View source for Philosophy:Knowledge

{{Short description|Awareness of facts or being competent}}
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[[File:Tetradrachm Athens 480-420BC MBA Lyon.jpg|thumb|upright=1.1|alt=Coin showing the owl of Athena|The owl of Athena, a symbol of knowledge in the Western world]]
{{Epistemology sidebar}}
'''Knowledge''' is an [[Philosophy:Declarative knowledge|awareness of facts]], a [[Knowledge by acquaintance|familiarity with individuals and situations]], or a [[Procedural knowledge|practical skill]]. Knowledge of facts, also called [[Proposition|proposition]]al knowledge, is often characterized as [[Truth|true]] [[Philosophy:Belief|belief]] that is distinct from opinion or guesswork by virtue of [[Philosophy:Justification (epistemology)|justification]]. While there is wide agreement among philosophers that propositional knowledge is a form of true belief, many controversies focus on justification. This includes questions like how to understand justification, whether it is needed at all, and whether something else besides it is needed. These controversies intensified in the latter half of the 20th century due to a series of [[Gettier problem#Gettier's two original counterexamples|thought experiments]] that provoked alternative definitions.

Knowledge can be produced in many ways. The main source of [[Philosophy:Empirical knowledge|empirical knowledge]] is [[Perception|perception]], which involves the usage of the senses to learn about the external world. [[Philosophy:Introspection|Introspection]] allows people to learn about their internal mental states and processes. Other sources of knowledge include [[Memory|memory]], rational intuition, [[Philosophy:Inference|inference]], and [[Testimony|testimony]]. According to [[Philosophy:Foundationalism|foundationalism]], some of these sources are basic in that they can justify beliefs, without depending on other mental states. [[Philosophy:Coherentism|Coherentists]] reject this claim and contend that a sufficient degree of coherence among all the mental states of the believer is necessary for knowledge. According to infinitism, an infinite chain of beliefs is needed.

The main discipline investigating knowledge is [[Philosophy:Epistemology|epistemology]], which studies what people know, how they come to know it, and what it means to know something. It discusses the value of knowledge and the thesis of [[Philosophy:Philosophical skepticism|philosophical skepticism]], which questions the possibility of knowledge. Knowledge is relevant to many fields like the [[Science|science]]s, which aim to acquire knowledge using the [[Scientific method|scientific method]] based on repeatable experimentation, [[Observation|observation]], and [[Measurement|measurement]]. Various religions hold that humans should seek knowledge and that God or the divine is the source of knowledge. The anthropology of knowledge studies how knowledge is acquired, stored, retrieved, and communicated in different cultures. The [[Social:Sociology of knowledge|sociology of knowledge]] examines under what sociohistorical circumstances knowledge arises, and what sociological consequences it has. The [[Philosophy:History of knowledge|history of knowledge]] investigates how knowledge in different fields has developed, and evolved, in the course of history.

== Definitions ==
{{main|Philosophy:Definitions of knowledge}}

Knowledge is a form of familiarity, [[Philosophy:Awareness|awareness]], [[Philosophy:Understanding|understanding]], or acquaintance. It often involves the possession of information learned through [[Philosophy:Experience|experience]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|AHD staff|2022a}} | {{harvnb|MW Staff|2023}} | {{harvnb|CD staff}} }}</ref> There is wide, though not universal, agreement among philosophers that knowledge involves a [[Cognition|cognitive]] success, or an epistemic contact with reality, like making a discovery.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=109}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=Lead Section, § 1. The Varieties of Cognitive Success}} }}</ref> Many academic definitions of knowledge focus on propositional knowledge or knowledge of facts, as in "I know that Dave is at home", and understand it as a form of true belief.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 1.1 The Truth Condition, § 1.2 The Belief Condition}} | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 1. The Varieties of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 1b. Knowledge-That}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ The Nature of Knowledge}} }}</ref> Other types of knowledge include knowledge-how in the form of practical [[Social:Competence (human resources)|competence]], as in "she knows how to swim", and "[[Knowledge by acquaintance|knowledge by acquaintance]]" as a form a familiarity with the known object based on previous direct experience.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 1. Kinds of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Stanley|Willlamson|2001|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/WILKHV 411–412]}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=92}} }}</ref>

Despite agreements about the general characteristics of knowledge, its exact definition is disputed. Some disagreements arise from the goal that a proposed definition is supposed to fulfill. One approach focuses on the most salient features of knowledge with the goal of giving a practically useful definition.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=99}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 2. Knowledge as a Kind}} }}</ref> Another tries to provide a theoretically precise definition by listing the conditions that are [[Necessity and sufficiency|individually necessary and jointly sufficient]]. The terms "analysis of knowledge" and "conceptions of knowledge" are often used for this approach.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Hannon|2021|loc=Knowledge, Concept of}} | {{harvnb|Lehrer|2015|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yKG9CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1. The Analysis of Knowledge]}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|pp=92, 96–97}} }}</ref> It can be understood in analogy to how [[Chemistry:Chemistry|chemists]] analyze a sample by seeking a list of all the chemical elements composing it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=96}} | {{harvnb|Gupta|2021}} }}</ref> According to a different view, knowledge is a unique state that cannot be analyzed in terms of other phenomena.<ref>{{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 7. Is Knowledge Analyzable?}}</ref>
[[File:Ludwig Wittgenstein.jpg|thumb|upright=.7|left|According to Ludwig Wittgenstein, there is no clear-cut definition of knowledge.]]

[[Philosophy:Philosophical methodology|Methodological differences]] also cause disagreements, for example, whether scholars base their inquiry on abstract and general intuitions (known as methodism) or concrete and specific cases (known as particularism).<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pritchard|2013|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ 3 Defining knowledge]}} | {{harvnb|McCain|2022|loc=Lead Section, § 2. Chisholm on the Problem of the Criterion}} | {{harvnb|Fumerton|2008|pp=[https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195183214.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780195183214-e-3 34–36]|loc=The Problem of the Criterion}} }}</ref> Another source of dispute surrounds the role of ordinary language in one's inquiry: the weight given to how the term "knowledge" is used in everyday discourse.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ The Origins of Knowledge, § Analytic Epistemology}} | {{harvnb|Lehrer|2015|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yKG9CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1. The Analysis of Knowledge]}} }}</ref> According to [[Biography:Ludwig Wittgenstein|Ludwig Wittgenstein]], for example, there exists no clear-cut definition of knowledge since it is just a cluster of concepts related through family resemblance.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|García-Arnaldos|2020|p=[https://brill.com/view/journals/hpla/23/2/article-p507_11.xml 508]}} | {{harvnb|O'Brien|2016|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=UVK9DQAAQBAJ Part I Chapter 7: Family resemblance]}} }}</ref> Different conceptions of the standards of knowledge are also responsible for disagreements. Some epistemologists, like [[Biography:René Descartes|René Descartes]], understand knowledge as a rare phenomenon that has very high requirements, like absolute [[Philosophy:Certainty|certainty]] or [[Infallibility|infallibility]]. Others see knowledge as a rather common phenomenon, prevalent in many everyday situations, without excessively high standards.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|loc=§ 8. Implications of Fallibilism: No Knowledge?}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 6. Standards for Knowing}} | {{harvnb|Black|2002|pp=[https://www.pdcnet.org/swphilreview/content/swphilreview_2002_0018_0001_0023_0032 23–32]}} }}</ref>

Knowledge is often understood as a state of an individual person but it can also refer to a characteristic of a group of people as group knowledge, social knowledge, or collective knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Klausen|2015|pp=[https://portal.findresearcher.sdu.dk/da/publications/bbee5873-28f2-46d5-94b6-49ef5b18a38b 813–818]}} | {{harvnb|Lackey|2021|pp=111–112}} }}</ref> The term may further denote knowledge stored in documents, as in "knowledge housed in the library"<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|AHD staff|2022a}} | {{harvnb|Magee|Popper|1971|pp=[https://archive.org/details/modernbritishphi0000mage/page/74 74–75]|loc=Conversation with Karl Popper}} }}</ref> or the [[Knowledge base|knowledge base]] of an [[Expert system|expert system]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|AHD staff|2022b}} | {{harvnb|Walton|2005|pp=59, 64}} }}</ref> Knowledge is closely related to [[Philosophy:Intelligence|intelligence]], but intelligence is more about the ability to acquire, process, and apply information, while knowledge concerns information and skills that a person already possesses.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rothberg|Erickson|2005|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=GT7qIH4PPmMC 5, 14–15]}} | {{harvnb|Christopher|Prasath|Vanga|2018|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9nSADwAAQBAJ&pg=PA93 93–94]}} | {{harvnb|AHD staff|2022a}} | {{harvnb|AHD staff|2022c}} }}</ref> Knowledge contrasts with [[Philosophy:Ignorance|ignorance]], which is linked to a lack of understanding, education, and true beliefs.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crotty|2022|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=LsSVEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA16 16]}} | {{harvnb|Peels|Blaauw|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=69t7DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 25]}} | {{harvnb|AHD staff|2022}} }}</ref>

The word ''knowledge'' has its roots in the 12th-century [[Social:Old English|Old English]] word {{lang|ang|cnawan}}, which comes from the Old High German word {{lang|goh|gecnawan}}.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hoad|1993|pp=254–255}} | {{harvnb|Wise|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=EathAQAAQBAJ&pg=PT80 80]}} }}</ref> The English word includes various meanings that some other languages distinguish using several words. For example, Latin uses the words {{lang|la|cognitio}} and {{lang|la|scientia}} for "knowledge" while French uses the words {{lang|fr|connaitre}} and {{lang|fr|savoir}} for "to know".<ref>{{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 2. What Is Knowledge?}}</ref> In ancient Greek, four important terms for knowledge were used: ''[[Philosophy:Episteme|epistēmē]]'' (unchanging theoretical knowledge), ''[[Philosophy:Techne|technē]]'' (expert technical knowledge), ''[[Unsolved:Metis (mythology)|mētis]]'' (strategic knowledge), and ''[[Philosophy:Gnosis|gnōsis]]'' (personal intellectual knowledge).<ref>{{harvnb|Allen|2005|loc=Lead Section}}</ref>

The main discipline studying knowledge is called [[Philosophy:Epistemology|epistemology]] or theory of knowledge. It examines the nature of knowledge and justification, how knowledge arises, and what value it has. Further topics include the different types of knowledge and the limits of what can be known.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Truncellito|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Moser|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5NJjAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 3]}} }}</ref> Some social sciences understand knowledge as a broad social phenomenon that is similar to culture.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Allwood|2013|pp=[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025 69–72]}} | {{harvnb|Allen|2005|loc=§ Sociology of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Barth|2002|p=1}} }}</ref>

=== Justified true belief ===
[[File:Justified true belief.png|thumb|alt=Venn diagram of justified true belief|The definition of knowledge as justified true belief is often discussed in the academic literature.]]
An often-discussed definition characterizes knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). This definition identifies three essential features: it is (1) a [[Philosophy:Belief|belief]] that is (2) [[Truth|true]] and (3) [[Philosophy:Justification (epistemology)|justified]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=Lead Section, § 3. Warrant}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|pp=99–100}} }}</ref>{{efn|A similar approach was already discussed in [[Philosophy:Ancient Greek philosophy|Ancient Greek philosophy]] in Plato's dialogue ''Theaetetus'', where [[Biography:Socrates|Socrates]] pondered the distinction between knowledge and true belief but rejected the JTB definition of knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Allen|2005|loc=Lead Section, § Gettierology}} | {{harvnb|Parikh|Renero|2017|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-53280-6_4 93–102]|loc=Justified True Belief: Plato, Gettier, and Turing}} | {{harvnb|Chappell|2019|loc=§ 8. Third Definition (D3): 'Knowledge Is True Judgement With an Account': 201d–210a}} }}</ref>}} Truth is a widely accepted feature of knowledge. It implies that, while it may be possible to believe something false, one cannot know something false.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 1.1 The Truth Condition}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 1b. Knowledge-That, § 5. Understanding Knowledge?}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ The Nature of Knowledge}} }}</ref> That knowledge is a form of belief implies that one cannot know something if one does not believe it. Some everyday expressions seem to violate this principle, like the claim that "I do not believe it, I know it!" But the point of such expressions is to emphasize one's confidence rather than denying that a belief is involved.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 1.2 The Belief Condition}} | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 1. The Varieties of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=93}} }}</ref>

The main controversy surrounding the JTB definition concerns its third feature: justification.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 1.3 The Justification Condition, § 6. Doing Without Justification?}} | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=Lead Section, § 3. Warrant}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=100}} }}</ref> This component is often included because of the impression that some true beliefs are not forms of knowledge. Specifically, this covers cases of [[Unsolved:Superstition|superstition]], lucky guesses, or erroneous reasoning. For example, a person who is convinced that a coin flip will land heads, usually does not know that even if their belief turns out to be true. This indicates that there is more to knowledge than just being right about something.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 2. Propositional Knowledge Is Not Mere True Belief, § 3. Warrant}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 5a. The Justified-True-Belief Conception of Knowledge, § 6e. Mere True Belief}} | {{harvnb|Lehrer|2015|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yKG9CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1. The Analysis of Knowledge]}} | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 1.3 The Justification Condition}} }}</ref>

The JTB definition solves this problem by identifying proper justification as the additional component needed. This approach can explain why superstition or lucky guesses may be true, but do not amount to knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 1.3 The Justification Condition}} | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 3. Warrant}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 5a. The Justified-True-Belief Conception of Knowledge, § 6e. Mere True Belief}} }}</ref> Many philosophers understand [[Philosophy:Internalism and externalism#Epistemology|justification internalistically]]: a belief is justified if another [[Philosophy:Mental state|mental state]] supports it, such as a sensory experience, a [[Memory|memory]], or a second belief. This mental state has to constitute a sufficiently strong [[Philosophy:Evidence|evidence]] or reason for the believed claim. Some modern versions modify the JTB definition by using an ''externalist'' conception of justification instead. This means that justification depends not only on factors internal to the believer's [[Philosophy:Mind|mind]], but also on external factors. According to [[Philosophy:Reliabilism|reliabilist]] theories of justification, a belief is justified if it is produced by a reliable process, like sensory perception or logical reasoning. According to causal theories, justification requires that the believed fact causes the belief. This is the case, for example, when a bird sits on a tree and a person forms a belief about this fact because they see the bird.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 1.3 The Justification Condition, § 6.1 Reliabilist Theories of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 4. Foundationalism and Coherentism, § 6. Externalism}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 5a. The Justified-True-Belief Conception of Knowledge, § 7. Knowing’s Point}} }}</ref>

=== Gettier problem and alternatives ===
{{Main|Gettier problem}}
[[File:Justified True Belief model of knowledge.svg|thumb|upright=1.3|alt=Venn diagram of justified true belief that does not amount to knowledge|The Gettier problem is motivated by the idea that some justified true beliefs do not amount to knowledge.]]
The JTB definition came under severe criticism in the 20th century, when [[Biography:Edmund Gettier|Edmund Gettier]] formulated a series of counterexamples.<ref>{{harvnb|Hetherington|2022|loc=Lead Section, § Introduction}}</ref> They purport to present concrete cases of justified true beliefs that fail to constitute knowledge. The reason for their failure is usually a form of epistemic luck: the beliefs are justified but their justification is not relevant to the truth.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 5. Defeasibility Theories}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 5. Understanding Knowledge?}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=100}} }}</ref> In a well-known example, someone drives along a country road with many [[Social:Potemkin village|barn facades]] and only one real barn. The person is not aware of this, stops in front of the real barn by a lucky coincidence, and forms the justified true belief that they are in front of a barn. This example aims to establish that the person does not know that they are in front of a real barn, since they would not have been able to tell the difference.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Rodríguez|2018|pp=29–32}} | {{harvnb|Goldman|1976|pp=771–773}} | {{harvnb|Sudduth|2022}} | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 10.2 Fake Barn Cases}} }}</ref> This means that it is a lucky coincidence that this justified belief is also true.<ref>{{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 3. The Gettier Problem, § 10.2 Fake Barn Cases}}</ref>

The responses to this and other counterexamples have been diverse. According to some, they show that the JTB definition of knowledge is deeply flawed and that a radical reconceptualization of knowledge is necessary, often by denying justification a role.<ref>{{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 3. The Gettier Problem, § 4. No False Lemmas, § 5. Modal Conditions, § 6. Doing Without Justification?}}</ref> This can happen, for example, by replacing the justification condition with reliability or by seeing knowledge as the manifestation of [[Philosophy:Intellectual virtue|cognitive virtue]]s. Another approach defines knowledge in regard to the function it plays in cognitive processes as, that which provides reasons for thinking or doing something.<ref>{{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 2.3 Knowing Facts}}</ref> Responses on the other half of the spectrum hold that Gettier cases pose no serious problems and no radical reconceptualization is required. They usually focus on minimal modifications of the JTB definition, for example, by making small adjustments to how justification is defined.<ref>{{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 3. The Gettier Problem, § 7. Is Knowledge Analyzable?}}</ref>

Responses between these two camps acknowledge that Gettier cases pose a problem and suggest a moderate departure from the JTB definition. They agree with the JTB definition that justified true belief is a necessary condition of knowledge, but disagree that it is a sufficient condition. They hold instead that an additional criterion, some feature ''X'', is necessary for knowledge. For this reason, they are often referred to as ''JTB+X'' definitions of knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 3. The Gettier Problem, § 7. Is Knowledge Analyzable?}} | {{harvnb|Durán|Formanek|2018|pp=648–650}} }}</ref> A closely related approach speaks not of justification but of warrant and defines warrant as justification together with whatever else is necessary to arrive at knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 3. Warrant}} | {{harvnb|Comesaña|2005|p=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/40040862 367]}} }}</ref>

Many candidates for the fourth feature have been suggested, like the requirements that the justified true belief does not depend on any false beliefs, that no [[Philosophy:Defeater|defeater]]s{{efn|A defeater of a belief is evidence that this belief is false.<ref>{{harvnb|McCain|Stapleford|Steup|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=IeNBEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT111 111]}}</ref>}} are present, or that the person would not have the belief if it was false.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lehrer|2015|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yKG9CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1. The Analysis of Knowledge]}} | {{harvnb|Sudduth|2022}} }}</ref> Such and similar definitions succeed at avoiding many of the original Gettier cases, but newly conceived counterexamples often undermine them.<ref>{{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=101}}</ref> To avoid all possible cases, it may be necessary to find a criterion that excludes all forms of epistemic luck. One complication for such a criterion may be that it sets the standards of knowledge very high by requiring that the belief be infallible to succeed in all cases,<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 5c. Questioning the Gettier Problem, § 6. Standards for Knowing}} | {{harvnb|Kraft|2012|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/KRASIF 49–50]}} }}</ref> meaning that very few beliefs would amount to knowledge, if any.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 5c. Questioning the Gettier Problem, § 6. Standards for Knowing}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|pp=103–104}} | {{harvnb|Sidelle|2001|p=[https://philpapers.org/rec/SIDAAT 163]}} }}</ref> For example, Richard Kirkham suggests our definition of knowledge requires that the evidence for the belief necessitates its truth.<ref>{{harvnb|Kirkham|1984|pp=501–503}}</ref> There is still very little consensus in the academic discourse as to which of the proposed modifications or reconceptualizations is correct, and there are various [[Philosophy:Definitions of knowledge#Other definitions|alternative definitions of knowledge]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Ichikawa|Steup|2018|loc=§ 3. The Gettier Problem, § 7. Is Knowledge Analyzable?}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|pp=93–94, 104–105}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 2.3 Knowing Facts}} }}</ref>

== Types ==
A common distinction among types of knowledge is between propositional knowledge, or knowledge-that, and non-propositional knowledge in the form of practical skills or acquaintance.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 1. Kinds of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Ronald|1990|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=eTjlAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA40 40]}} | {{harvnb|Lilley|Lightfoot|Amaral|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=HT8VDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA162 162–163]}} }}</ref> Other distinctions focus on how the knowledge is acquired and on the content of the known information.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Baehr|2022|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Faber|Maruster|Jorna|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KKo0DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT340 340]}} | {{harvnb|Gertler|2021|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Rescher|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=o7m3amAbDEsC&pg=PA20 20]}} }}</ref>

=== Propositional ===
{{main|Philosophy:Declarative knowledge}}
[[File:Latin dictionary.jpg|thumb|alt=Photo of the Totius Latinitatis Lexicon by Egidio Forcellini, a multi-volume Latin dictionary|Declarative knowledge can be expressed using declarative sentences stored in books.]]

Propositional knowledge, also referred to as declarative and descriptive knowledge, is a form of theoretical knowledge about facts, like knowing that "2 + 2 = 4". It is the paradigmatic type of knowledge in analytic philosophy.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 1. The Varieties of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 1b. Knowledge-That}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ The Nature of Knowledge}} }}</ref> Propositional knowledge is ''propositional'' in the sense that it involves a relation to a proposition. Since propositions are often expressed through that-clauses, it is also referred to as ''knowledge-that'', as in "Akari knows that kangaroos hop".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 1b. Knowledge-That}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ The Nature of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=92}} }}</ref> In this case, Akari stands in the relation of knowing to the proposition "kangaroos hop". Closely related types of knowledge are ''know-wh'', for example, ''knowing who'' is coming to dinner and ''knowing why'' they are coming.<ref>{{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 1b. Knowledge-That, § 1c. Knowledge-Wh}}</ref> These expressions are normally understood as types of propositional knowledge since they can be paraphrased using a that-clause.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 1c. Knowledge-Wh}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ The Nature of Knowledge}} }}</ref>

Propositional knowledge takes the form of mental representations involving concepts, ideas, theories, and general rules. These representations connect the knower to certain parts of reality by showing what they are like. They are often context-independent, meaning that they are not restricted to a specific use or purpose.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Morrison|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=znbkHaC8QeMC&pg=PA371 371]}} | {{harvnb|Reif|2008|p=33}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=93}} }}</ref> Propositional knowledge encompasses both knowledge of specific facts, like that the atomic mass of gold is 196.97 [[Dalton (unit)|u]], and general laws, like that the color of leaves of some trees changes in autumn.<ref>{{harvnb|Woolfolk|Margetts|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=whziBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA251 251]}}</ref> Because of the dependence on mental representations, it is often held that the capacity for propositional knowledge is exclusive to relatively sophisticated creatures, such as humans. This is based on the claim that advanced intellectual capacities are needed to believe a proposition that expresses what the world is like.<ref name="auto6">{{harvnb|Pritchard|2013|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ 1 Some preliminaries]}}</ref>

=== Non-propositional ===
[[File:Bicycle ride.jpg|thumb|alt=Photograph of someone riding a bicycle|Knowing how to ride a bicycle is one form of non-propositional knowledge.]]
Non-propositional knowledge is knowledge in which no essential relation to a proposition is involved. The two most well-known forms are knowledge-how (know-how or [[Procedural knowledge|procedural knowledge]]) and knowledge by acquaintance.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 1. Kinds of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ The Nature of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Stanley|Willlamson|2001|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/WILKHV 411–412]}} }}</ref> To possess knowledge-how means to have some form of practical [[Philosophy:Ability|ability]], skill, or [[Social:Competence (human resources)|competence]],<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 1d. Knowing-How}} | {{harvnb|Pritchard|2013|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ 1 Some preliminaries]}} }}</ref> like knowing how to ride a bicycle or knowing how to swim. Some of the abilities responsible for knowledge-how involve forms of knowledge-that, as in knowing how to prove a [[Mathematics|mathematical]] theorem, but this is not generally the case.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 2.2 Knowing How}} | {{harvnb|Pavese|2022|loc=Lead Section, § 6. The Epistemology of Knowledge-How}} }}</ref> Some types of knowledge-how do not require a highly developed mind, in contrast to propositional knowledge, and are more common in the animal kingdom. For example, an [[Biology:Ant|ant]] knows how to walk even though it presumably lacks a mind sufficiently developed to represent the corresponding proposition.<ref name="auto6"/>

Knowledge by acquaintance is familiarity with something that results from direct experiential contact.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 1a. Knowing by Acquaintance}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ St. Anselm of Canterbury}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=92}} }}</ref> The object of knowledge can be a person, a thing, or a place. For example, by eating chocolate, one gets knowledge by acquaintance of chocolate and visiting [[Earth:Lake Taupō|Lake Taupō]] leads to the formation of knowledge of acquaintance of Lake Taupō. In these cases, the person forms non-inferential knowledge based on first-hand experience without necessarily acquiring factual information about the object. By contrast, it is also possible to indirectly learn a lot of propositional knowledge about chocolate or Lake Taupō by reading books without having the direct experiential contact required for knowledge by acquaintance.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Peels|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=acCpEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA28 28]}} | {{harvnb|Heydorn|Jesudason|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=6QDqPIsiEXEC&pg=PT10 10]}} | {{harvnb|Foxall|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=HSE6DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT75 75]}} | {{harvnb|Hasan|Fumerton|2020}} | {{harvnb|DePoe|2022|loc=Lead Section, § 1. The Distinction: Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 1a. Knowing by Acquaintance}} }}</ref> Knowledge by acquaintance plays a central role in [[Biography:Bertrand Russell|Bertrand Russell]]'s epistemology. He holds that it is more basic than propositional knowledge since to understand a proposition, one has to be acquainted with its constituents, like the [[Philosophy:Universal (metaphysics)|universals]] and [[Physics:Particular|particular]] objects it refers to.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Hasan|Fumerton|2020|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-acquaindescrip/ introduction]}} |2={{harvnb|Haymes|Özdalga|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=iz6uCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA27 26–28]}} |3={{harvnb|Miah|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=l7KvAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA19 19–20]}} |4={{harvnb|Alter|Nagasawa|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FgPWBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA93 93–94]}} |5={{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 1a. Knowing by Acquaintance}}}}</ref>

=== ''A priori'' and ''a posteriori'' ===
{{main|Philosophy:A priori and a posteriori}}
The distinction between ''a priori'' and ''a posteriori'' knowledge depends on the role of experience in the processes of formation and justification.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ A Priori and a Posteriori Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Baehr|2022|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Russell|2020|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> To know something ''a posteriori'' means to know it based on experience.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Baehr|2022|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Moser|2016|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> For example, by seeing that it rains outside or hearing that the baby is crying, one acquires ''a posteriori'' knowledge of these facts.<ref>{{harvnb|Baehr|2022|loc=Lead Section}}</ref> ''A priori'' knowledge is possible without any experience to justify or support the known proposition.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Russell|2020|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Baehr|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> Mathematical knowledge, such as that 2 + 2 = 4, belongs to ''a priori'' knowledge since no empirical investigation is necessary to confirm this fact. In this regard, ''a posteriori'' knowledge is empirical knowledge while ''a priori'' knowledge is non-empirical knowledge.<ref>{{harvnb|Moser|2016|loc=Lead Section}}</ref>

The relevant experience in question is primarily identified with [[Philosophy:Experience#Perception|sensory experience]]. Some non-sensory experiences, like memory and introspection, are often included as well. Some conscious phenomena are excluded in this context, like rational insight into the solution of a mathematical problem.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Baehr|2022|loc=§ 1. An Initial Characterization, § 4. The Relevant Sense of 'Experience'}} | {{harvnb|Russell|2020|loc=§ 4.1 A Priori Justification Is Justification That Is Independent of Experience}} }}</ref> The same is the case for the experience needed to understand the claim in which the term is expressed. For example, knowing that "all bachelors are unmarried" is ''a priori'' knowledge because no sensory experience is necessary to confirm this fact even though experience was needed to learn the meanings of the terms "bachelor" and "unmarried".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Baehr|2022}} | {{harvnb|Russell|2020|loc=§ 4.1 A Priori Justification Is Justification That Is Independent of Experience}} }}</ref>

One difficulty for ''a priori'' knowledge is to explain how it is possible. It is usually seen as unproblematic that one can come to know things through experience, but it is not clear how knowledge is possible without experience. One of the earliest solutions to this problem is due to Plato, who argues that the soul already possesses the knowledge and just needs to recollect, or remember it, to access it again.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Woolf|2013|pp=[https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/122/485/171/961176 192–193]}} | {{harvnb|Hirschberger|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=LWGlDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT22 22]}} }}</ref> A similar explanation is given by René Descartes, who holds that ''a priori'' knowledge exists as innate knowledge present in the [[Philosophy:Mind|mind]] of each human.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Moser|1998|loc=§ 2. Innate concepts, certainty and the a priori}} | {{harvnb|Markie|1998|loc=§ 2. Innate ideas}} }}</ref> A further approach posits a special mental faculty responsible for this type of knowledge, often referred to as rational intuition or rational insight.<ref>{{harvnb|Baehr|2022|loc=§ 1. An Initial Characterization, § 6. Positive Characterizations of the A Priori}}</ref>

=== Others ===
Various other types of knowledge are discussed in the academic literature. In philosophy, "self-knowledge" refers to a person's knowledge of their own [[Philosophy:Sense|sensations]], [[Philosophy:Thought|thought]]s, beliefs, and other mental states. A common view is that self-knowledge is more direct than knowledge of the external world, which relies on the interpretation of sense data. Because of this, it is traditionally claimed that self-knowledge is indubitable, like the claim that a person cannot be wrong about whether they are in pain. However, this position is not universally accepted in the contemporary discourse and an alternative view states that self-knowledge also depends on interpretations that could be false.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertler|2021|loc=Lead Section, § 1. The Distinctiveness of Self-Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Gertler|2010|p=1|loc=1. Introduction}} | {{harvnb|McGeer|2001|pp=13837–13841}} }}</ref> In a slightly different sense, [[Philosophy:Self-knowledge (psychology)|self-knowledge]] can also refer to knowledge of the [[Philosophy:Self|self]] as a persisting entity with certain personality traits, [[Preference|preference]]s, physical attributes, relationships, goals, and [[Social:Identity (social science)|social identities]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gertler|2021a}} | {{harvnb|Morin|Racy|2021|pp=373–374|loc=15. Dynamic Self-processes – Self-knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Kernis|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=r0gahbOYsU4C&pg=PA209 209]}} }}</ref>

[[Philosophy:Metaknowledge|Metaknowledge]] is knowledge about knowledge. It can arise in the form of self-knowledge but includes other types as well, such as knowing what someone else knows or what information is contained in a scientific article. Other aspects of metaknowledge include knowing how knowledge can be acquired, stored, distributed, and used.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Evans|Foster|2011|pp=721–725}} | {{harvnb|Rescher|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=o7m3amAbDEsC&pg=PA20 20]}} | {{harvnb|Cox|Raja|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OR4Ld8NeFE8C&pg=PA134 134]}} | {{harvnb|Leondes|2001|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5kSamKhS560C&pg=PA416 416]}} }}</ref>

[[Philosophy:Common knowledge|Common knowledge]] is knowledge that is publicly known and shared by most individuals within a community. It establishes a common ground for communication, understanding, social cohesion, and cooperation.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Desouza|Awazu|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=GRyBDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA53 53]}} | {{harvnb|Jorna|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KKo0DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT340 340]}} | {{harvnb|Faber|Maruster|Jorna|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KKo0DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT340 340]|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KKo0DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT340 Assessing and Determining Social Sustainability]}} }}</ref> [[Philosophy:General knowledge|General knowledge]] encompasses common knowledge, but also includes knowledge that many people have been exposed to but may not be able to immediately recall.<ref>{{harvnb|Schneider|McGrew|2022|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=bqKgEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA115 115–116]}}</ref> Common knowledge contrasts with [[Philosophy:Domain knowledge|domain knowledge]] or specialized knowledge, which belongs to a specific domain and is only possessed by experts.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Faber|Maruster|Jorna|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KKo0DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT340 340]|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=KKo0DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT340 Assessing and Determining Social Sustainability]}} | {{harvnb|Vempala|2014|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=qfcOBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA277 Creativity, Theories of Musical]}} }}</ref>

{{Anchor|Situated knowledge}}
'''Situated knowledge''' is knowledge specific to a particular situation.<ref name="auto4">{{multiref | {{harvnb|APA staff|2022}} | {{harvnb|Hunter|2009|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230244481_23 151–153]|loc=Situated Knowledge}} }}</ref> It is closely related to practical or tacit knowledge, which is learned and applied in specific circumstances. This especially concerns certain forms of acquiring knowledge, such as [[Trial and error|trial and error]] or learning from experience.<ref>{{harvnb|Barnett|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=WX9UVK6FYSkC&pg=PA146 146–147]|loc=Vocational Knowledge and Vocational Pedagogy}}</ref> In this regard, situated knowledge usually lacks a more explicit structure and is not articulated in terms of universal ideas.<ref>{{harvnb|Hunter|2009|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230244481_23 151–153]|loc=Situated Knowledge}}</ref> The term is often used in [[Social:Feminism|feminism]] and [[Philosophy:Postmodernism|postmodernism]] to argue that many forms of knowledge are not absolute but depend on the concrete historical, cultural, and linguistic context.<ref name="auto4"/>

[[Philosophy:Explicit knowledge|Explicit knowledge]] is knowledge that can be fully articulated, shared, and explained, like the knowledge of historical dates and mathematical formulas. It can be acquired through traditional learning methods, such as reading books and attending lectures. It contrasts with [[Philosophy:Tacit knowledge|tacit knowledge]], which is not easily articulated or explained to others, like the ability to recognize someone's face and the practical expertise of a master craftsman. Tacit knowledge is often learned through first-hand experience or direct practice.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gascoigne|Thornton|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=IVlsBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA8 8, 37, 81, 108]}} | {{harvnb|Hill|2009|loc=[https://www.encyclopedia.com/management/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/knowledge-based-view-firm § Idiosyncratic Views of Knowledge]}} | {{harvnb|Wilson|Cattell|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zpNc_GZIiikC&pg=PA118 118]}} }}</ref> In some cases, it is possible to convert tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge into one another.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Becerra-Fernandez|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4QHLU-ELWsMC&pg=PA263 263]}} | {{harvnb|Wilson|Cattell|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zpNc_GZIiikC&pg=PA119 119]}} }}</ref>

Knowledge can be [[Philosophy:Belief#Occurrent and dispositional|occurrent or dispositional]]. Occurrent knowledge is knowledge that is actively involved in cognitive processes. Dispositional knowledge, by contrast, lies dormant in the back of a person's mind and is given by the mere ability to access the relevant information. For example, if a person knows that cats have [[Biology:Whiskers|whiskers]] then this knowledge is dispositional most of the time and becomes occurrent while they are thinking about it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ Occasional and Dispositional Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Bartlett|2018|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/BAROS-4 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Schwitzgebel|2021}} }}</ref>

Many forms of Eastern spirituality and religion distinguish between higher and lower knowledge. They are also referred to as [[Philosophy:Para Vidya|para vidya]] and [[Philosophy:Vidya#Hierarchy of knowledge|apara vidya]] in [[Religion:Hinduism|Hinduism]] or the [[Philosophy:Two truths doctrine|two truths doctrine]] in [[Religion:Buddhism|Buddhism]]. Lower knowledge is based on the senses and the intellect. It encompasses both mundane or conventional truths as well as discoveries of the empirical sciences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|The Hindu staff|2018}} | {{harvnb|Thakchoe|2022|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Mishra|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=v8s7EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA52 52]}} | {{harvnb|Ghose|1998|loc=[https://incarnateword.in/cwsa/7/the-glory-of-god-in-man Political Writings and Speeches. 1890–1908: The Glory of God in Man]}} }}</ref> Higher knowledge is understood as knowledge of God, [[Philosophy:Absolute|the absolute]], the true self, or the [[Religion:Ultimate reality|ultimate reality]]. It belongs neither to the external world of physical objects nor to the internal world of the experience of emotions and concepts. Many spiritual teachings stress the importance of higher knowledge to progress on the spiritual path and to see reality as it truly is beyond the [[Religion:Maya|veil of appearances]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|The Hindu staff|2018}} | {{harvnb|Mishra|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=v8s7EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA52 52]}} | {{harvnb|Ghose|1998|loc=[https://incarnateword.in/cwsa/7/the-glory-of-god-in-man Political Writings and Speeches. 1890–1908: The Glory of God in Man]}} }}</ref>

== Sources ==
[[File:Five Senses.jpg|thumb|alt=Photos of the five senses|Perception relies on the senses to acquire knowledge.]]

Sources of knowledge are ways how people come to know things. They can be understood as cognitive capacities that are exercised when a person acquires new knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kern|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=eyh5DQAAQBAJ&pg=PA8 8–10, 133]}} | {{harvnb|Spaulding|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4ct5CwAAQBAJ&pg=PA223 223–224]|loc=Imagination Through Knowledge}} }}</ref> Various sources of knowledge are discussed in the academic literature, often in terms of the mental faculties responsible. They include perception, introspection, memory, inference, and testimony. However, not everyone agrees that all of them actually lead to knowledge. Usually, [[Perception|perception]] or observation, i.e. using one of the senses, is identified as the most important source of empirical knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 3. Ways of Knowing}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ The Origins of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|O’Brien|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> Knowing that a baby is sleeping is observational knowledge if it was caused by a perception of the snoring baby. However, this would not be the case if one learned about this fact through a telephone conversation with one's spouse. Direct realists explain observational knowledge by holding that perception is a direct contact with the perceived object. Indirect realists contend that this contact happens indirectly: people can only directly perceive [[Philosophy:Sense data|sense data]], which are then interpreted as representing external objects. This contrast affects whether the knowledge of external objects is direct or indirect and may thus have an impact on how certain perceptual knowledge is.<ref>{{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 5.1 Perception}}</ref>

[[Philosophy:Introspection|Introspection]] is often seen in analogy to perception as a source of knowledge, not of external physical objects, but of internal mental states. A traditionally common view is that introspection has a special epistemic status by being infallible. According to this position, it is not possible to be mistaken about introspective facts, like whether one is in pain, because there is no difference between appearance and reality. However, this claim has been contested in the contemporary discourse and critics argue that it may be possible, for example, to mistake an unpleasant itch for a pain or to confuse the experience of a slight ellipse for the experience of a circle.<ref>{{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 5.2 Introspection}}</ref> Perceptual and introspective knowledge often act as a form of fundamental or basic knowledge. According to some [[Philosophy:Empiricism|empiricists]], they are the only sources of basic knowledge and provide the foundation for all other knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 3. Ways of Knowing}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ The Origins of Knowledge}} }}</ref>

Memory differs from perception and introspection in that it is not as independent or basic as they are since it depends on other previous experiences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 5.3 Memory}} | {{harvnb|Audi|2002|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTSO-3 72–75]|loc=The Sources of Knowledge}} }}</ref> The faculty of memory retains knowledge acquired in the past and makes it accessible in the present, as when remembering a past event or a friend's phone number.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gardiner|2001|pp=1351–1352}} | {{harvnb|Michaelian|Sutton|2017}} }}</ref> It is generally seen as a reliable source of knowledge. However, it can be deceptive at times nonetheless, either because the original experience was unreliable or because the memory degraded and does not accurately represent the original experience anymore.<ref>{{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 5.3 Memory}}</ref>

Knowledge based on perception, introspection, and memory may give rise to inferential knowledge, which comes about when reasoning is applied to draw inferences from other known facts.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 3d. Knowing by Thinking-Plus-Observing}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 5.4 Reason}} }}</ref> For example, the perceptual knowledge of a Czech stamp on a postcard may give rise to the inferential knowledge that one's friend is visiting the Czech Republic. This type of knowledge depends on other sources of knowledge responsible for the premises. [[Philosophy:Rationalism|Rationalists]] argue that some forms of knowledge arise from reason alone completely independent of observation and introspection. They use this approach to explain how a priori beliefs, like the mathematical belief that 2 + 2 = 4, constitute knowledge. One explanation of knowledge by pure reason holds that there is a mental faculty of rational intuition. This faculty can be used to explain why such general and abstract beliefs amount to knowledge even though there seem to be no sensory perceptions that could justify them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Audi|2002|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/AUDTSO-3 85, 90–91]|loc=The Sources of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Markie|Folescu|2021|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Introduction}} }}</ref> However, difficulties in providing a clear account of pure reason or rational intuition have led some empirically-minded epistemologists to doubt that they constitute independent sources of knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 3c. Knowing Purely by Thinking}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ Rationalism and Empiricism}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 5.4 Reason}} }}</ref> A closely related approach holds that this type of knowledge is innate. According to Plato's theory of recollection, for example, it is accessed through a [[Philosophy:Anamnesis|special form of remembering]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 3a. Innate Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ Innate and Acquired Knowledge}} }}</ref>

[[File:Borochov-testimony.jpg|thumb|alt=Photograph of a person giving testimony|Knowledge by testimony relies on statements given by other people, like the testimony given at a trial.]]
[[Testimony]] is often included as an additional source of knowledge that, unlike the other sources, is not tied to one specific cognitive faculty. Instead, it is based on the idea that one person can come to know a fact because another person talks about this fact. Testimony can happen in numerous ways, like regular speech, a letter, a newspaper, or an online blog. The [[Philosophy:Philosophy of testimony|problem of testimony]] consists in clarifying why and under what circumstances testimony can lead to knowledge. A common response is that it depends on the reliability of the person pronouncing the testimony: only testimony from reliable sources can lead to knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 5.5 Testimony}} | {{harvnb|Leonard|2021|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Reductionism and Non-Reductionism}} | {{harvnb|Green|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref>

== Structure ==
The structure of knowledge is the way in which the mental states of a person need to be related to each other for knowledge to arise.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hasan|Fumerton|2018|loc=Lead Section, 2. The Classical Analysis of Foundational Justification}} | {{harvnb|Fumerton|2022|loc=§ Summary}} }}</ref> A common view is that a person has to have good reasons for holding a belief if this belief is to amount to knowledge. When the belief is challenged, the person may justify it by referring to their reason for holding it. In many cases, this reason depends itself on another belief that may as well be challenged. An example is a person who believes that Ford cars are cheaper than BMWs. When their belief is challenged, they may justify it by claiming that they heard it from a reliable source. This justification depends on the assumption that their source is reliable, which may itself be challenged. The same may apply to any subsequent reason they cite.<ref name="auto2">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=Lead Section, § 4. Foundationalism and Coherentism}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 4. The Structure of Knowledge and Justification}} | {{harvnb|Lehrer|2015|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yKG9CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1. The Analysis of Knowledge]}} }}</ref> This threatens to lead to an [[Infinite regress|infinite regress]] since the epistemic status at each step depends on the epistemic status of the previous step.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Cameron|2018}} | {{harvnb|Clark|1988|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/CLAVIR 369–370]}} }}</ref> Theories of the structure of knowledge offer responses for how to solve this problem.<ref name="auto2"/>

[[File:Foundationalism, coherentism, infinitism.svg|thumb|upright=1.5|alt=Diagram showing the differences between foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism|Foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism are theories of the structure of knowledge. The black arrows symbolize how one belief supports another belief.]]
The three most common theories are [[Philosophy:Foundationalism|foundationalism]], [[Philosophy:Coherentism|coherentism]], and [[Infinitism|infinitism]]. Foundationalists and coherentists deny the existence of an infinite regress, in contrast to infinitists.<ref name="auto2"/> According to foundationalists, some basic reasons have their epistemic status independent of other reasons and thereby constitute the endpoint of the regress.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=Lead Section, § 4. Foundationalism and Coherentism}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 4.1 Foundationalism}} | {{harvnb|Lehrer|2015|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yKG9CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1. The Analysis of Knowledge]}} }}</ref> Some foundationalists hold that certain sources of knowledge, like perception, provide basic reasons. Another view is that this role is played by certain self-evident truths, like the knowledge of one's own existence and the content of one's ideas.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Poston|loc=[https://iep.utm.edu/foundationalism-in-epistemology/ Lead Section]}} | {{harvnb|Hasan|Fumerton|2022|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/ § 1. Regress Arguments for Foundationalism]}} }}</ref> The view that basic reasons exist is not universally accepted. One criticism states that there should be a reason why some reasons are basic while others are not. According to this view, the putative basic reasons are not actually basic since their status would depend on other reasons. Epistemologists who agree about the existence of basic reasons may disagree about which reasons constitute basic reasons.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 4. Foundationalism and Coherentism}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 4. The Structure of Knowledge and Justification}} | {{harvnb|Lehrer|2015|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=yKG9CgAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1. The Analysis of Knowledge]}} }}</ref>

Coherentists and infinitists avoid these problems by denying the contrast between basic and non-basic reasons. Coherentists argue that there is only a finite number of reasons, which mutually support and justify one another. This is based on the intuition that beliefs do not exist in isolation but form a complex web of interconnected ideas that is justified by its coherence rather than by a few privileged foundational beliefs.<ref name="auto">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 4. Foundationalism and Coherentism}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 4. The Structure of Knowledge and Justification}} }}</ref> One difficulty for this view is how to demonstrate that it does not involve the fallacy of [[Philosophy:Circular reasoning|circular reasoning]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Murphy|2022}} | {{harvnb|Lammenranta|2022}} }}</ref> If two beliefs mutually support each other then a person has a reason for accepting one belief if they already have the other. However, mutual support alone is not a good reason for newly accepting both beliefs at once. A closely related issue is that there can be distinct sets of coherent beliefs. Coherentists face the problem of explaining why someone should accept one coherent set rather than another.<ref name="auto"/> For infinitists, in contrast to foundationalists and coherentists, there is an infinite number of reasons. This view embraces the idea that there is a regress since each reason depends on another reason. One difficulty for this view is that the human mind is limited and may not be able to possess an infinite amount of reasons. This raises the question of whether, according to infinitism, human knowledge is possible at all.<ref>{{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 4. Foundationalism and Coherentism}}</ref>

== Value ==
[[File:File-Los portadores de la antorcha.jpg|thumb|alt=Sculpture showing a torch being passed form one person to another|upright=.9|''Los portadores de la antorcha (The Torch-Bearers)'' – sculpture by Anna Hyatt Huntington symbolizing the transmission of knowledge from one generation to the next (Ciudad Universitaria, Madrid, Spain)]]
Knowledge may be valuable either because it is useful or because it is good in itself. Knowledge can be useful by helping a person achieve their goals. For example, if one knows the answers to questions in an exam one is able to pass that exam or by knowing which horse is the fastest, one can earn money from bets. In these cases, knowledge has instrumental value.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Degenhardt|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FuCsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–6]}} | {{harvnb|Pritchard|2013|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ 2 The value of knowledge]}} | {{harvnb|Olsson|2011|pp=874–875}} }}</ref> Not all forms of knowledge are useful and many beliefs about trivial matters have no instrumental value. This concerns, for example, knowing how many grains of sand are on a specific beach or memorizing phone numbers one never intends to call. In a few cases, knowledge may even have a negative value. For example, if a person's life depends on gathering the courage to jump over a ravine, then having a true belief about the involved dangers may hinder them from doing so.<ref>{{harvnb|Pritchard|2013|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ 2 The value of knowledge]}}</ref>

[[File:Early Childhood Education USAID Africa.jpg|thumb|alt=Photo of early childhood education in Ziway, Ethiopia|The value of knowledge plays a key role in education for deciding which knowledge to pass on to the students.]]
Besides having instrumental value, knowledge may also have [[Philosophy:Axiology#Intrinsic value|intrinsic value]]. This means that some forms of knowledge are good in themselves even if they do not provide any practical benefits. According to Duncan Pritchard, this applies to forms of knowledge linked to [[Philosophy:Wisdom|wisdom]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pritchard|2013|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ 2 The value of knowledge]}} | {{harvnb|Degenhardt|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FuCsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–6]}} }}</ref> The value of knowledge is relevant to the field of education, specifically to the issue of choosing which knowledge should be passed on to the student.<ref>{{harvnb|Degenhardt|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FuCsDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–6]}}</ref>

A more specific issue in epistemology concerns the question of whether or why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pritchard|Turri|Carter|2022}} | {{harvnb|Olsson|2011|pp=874–875}} }}</ref> There is wide agreement that knowledge is usually good in some sense but the thesis that knowledge is better than true belief is controversial. An early discussion of this problem is found in Plato's [[Philosophy:Meno|Meno]] in relation to the claim that both knowledge and true belief can successfully guide [[Philosophy:Action|action]] and, therefore, have apparently the same value. For example, it seems that mere true belief is as effective as knowledge when trying to find the way to [[Place:Larissa|Larissa]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Olsson|2011|pp=874–875}} | {{harvnb|Pritchard|Turri|Carter|2022}} | {{harvnb|Plato|2002|pp=[https://archive.org/details/fivedialogueseut00plat/page/89 89–90, 97b–98a]}} }}</ref> According to Plato, knowledge is better because it is more stable.<ref>{{harvnb|Olsson|2011|p=875}}</ref> Another suggestion is that knowledge gets its additional value from justification. One difficulty for this view is that while justification makes it more probable that a belief is true, it is not clear what additional value it provides in comparison to an unjustified belief that is already true.<ref>{{harvnb|Pritchard|Turri|Carter|2022|loc=Lead Section, § 6. Other Accounts of the Value of Knowledge}}</ref>

The problem of the value of knowledge is often discussed in relation to [[Philosophy:Reliabilism|reliabilism]] and [[Philosophy:Virtue epistemology|virtue epistemology]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pritchard|Turri|Carter|2022}} | {{harvnb|Olsson|2011|p=874}} | {{harvnb|Pritchard|2007|pp=85–86}} }}</ref> Reliabilism can be defined as the thesis that knowledge is reliably formed true belief. This view has difficulties in explaining why knowledge is valuable or how a reliable belief-forming process adds additional value.<ref>{{harvnb|Pritchard|Turri|Carter|2022|loc=§ 2. Reliabilism and the Meno Problem, § 3. Virtue Epistemology and the Value Problem}}</ref> According to an analogy by [[Biography:Linda Zagzebski|Linda Zagzebski]], a cup of coffee made by a reliable coffee machine has the same value as an equally good cup of coffee made by an unreliable coffee machine.<ref>{{harvnb|Turri|Alfano|Greco|2021}}</ref> This difficulty in solving the value problem is sometimes used as an argument against reliabilism.<ref>{{harvnb|Pritchard|Turri|Carter|2022|loc=§ 2. Reliabilism and the Meno Problem}}</ref> Virtue epistemology, by contrast, offers a unique solution to the value problem. Virtue epistemologists see knowledge as the manifestation of cognitive virtues. They argue that knowledge has additional value due to its association with virtue. This is based on the idea that cognitive success in the form of the manifestation of virtues is inherently valuable independent of whether the resulting states are instrumentally useful.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pritchard|Turri|Carter|2022|loc=§ 3. Virtue Epistemology and the Value Problem}} | {{harvnb|Olsson|2011|p=877}} | {{harvnb|Turri|Alfano|Greco|2021|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/#EpisValu § 6. Epistemic Value]}} }}</ref>

== Philosophical skepticism ==
[[File:Philosopher,_marble_head,_Roman_copy,_AM_Corfu,_Krfm22.jpg|thumb|upright=.8|alt=Bust of Pyrrho of Elis|[[Biography:Pyrrho|Pyrrho]] was one of the first philosophical skeptics.]]
[[Philosophy:Philosophical skepticism|Philosophical skepticism]] in its strongest form, also referred to as [[Philosophy:Radical skepticism|radical skepticism]], is the thesis that humans lack any form of knowledge or that knowledge is impossible. Very few philosophers have explicitly defended this position. It has been influential nonetheless, usually in a negative sense: many scholars see it as a serious challenge to any epistemological theory and often try to show how their preferred theory overcomes it.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 8. The Epistemic Principles and Scepticism}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 4. Sceptical Doubts About Knowing}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 6.1 General Skepticism and Selective Skepticism}} }}</ref> A weaker form of philosophical skepticism advocates the suspension of judgment as a form of attaining [[Philosophy:Ataraxia|tranquility]] while remaining [[Philosophy:Humility|humble]] and open-minded.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Attie-Picker|2020|pp=97–98}} | {{harvnb|Perin|2020|pp=[https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781351168120-23/tranquility-goal-pyrrhonian-skepticism-casey-perin 285–286]}} }}</ref>

One argument for radical skepticism is the [[Philosophy:Dream argument|dream argument]]. According to it, perceptual experience is not a source of knowledge since dreaming provides unreliable information and a person could be dreaming without knowing it. Because of this inability to discriminate between dream and perception, it is argued that there is no perceptual knowledge of the external world.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Windt|2021|loc=§ 1.1 Cartesian Dream Skepticism}} | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 8. The Epistemic Principles and Scepticism}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 4. Sceptical Doubts About Knowing}} }}</ref> A similar often-cited [[Thought experiment|thought experiment]] assumes that a person is not a regular human being but a [[Philosophy:Brain in a vat|brain in a vat]] that receives electrical stimuli. These stimuli give the brain the false impression of having a body and interacting with the external world. The basic argument is the same: since the person is unable to tell the difference, they do not know that they have a body responsible for reliable perceptions.<ref name="auto3">{{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 6.1 General Skepticism and Selective Skepticism}}</ref> Both these thought experiments focus on the problem of [[Philosophy:Underdetermination|underdetermination]]. This problem arises in cases where the available evidence is not sufficient to make a rational decision between competing theories. In such cases, a person is not justified in believing one theory rather than the other. If this is always the case then a global skepticism follows.<ref name="auto3"/> Another skeptical argument assumes that knowledge requires absolute certainty and aims to show that all human cognition is fallible and fails to meet this standard.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 6. Standards for Knowing}} | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 8. The Epistemic Principles and Scepticism}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 6.1 General Skepticism and Selective Skepticism}} }}</ref>

An influential argument against radical skepticism states that radical skepticism is self-contradictory. The argument is based on the idea that denying the existence of knowledge is itself a knowledge-claim.<ref>{{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ Skepticism}}</ref> Another response comes from [[Philosophy:Common sense|common sense]] philosophy and states that many of the ordinary beliefs denied by radical skepticism are more reliable than the abstract reasoning cited in favor of skepticism. According to this view, the conclusion is not that ordinary beliefs fail to amount to knowledge but that there must be some kind of flaw in the reasoning process leading to radical skepticism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 6.2 Responses to the Closure Argument}} | {{harvnb|Lycan|2019|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=cfeEDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT21 21–22, 5–36]}} }}</ref> [[Philosophy:Pragmatism|Pragmatist]] epistemologists tend to reject the claim by some radical skeptics that knowledge requires infallibility and argue instead that all beliefs and theories are fallible hypotheses that may need to be revised as new evidence is acquired.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|McDermid|2023}} | {{harvnb|Misak|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=S6WHAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA53 53]}} | {{harvnb|Hamner|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Uno8DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA87 87]}} }}</ref>

Less global forms of skepticism deny that knowledge exists within a specific area or discipline, sometimes referred to as local or selective skepticism.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 4. Sceptical Doubts About Knowing}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 6.1 General Skepticism and Selective Skepticism }} }}</ref> They are often motivated by the idea that certain phenomena do not accurately represent their subject matter and may lead to false impressions. Some skeptics accept that people can know about their own sensory impressions and experiences but not about the external world. This is based on the idea that beliefs about the external world are mediated through the senses, which can be misleading at times. This problem does not affect the [[Philosophy:Qualia|sensory impressions]] themselves but the inferences drawn from them. In this regard, a person cannot know that there is a red Ferrari in the street but they can know that they have the sensory impression of the color red.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 4. Sceptical Doubts About Knowing}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ Skepticism, § Perception and Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 6.1 General Skepticism and Selective Skepticism}} }}</ref> Other forms of local skepticism accept scientific knowledge but deny the possibility of moral or religious knowledge, for example, because there is no reliable way to empirically measure whether a moral claim is true or false.<ref>{{harvnb|Hetherington|2022a|loc=§ 4. Sceptical Doubts About Knowing}}</ref>

== In various disciplines ==
=== Science ===
{{main|Philosophy:Philosophy of science}}
The scientific approach is usually regarded as an exemplary process of how to gain knowledge about empirical facts.<ref name="auto5">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pritchard|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ 115–118]|loc=11 Scientific Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Moser|2005|p=385|loc=13. Scientific Knowledge}} }}</ref> Scientific knowledge includes mundane knowledge about easily observable facts, for example, chemical knowledge that certain reactants become hot when mixed together. It also encompasses knowledge of less tangible issues, like claims about the behavior of [[Biology:Gene|gene]]s, [[Physics:Neutrino|neutrino]]s, and [[Astronomy:Black hole|black hole]]s.<ref>{{harvnb|Moser|2005|p=386|loc=13. Scientific Knowledge}}</ref>

A key aspect of most forms of science is that they seek natural laws that explain empirical observations.<ref name="auto5"/> Scientific knowledge is discovered and tested using the [[Scientific method|scientific method]]. This method aims to arrive at reliable knowledge by formulating the problem in a clear way and by ensuring that the evidence used to support or refute a specific theory is public, reliable, and replicable. This way, other researchers can repeat the experiments and observations in the initial study to confirm or disconfirm it.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Moser|2005|p=390|loc=13. Scientific Knowledge}} |2={{harvnb|Hatfield|1996|loc=[https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO Scientific method]}} |3={{harvnb|Beins|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=fBs0DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA8 8–9]}} |4={{harvnb|Hepburn|Andersen|2021}} }}</ref> The scientific method is often analyzed as a series of steps that begins with regular observation and data collection. Based on these insights, scientists then try to find a [[Hypothesis|hypothesis]] that explains the observations. The hypothesis is then tested using a controlled experiment to compare whether predictions based on the hypothesis match the observed results. As a last step, the results are interpreted and a conclusion is reached whether and to what degree the findings confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dodd|Zambetti|Deneve|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=jXqAEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA11 11–12]}} | {{harvnb|Hatfield|1996|loc=[https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO Scientific method]}} | {{harvnb|Hepburn|Andersen|2021}} }}</ref>

The progress of scientific knowledge is traditionally seen as a gradual and continuous process in which the existing body of knowledge is increased at each step. This view has been challenged by some philosophers of science, such as [[Biography:Thomas Kuhn|Thomas Kuhn]], who holds that between phases of incremental progress, there are so-called scientific revolutions in which a [[Philosophy:Paradigm shift|paradigm shift]] occurs. According to this view, some basic assumptions are changed due to the paradigm shift. This results in a radically new perspective on the body of scientific knowledge that is [[Philosophy:Commensurability (philosophy of science)|incommensurable]] with the previous outlook.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Pritchard|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ 123–125]|loc=11 Scientific Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Niiniluoto|2019}} }}</ref>

=== History ===
{{main|Philosophy:History of knowledge}}

The history of knowledge is the field of inquiry that studies how knowledge in different fields has developed and evolved in the course of history. It is closely related to the [[History:History of science|history of science]] but covers a wider area that includes knowledge from fields like [[Philosophy:History of philosophy|philosophy]], [[History of mathematics|mathematics]], education, literature, art, and religion. It further covers practical knowledge of specific crafts, medicine, and everyday practices. It investigates not only how knowledge is created and employed but also how it is disseminated and preserved.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Burke|2015|loc=1. Knowledges and Their Histories: § History and Its Neighbours, 3. Processes: § Four Stages, 3. Processes: § Oral Transmission}} | {{harvnb|Doren|1992|pp=xvi–xviii}} | {{harvnb|Daston|2017|pp=142–143}} | {{harvnb|Mulsow|2018|p=159}} }}</ref>

[[History:Prehistory|Before the ancient period]], knowledge about social conduct and survival skills was passed down orally and in the form of customs from one generation to the next.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bowen|Gelpi|Anweiler|2023|loc=§ Introduction, Prehistoric and Primitive Cultures}} | {{harvnb|Bartlett|Burton|2007|p=15}} | {{harvnb|Fagan|Durrani|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=dCwlDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA15 15]}} | {{harvnb|Doren|1992|pp=3–4}} }}</ref> The ancient period saw the rise of major civilizations starting about 3000 BCE in [[Place:Mesopotamia|Mesopotamia]], Egypt, India, and China. The invention of writing in this period significantly increased the amount of stable knowledge within society since it could be stored and shared without being limited by [[Memory#Failures|imperfect human memory]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Doren|1992|pp=xxiii–xxiv, 3–4}} | {{harvnb|Friesen|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=0Ks-DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA17 17–18]}} | {{harvnb|Danesi|2013|pp=168–169}} | {{harvnb|Steinberg|1995|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=VPs3kidEqXYC&pg=PA3 3–4]}} | {{harvnb|Lanzer|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=UCRZDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA7 7]}} }}</ref> During this time, the first developments in scientific fields like mathematics, astronomy, and medicine were made. They were later formalized and greatly expanded by the {{wipe|Ancient Greece}} starting in the 6th century BCE. Other ancient advancements concerned knowledge in the fields of agriculture, law, and politics.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Doren|1992|pp=xxiii–xxiv, 3–4, 29–30}} | {{harvnb|Conner|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=EAo4DgAAQBAJ&pg=PT81 81]}} }}</ref>

[[File:Printing machine of Johanes Gutenbrg1.jpg|thumb|upright=.8|alt=Photo of the printing press created by Johanes Gutenburg|The invention of the printing press in the 15th century greatly expanded access to written materials.]]

In the medieval period, religious knowledge was a central concern, and religious institutions, like the [[Organization:Catholic Church|Catholic Church]] in Europe, influenced intellectual activity.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Burke|2015|loc=2. Concepts: § Authorities and Monopolies}} | {{harvnb|Kuhn|1992|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=HQ41EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA106 106]}} | {{harvnb|Lanzer|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=UCRZDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA7 7]}} }}</ref> Jewish communities set up yeshivas as centers for studying religious texts and [[Religion:Halakha|Jewish law]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bowker|2003|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780192800947.001.0001/acref-9780192800947-e-8089?rskey=Ba4XPQ&result=1 Yeshivah ]}} | {{harvnb|Walton|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Jv9tCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA130 130]}} }}</ref>  In the [[Religion:Muslim world|Muslim world]], [[Engineering:Madrasa|madrasa]] schools were established and focused on Islamic law and [[Religion:Islamic philosophy|Islamic philosophy]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Johnson|Stearns|2023|pp=5, 43–44, 47}} | {{harvnb|Esposito|2003|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100125907 Madrasa]}} }}</ref> Many intellectual achievements of the ancient period were preserved, refined, and expanded during the Islamic Golden Age from the 8th to 13th centuries.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Trefil|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=K-bGBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT63 63–64]|loc=Islamic Science}} | {{harvnb|Ashraf|2023|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TozYEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT101 101–102]}} }}</ref> Centers of higher learning were established in this period in various regions, like Al-Qarawiyyin University in Morocco,<ref>{{harvnb|Aqil|Babekri|Nadmi|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TGjvDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA156 156]|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TGjvDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA156 Morocco: Contributions to Mathematics Education From Morocco]}}</ref> the [[Organization:Al-Azhar University|Al-Azhar University]] in Egypt,<ref>{{harvnb|Cosman|Jones|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=-Jf5t1vFw1QC&pg=PA148 148]}}</ref> the [[Organization:House of Wisdom|House of Wisdom]] in Iraq,<ref>{{harvnb|Gilliot|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=P-pGDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT81 81]}}</ref> and the first universities in Europe.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bowen|Gelpi|Anweiler|2023|loc=§ The Development of the Universities}} | {{harvnb|Kemmis|Edwards-Groves|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=fFM7DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA50 50]}} }}</ref> This period also saw the formation of guilds, which preserved and advanced technical and craft knowledge.<ref>{{harvnb|Power|1970|pp=[https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.$b201970&view=1up&seq=273 243–244]}}</ref>

In the [[Philosophy:Renaissance|Renaissance]] period, starting in the 14th century, there was a renewed interest in the [[Social:Humanities|humanities]] and sciences.<ref>{{harvnb|Ashraf|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TozYEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT159 159]}}</ref> The printing press was invented in the 15th century and significantly increased the availability of written media and general [[Philosophy:Literacy|literacy]] of the population.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steinberg|1995|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=VPs3kidEqXYC&pg=PA5 5]}} | {{harvnb|Danesi|2013|pp=169–170}} }}</ref> These developments served as the foundation of the Scientific Revolution in the [[Philosophy:Age of Enlightenment|Age of Enlightenment]] starting in the 16th and 17th centuries. It led to an explosion of knowledge in fields such as physics, chemistry, biology, and the social sciences.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Doren|1992|pp=xxiv–xxv, 184–185}} | {{harvnb|Lanzer|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=UCRZDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA7 7]}} }}</ref> The technological advancements that accompanied this development made possible the [[History:Industrial Revolution|Industrial Revolution]] in the 18th and 19th centuries.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Doren|1992|pp=xxiv–xxv, 213–214}} | {{harvnb|Lanzer|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=UCRZDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA7 7]}} }}</ref> In the 20th century, the development of computers and the Internet led to a vast expansion of knowledge by revolutionizing how knowledge is stored, shared, and created.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lanzer|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=UCRZDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA8 8]}} | {{harvnb|Danesi|2013|pp=178–181}} }}</ref>

=== Religion ===
Knowledge plays a central role in many religions. Knowledge claims about the [[Philosophy:Existence of God|existence of God]] or religious doctrines about how each one should live their lives are found in almost every culture.<ref>{{harvnb|Clark|2022|loc=Lead Section, § 2. The Evidentialist Objection to Belief in God}}</ref> However, such knowledge claims are often controversial and are commonly rejected by [[Philosophy:Religious skepticism|religious skeptics]] and atheists.<ref name=Penelhum1971>{{harvnb|Penelhum|1971|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QQU9AAAAIAAJ 1. Faith, Scepticism and Philosophy]}}</ref> The [[Religion:Religious epistemology|epistemology of religion]] is the field of inquiry studying whether [[Philosophy:Belief in God|belief in God]] and in other religious doctrines is rational and amounts to knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Clark|2022|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Forrest|2021|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Simplifications}} }}</ref> One important view in this field is [[Philosophy:Evidentialism|evidentialism]], which states that belief in religious doctrines is justified if it is supported by sufficient evidence. Suggested examples of evidence for religious doctrines include [[Philosophy:Religious experience|religious experience]]s such as direct contact with the divine or inner testimony when hearing God's voice.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Clark|2022|loc=Lead Section, § 2. The Evidentialist Objection to Belief in God}} | {{harvnb|Forrest|2021|loc=Lead Section, § 2. The Rejection of Enlightenment Evidentialism}} | {{harvnb|Dougherty|2014|pp=97–98}} }}</ref> Evidentialists often reject that belief in religious doctrines amounts to knowledge based on the claim that there is not sufficient evidence.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Clark|2022|loc=§ 2. The Evidentialist Objection to Belief in God}} | {{harvnb|Forrest|2021|loc=Lead Section, 2. The Rejection of Enlightenment Evidentialism}} }}</ref> A famous saying in this regard is due to Bertrand Russell. When asked how he would justify his lack of belief in God when facing his judgment after death, he replied "Not enough evidence, God! Not enough evidence."<ref>{{harvnb|Clark|2022|loc=§ 2. The Evidentialist Objection to Belief in God}}</ref>

However, religious teachings about the existence and nature of God are not always seen as knowledge claims by their defenders. Some explicitly state that the proper attitude towards such doctrines is not knowledge but [[Philosophy:Faith|faith]]. This is often combined with the assumption that these doctrines are true but cannot be fully understood by reason or verified through rational inquiry. For this reason, it is claimed that one should accept them even though they do not amount to knowledge.<ref name=Penelhum1971/> Such a view is reflected in a famous saying by Immanuel Kant where he claims that he "had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith."<ref>{{harvnb|Stevenson|2003|pp=[https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/kantian-review/article/abs/opinion-belief-or-faith-and-knowledge/9519081ED9BAE7811D2B9670340AD7E1 72–73]}}</ref>

Distinct religions often differ from each other concerning the doctrines they proclaim as well as their understanding of the role of knowledge in religious practice.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Paden|2009|pp=[https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203868768-19/comparative-religion-william-paden 225–227]|loc=Comparative Religion}} | {{harvnb|Bouquet|1962|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zQ49AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA1 1]}} }}</ref> In both the Jewish and the Christian traditions, knowledge plays a role in the [[Religion:Fall of man|fall of man]] in which Adam and Eve were expelled from the [[Religion:Garden of Eden|Garden of Eden]]. Responsible for this fall was that they ignored God's command and ate from the tree of knowledge, which gave them the knowledge of good and evil. This is seen as a rebellion against God since this knowledge belongs to God and it is not for humans to decide what is right or wrong.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carson|Cerrito|2003|p=164}} | {{harvnb|Delahunty|Dignen|2012|p=365|loc=Tree of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Blayney|1769|loc=[https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Bible_(King_James)/Genesis#3:22 Genesis]}} }}</ref> In the Christian literature, knowledge is seen as one of the [[Religion:Seven gifts of the Holy Spirit|seven gifts of the Holy Spirit]].<ref>{{harvnb|Vost|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pdaiDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 75–76]}}</ref> In [[Religion:Islam|Islam]], "the Knowing" (''al-ʿAlīm'') is one of the 99 names reflecting distinct attributes of [[Religion:God in Islam|God]]. The Qur'an asserts that knowledge comes from God and the acquisition of knowledge is encouraged in the [[Religion:Hadith|teachings of Muhammad]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Campo|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OZbyz_Hr-eIC&pg=PA515 515]}} | {{harvnb|Swartley|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=gLi2X1rzeZIC&pg=PA63 63]}} }}</ref>

[[File:Saraswati - Raja Ravi Varma.jpg|thumb|upright=.8|alt=Oil painting showing Saraswati|[[Religion:Saraswati|Saraswati]] is the goddess of knowledge and the arts in Hinduism.]]
In Buddhism, knowledge that leads to [[Philosophy:Enlightenment in Buddhism|liberation]] is called ''vijjā''. It contrasts with ''avijjā'' or ignorance, which is understood as the root of all [[Philosophy:Duḥkha|suffering]]. This is often explained in relation to the claim that humans suffer because they crave things that are [[Philosophy:Impermanence#Buddhism|impermanent]]. The ignorance of the impermanent nature of things is seen as the factor responsible for this craving.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Burton|2002|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/1400322 326–327]}} | {{harvnb|Chaudhary|2017|pp=202–203|loc=Avijjā)}} | {{harvnb|Chaudhary|2017|pp=1373–1374|loc=Wisdom (Buddhism)}} }}</ref> The central goal of Buddhist practice is to stop suffering. This aim is to be achieved by understanding and practicing the teaching known as the [[Philosophy:Four Noble Truths|Four Noble Truths]] and thereby overcoming ignorance.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Chaudhary|2017|pp=202–203|loc=Avijjā)}} | {{harvnb|Chaudhary|2017|pp=1373–1374|loc=Wisdom (Buddhism)}} }}</ref> Knowledge plays a key role in the classical path of Hinduism known as ''[[Philosophy:Jnana yoga|jñāna yoga]]'' or "path of knowledge". Its aim is to achieve oneness with the divine by fostering an understanding of the self and its relation to [[Philosophy:Brahman|Brahman]] or ultimate reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jones|Ryan|2006|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OgMmceadQ3gC jnana]}} | {{harvnb|Jones|Ryan|2006|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=OgMmceadQ3gC Bhagavad Gita]}} }}</ref>

=== Anthropology ===
The ''anthropology of knowledge'' is a multi-disciplinary field of inquiry.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Allwood|2013|pp=[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025 69–72]|loc=Anthropology of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Boyer|2007|loc=1. Of Dialectical Germans and Dialectical Ethnographers: Notes from an Engagement with Philosophy}} }}</ref> It studies how knowledge is acquired, stored, retrieved, and communicated.<ref>{{harvnb|Cohen|2010|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/40606072 S193–S202]}}</ref> Special interest is given to how knowledge is reproduced and changes in relation to social and cultural circumstances.<ref name=Allwood2013>{{harvnb|Allwood|2013|pp=[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025 69–72]|loc=Anthropology of Knowledge}}</ref> In this context, the term ''knowledge'' is used in a very broad sense, roughly equivalent to terms like ''understanding'' and ''culture''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Allwood|2013|pp=[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025 69–72]|loc=Anthropology of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Barth|2002|p=1}} }}</ref> This means that the forms and reproduction of understanding are studied irrespective of their [[Philosophy:Truth value|truth value]]. In epistemology, on the other hand, knowledge is usually restricted to forms of true belief. The main focus in [[Social:Anthropology|anthropology]] is on [[Empirical evidence|empirical observations]] of how people ascribe truth values to meaning contents, like when affirming an assertion, even if these contents are false.<ref name=Allwood2013/> This also includes practical components: knowledge is what is employed when interpreting and acting on the world and involves diverse phenomena, such as feelings, embodied skills, information, and concepts. It is used to understand and anticipate events to prepare and react accordingly.<ref>{{harvnb|Barth|2002|pp=1–2}}</ref>

The reproduction of knowledge and its changes often happen through some form of communication used to [[Social:Knowledge transfer|transfer knowledge]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Allwood|2013|pp=[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025 69–72]|loc=Anthropology of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Cohen|2010|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/40606072 S193–S202]}} }}</ref> This includes face-to-face discussions and online communications as well as seminars and rituals. An important role in this context falls to institutions, like university departments or scientific journals in the academic context.<ref name=Allwood2013/> Anthropologists of knowledge understand traditions as knowledge that has been reproduced within a society or geographic region over several generations. They are interested in how this reproduction is affected by external influences. For example, societies tend to interpret knowledge claims found in other societies and incorporate them in a modified form.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Allwood|2013|pp=[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025 69–72]|loc=Anthropology of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Barth|2002|pp=1–4 }} | {{harvnb|Kuruk|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ia7ZDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT25 25]}} }}</ref>

Within a society, people belonging to the same social group usually understand things and organize knowledge in similar ways to one another. In this regard, social identities play a significant role: people who associate themselves with similar identities, like age-influenced, professional, religious, and ethnic identities, tend to embody similar forms of knowledge. Such identities concern both how a person sees themselves, for example, in terms of the ideals they pursue, as well as how other people see them, such as the expectations they have toward the person.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Allwood|2013|pp=[https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118339893.wbeccp025 69–72]|loc=Anthropology of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Hansen|1982|p=193}} }}</ref>

=== Sociology ===
{{main|Social:Sociology of knowledge}}
The sociology of knowledge is the subfield of sociology that studies how thought and society are related to each other.<ref name="auto1">{{multiref | {{harvnb|Coser|2009|loc=[https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/sociology-and-social-reform/sociology-general-terms-and-concepts/sociology-knowledge Knowledge, Sociology of]}} | {{harvnb|Tufari|2003|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4C0KAQAAMAAJ Knowledge, Sociology of]}} | {{harvnb|Scheler|Stikkers|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pFqrO7Lxiw4C&pg=PA23 23]}} }}</ref> Like the anthropology of knowledge, it understands "knowledge" in a wide sense that encompasses philosophical and political ideas, religious and ideological doctrines, folklore, law, and technology. The sociology of knowledge studies in what sociohistorical circumstances knowledge arises, what consequences it has, and on what existential conditions it depends. The examined conditions include physical, demographic, economic, and sociocultural factors. For instance, [[Biography:Karl Marx|Karl Marx]] claimed that the dominant ideology in a society is a product of and changes with the underlying socioeconomic conditions.<ref name="auto1"/> Another example is found in forms of decolonial scholarship that claim that colonial powers are responsible for the [[Social:Hegemony|hegemony]] of Western knowledge systems. They seek a [[Philosophy:Decolonization of knowledge|decolonization of knowledge]] to undermine this hegemony.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lee|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ZtArDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT67 67]}} | {{harvnb|Dreyer|2017|pp=1–7}} }}</ref>

=== Others ===
[[Philosophy:Formal epistemology|Formal epistemology]] studies knowledge using formal tools found in mathematics and logic.<ref>{{harvnb|Weisberg|2021}}</ref> An important issue in this field concerns the epistemic principles of knowledge. These are rules governing how knowledge and related states behave and in what relations they stand to each other. The transparency principle, also referred to as the ''luminosity of knowledge'', states that knowing something implies the second-order knowledge that one knows it. This principle implies that if Heike knows that today is Monday, then she also knows that she knows that today is Monday.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Steup|Neta|2020|loc=§ 3.3 Internal Vs. External}} | {{harvnb|Das|Salow|2018|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/DASTAT-2 3–4]}} | {{harvnb|Dokic|Égré|2009|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/DOKMFE-2 1–2]}} }}</ref> According to the conjunction principle, if a person has justified beliefs in two separate propositions then they are also justified in believing the [[Logical conjunction|conjunction]] of these two propositions. In this regard, if Bob has a justified belief that dogs are animals and another justified belief that cats are animals, then he is justified to believe the conjunction of these two propositions, i.e. that both dogs and cats are animals. Other commonly discussed principles are the closure principle and the evidence transfer principle.<ref>{{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 7. Epistemic Principles}}</ref>

[[Knowledge management]] is the process of creating, gathering, storing, and sharing knowledge. It involves the management of information assets that can take the form of [[Document|document]]s, [[Database|database]]s, policies, and procedures. It is of particular interest in the field of business and organizational development, as it directly impacts [[Decision-making|decision-making]] and [[Social:Strategic planning|strategic planning]]. Knowledge management efforts are often employed to increase [[Finance:Operational efficiency|operational efficiency]] in attempts to gain a [[Social:Competitive advantage|competitive advantage]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lengnick-Hall|Lengnick-Hall|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=t8RLT77_VHMC&pg=PA85 85]}} | {{harvnb|Awad|Ghaziri|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=qzREBAAAQBAJ&pg=PT28 28]}} }}</ref> Key processes in the field of knowledge management are knowledge creation, [[Data storage|knowledge storage]], knowledge sharing, and knowledge application. Knowledge creation is the first step and involves the production of new information. The newly acquired knowledge has to be reliably stored to not become lost or forgotten. This can happen through different means, including books, audio recordings, film, and digital databases. Secure storage facilitates knowledge sharing, which involves the transmission of information from one person to another. For the knowledge to be beneficial, it has to be put into practice, meaning that its insights should be used to either improve existing practices or implement new ones.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Suzanne|2021|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ht8XEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA114 114–115]}} | {{harvnb|Choo|2002|pp=503–504}} | {{harvnb|Witzel|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=riM-iG8Ib64C&pg=PT252 252]}} }}</ref>

Knowledge representation is the field of inquiry within [[Artificial intelligence|artificial intelligence]] that studies how computer systems can efficiently represent information. It investigates how different [[Data structure|data structure]]s and interpretative procedures can be combined to achieve this goal and which formal languages can be used to express knowledge items. Some efforts in this field are directed at developing general languages and systems that can be employed in a great variety of domains while others focus on an optimized representation method within one specific domain. Knowledge representation is closely linked to automatic reasoning because the purpose of knowledge representation formalisms is usually to construct a [[Knowledge base|knowledge base]] from which [[Philosophy:Inference|inference]]s are drawn.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Castilho|Lopes|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aOeAoTz24jUC&pg=PA287 287]}} | {{harvnb|Kandel|1992|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9r4dh4pdQNkC&pg=PA5 5–6]}} | {{harvnb|Cai|Liu|Chen|Wang|2021|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=x30xEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA21 21]}} }}</ref> Influential knowledge base formalisms include logic-based systems, [[Rule-based system|rule-based system]]s, semantic networks, and [[Frame (artificial intelligence)|frames]]. Logic-based systems rely on [[Formal language|formal language]]s employed in [[Logic|logic]] to represent knowledge. They use linguistic devices like individual terms, [[Predicate (mathematical logic)|predicates]], and [[Philosophy:Quantifier (logic)|quantifiers]]. For rule-based systems, each unit of information is expressed using a conditional production rule of the form "if A then B". Semantic nets model knowledge as a [[Graph (discrete mathematics)|graph]] consisting of [[Vertex (graph theory)|vertices]] to represent facts or concepts and edges to represent the relations between them. Frames provide complex taxonomies to group items into classes, subclasses, and instances.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Castilho|Lopes|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=aOeAoTz24jUC&pg=PA287 287–288]}} | {{harvnb|Kandel|1992|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9r4dh4pdQNkC&pg=PA5 5–6]}} | {{harvnb|Akerkar|Sajja|2010|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Tj8r3A-0dZkC&pg=PA71 71–72]}} }}</ref>

== See also ==
{{div col|colwidth=26em}}
* {{Annotated link|Epistemic modal logic}}
* {{Annotated link|Knowledge falsification}}
* {{Annotated link|Omniscience}}
* {{Annotated link|Outline of knowledge}}
{{div col end}}

== References ==
=== Notes ===
{{Reflist|group=lower-alpha|30em}}

=== Citations ===
{{Reflist|23em}}

===Sources===
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* {{cite web |last1=Gertler |first1=Brie |title=Self-Knowledge > Knowledge of the Self |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-knowledge/supplement.html |website=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=22 October 2022 |date=2021a |archive-date=3 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220703092637/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-knowledge/supplement.html |url-status=live }}
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* {{cite book |last1=Magee |first1=Bryan |last2=Popper |first2=Karl R. |date=1971 |chapter=Conversation with Karl Popper |editor-last=Magee |editor-first=Bryan |title=Modern British Philosophy |publisher=St. Martin's Press |pages=[https://archive.org/details/modernbritishphi0000mage/page/74 74–75] |oclc=314039 |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/modernbritishphi0000mage/page/66 |chapter-url-access=registration |isbn=978-0-19-283047-0 |quote=Popper: Putting our ideas into words, or better, writing them down, makes an important difference. ... It is what I call 'knowledge in the objective sense'. Scientific knowledge belongs to it. It is this knowledge which is stored in our libraries rather than our heads. Magee: And you regard the knowledge stored in our libraries as more important than the knowledge stored in our heads. Popper: Much more important, from every point of view }}
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* {{cite journal |last1=Stevenson |first1=Leslie |title=Opinion, Belief or Faith, and Knowledge |journal=Kantian Review |date=2003 |volume=7 |pages=72–101 |doi=10.1017/S1369415400001746 |s2cid=143965507 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/kantian-review/article/abs/opinion-belief-or-faith-and-knowledge/9519081ED9BAE7811D2B9670340AD7E1 |language=en |issn=2044-2394 |access-date=21 September 2022 |archive-date=21 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220921213211/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/kantian-review/article/abs/opinion-belief-or-faith-and-knowledge/9519081ED9BAE7811D2B9670340AD7E1 |url-status=live }}
* {{cite web |last1=Stroll |first1=Avrum |title=Epistemology |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology |website=www.britannica.com |access-date=20 May 2022 |language=en |archive-date=10 July 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190710175341/https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology |url-status=live |date=2023 }}
* {{cite web |last1=Sudduth |first1=Michael |title=Defeaters in Epistemology: 2b Defeasibility Analyses and Propositional Defeaters |url=https://iep.utm.edu/defeaters-in-epistemology/#SH2b |website=[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |access-date=17 May 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602105748/https://iep.utm.edu/defeaters-in-epistemology/#SH2b |url-status=live |date=2022 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Suzanne |first1=Zyngier |title=Enhancing Academic Research and Higher Education With Knowledge Management Principles |date=2021 |publisher=IGI Global |isbn=978-1-7998-5773-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ht8XEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA114 |language=en |access-date=2 December 2023 |archive-date=2 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231202183024/https://books.google.com/books?id=ht8XEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA114 |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Swartley |first1=Keith E. |title=Encountering the World of Islam |date=2005 |publisher=InterVarsity Press |isbn=978-0-8308-5644-2 |page=63 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gLi2X1rzeZIC&pg=PA63 |language=en |access-date=4 March 2023 |archive-date=4 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230304103829/https://books.google.com/books?id=gLi2X1rzeZIC&pg=PA63 |url-status=live }}
* {{cite web |last1=Thakchoe |first1=Sonam |title=The Theory of Two Truths in India |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-india/ |website=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=6 June 2022 |date=2022 |archive-date=16 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220516210648/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-india/ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite web |title=Para and Apara Vidya |url=https://www.thehindu.com/society/faith/para-and-apara-vidya/article24978890.ece |website=The Hindu |access-date=6 June 2022 |language=en-IN |date=2018 |archive-date=31 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220531105255/https://www.thehindu.com/society/faith/para-and-apara-vidya/article24978890.ece |url-status=live |author=The Hindu staff }}
* {{cite book |last1=Trefil |first1=James |title=Science in World History |date=2012 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-136-49929-6 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=K-bGBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT63 |language=en |chapter=Islamic Science |access-date=29 November 2023 |archive-date=2 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231202184224/https://books.google.com/books?id=K-bGBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT63 |url-status=live }}
* {{cite web |last1=Truncellito |first1=David A. |title=Epistemology |url=https://iep.utm.edu/epistemo/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=8 March 2023 |date=2023 |archive-date=13 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220113223803/https://iep.utm.edu/epistemo/ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Tufari |first1=P. |title=New Catholic Encyclopedia |date=2003 |publisher=Thomson/Gale |isbn=978-0-7876-4008-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=4C0KAQAAMAAJ |language=en |chapter=Knowledge, Sociology of |access-date=7 March 2023 |archive-date=1 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240201125118/https://books.google.com/books?id=4C0KAQAAMAAJ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite web |last1=Turri |first1=John |last2=Alfano |first2=Mark |last3=Greco |first3=John |title=Virtue Epistemology: 6. Epistemic Value |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/#EpisValu |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=20 September 2022 |date=2021 |archive-date=26 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230326030005/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/#EpisValu |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Vempala |first1=Naresh N. |editor1-last=Thompson |editor1-first=William Forde |title=Music in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Encyclopedia |date=2014 |publisher=SAGE Publications |isbn=978-1-4522-8302-9 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qfcOBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA277 |language=en |chapter=Creativity, Theories of Musical |access-date=30 November 2023 |archive-date=2 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231202184224/https://books.google.com/books?id=qfcOBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA277 |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Vost |first1=Kevin |title=Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit |date=2016 |publisher=Sophia Institute Press |isbn=978-1-62282-412-0 |pages=75–76 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pdaiDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 |language=en |access-date=7 March 2023 |archive-date=7 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230307134743/https://books.google.com/books?id=pdaiDQAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 |url-status=live }}
* {{cite journal |last=Walton |first=Douglas N. |date=2005 |title=Pragmatic and Idealized Models of Knowledge and Ignorance |journal=American Philosophical Quarterly |volume=42 |issue=1 |pages=59–69 [59, 64] |jstor=20010182 |quote=It is a pervasive assumption in recent analytical philosophy that knowledge can be defined as a modality representing a rational agent's true and consistent beliefs. Such views are based on rationality assumptions. One is that knowledge can only consist of true propositions. This way of speaking is sharply at odds with the way we speak about knowledge, for example, in computing, where a so-called knowledge base can be a database, that is, a set of data that has been collected and is thought to consist of true propositions, even though, realistically speaking, many of them might later be shown to be false or untenable. ... The pragmatic account of knowledge starts with a knowledge system, meaning a working system with an agent having a database. ... The notion of a search can be a social one, in many instances. A group of agents can be engaged in the search, and some of them can know things that others do not know.}}
* {{cite book |last1=Walton |first1=Linda |chapter=Educational Institutions |editor-last1=Kedar |editor-first1=Benjamin Z. |editor-last2=Wiesner-Hanks |editor-first2=Merry E. |title=The Cambridge World History: Volume 5, Expanding Webs of Exchange and Conflict, 500CE–1500CE |date=9 April 2015 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-316-29775-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Jv9tCAAAQBAJ |language=en |access-date=15 December 2023 |archive-date=18 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221118094909/https://books.google.com/books?id=Jv9tCAAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite web |last1=Weisberg |first1=Jonathan |title=Formal Epistemology |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/formal-epistemology/ |website=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=5 June 2022 |date=2021 |archive-date=14 March 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150314172053/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/formal-epistemology/ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Wilson |first1=John P. |last2=Cattell |first2=Alan |chapter=7. Knowledge Management |editor-last1=Wilson |editor-first1=John P. |title=Human Resource Development: Learning & Training for Individuals & Organizations |date=2005 |publisher=Kogan Page Publishers |isbn=978-0-7494-4352-8 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zpNc_GZIiikC&pg=PA118 |language=en |access-date=5 December 2023 |archive-date=5 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231205132018/https://books.google.com/books?id=zpNc_GZIiikC&pg=PA118 |url-status=live }}
* {{cite web |last1=Windt |first1=Jennifer M. |title=Dreams and Dreaming |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dreams-dreaming/#CartDreaSkep |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=12 December 2023 |date=2021 |archive-date=1 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240201125124/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dreams-dreaming/#CartDreaSkep |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Wise |first1=C. |title=Chomsky and Deconstruction: The Politics of Unconscious Knowledge |date=2011 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-0-230-11705-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=EathAQAAQBAJ&pg=PT80 |language=en |access-date=3 December 2023 |archive-date=3 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231203185739/https://books.google.com/books?id=EathAQAAQBAJ&pg=PT80 |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Witzel |first1=Morgen |title=Management: The Basics |date=2004 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-134-36172-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=riM-iG8Ib64C&pg=PT252 |access-date=2 December 2023 |archive-date=2 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231202181104/https://books.google.com/books?id=riM-iG8Ib64C&pg=PT252 |url-status=live }}
* {{cite journal |last1=Woolf |first1=Raphael |title=Plato and the Norms of Thought |journal=Mind |date=2013 |volume=122 |issue=485 |pages=171–216 |doi=10.1093/mind/fzt012 |url=https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/122/485/171/961176 |issn=0026-4423 |access-date=18 September 2022 |archive-date=20 September 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220920172241/https://academic.oup.com/mind/article/122/485/171/961176 |url-status=live |doi-access=free }}
* {{cite book |last1=Woolfolk |first1=Anita |last2=Margetts |first2=Kay |title=Educational Psychology Australian Edition |date=2012 |publisher=Pearson Higher Education AU |isbn=978-1-4425-5145-9 |page=251 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=whziBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA251 |language=en |access-date=16 April 2023 |archive-date=6 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230406151913/https://books.google.com/books?id=whziBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA251 |url-status=live }}
* {{cite book |last1=Zagzebski |first1=Linda |date=1999 |chapter=What Is Knowledge? |editor1-last=Greco |editor1-first=John |editor2-last=Sosa |editor2-first=Ernest |title=The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology |publisher=Blackwell |pages=92–116 |chapter-url=https://philpapers.org/rec/ZAGWIK |isbn=978-0-631-20290-5 |oclc=39269507 |doi=10.1002/9781405164863.ch3 |s2cid=158886670 |access-date=12 June 2022 |archive-date=2 June 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220602215147/https://philpapers.org/rec/ZAGWIK |url-status=live }}
{{refend}}

== External links ==
* {{PhilPapers|category|knowledge}}
* {{cite IEP |url-id=epistemic-value |title=Epistemic Value }}
* {{InPho|taxonomy|2390}}

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[[Category:Knowledge| ]]
[[Category:Concepts in epistemology]]
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{{Sourceattribution|Knowledge}}