View source for Philosophy:Ethics of care

{{short description|Ethical theory}}

The '''ethics of care''' (alternatively '''care ethics''' or '''EoC''') is a normative [[Philosophy:Ethics|ethical theory]] that holds that moral action centers on [[Social:Interpersonal relationship|interpersonal relationship]]s and care or benevolence as a virtue. EoC is one of a cluster of [[Philosophy:Normative ethics|normative]] ethical theories that were developed by some feminists and environmentalists since the 1980s.<ref name=Sander-Staudt-IEP>{{cite web| title = Care Ethics | first = Maureen | last = Sander-Staudt |website= The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |issn = 2161-0002 |url=https://iep.utm.edu/care-ethics/ |access-date = June 4, 2022}}</ref> While [[Philosophy:Consequentialism|consequentialist]] and [[Philosophy:Deontology|deontological]] ethical theories emphasize generalizable standards and impartiality, ethics of care emphasize the importance of response to the individual. The distinction between the general and the individual is reflected in their different moral questions: "what is just?" versus "how to respond?"<ref name=Gilligan2008/>{{rp|469}} [[Biography:Carol Gilligan|Carol Gilligan]], who is considered the originator of the ethics of care, criticized the application of generalized standards as "morally problematic, since it breeds [[Philosophy:Moral blindness|moral blindness]] or indifference".<ref name=Gilligan2008>Gilligan, Carol. "Moral Orientation and Moral Development". In Alison Bailey and Chris J. Cuomo (eds.). ''The Feminist Philosophy Reader''. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2008.</ref>{{rp|471}}

Assumptions of the framework include: persons are understood to have varying degrees of dependence and interdependence; other individuals affected by the consequences of one's choices deserve consideration in proportion to their vulnerability; and situational details determine how to safeguard and promote the interests of individuals.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Sevenhuijsen |first=Selma |year=2003 |title=The Place of Care: The Relevance of the Feminist Ethic of Care for Social Policy |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/14647001030042006 |journal=Feminist Theory |language=en |volume=4 |issue=2 |pages=179–197 |doi=10.1177/14647001030042006 |issn=1464-7001}}</ref>

==Historical background==
The originator of the ethics of care was [[Biography:Carol Gilligan|Carol Gilligan]], an American ethicist and psychologist. Gilligan created this model as a critique of her mentor, developmental psychologist [[Biography:Lawrence Kohlberg|Lawrence Kohlberg]]'s model of moral development. Gilligan observed that measuring moral development by Kohlberg's stages of moral development found boys to be more morally mature than girls, and this result held for adults as well (although when education is controlled for there are no gender differences).<ref>Walker, L.J. (1991). "Sex differences in moral reasoning". In W.M. Kurtines and J. L. Gewirtz (eds.) ''Handbook of moral behavior and development'': Vol, 2. Research. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.</ref> Gilligan argued that Kohlberg's model was not objective, but rather a masculine perspective on morality, founded on principles of [[Philosophy:Justice|justice]] and rights. In her 1982 book ''In a Different Voice'', she further posited that men and women have tendencies to view morality in different terms. Her theory claimed women tended to emphasize [[Philosophy:Empathy|empathy]] and [[Philosophy:Compassion|compassion]] over the notions of morality in terms of abstract [[Philosophy:Duty|duties]] or obligations that are privileged in Kohlberg's scale.<ref>{{Cite book | last = Gilligan | first = Carol |  title = In a different voice: psychological theory and women's development | publisher =Harvard University Press | year = 1982 | location =Cambridge, Massachusetts | isbn = 9780674445444 | title-link = In a Different Voice }}</ref> Dana Ward stated, in an unpublished paper, that Kohlberg's scale is [[Psychometrics|psychometrically]] sound.<ref>Ward, Dana (2000). "Still Hearing Voice: The Persistent Myth of Gendered Judgment". Keynote address presented at the VIIIth Biennial conference of the International Society for Justice Research, Rishon LeZion, Israel.</ref> Subsequent research suggests that the differences in care-based or justice-based ethical approaches may be due to gender differences, or differences in life situations of genders.<ref>Ford, M. R.; Lowery, C. R. (1986). "Gender Differences in Moral Reasoning: A Comparison of the Use of Justice and Care Orientations". ''Journal of Personality and Social Psychology''. 50(4), 777–783. {{doi|10.1037/0022-3514.50.4.777}}</ref><ref>Rothbart, M. K.; et al. (1986). "Gender Differences in Moral Reasoning". ''Sex Roles''. 15 (11&12), 645–653. {{doi|10.1007/BF00288220}}</ref><ref>Krebs, D.L.; Vermeulen, S.C.; Denton, K.; and Carpendale, J. I. (1994). "Gender and perspective differences in moral judgment and moral orientation". ''Journal of Moral Education''. 23, 17–26. {{doi|10.1080/0305724940230102}}</ref> Gilligan's summarizing of gender differences provided feminists with a voice to question moral values and practices of the society as masculine. 

==Relationship to traditional ethical positions==
Care ethics is different from other ethical models, such as [[Philosophy:Consequentialism|consequentialist]] theories (e.g. [[Philosophy:Utilitarianism|utilitarianism]]) and [[Philosophy:Deontological ethics|deontological theories]] (e.g. [[Philosophy:Kantian ethics|Kantian ethics]]), in that it seeks to incorporate traditionally feminine virtues and values which, proponents of care ethics contend, are absent in traditional models of ethics.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-ethics/#CarEthTheDifVoi|title=Feminist Ethics|last1=Tong|first1=Rosemarie|last2=Williams|first2=Nancy|date=May 4, 2009|website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|publisher=The Metaphysics Research Lab|access-date=January 6, 2017}}</ref> One of these values is the placement of caring and relationship over logic and reason. In care ethics, reason and logic are subservient to natural care, that is, care that is done out of inclination. This is in contrast to [[Philosophy:Deontology|deontology]], where actions taken out of inclination are unethical.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Caring: a relational approach to ethics & moral education|last=Noddings | first= Nel |isbn=9780520957343|oclc=859158671|date = 2013-09-14|publisher=Univ of California Press }}</ref>

Virginia Held has noted the similarities between care ethics and virtue ethics but distinguished it from the virtue ethics of British moralists such as [[Biography:David Hume|Hume]] in that people are seen as fundamentally relational rather than independent individuals.<ref name=Held2018>{{Cite book |last=Held |first=Virginia |chapter=The ethics of care |editor-last=Olsaretti |editor-first=Serena |title=The Oxford handbook of distributive justice |date=2018 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-964512-1 |oclc=1013820392 |location=Oxford, UK; New York, NY |pages=213–234 |doi=10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199645121.013.12}}</ref>{{Rp|page=221}} Other philosophers have argued about the relation between care ethics and virtue ethics, taking various positions on the question of how closely the two are related.<ref name=Sander-Staudt-IEP/><ref>{{cite journal |last=Sander-Staudt |first=Maureen |date=Fall 2006 |title=The unhappy marriage of care ethics and virtue ethics |journal=Hypatia |volume=21 |issue=4 |pages=21–39 |jstor=4640020 |doi=10.1353/hyp.2006.0050 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Steyl |first=Steven |date=Summer 2019 |title=The virtue of care |journal=Hypatia |volume=34 |issue=3 |pages=507–526 |doi=10.1111/hypa.12481 }}</ref> Jason Josephson Storm argued for close parallels between the ethics of care and traditional [[Religion:Buddhism|Buddhist]] virtue ethics, especially the prioritization of [[Philosophy:Compassion|compassion]] by Śāntideva and others.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Storm |first=Jason Josephson |date=2021 |title=Metamodernism: The Future of Theory |location=Chicago |publisher=[[Organization:University of Chicago Press|University of Chicago Press]] |pages=263–64 |isbn=978-0-226-78665-0 |oclc=1200579878 |doi=10.7208/chicago/9780226786797.001.0001}}</ref> Other scholars had also previously connected ethics of care with Buddhist ethics.<ref>{{cite journal |last=White |first=Judith |date=May 1999 |title=Ethical comportment in organizations: a synthesis of the feminist ethic of care and the Buddhist ethic of compassion |journal=International Journal of Value-Based Management |volume=12 |issue=2 |pages=109–128 |doi=10.1023/A:1007779604630}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chang |first1=Dave |last2=Bai |first2=Heesoon |date=January 2016 |title=Self-with-other in teacher practice: a case study through care, Aristotelian virtue, and Buddhist ethics |journal=Ethics and Education |volume=11 |issue=1 |pages=17–28 |doi=10.1080/17449642.2016.1145491}}</ref>

==Care ethics as feminist ethics==

While some feminists have criticized care-based ethics for reinforcing traditional gender stereotypes,<ref name=Bartky>{{cite book | last = Bartky | first = Sandra Lee |  title = Femininity and domination: studies in the phenomenology of oppression | url = https://archive.org/details/femininitydomina00bart | url-access = registration | pages = [https://archive.org/details/femininitydomina00bart/page/104 104–105] | publisher = Routledge | location = New York | year = 1990 | isbn = 9780415901864 }}</ref> others have embraced parts of the paradigm under the theoretical concept of '''care-focused feminism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA-->.<ref name=Tong>{{cite book|last=Tong|first=Rosemarie|title=Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive Introduction|publisher=Westview Press|year=2009|isbn=978-0-81-334375-4|edition=3rd|location=Boulder, Colo.|pages=162–65}}</ref>

Care-focused feminism, alternatively called ''gender feminism'',<ref>{{cite book |last=Tong |first=Rosemarie |title=Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive Introduction |date=2018 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-0-81-335023-3 |edition=Student economy edition, 4th |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cSZhDwAAQBAJ&q=%22gender+feminism%22 }}</ref> is a branch of feminist thought informed primarily by the ethics of care as developed by Carol Gilligan and [[Biography:Nel Noddings|Nel Noddings]].<ref name=Tong/> This theory is critical of how caring is socially engendered, being assigned to women and consequently devalued.  "Care-focused feminists regard women's capacity for care as a human strength"<ref name=Tong/> which can and should be taught to and expected of men as well as women. Noddings proposes that ethical caring could be a more concrete evaluative model of moral dilemma, than an ethic of justice.<ref>{{cite book|last = Noddings | first= Nel |title =  Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education | pages= 3–4 | publisher = University of California Press |location= Berkeley | date= 1984|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=u7MwDwAAQBAJ|isbn=9780520275706}}</ref>  Noddings' care-focused feminism requires practical application of [[Biography:Nel Noddings#Nel Noddings's relational ethics|relational ethics]], predicated on an ethic of care.<ref>{{cite book| last = Noddings | first = Nel |title= Women and Evil | page = 222 |publisher = University of California Press | location = Berkeley | date = 1989 | isbn = 9780520074132 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=i-zN_8h_3l8C}}</ref>

Ethics of care is a basis for care-focused feminist theorizing on maternal ethics. These theories recognize caring as an ethically relevant issue.<ref>Held, Virginia. Ethics of Care, page 64. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.</ref> Critical of how society engenders caring labor, theorists Sara Ruddick, Virginia Held, and Eva Feder Kittay suggest caring should be performed and care givers valued in both public and private spheres.<ref>Kittay, Eva Feder:  Love's Labor: Essays on Women, Equality and Dependency, page 20. Routledge, New York, 1999.</ref> This proposed paradigm shift in ethics encourages the view that an ethic of caring be the social responsibility of both men and women.

Joan Tronto argues that the definition of "ethic of care" is ambiguous due in part to it not playing a central role in moral theory.<ref name="Tronto">{{citation | last = Tronto | first = Joan C. |  contribution = An ethic of care | editor-last1 = Cudd | editor-first1 = Ann E. | editor-last2 = Andreasen | editor-first2 = Robin O. |  title = Feminist theory: a philosophical anthology | pages = 251–263 | publisher = Blackwell Publishing | location = Oxford, UK Malden, Massachusetts | year = 2005 | isbn = 9781405116619 | postscript = .}}</ref> She argues that considering moral philosophy is engaged with human goodness, then care would appear to assume a significant role in this type of philosophy.<ref name="Tronto"/> However, this is not the case and Tronto further stresses the association between care and "naturalness". The latter term refers to the socially and culturally constructed gender roles where care is mainly assumed to be the role of the woman.<ref name="Tronto"/> As such, care loses the power to take a central role in moral theory.

Tronto states there are four ethical qualities of care: 
#''Attentiveness'': Attentiveness is crucial to the ethics of care because care requires a recognition of others' needs in order to respond to them.<ref name="Tronto"/> The question which arises is the distinction between ignorance and inattentiveness.<ref name="Tronto"/> Tronto poses this question as such, "But when is ignorance simply ignorance, and when is it inattentiveness"?<ref name="Tronto"/>
#''Responsibility'': In order to care, we must take it upon ourselves, thus responsibility. The problem associated with this second ethical element of responsibility is the question of obligation. Obligation is often, if not already, tied to pre-established societal and cultural norms and roles. Tronto makes the effort to differentiate the terms "responsibility" and "obligation" with regards to the ethic of care. Responsibility is ambiguous, whereas obligation refers to situations where action or reaction is due, such as the case of a legal contract.<ref name="Tronto"/> This ambiguity allows for ebb and flow in and between class structures and gender roles, and to other socially constructed roles that would bind responsibility to those only befitting of those roles.
#''Competence'': To provide care also means competency.  One cannot simply acknowledge the need to care, accept the responsibility, but not follow through with enough adequacy - as such action would result in the need of care not being met.<ref name="Tronto"/>
#''Responsiveness'': This refers to the "responsiveness of the care receiver to the care".<ref name="Tronto"/> Tronto states, "Responsiveness signals an important moral problem within care: by its nature, care is concerned with conditions of vulnerability and inequality".<ref name="Tronto"/> She further argues responsiveness does not equal reciprocity.<ref name="Tronto"/> Rather, it is another method to understand vulnerability and inequality by understanding what has been expressed by those in the vulnerable position, as opposed to re-imagining oneself in a similar situation.<ref name="Tronto"/>

In 2013, Tronto added a fifth ethical quality: 
<ol start=5><li>''Plurality, communication, trust and respect; solidarity or caring with'': Together, these are the qualities necessary for people to come together in order to take collective responsibility, to understand their citizenship as always imbricated in relations of care, and to take seriously the nature of caring needs in society.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Tronto |first1=Joan |title=Caring Democracy: Markets, Equality, and Justice |date=2013 |publisher=New York University Press |location=New York |isbn=9780814782781}}</ref></li></ol>

== In politics ==
It is often suggested that the ethics of care is only applicable within families and groups of friends, but many feminist theorists have argued against this suggestion, including Ruddick, Manning, Held, and Tronto.<ref name=Held2018 />{{Rp|page=226}} Attempts have been made to apply principles from the ethics of care more generally, by identifying values in one particular caring relationship and applying these values to other situations. Moral values are seen as embedded in acts of care.<ref name=Held2018 />{{Rp|page=220}}

The ethics of care is contrasted with theories based on the "liberal individual" and a [[Social:Social contract|social contract]], following [[Biography:John Locke|Locke]] and [[Biography:Thomas Hobbes|Hobbes]]. Ethics-of-care theorists note that in many situations, such as childhood, there are very large power imbalances between individuals, and so these relationships are based on care rather than any form of contract. Noting the power imbalances that can exist in society, it is argued that care may be a better basis to understand society than freedom and social contracts.<ref name=Held2018 />{{Rp|page=219–221}}

==In mental health==
Psychiatrist Kaila Rudolph noted that care ethics aligns with a [[Social:Trauma-informed care|trauma-informed care]] framework in psychiatry.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rudolph |first=Kaila |date=2021 |title=Ethical Considerations in Trauma-Informed Care |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0193953X21000514 |journal=Psychiatric Clinics of North America |language=en |volume=44 |issue=4 |pages=521–535 |doi=10.1016/j.psc.2021.07.001|pmid=34763786 }}</ref> 

== Criticism ==
In the field of nursing, the ethics of care has been criticized by Peter Allmark, [[Biography:Helga Kuhse|Helga Kuhse]], and John Paley.<ref name=Edwards2009/> Allmark criticized its focus on the mental state of the carer, on the grounds that subjectively caring does not prevent an individual's care from being harmful.<ref name=Edwards2009/> Allmark also criticized the theory for conflicting with the idea of treating everyone with unbiased consideration, which he considered necessary in certain situations.<ref name=Edwards2009>{{Cite journal |last=Edwards |first=Steven D. |date=2009 |title=Three versions of an ethics of care |journal=Nursing Philosophy |language=en |volume=10 |issue=4 |pages=231–240 |doi=10.1111/j.1466-769X.2009.00415.x|doi-access=free }}</ref>

Care ethics has been criticised for failing to protect the individual from [[Philosophy:Paternalism|paternalism]], noting there is a risk of caregivers mistaking their needs for those of the people they care for. Individuals may need to cultivate the ability to distinguish their own needs from those that they care for, with Ruddick arguing for a need to respect the "embodied willfulness" of those who are cared for.<ref name=Held2018 />{{Rp|page=226}}

==See also==
{{Columns-list|colwidth=22em|
*[[Philosophy:Altruism|Altruism]]
*[[Philosophy:Ecofeminism|Ecofeminism]]
*[[Philosophy:Ethical relationship|Ethical relationship]]
*[[Philosophy:Feminist epistemology|Feminist epistemology]]
*[[Philosophy:Feminist ethics|Feminist ethics]]
*[[Social:Feminist justice ethics|Feminist justice ethics]]
*''[[Philosophy:I and Thou|I and Thou]]''
*[[Philosophy:Intersubjectivity|Intersubjectivity]]
*{{slink|Maternal-fetal conflict|Ethics of care and relational ethics}}
}}

===Theorists===
{{Columns-list|colwidth=22em|
* [[Biography:Annette Baier|Annette Baier]]
* Sandra Bartky
* Joan Callahan
* [[Biography:Carol Gilligan|Carol Gilligan]]
* Virginia Held
* Sarah Hoagland
* Eva Feder Kittay
* Christine Koggel
* [[Biography:Nel Noddings|Nel Noddings]]
* Tove Pettersen
* Sara Ruddick
* Mary Lyndon Shanley
* Michael Slote
* Joan Tronto
* Margaret Urban Walker
* Robin West
}}

==References==
{{reflist}}

==Further reading==
* {{cite IEP |url-id=care-eth |title=Care Ethics}}
* {{Cite book | last = Gilligan | first = Carol |  title = In a different voice: psychological theory and women's development | publisher =Harvard University Press | year = 1982 | location =Cambridge, Massachusetts | isbn = 9780674445444 | title-link = In a Different Voice }}
* {{Cite book | last =Held | first =Virginia |  title =The ethics of care | publisher =Oxford University Press | year =2005 | location =Oxford | url =https://archive.org/details/ethicsofcarepers00held | doi =10.1093/0195180992.001.0001 | isbn =9780195180992 | url-access =registration }}
* {{Cite book | last = Held | first = Virginia |  title = Feminist morality: transforming culture, society, and politics | publisher =University of Chicago Press | year = 1993 | location =Chicago | isbn = 9780226325934 }}
* {{citation | last = Jagger | first = Alison | contribution = Caring as a feminist practice of moral reason | editor-last = Virginia | editor-first = Held |  title = Justice and care: essential readings in feminist ethics | publisher = Westview Press | location = Boulder, Colorado | year = 1995 | isbn = 9780813321622 | postscript = .}}
* {{Cite book | last = Noddings | first = Nel | title = Educating citizens for global awareness | publisher = Teachers College Press | year = 2005 | location = New York | isbn = 9780807745342 }}
* {{Cite book | last =Slote | first =Michael A. | title =The ethics of care and empathy | publisher =Routledge | year =2007 | location =London ; New York | url =https://archive.org/details/ethicsofcareempa0000slot| url-access =registration | isbn = 978-0-415-77200-6 <!--(hardback)--> }}
* {{Cite journal | last = Tronto | first = Joan C. |  title = Partiality based on relational responsibilities: another approach to global ethics | journal = Ethics and Social Welfare| volume = 6 | issue = 3 | pages = 303–316 | doi = 10.1080/17496535.2012.704058 | date = September 2012 | s2cid = 143230526 }}

{{ethics}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Ethics Of Care}}
[[Category:Normative ethics|Care]]
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[[Category:Left-wing politics]]
[[Category:Progressivism]]
[[Category:Relational ethics]]
[[Category:Ethical theories]]

{{Sourceattribution|Ethics of care}}