to more abstract and general ideas that group together many individual phenomena. For example, knowledge of the concept of ''jogging'' implies knowing how it differs from walking and running as well as being able to apply this concept to concrete cases. Knowledge of principles is an awareness of general patterns of cause and effect, including rules of thumb. It is a form of understanding how things work and being aware of the explanation of why something happened the way it did. Examples are that if there is [[Astronomy:Lightning|lightning]] then there will be [[Physics:Thunder|thunder]] or if a person robs a bank then they may go to jail.{{sfn|Price|Nelson|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=SWoWAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA4 4]}}{{sfn|Foshay|Silber|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=xhWVufg1RxAC&pg=RA1-PA14 14–15]}} Similar classifications distinguish between declarative knowledge of persons, events, principles, [[Philosophy:Maxim|maxims]], and [[Philosophy:Norm|norms]].{{sfn|Chiu|Hong|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8xVdAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA102 102]}}{{sfn|Jankowski|Marshall|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=E8M7CwAAQBAJ&pg=PA70 70]}}{{sfn|Scott|Gallacher|Parry|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2nZ4DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA97 97]}}

Declarative knowledge is traditionally identified with [[Philosophy:Explicit knowledge|explicit knowledge]] and contrasted with tacit or implicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is knowledge of which the person is aware and which can be articulated. It is stored in [[Biology:Explicit memory|explicit memory]]. Implicit knowledge, on the other hand, is a form of embodied knowledge that the person cannot articulate. The traditional association of declarative knowledge with explicit knowledge is not always accepted in the contemporary literature. Some theorists argue that there are forms of implicit declarative knowledge. A putative example is a person who has learned a concept and is now able to correctly classify objects according to this concept even though they are not able to provide a verbal rationale for their decision.{{sfn|Bengson|Moffett|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=BHHnBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA328 328]}}{{sfn|Kikoski|Kikoski|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=c8S8WbD5xVIC&pg=PA62 62, 65–66]}}{{sfn|Reber|Allen|2022|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=wD90EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA281 281]}}

A further contrast is between domain-specific and [[Philosophy:General knowledge|general knowledge]]. Domain-specific knowledge applies to a narrow subject or a particular task but is useless outside this focus. General knowledge, on the other hand, concerns wide topics or has general applications. For example, declarative knowledge of the rules of [[Social:Grammar|grammar]] belongs to general knowledge while having memorized the lines of the poem The Raven is domain-specific knowledge. This distinction is based on a continuum of cases that are more or less general without a clear-cut line between the types.{{sfn|Woolfolk|Margetts|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=whziBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA251 251]}}{{sfn|Finlay|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uIwEEAAAQBAJ&pg=PP13 13]}} According to Paul Kurtz, there are six types of descriptive knowledge: knowledge of available means, of consequences, of particular facts, of general causal laws, of established values, and of basic needs.{{sfn|Fischer|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QK2bDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT66 66]}} Another classification distinguishes between structural knowledge and perceptual knowledge.{{sfn|Yamamoto|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4BifDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA61 61]}}

== Contrast with other forms of knowledge ==
[[File:A man playing with the Guitar in Northern Ghana 02.jpg|thumb|alt=Photo of a man playing the guitar|Knowing how to play the guitar is one form of non-declarative knowledge.]]
Declarative knowledge is often contrasted with other types of knowledge. A common classification in epistemology distinguishes it from practical knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance. All of them can be expressed with the verb "to know" but their differences are reflected in the grammatical structures used to articulate them. Declarative knowledge is usually expressed with a that-clause, as in "Ann knows that koalas sleep most of the time". For practical knowledge, a how-clause is used instead, for example, "Dave knows how to read the time on a clock". Knowledge by acquaintance can be articulated using a direct object without a preposition, as in "Emily knows Obama personally".<ref>{{multiref2 |1={{harvnb|Bishop|Boling|Elen|Svihla|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=MnD-DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA74 74]}} |2={{harvnb|Lilley|Lightfoot|Amaral|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=HT8VDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA162 162–163]}} |3={{harvnb|Pavese|2022|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/ introduction]}} |4={{harvnb|Klauer|Manstetten|Petersen|Schiller|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=YjglDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA105 105–106]}} |5={{harvnb|Hetherington|2023|loc=[https://iep.utm.edu/knowledg/#H1 1. Kinds of Knowledge]}} }}</ref>

Practical knowledge consists of skills. Knowing how to ride a horse or how to play the guitar are forms of practical knowledge. The terms "procedural knowledge" and "knowledge-how" are often used as synonyms.{{sfn|Klauer|Manstetten|Petersen|Schiller|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=YjglDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA105 105–106]}}{{sfn|Gaskins|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1-BLsucyKVkC&pg=PA51 51]}}{{sfn|Peels|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acCpEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA28 28]}} It differs from declarative knowledge in various aspects. It is usually imprecise and cannot be proven by deducing it from premises. It is non-propositional and, for the most part, cannot be taught in abstract without concrete exercise. In this regard, it is a form of non-intellectual knowledge.{{sfn|Klauer|Manstetten|Petersen|Schiller|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=YjglDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA105 105–6]}}{{sfn|Pavese|2022|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/ introduction]}} It is tied to a specific goal and its value lies not in being true, but rather in how effective it is to accomplish its goal.{{sfn|Merriënboer|1997|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=o0I3IXLfXuAC&pg=PA32 32]}} Practical knowledge can be present without any beliefs and may even involve false beliefs. For example, an experienced ball player may know how to catch a ball despite having false beliefs. They may believe that their eyes continuously track the ball. But, in truth, their [[Biology:Saccade|eyes perform a series of abrupt movements]] that anticipate the ball's trajectory rather than following it.{{sfn|Pavese|2022|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/#EpisKnowHow 6.1 Knowledge-how and Belief]}} Another difference is that declarative knowledge is commonly only ascribed to animals with highly developed minds, like humans. Practical knowledge, on the other hand, is more prevalent in the animal kingdom. For example, [[Biology:Ant|ant]]s know how to walk through the kitchen despite presumably lacking the mental capacity for the declarative knowledge that they are walking through the kitchen.{{sfn|Pritchard|2023|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ 1 Some preliminaries]}}

[[File:Young boy eating chocolate egg.jpg |thumb|alt=Photo of a boy eating a chocolate egg|Familiarity with the flavor of chocolate is one example of knowledge by acquaintance, which belongs to non-declarative knowledge.]]
Declarative knowledge is also different from knowledge by acquaintance, which is also known as objectual knowledge, and knowledge-of. Knowledge by acquaintance is a form of familiarity or direct awareness that a person has with another person, a thing, or a place. For example, a person who has tasted the flavor of chocolate ''knows chocolate'' in this sense, just like a person who visited [[Earth:Lake Taupō|Lake Taupō]] ''knows Lake Taupō''. Knowledge by acquaintance does not imply that the person can provide factual information about the object. It is a form of non-inferential knowledge that depends on first-hand experience. For example, a person who has never left their home country may acquire a lot of declarative knowledge about other countries by reading books without any knowledge by acquaintance.{{sfn|Peels|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acCpEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA28 28]}}{{sfn|Heydorn|Jesudason|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=6QDqPIsiEXEC&pg=PT10 10]}}{{sfn|Foxall|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=HSE6DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT75 75]}}

Knowledge by acquaintance plays a central role in the epistemology of [[Biography:Bertrand Russell|Bertrand Russell]]. He holds that it is more basic than other forms of knowledge since to understand a proposition, one has to be acquainted with its constituents. According to Russell, knowledge by acquaintance covers a wide range of phenomena, such as [[Philosophy:Thought|thought]]s, [[Philosophy:Feeling|feeling]]s, [[Social:Desire|desire]]s, memory, introspection, and [[Philosophy:Sense data|sense data]]. It can happen in relation to [[Physics:Particular|particular]] things and [[Philosophy:Universal (metaphysics)|universals]]. Knowledge of physical objects, on the other hand, belongs to declarative knowledge, which he calls ''knowledge by description''. It also has a central role to play since it extends the realm of knowledge to things that lie beyond the personal sphere of experience.<ref>{{multiref2 |1={{harvnb|Hasan|Fumerton|2020|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-acquaindescrip/ introduction]}} |2={{harvnb|Haymes|Özdalga|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=iz6uCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA27 26–28]}} |3={{harvnb|Miah|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=l7KvAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA19 19–20]}} |4={{harvnb|Alter|Nagasawa|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FgPWBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA93 93–94]}} }}</ref>

Some theorists, like Anita Woolfolk et. al., contrast declarative knowledge and procedural knowledge with conditional knowledge. According to this view, conditional knowledge is about knowing when and why to use declarative and procedural knowledge. For many issues, like solving math problems and learning a [[Social:Foreign language|foreign language]], it is not sufficient to know facts and general procedures if the person does not know under which situations to use them. To master a language, for example, it is not enough to acquire declarative knowledge of [[Social:Grammatical conjugation|verb forms]] if one lacks conditional knowledge of when it is appropriate to use them. Some theorists understand conditional knowledge as one type of declarative knowledge and not as a distinct category.<ref>{{multiref2 |1={{harvnb|Woolfolk|Hughes|Walkup|2008|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=56bOkxXZXKYC&pg=PA307 307]}} |2={{harvnb|Dunlap|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tZ6KLHSZgO0C&pg=PA144 144–145]}} |3={{harvnb|Earley|Ang|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=g0PSkiOT8ggC&pg=PA109 109]}} |4={{harvnb|Woolfolk|Margetts|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=whziBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA251 251]}} }}</ref>

A further distinction is between declarative or descriptive knowledge in contrast to prescriptive knowledge. Descriptive knowledge represents what the world is like. It describes and classifies what phenomena are there and in what relations they stand toward each other. It is interested in what is true independently of what people want. Prescriptive knowledge is not about what things ''actually are'' like but what they ''should be'' like. This concerns specifically the question of what purposes people should follow and how they should act. It guides [[Philosophy:Action|action]] by showing what people should do to fulfill their needs and desires. In this regard, it has a more subjective component since it depends on what people want. Some theorists equate prescriptive knowledge with procedural knowledge. But others distinguish them based on the claim that prescriptive knowledge is about what should be done while procedural knowledge is about how to do it.<ref>{{multiref2|1={{harvnb|Maedche|Brocke|Hevner|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vtQkDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA403 403]}} |2={{harvnb|Goldberg|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9NEN80chkT8C&pg=PT121 121–122]}} |3={{harvnb|Lalanda|McCann|Diaconescu|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1RQ_AAAAQBAJ&pg=PA187 187–188]}} |4={{harvnb|Chen|Terken|2022|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=vSKDEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA49 49]}} }}</ref> Other classifications contrast declarative knowledge with structural knowledge, meta knowledge, heuristic knowledge, control knowledge, case knowledge, and strategic knowledge.{{sfn|Nguyen|Nguyen|Tran|2022|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=mPqhEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA33 33–34]}}{{sfn|Jankowski|Marshall|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=E8M7CwAAQBAJ&pg=PA70 70]}}{{sfn|Scott|Gallacher|Parry|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2nZ4DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA97 97]}}

Some theorists argue that one type of knowledge is more basic than others. For example, Robert E. Haskell claims that declarative knowledge is the basic form of knowledge since it constitutes a general framework of understanding. According to him, it is a precondition for acquiring other forms of knowledge.{{sfn|Haskell|2001|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QIn9J0SBK7IC&pg=PA101 101–103]}} However, this position is not generally accepted and philosophers like [[Biography:Gilbert Ryle|Gilbert Ryle]] defend the opposing thesis that declarative knowledge presupposes procedural knowledge.{{sfn|Stillings|Chase|Weisler|Feinstein|1995|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=wCRonP7EgDkC&pg=PA370 370]}}{{sfn|Cornelis|Smets|Bendegem|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-9boCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA37 37]}}

== Value ==
Declarative knowledge plays a central role in human understanding of the world. It underlies activities such as labeling phenomena, describing them, explaining them, and communicating with others about them.{{sfn|Murphy|Alexander|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9vJ0AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA38 38–39]}} The value of declarative knowledge depends in part on its usefulness in helping people achieve their objectives. For example, to treat a disease, knowledge of its symptoms and possible cures is beneficial. Or if a person has applied for a new job then knowing where and when the interview takes place is important.{{sfn|Degenhardt|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FuCsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–6]}}{{sfn|Pritchard|2023|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ 2 The value of knowledge]}}{{sfn|Olsson|2011|pp=874–883}} Due to its context-independence, declarative knowledge can be used for a great variety of tasks and because of its compact nature, it can be easily stored and retrieved.{{sfn|Reif|2008}}{{sfn|Morrison|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=znbkHaC8QeMC&pg=PA371 371]}} Declarative knowledge can be useful for procedural knowledge, for example, by knowing the list of steps needed to execute a skill. It also has a key role in understanding and [[Problem solving|solving problems]] and can guide the process of [[Decision-making|decision-making]].{{sfn|Smith|Ragan|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_cAkAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA152 152–154]}}{{sfn|Soled|1995|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=rCA8zzGNaxAC&pg=PA49 49]}}{{sfn|Leung|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yCLLDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA210 210]}} A related issue in the field of epistemology concerns the question of whether declarative knowledge is more valuable than true belief. This is not obvious since, for many purposes, true belief is as useful as knowledge to achieve one's goals.{{sfn|Olsson|2011|pp=874–883}}{{sfn|Pritchard|Turri|Carter|2022|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/ introduction]}}{{sfn|Plato|2002|p=[https://archive.org/details/fivedialogueseut00plat/page/89 89–90; 97b–98a]}}

Declarative knowledge is primarily desired in cases where it is immediately useful.{{sfn|Haskell|2001|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QIn9J0SBK7IC&pg=PA101 101–103]}} But not all forms of knowledge are useful. For example, indiscriminately memorizing phone numbers found in a foreign phone book is unlikely to result in useful declarative knowledge.{{sfn|Pritchard|2023|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ 2 The value of knowledge]}} However, it is often difficult to assess the value of knowledge if one does not foresee a situation where it would be useful. In this regard, it can happen that the value of apparently useless knowledge is only discovered much later. For example, [[Physics:Maxwell's equations|Maxwell's equations]] linking [[Physics:Magnetism|magnetism]] to [[Physics:Electricity|electricity]] were considered useless at the time of discovery until experimental scientists discovered how to detect electromagnetic waves.{{sfn|Haskell|2001|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QIn9J0SBK7IC&pg=PA101 101–103]}} Occasionally, knowledge may have a negative value, for example, when it hinders someone to do what would be needed because their knowledge of associated dangers paralyzes them.{{sfn|Pritchard|2023|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ 2 The value of knowledge]}}

== Learning ==
[[File:Seiun lesson.JPG|thumb|alt=Photo of a school lesson|A lot of knowledge taught at school is declarative knowledge.]]
The value of knowledge is specifically relevant in the field of education. It is needed to decide which of the vast amount of knowledge should become part of the curriculum to be passed on to students.{{sfn|Degenhardt|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FuCsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–6]}} Many types of [[Learning|learning]] at school involve the acquisition of declarative knowledge.{{sfn|Murphy|Alexander|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9vJ0AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA38 38–39]}} One form of declarative knowledge learning is so-called rote learning. It is a [[Biology:Mnemonic|memorization technique]] in which the claim to be learned is repeated again and again until it is fully memorized. Other forms of declarative knowledge learning focus more on developing an understanding of the subject. This means that the learner should not only be able to repeat the claim but also to explain, describe, and summarize it. For declarative knowledge to be useful, it is often advantageous if it is embedded in a meaningful structure. For example, learning about new concepts and ideas involves developing an understanding of how they are related to each other and to what is already known.{{sfn|Smith|Ragan|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_cAkAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA152 152–154]}}

According to Ellen Gagné, learning declarative knowledge happens in four steps. In the first step, the learner comes into contact with the material to be learned and apprehends it. Next, they translate this information into propositions. Following that, the learner's memory triggers and activates related propositions. As the last step, new connections are established and inferences are drawn.{{sfn|Smith|Ragan|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_cAkAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA152 152–154]}} A similar process is described by John V. Dempsey, who stresses that the new information must be organized, divided, and linked to existing knowledge. He distinguishes between learning that involves recalling information in contrast to learning that only requires being able to recognize patterns.{{sfn|Dempsey|1993|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ss3fz-5WC6gC&pg=PA80 80–81]}} A related theory is defended by Anthony J. Rhem. He holds that the process of learning declarative knowledge involves organizing new information into groups. Next, links between the groups are drawn and the new information is connected to pre-existing knowledge.{{sfn|Rhem|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=mgF-DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT42 42–43]}}

Some theorists, like Robert Gagné and Leslie Briggs, distinguish between types of declarative knowledge learning based on the cognitive processes involved: learning of labels and names, of facts and lists, and of organized discourse. Learning labels and names requires forming a mental connection between two elements. Examples include memorizing foreign vocabulary and learning the capital city of each [[Earth:State (polity)|state]]. Learning facts involves relationships between concepts, for example, that "Ann Richards was the governor of Texas in 1991". This process is usually easier if the person is not dealing with isolated facts but possesses a network of information into which the new fact is integrated. The case for learning lists is similar since it involves the association of many items. Learning organized discourse encompasses not discrete facts or items but a wider comprehension of the meaning present in an extensive body of information.{{sfn|Smith|Ragan|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_cAkAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA152 152–154]}}{{sfn|Dempsey|1993|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ss3fz-5WC6gC&pg=PA80 80–81]}}{{sfn|Rhem|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=mgF-DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT42 42–43]}}

Various sources of declarative knowledge are discussed in epistemology. They include perception, introspection, memory, reasoning, and testimony.{{sfn|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/#SourKnowJust 5. Sources of Knowledge and Justification]}}{{sfn|Blaauw|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=s28xEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA49 49]}}{{sfn|Campbell|O'Rourke|Silverstein|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2SgTDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}} Perception is usually understood as the main source of empirical knowledge. It is based on the senses, like seeing that it is raining when looking out the window.{{sfn|Hetherington|2023|loc=[https://iep.utm.edu/knowledg/#SH3b 3b. Observational Knowledge]}}{{sfn|O’Brien}}{{sfn|Martinich|Stroll|loc=[https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology/Knowledge-and-certainty#ref247960 Rationalism and empiricism]}} Introspection is similar to perception but provides knowledge of the internal sphere and not of external objects.{{sfn|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/#Intr 5.2 Introspection]}} An example is directing one's attention to a pain in one's toe to assess whether it has intensified.{{sfn|Hohwy|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=z7gVDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA245 245]}}

Memory differs from perception and introspection in that it does not produce new knowledge but merely stores and retrieves pre-existing knowledge. As such, it depends on other sources.{{sfn|Blaauw|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=s28xEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA49 49]}}{{sfn|Audi|2002|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTSO-3 71–94]|loc=The Sources of Knowledge}}{{sfn|Gardiner|2001|pp=1351–1361}} It is similar to reasoning in this regard, which starts from a known fact and arrives at new knowledge by drawing inferences from it. Empiricists hold that this is the only way how reason can arrive at knowledge while rationalists contend that some claims can be known by pure reason independent of additional sources.{{sfn|Martinich|Stroll|loc=[https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology/Knowledge-and-certainty#ref247960 Rationalism and empiricism]}}{{sfn|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/#Reas 5.4 Reason]}}{{sfn|Audi|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=HeF_AAAAQBAJ&pg=PA315 315]}} Testimony is different from the other sources since it does not have its own cognitive faculty. Rather, it is grounded in the notion that people can acquire knowledge through [[Biology:Communication|communication]] with others, for example, by speaking to someone or by reading a newspaper.{{sfn|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/#Test 5.5 Testimony]}}{{sfn|Leonard|2021|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/testimony-episprob/ introduction]}}{{sfn|Green|loc=[https://iep.utm.edu/ep-testi/ introduction]}} Some religious philosophers include [[Philosophy:Religious experience|religious experience]]s (through the so-called [[Philosophy:Sensus divinitatis|sensus divinitatis]]) as a source of knowledge of the divine. However, such claims are controversial.{{sfn|Blaauw|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=s28xEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA49 49]}}{{sfn|Plantinga|2000|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=BypSHmoozV0C&pg=PA182 182–183]}}

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* {{cite book |last1=Finlay |first1=Janet |title=An Introduction To Artificial Intelligence |date=29 October 2020 |publisher=CRC Press |isbn=978-1-000-15403-0 |page=13 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uIwEEAAAQBAJ&pg=PP13 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=15 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230415030027/https://books.google.com/books?id=uIwEEAAAQBAJ&pg=PP13 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Fischer |first1=Frank |title=Politics, Values, And Public Policy: The Problem Of Methodology |date=4 June 2019 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-000-30762-7 |page=66 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QK2bDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT66 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=1 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230401205741/https://books.google.com/books?id=QK2bDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT66 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Flick |first1=Uwe |title=The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis |date=10 December 2013 |publisher=SAGE |isbn=9781446296691 |page=123 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=R-6GAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA123 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=10 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230210114225/https://books.google.com/books?id=R-6GAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA123 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Foshay |first1=Wellesley R. |last2=Silber |first2=Kenneth H. |title=Handbook of Improving Performance in the Workplace, Instructional Design and Training Delivery |date=19 November 2009 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-0-470-52506-7 |pages=14–15 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xhWVufg1RxAC&pg=RA1-PA14 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=1 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230401155035/https://books.google.com/books?id=xhWVufg1RxAC&pg=RA1-PA14 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Foxall |first1=Gordon |title=Context and Cognition in Consumer Psychology: How Perception and Emotion Guide Action |date=16 October 2017 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-317-67738-3 |page=75 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HSE6DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT75 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=1 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230401160115/https://books.google.com/books?id=HSE6DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT75 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Freitas |first1=Sara de |last2=Jameson |first2=Jill |title=The e-Learning Reader |date=5 April 2012 |publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing |isbn=978-1-4411-7679-0 |page=189 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hmESBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA189 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=15 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230415030025/https://books.google.com/books?id=hmESBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA189 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Gardiner |first1=J. M. |title=Episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness: a first-person approach |journal=Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences |date=29 September 2001 |volume=356 |issue=1413 |pages=1351–1361 |doi=10.1098/rstb.2001.0955 |pmid=11571027 |pmc=1088519 |issn=0962-8436}}
* {{cite book |last1=Gaskins |first1=Irene West |title=Success with Struggling Readers: The Benchmark School Approach |date=3 May 2005 |publisher=Guilford Press |isbn=978-1-59385-169-9 |page=51 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1-BLsucyKVkC&pg=PA51 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=1 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230401211513/https://books.google.com/books?id=1-BLsucyKVkC&pg=PA51 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Goldberg |first1=Elkhonon |title=The Wisdom Paradox: How Your Mind Can Grow Stronger As Your Brain Grows Older |date=16 February 2006 |publisher=Penguin |isbn=978-1-4406-2695-1 |pages=121–122 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9NEN80chkT8C&pg=PT121 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=6 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230406151914/https://books.google.com/books?id=9NEN80chkT8C&pg=PT121 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Goldman |first1=Alvin I. |title=Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences |date=1992 |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=978-0-262-07135-2 |pages=105–106 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=McV7NyYDmG4C&pg=PA105 |language=en |access-date=2023-04-16 |archive-date=2023-03-31 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230331073959/https://books.google.com/books?id=McV7NyYDmG4C&pg=PA105 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite web |last1=Green |first1=Christopher R. |title=Epistemology of Testimony |url=https://iep.utm.edu/ep-testi/ |website=[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |access-date=8 June 2022 |archive-date=7 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220307123956/https://iep.utm.edu/ep-testi/ |url-status=live |at=introduction}}
* {{cite web |last1=Gupta |first1=Anil |title=Definitions: 1.1 Real and nominal definitions |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/definitions/#ReaNomDef |website=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=28 May 2022 |date=2021 |archive-date=1 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220501014300/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/definitions/#ReaNomDef |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Hacker |first1=P. M. S. |title=The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature |date=1 July 2013 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-118-60906-4 |page=211 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZMXUF9aGmf8C&pg=PT211 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=30 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230330073704/https://books.google.com/books?id=ZMXUF9aGmf8C&pg=PT211 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Hamilton |first1=Christopher |title=Understanding Philosophy for AS Level |date=2003 |publisher=Nelson Thornes |isbn=978-0-7487-6560-7 |page=23 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xkrq8TypPmcC&pg=PA23 |language=en |access-date=2023-04-16 |archive-date=2023-04-04 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404115151/https://books.google.com/books?id=xkrq8TypPmcC&pg=PA23 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite web |author=HarperCollins staff |publisher=HarperCollins |website=The American Heritage Dictionary |title=knowledge |url=https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=knowledge |access-date=25 October 2022 |archive-date=29 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221129072236/https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=knowledge |url-status=live}}
* {{cite web |last1=Hasan |first1=Ali |last2=Fumerton |first2=Richard |title=Knowledge by Acquaintance vs. Description |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-acquaindescrip/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=31 March 2023 |at=introduction |date=2020 |archive-date=31 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220531070118/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-acquaindescrip/ |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Haskell |first1=Robert E. |title=Transfer of Learning: Cognition and Instruction |date=2001 |publisher=Academic Press |isbn=978-0-12-330595-4 |page=101-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=QIn9J0SBK7IC&pg=PA101 |language=en |access-date=2023-04-16 |archive-date=2023-04-15 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230415030030/https://books.google.com/books?id=QIn9J0SBK7IC&pg=PA101 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Haymes |first1=Brian |last2=Özdalga |first2=Elisabeth |title=Concept Of The Knowledge Of God |date=3 January 2016 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-1-349-19066-9 |pages=26–28 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iz6uCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA27 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=1 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230401160116/https://books.google.com/books?id=iz6uCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA27 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite web |last1=Hetherington |first1=Stephen |title=Gettier Problems |url=https://iep.utm.edu/gettier/ |website=[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |date=2022 |access-date=28 May 2022 |archive-date=19 February 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090219085540/http://www.iep.utm.edu/g/gettier.htm |url-status=live}}
* {{cite web |last1=Hetherington |first1=Stephen |title=Knowledge |url=https://iep.utm.edu/knowledg/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=2023 |access-date=31 March 2023 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602105750/https://iep.utm.edu/knowledg/ |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Hetherington |first1=Stephen |title=Knowledge and the Gettier Problem |date=1 September 2016 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-316-75729-1 |page=219 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OwnFDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA219 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=30 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230330073705/https://books.google.com/books?id=OwnFDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA219 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Heydorn |first1=Wendy |last2=Jesudason |first2=Susan |title=Decoding Theory of Knowledge for the IB Diploma |date=18 July 2013 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-107-62842-7 |page=10 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6QDqPIsiEXEC&pg=PT10 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=1 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230401155046/https://books.google.com/books?id=6QDqPIsiEXEC&pg=PT10 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Hohwy |first1=Jakob |title=The Predictive Mind |date=November 2013 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-968273-7 |page=245 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=z7gVDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA245 |language=en |access-date=2023-04-16 |archive-date=2023-04-06 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230406134358/https://books.google.com/books?id=z7gVDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA245 |url-status=live}}
* {{Cite book |title=The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning |last1=Holyoak |first1=Keith |last2=Morrison |first2=Robert |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2005 |isbn=0521824176 |location=Cambridge |pages=371}}
* {{cite web |last1=Ichikawa |first1=Jonathan Jenkins |last2=Steup |first2=Matthias |title=The Analysis of Knowledge |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=29 March 2023 |date=2018 |archive-date=2 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220502031402/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/ |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Jankowski |first1=Natasha A. |last2=Marshall |first2=David W. |title=Partners in Advancing Student Learning: Degree Qualifications Profile and Tuning: New Directions for Institutional Research, Number 165 |date=11 January 2016 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-1-119-24064-8 |page=70 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=E8M7CwAAQBAJ&pg=PA70 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=1 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230401160117/https://books.google.com/books?id=E8M7CwAAQBAJ&pg=PA70 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Kent |first1=Allen |last2=Williams |first2=James G. |title=Encyclopedia of Microcomputers: Volume 13 – Optical Disks to Production Scheduling |date=18 November 1993 |publisher=CRC Press |isbn=978-0-8247-2711-6 |page=295 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Rx3hqGdXcooC&pg=PA295 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=22 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230422032548/https://books.google.com/books?id=Rx3hqGdXcooC&pg=PA295 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Kikoski |first1=Catherine Kano |last2=Kikoski |first2=John F. |title=The Inquiring Organization: Tacit Knowledge, Conversation, and Knowledge Creation : Skills for 21st-century Organizations |date=2004 |publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group |isbn=978-1-56720-490-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=c8S8WbD5xVIC&pg=PA62 |language=en |pages=62, 65–66 |access-date=2023-04-16 |archive-date=2023-04-06 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230406134751/https://books.google.com/books?id=c8S8WbD5xVIC&pg=PA62 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Kirkham |first1=Richard L. |title=Does the Gettier Problem Rest on a Mistake? |journal=Mind |date=1984 |volume=XCIII |issue=372 |pages=503, 512–3 |doi=10.1093/mind/XCIII.372.501}}
* {{cite book |last1=Klauer |first1=Bernd |last2=Manstetten |first2=Reiner |last3=Petersen |first3=Thomas |last4=Schiller |first4=Johannes |title=Sustainability and the Art of Long-Term Thinking |date=1 September 2016 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=978-1-134-98618-7 |pages=105–106 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YjglDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA105 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=1 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230401160116/https://books.google.com/books?id=YjglDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA105 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last=Klein |first=Peter D. |date=1998 |chapter=Knowledge, concept of |editor1-last=Craig |editor1-first=Edward |title=[[Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |location=London; New York |publisher=Routledge |chapter-url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/knowledge-concept-of/v-1 |doi=10.4324/9780415249126-P031-1 |isbn=978-0-415-25069-6 |oclc=38096851 |access-date=13 June 2022 |archive-date=13 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220613025031/https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/knowledge-concept-of/v-1 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Kleinman |first1=Paul |title=Philosophy 101: From Plato and Socrates to Ethics and Metaphysics, an Essential Primer on the History of Thought |date=18 September 2013 |publisher=Simon and Schuster |isbn=978-1-4405-6768-1 |page=258 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fG_rDQAAQBAJ&pg=PT258 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=7 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230407195048/https://books.google.com/books?id=fG_rDQAAQBAJ&pg=PT258 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Kornblith |first1=Hilary |editor1-last=Smith |editor1-first=Quentin |title=Epistemology: New Essays |date=2008 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=9780191718472 |pages=5–6 |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/8079/chapter-abstract/153495629?redirectedFrom=fulltext |chapter=1 Knowledge Needs No Justification |access-date=2023-04-16 |archive-date=2023-03-30 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230330073655/https://academic.oup.com/book/8079/chapter-abstract/153495629?redirectedFrom=fulltext |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Lalanda |first1=Philippe |last2=McCann |first2=Julie A. |last3=Diaconescu |first3=Ada |title=Autonomic Computing: Principles, Design and Implementation |date=13 May 2013 |publisher=Springer Science & Business Media |isbn=978-1-4471-5007-7 |pages=187–188 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1RQ_AAAAQBAJ&pg=PA187 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=7 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230407154041/https://books.google.com/books?id=1RQ_AAAAQBAJ&pg=PA187 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Lee |first1=James |title=A Metaphysician's User Guide: The Epistemology of Metaphysics |date=25 August 2017 |publisher=Syracuse University |pages=6–9 |url=https://surface.syr.edu/etd/765/ |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=31 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230331075505/https://surface.syr.edu/etd/765/ |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Lehrer |first1=Keith |title=Theory of Knowledge |date=15 October 2015 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-135-19609-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yKG9CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |language=en |chapter=1. The Analysis of Knowledge |access-date=12 June 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602105810/https://books.google.com/books?id=yKG9CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite web |last1=Leonard |first1=Nick |title=Epistemological Problems of Testimony |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/testimony-episprob/ |website=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=8 June 2022 |date=2021 |archive-date=10 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220710155155/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/testimony-episprob/ |url-status=live |at=introduction}}
* {{cite book |last1=Leondes |first1=Cornelius T. |title=Expert Systems: The Technology of Knowledge Management and Decision Making for the 21st Century |date=26 September 2001 |publisher=Elsevier |isbn=978-0-08-053145-8 |page=804 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5kSamKhS560C&pg=PA804 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=7 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230407195043/https://books.google.com/books?id=5kSamKhS560C&pg=PA804 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Leung |first1=Yee |title=International Encyclopedia of Human Geography |date=29 November 2019 |publisher=Elsevier |isbn=978-0-08-102296-2 |page=210 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=yCLLDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA210 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=25 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230425231829/https://books.google.com/books?id=yCLLDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA210 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Lilley |first1=Simon |last2=Lightfoot |first2=Geoffrey |last3=Amaral |first3=Paulo |title=Representing Organization: Knowledge, Management, and the Information Age |date=2004 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-877541-6 |pages=162–163 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HT8VDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA162 |language=en |quote=In its more modern forms epistemology has taken the analysis of meaning and the status of claims to knowledge as its quarry. Consequently, writers such as Bertrand Arthur William Russell (also known as the third Earl Russell, 1872–1970), George Edward Moore (1873–1958), and Ludwig Joseph Johann Wittgenstein (1889–1951) have attempted to delineate three kinds of knowledge: 1. Knowledge that, or 'factual knowledge' ... 2. Knowledge how, or 'practical knowledge' ... 3. Knowledge of people, places, and things, or 'knowledge by acquaintance' |access-date=2023-04-17 |archive-date=2023-03-10 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230310130538/https://books.google.com/books?id=HT8VDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA162 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Maedche |first1=Alexander |last2=Brocke |first2=Jan vom |last3=Hevner |first3=Alan |title=Designing the Digital Transformation: 12th International Conference, DESRIST 2017, Karlsruhe, Germany, May 30 – June 1, 2017, Proceedings |date=22 May 2017 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-3-319-59144-5 |page=403 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vtQkDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA403 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=7 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230407052718/https://books.google.com/books?id=vtQkDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA403 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Magee |first1=Bryan |last2=Popper |first2=Karl R. |date=1971 |chapter=Conversation with Karl Popper |editor-last=Magee |editor-first=Bryan |title=Modern British philosophy |location=New York |publisher=St. Martin's Press |pages=[https://archive.org/details/modernbritishphi0000mage/page/74 74–75] |oclc=314039 |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/modernbritishphi0000mage/page/66 |chapter-url-access=registration |isbn=978-0-19-283047-0 |quote=Popper: Putting our ideas into words, or better, writing them down, makes an important difference. ... It is what I call 'knowledge in the objective sense'. Scientific knowledge belongs to it. It is this knowledge which is stored in our libraries rather than our heads. Magee: And you regard the knowledge stored in our libraries as more important than the knowledge stored in our heads. Popper: Much more important, from every point of view}}
* {{cite web |last1=Martinich |first1=A. P. |last2=Stroll |first2=Ayrum |title=Epistemology – Knowledge and certainty |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology/Knowledge-and-certainty#ref247960 |website=www.britannica.com |access-date=5 April 2023 |at=Rationalism and empiricism |language=en |archive-date=5 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230405082413/https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology/Knowledge-and-certainty#ref247960 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Merriënboer |first1=Jeroen J. G. van |title=Training Complex Cognitive Skills: A Four-Component Instructional Design Model for Technical Training |date=1997 |publisher=Educational Technology |isbn=978-0-87778-298-8 |page=32 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=o0I3IXLfXuAC&pg=PA32 |language=en |access-date=2023-04-16 |archive-date=2023-04-01 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230401155039/https://books.google.com/books?id=o0I3IXLfXuAC&pg=PA32 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Miah |first1=Sajahan |title=Russell's Theory of Perception |date=30 May 2006 |publisher=Continuum |isbn=978-1-84714-284-9 |pages=19–20 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=l7KvAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA19 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=1 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230401155040/https://books.google.com/books?id=l7KvAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA19 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Morrison |first1=Robert |title=The Cambridge Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning |date=18 April 2005 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-82417-0 |page=371 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=znbkHaC8QeMC&pg=PA371 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=30 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230330073706/https://books.google.com/books?id=znbkHaC8QeMC&pg=PA371 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite web |last1=Moser |first1=Paul K. |title=A posteriori |url=https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/a-posteriori/v-1 |website=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Routledge |access-date=18 September 2022 |language=en |archive-date=20 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220920170718/https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/a-posteriori/v-1 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Moser |first1=Paul K. |title=The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology |date=27 October 2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-020818-9 |page=3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5NJjAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=8 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230308083559/https://books.google.com/books?id=5NJjAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Murphy |first1=P. Karen |last2=Alexander |first2=Patricia A. |title=Understanding How Students Learn: A Guide for Instructional Leaders |date=7 October 2005 |publisher=Corwin Press |isbn=978-1-4833-6347-9 |pages=38–39 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9vJ0AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA38 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=4 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404115151/https://books.google.com/books?id=9vJ0AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA38 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Nguyen |first1=Van Tham |last2=Nguyen |first2=Ngoc Thanh |last3=Tran |first3=Trong Hieu |title=Knowledge Integration Methods for Probabilistic Knowledge-based Systems |date=30 December 2022 |publisher=CRC Press |isbn=978-1-000-80999-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mPqhEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA33 |pages=33–34 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=1 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230401160116/https://books.google.com/books?id=mPqhEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA33 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite web |last1=O’Brien |first1=Daniel |title=The Epistemology of Perception |url=https://iep.utm.edu/epis-per/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=25 October 2022 |archive-date=8 May 2009 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090508190020/http://iep.utm.edu/e/epis-per.htm |url-status=live}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Olsson |first1=Erik J |title=The Value of Knowledge: The Value of Knowledge |journal=Philosophy Compass |date=December 2011 |volume=6 |issue=12 |pages=874–883 |doi=10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00425.x |s2cid=143034920}}
* {{cite web |last1=Pavese |first1=Carlotta |title=Knowledge How |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=31 March 2023 |date=2022 |archive-date=27 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230327152902/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/ |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Peels |first1=Rik |title=Ignorance: A Philosophical Study |date=2023 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-765451-4 |page=28 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=acCpEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA28 |language=en |access-date=2023-04-16 |archive-date=2023-04-01 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230401211509/https://books.google.com/books?id=acCpEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA28 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Plantinga |first1=Alvin |title=Warranted Christian Belief |date=27 January 2000 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-803024-9 |pages=182–183 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BypSHmoozV0C&pg=PA182 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=4 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404075637/https://books.google.com/books?id=BypSHmoozV0C&pg=PA182 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book | last1=Plato | title=Five Dialogues | date=2002 | publisher=Hackett Pub. Co. | location=Indianapolis, IN | pages=[https://archive.org/details/fivedialogueseut00plat/page/89 89–90; 97b–98a] | isbn=978-0-87220-633-5 | url=https://archive.org/details/fivedialogueseut00plat/page/89}}
* {{cite web |last1=Poston |first1=Ted |title=Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology |url=https://iep.utm.edu/int-ext/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=30 March 2023 |at=introduction |archive-date=31 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230331074000/https://iep.utm.edu/int-ext/ |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Price |first1=Kay M. |last2=Nelson |first2=Karna L. |title=Planning Effective Instruction: Diversity Responsive Methods and Management |date=1 January 2013 |publisher=Cengage Learning |isbn=978-1-285-49991-8 |page=4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=SWoWAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA4 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=1 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230401205736/https://books.google.com/books?id=SWoWAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA4 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite web |last1=Pritchard |first1=Duncan |last2=Turri |first2=John |last3=Carter |first3=J. Adam |title=The Value of Knowledge |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=19 September 2022 |date=2022 |at=introduction |archive-date=10 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220710164703/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/ |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Pritchard |first1=Duncan |title=What is this thing called Knowledge? |date=18 May 2023 |publisher=Taylor & Francis |isbn=978-1-000-87480-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hB22EAAAQBAJ |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=31 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230331073959/https://books.google.com/books?id=hB22EAAAQBAJ&pg=PT38 |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Reber |first1=Arthur S. |last2=Allen |first2=Rhianon |title=The Cognitive Unconscious: The First Half Century |date=2022 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-750157-3 |page=281 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wD90EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA281 |language=en |access-date=2023-04-16 |archive-date=2023-04-04 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404202338/https://books.google.com/books?id=wD90EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA281 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Reif |first1=Frederick |title=Applying Cognitive Science to Education: Thinking and Learning in Scientific and Other Complex Domains |date=2008 |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=978-0-262-18263-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8V7RZT-IHlUC&pg=PA33 |language=en |access-date=2023-04-16 |archive-date=2023-04-15 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230415030023/https://books.google.com/books?id=8V7RZT-IHlUC&pg=PA33 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Rhem |first1=Anthony J. |title=UML for Developing Knowledge Management Systems |date=21 November 2005 |publisher=CRC Press |isbn=978-1-135-48553-5 |page=42-3 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mgF-DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT42 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=7 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230407195043/https://books.google.com/books?id=mgF-DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT42 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite web |last1=Russell |first1=Bruce |title=A Priori Justification and Knowledge |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=18 September 2022 |date=2020 |archive-date=12 August 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210812143105/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/ |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Sadegh-Zadeh |first1=Kazem |title=Handbook of Analytic Philosophy of Medicine |date=28 September 2011 |publisher=Springer Science & Business Media |isbn=978-94-007-2260-6 |pages=450-1, 470, 475 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=25W4gBfpX5QC&pg=PA450 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=30 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230330073655/https://books.google.com/books?id=25W4gBfpX5QC&pg=PA450 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Schelling |first1=Birte |title=Knowledge – Genetic Foundations and Epistemic Coherence |date=2 May 2013 |publisher=Walter de Gruyter |isbn=978-3-11-032266-8 |pages=55–56 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UQLpBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA55 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=31 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230331075540/https://books.google.com/books?id=UQLpBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA55 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Scott |first1=Peter |last2=Gallacher |first2=Jim |last3=Parry |first3=Gareth |title=New Languages and Landscapes of Higher Education |date=2017 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-878708-2 |page=97 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=2nZ4DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA97 |language=en |access-date=2023-04-16 |archive-date=2023-04-01 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230401205751/https://books.google.com/books?id=2nZ4DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA97 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Seel |first1=Norbert M. |title=Encyclopedia of the Sciences of Learning |date=5 October 2011 |publisher=Springer Science & Business Media |isbn=978-1-4419-1427-9 |page=1001 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xZuSxo4JxoAC&pg=PA1001 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=30 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230330073704/https://books.google.com/books?id=xZuSxo4JxoAC&pg=PA1001 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Smith |first1=Patricia L. |last2=Ragan |first2=Tillman J. |title=Instructional Design |date=7 December 2004 |publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=978-0-471-39353-5 |pages=152–154 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_cAkAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA152 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=4 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230404115150/https://books.google.com/books?id=_cAkAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA152 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Soled |first1=Suzanne Wegener |title=Assessment, Testing, and Evaluation in Teacher Education |date=1995 |publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group |isbn=978-1-56750-153-7 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=rCA8zzGNaxAC&pg=PA49 |language=en |page=49 |access-date=2023-04-16 |archive-date=2023-04-06 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230406050917/https://books.google.com/books?id=rCA8zzGNaxAC&pg=PA49 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite web |last1=Steup |first1=Matthias |last2=Neta |first2=Ram |title=Epistemology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/ |website=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=22 May 2022 |date=2020 |archive-date=21 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200721023728/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology/ |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Stillings |first1=Neil A. |last2=Chase |first2=Christopher H. |last3=Weisler |first3=Steven E. |last4=Feinstein |first4=Mark H. |last5=Rissland |first5=Edwina L. |title=Cognitive Science: An Introduction |date=1995 |publisher=MIT Press |isbn=978-0-262-69175-8 |page=370 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wCRonP7EgDkC&pg=PA370 |language=en |access-date=2023-04-16 |archive-date=2023-04-22 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230422034557/https://books.google.com/books?id=wCRonP7EgDkC&pg=PA370 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Strube |first1=G. |last2=Wender |first2=K. F. |title=The Cognitive Psychology of Knowledge |date=1 October 1993 |publisher=Elsevier |isbn=978-0-08-086755-7 |page=354 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=V1DFcqt1MXAC&pg=PA354 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=7 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230407155501/https://books.google.com/books?id=V1DFcqt1MXAC&pg=PA354 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite web |last1=Sudduth |first1=Michael |title=Defeaters in Epistemology |url=https://iep.utm.edu/defeaters-in-epistemology/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=30 March 2023 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602105748/https://iep.utm.edu/defeaters-in-epistemology/ |url-status=live}}
* {{Cite book |title=Mind, Brain, and Education Science: A Comprehensive Guide to the New Brain-Based Teaching |last=Tokuhama-Espinosa |first=Tracey |publisher=W. W. Norton & Company |year=2011 |isbn=9780393706079 |location=New York |pages=255}}
* {{cite journal |last1=Tolliver |first1=Joseph Thomas |title=Knowledge without truth |journal=Philosophical Studies |date=May 1989 |volume=56 |issue=1 |pages=29–51 |doi=10.1007/bf00646208|s2cid=170980707 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Truncellito |first1=David A. |title=Epistemology |url=https://iep.utm.edu/epistemo/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=8 March 2023 |archive-date=13 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220113223803/https://iep.utm.edu/epistemo/ |url-status=live}}
* {{cite web |last1=Turri |first1=John |last2=Alfano |first2=Mark |last3=Greco |first3=John |title=Virtue Epistemology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/#Know |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |at=5. Knowledge |date=2021 |access-date=2023-04-16 |archive-date=2023-03-26 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230326030005/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/#Know |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Villoro |first1=Luis |title=Belief, personal, and propositional knowledge |date=1998 |publisher=Rodopi |location=Amsterdam |isbn=9042007427}}
* {{cite journal |last=Walton |first=Douglas N. |date=January 2005 |title=Pragmatic and idealized models of knowledge and ignorance |journal=American Philosophical Quarterly |volume=42 |issue=1 |pages=59–69 (59, 64) |jstor=20010182 |quote=It is a pervasive assumption in recent analytical philosophy that knowledge can be defined as a modality representing a rational agent's true and consistent beliefs. Such views are based on rationality assumptions. One is that knowledge can only consist of true propositions. This way of speaking is sharply at odds with the way we speak about knowledge, for example, in computing, where a so-called knowledge base can be a database, that is, a set of data that has been collected and is thought to consist of true propositions, even though, realistically speaking, many of them might later be shown to be false or untenable. ... The pragmatic account of knowledge starts with a knowledge system, meaning a working system with an agent having a database. ... The notion of a search can be a social one, in many instances. A group of agents can be engaged in the search, and some of them can know things that others do not know.}}
* {{cite web |last1=Watson |first1=Jamie Carlin |title=Justification, Epistemic |url=https://iep.utm.edu/epi-just/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=30 March 2023 |at=Introduction |archive-date=14 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230314230936/https://iep.utm.edu/epi-just/ |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Woolfolk |first1=Anita |last2=Margetts |first2=Kay |title=Educational Psychology Australian Edition |date=25 July 2012 |publisher=Pearson Higher Education AU |isbn=978-1-4425-5145-9 |page=251 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=whziBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA251 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=6 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230406151913/https://books.google.com/books?id=whziBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA251 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Woolfolk |first1=Anita E. |last2=Hughes |first2=Malcolm |last3=Walkup |first3=Vivienne |title=Psychology in Education |date=2008 |publisher=Pearson Longman |isbn=978-1-4058-3541-1 |page=307 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=56bOkxXZXKYC&pg=PA307 |language=en |access-date=2023-04-16 |archive-date=2023-04-08 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230408032145/https://books.google.com/books?id=56bOkxXZXKYC&pg=PA307 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Yamamoto |first1=Sakae |title=Human Interface and the Management of Information: Information, Design and Interaction: 18th International Conference, HCI International 2016 Toronto, Canada, July 17–22, 2016, Proceedings, Part I |date=4 July 2016 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-3-319-40349-6 |page=61 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4BifDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA61 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=1 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230401155035/https://books.google.com/books?id=4BifDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA61 |url-status=live}}
* {{cite book |last1=Zagzebski |first1=Linda |date=1999 |chapter=What Is Knowledge? |editor1-last=Greco |editor1-first=John |editor2-last=Sosa |editor2-first=Ernest |title=The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology |location=Malden, MA |publisher=Blackwell |pages=92–116 |chapter-url=https://philpapers.org/rec/ZAGWIK |isbn=978-0-631-20290-5 |oclc=39269507 |doi=10.1002/9781405164863.ch3 |s2cid=158886670 |access-date=12 June 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602215147/https://philpapers.org/rec/ZAGWIK |url-status=live }}
{{refend}}

{{Epistemology}}
[[Category:Concepts in epistemology]]
[[Category:Psychological concepts]]
[[Category:Intelligence]]
[[Category:Mental content]]

{{Sourceattribution|Declarative knowledge}}