View source for Philosophy:Two truths doctrine

{{Short description|Buddhist differentiation of conventional and ultimate truth}}

The [[Religion:Buddhism|Buddhist doctrine]] of '''the two truths''' ([[Social:Sanskrit|Sanskrit]]: ''dvasatya,'' {{bo|w=bden pa gnyis}}) differentiates between two levels of ''[[Philosophy:Satya|satya]]'' (Sanskrit; Pali: ''sacca''; word meaning "[[Truth|truth]]" or "[[Philosophy:Reality|reality]]") in the teaching of the [[Biography:Gautama Buddha|Śākyamuni Buddha]]: the "conventional" or "provisional" (''saṁvṛti'') truth, and the "ultimate" (''paramārtha'') truth.{{sfn|Matilal|2002|pp=203-208}}<ref name="Stanford 2022">{{cite encyclopedia |last=Thakchoe |first=Sonam |date=Summer 2022 |title=The Theory of Two Truths in Tibet |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-tibet/ |url-status=live |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |encyclopedia=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=The Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information, [[Organization:Stanford University|Stanford University]] |issn=1095-5054 |oclc=643092515 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220528014845/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-tibet/ |archive-date=28 May 2022 |access-date=5 July 2022}}</ref>

The exact meaning varies between the various Buddhist schools and traditions. The best known interpretation is from the [[Philosophy:Madhyamaka|Madhyamaka]] school of [[Philosophy:Mahayana|Mahāyāna Buddhism]], whose founder was the Indian Buddhist monk and philosopher [[Biography:Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]].{{sfn|Matilal|2002|pp=203-208}} For Nāgārjuna, the two truths are ''epistemological truths''.<ref name="Stanford 2022"/> The phenomenal world is accorded a provisional existence.<ref name="Stanford 2022"/> The character of the phenomenal world is declared to be neither real nor unreal, but logically indeterminable.<ref name="Stanford 2022"/> Ultimately, all phenomena are empty (''śūnyatā'') of an inherent self or essence due to the [[Philosophy:Anattā|non-existence of the self]] (''anattā''), but exist [[Philosophy:Pratītyasamutpāda|depending on other phenomena]] (''pratītyasamutpāda'').{{sfn|Matilal|2002|pp=203-208}}<ref name="Stanford 2022"/>

In Chinese Buddhism, the [[Philosophy:Madhyamaka|Madhyamaka]] position is accepted and the two truths refer to two ''ontological truths''. Reality exists of two levels, a relative level and an absolute level.{{sfn|Lai|2003|p=11}} Based on their understanding of the ''Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra'', the Chinese Buddhist monks and philosophers supposed that the teaching of the [[Philosophy:Buddha-nature|Buddha-nature]] was, as stated by that sutra, the final Buddhist teaching, and that there is an essential truth above ''śūnyatā'' and the two truths.{{sfn|Lai|2003}} The doctrine of ''śūnyatā'' is an attempt to show that it is neither proper nor strictly justifiable to regard any [[Philosophy:Metaphysics|metaphysical]] system as absolutely valid. It doesn't lead to [[Philosophy:Nihilism|nihilism]] but strikes a middle course between excessive naïveté and excessive scepticism.{{sfn|Matilal|2002|pp=203-208}}

==Etymology and meaning==
''[[Philosophy:Satya|Satya]]'' is usually taken to mean "truth", but also refers to "a reality", "a genuinely real existent".{{sfn|Harvey|2012|p=50}} ''Satya'' (''Sat-yá'')<ref name=aam/> is derived from [[Religion:Sat (Sanskrit)|''Sat'']] and ''ya''. ''Sat'' means being, reality, and is the present participle of the root ''as'', "to be" (PIE ''{{PIE|*h₁es-}}''; cognate to English ''is'').<ref name=aam>A. A. Macdonell, Sanskrit English Dictionary, Asian Educational Services, {{ISBN|978-8120617797}}, pp 330-331</ref> ''Ya'' and ''yam'' means "advancing, supporting, hold up, sustain, one that moves".<ref>[http://spokensanskrit.de/index.php?tinput=yA&direction=SE&script=HK&link=yes&beginning=0 yA] Sanskrit English Dictionary</ref><ref>[http://www.sanskrit-lexicon.uni-koeln.de/scans/MWScan/tamil/index.html ''yam''] Monier Williams' Sanskrit English Dictionary, Univ of Koeln, Germany</ref> As a composite word, ''Satya'' and ''Satyam'' imply that "which supports, sustains and advances reality, being"; it literally means, "that which is true, actual, real, genuine, trustworthy, valid".<ref name=aam/>

The two truths doctrine states that there is:
* ''Provisional ''or conventional truth ([[Social:Sanskrit|Sanskrit]] {{IAST|''saṁvṛti''}}''-satya'', Pāli ''sammuti sacca'', Tibetan ''kun-rdzob bden-pa''), which describes our daily experience of a concrete world, and
* ''Ultimate'' truth (Sanskrit, ''paramārtha-satya'', Pāli ''paramattha sacca'', Tibetan: ''don-dam bden-pa''), which describes the ultimate reality as ''sunyata'', empty of concrete and inherent characteristics.

Chandrakīrti suggests three possible meanings of {{IAST|''saṁvṛti''}} : {{sfn|Matilal|2002|pp=203-208}}
# complete covering or the 'screen' of ignorance which hides truth;
# existence or origination through dependence, mutual conditioning;
# worldly behavior or speech behavior involving designation and designatum, cognition and cognitum.

The conventional truth may be interpreted as "obscurative truth" or "that which obscures the true nature" as a result. It is constituted by the appearances of mistaken awareness. Conventional truth would be the appearance that includes a duality of apprehender and apprehended, and objects perceived within that. Ultimate truths are phenomena free from the duality of apprehender and apprehended.<ref name="LevinsonAug06">Levinson, Jules (August 2006) [http://www.berotsana.org/pdf/lotsawa_timesII_sc.pdf Lotsawa Times Volume II] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080724083326/http://www.berotsana.org/pdf/lotsawa_timesII_sc.pdf |date=July 24, 2008 }}</ref>

==Background==
Buddha's teaching of Dharma may be viewed as a path ({{IAST|''mārga''}}) of release from suffering or ''[[Philosophy:Duḥkha#Buddhism|Dukkha]]''. The first Noble Truth equates life-experiences with pain and suffering. Buddha's language was simple and colloquial. Naturally, various statements of Buddha at times appear contradictory to each other. Later Buddhist teachers were faced with the problem of resolving these contradictions. Nagarjuna and other teachers introduced an exegetical technique of distinguishing between two levels of truth, the conventional and the ultimate.{{sfn|Matilal|2002|pp=203-208}}

A similar method is reflected in the Brahmanical exegesis of the Vedic scriptures, which combine the ritualistic injunctions of the Brahmana and speculative philosophical questions of the [[Religion:Upanishads|Upanishads]] as one whole 'revealed' body of work thereby contrasting the {{IAST|''jñāna kāņḍa''}} with {{IAST|''karmakāņḍa''}}.{{sfn|Matilal|2002|pp=203-208}}

==Origin and development==

While the concept of the two truths is associated with the [[Philosophy:Madhyamaka|Madhyamaka]] school, its history goes back to the earliest years of Buddhism.

===Early Indian Buddhism===

====Pali Canon====
In the Pali canon, the distinction is not made between a ''lower'' truth and a ''higher'' truth, but rather between two kinds of expressions of the same truth, which must be interpreted differently. Thus a phrase or passage, or a whole sutta, might be classed as ''neyyattha'' or ''samuti'' or ''vohāra'', but it is not regarded at this stage as expressing or conveying a different ''level'' of truth.

''Nītattha'' (Pāli; Sanskrit: ''nītārtha''), "of plain or clear meaning"<ref name="Monier-Williams">Monier-Williams</ref> and ''neyyattha'' (Pāli; Sanskrit: ''neyartha''), "[a word or sentence] having a sense that can only be guessed".<ref name="Monier-Williams"/> These terms were used to identify texts or statements that either did or did not require additional interpretation. A ''nītattha'' text required no explanation, while a ''neyyattha'' one might mislead some people unless properly explained:<ref>McCagney: 82</ref>
{{quote|There are these two who misrepresent the Tathagata.  Which two? He who represents a Sutta of indirect meaning as a Sutta of direct meaning and he who represents a Sutta of direct meaning as a Sutta of indirect meaning.<ref>''Anguttara Nikaya'' I:60 (Jayatilleke: 361, in McCagney: 82)</ref>}}

''{{IAST|Saṃmuti}}'' or ''{{IAST|samuti}}'' (Pāli; Sanskrit: ''{{IAST|saṃvṛti}}''), meaning "common consent, general opinion, convention",<ref>PED</ref> and ''paramattha'' (Pāli; Sanskrit: ''paramārtha''), meaning "ultimate", are used to distinguish conventional or common-sense language, as used in metaphors or for the sake of convenience, from language used to express higher truths directly. The term ''vohāra'' (Pāli; Sanskrit: ''vyavahāra'', "common practice, convention, custom" is also used in more or less the same sense as ''samuti''.

====Theravāda====
The [[Philosophy:Theravada|Theravādin]] commentators expanded on these categories and began applying them not only to expressions but to the truth then expressed: {{quote|The Awakened One, the best of teachers, spoke of two truths, conventional and higher; no third is ascertained; a conventional statement is true because of convention and a higher statement is true as disclosing the true characteristics of events.<ref>''{{IAST|Khathāvatthu Aṭṭha kathǎ}}'' (Jayatilleke: 363, in McCagney: 84)</ref>}}

====Prajnāptivāda====
The Prajñaptivāda school took up the distinction between the conventional ({{IAST|saṃvṛti}}) and ultimate ({{IAST|paramārtha}}) truths, and extended the concept to [[Philosophy:Dharma#Dharmas in Buddhist phenomenology|metaphysical-phenomenological constituents]] (''dharma''), distinguishing those that are real (''tattva'') from those that are purely conceptual, i.e., ultimately nonexistent (''prajñāpti'').

===Indian Mahayana Buddhism===

====Madhyamaka====
The distinction between the two truths (''satyadvayavibhāga'') was fully developed by [[Biography:Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]] (c. 150 – c. 250 CE) of the [[Philosophy:Madhyamaka|Madhyamaka]] school.{{sfn|Garfield|2002|p=91}} The Madhyamikas distinguish between ''loka-samvriti-satya'', "world speech truth" c.q. "relative truth"<ref group=web name="urbandharma">[http://www.urbandharma.org/udnl2/nl031604.html ''The Urban Dharma Newsletter. March 16, 2004'']</ref> c.q. "truth that keeps the ultimate truth concealed",{{sfn|Chattopadhyaya|2001|pp=103-106}} and ''paramarthika satya'', ultimate truth.<ref group=web name="urbandharma"/>

''Loka-samvriti-satya'' can be further divided in ''tathya-samvrti'' or ''loka-samvrti'', and ''mithya-samvrti'' or ''aloka-samvrti'',{{sfn|Joshi|1977|p=174}}{{sfn|Nakamure|1980|p=285}}{{sfn|Dutt|1930}}{{sfn|Stcherbatsky|1989|p=54}} "true samvrti" and "false samvrti".{{sfn|Stcherbatsky|1989|p=54}}<ref group=web name="urbandharma"/><!--START OF NOTE-->{{refn|group=note|According to Lal Mani Joshi, [[Biography:Bhāviveka|Bhāviveka]] (6th century CE), the founder of the Svātantrikasubschool of the Mādhyamaka, classified ''samvrti'' into ''tathya-samvrti'' and ''mithya-samvrti''.{{sfn|Joshi|1977|p=174}} Candrakīrti (7th century CE), one of the main proponents of the Prasaṅgika subschool of Madhyamaka, divided ''samvrti'' into ''loka-samvrti'' and ''aloka-samvrti''.{{sfn|Joshi|1977|p=174}}{{sfn|Nakamure|1980|p=285}} Shantideva (8th century CE) and his commentator Prajñakaramati (950-1030<ref group=web>[http://www.rigpawiki.org/index.php?title=Praj%C3%B1akaramati Rigpawiki, ''Prajñakaramati'']</ref>) both use the terms ''tathya-samvrti'' and ''mithya-samvrti''.{{sfn|Dutt|1930}}{{sfn|Stcherbatsky|1989|p=54}} [[Biography:Kumārila Bhaṭṭa|Kumārila Bhaṭṭa]], an influential 8th-century Mimamsa-philosopher, in commenting on Madhyamaka philosophy, also uses the terms ''loka-samvrti'' and ''aloka-samvrti''.{{sfn|Chattopadhyaya|2001|pp=103-106}} Murti, in his ''The Central Philosophy of Buddhism'', uses the term ''aloka'', and refers to the synonym ''mithya samvrti''.{{sfn|Murti|2013|p=245}}<br/><br/>Murti: "In calling it 'loka samvrti,' it is implied that there is some appearance which is 'aloka' - non-empirical, i.e. false for the emprical consciousness even."{{sfn|Murti|2013|p=245}}<br/><br/>David Seyfort Ruegg further comments: "The ''samvrti'' in worldly usage is termed ''lokasamvrti''; and while it can serve no real purpose to distinguish an ''alokasamvrti'' opposed to it (from the point of view of ultimate reality both are unreal, though in different degrees from the relative standpoint), one may nevertheless speak of an ''alokasamvrti'' as distinct from it when considering that there exist persons who can be described as 'not of the world' (''alokah'') since they have experiences which are falsified because their sense-faculties are impaired (and which, therefore, do not belong to the general worldly consensus."{{sfn|Seyfort Ruegg|1981|p=74-75}}}}<!--END OF NOTE--> ''Tathya-samvrti'' or "true samvrti" refers to "things" which concretely exist and can be perceived as such by the senses, while ''mithya-samvrti'' or "false samvrti" refers to false cognitions of "things" which do not exist as they are perceived.{{sfn|Dutt|1930}}{{sfn|Stcherbatsky|1989|p=54}}{{sfn|Chattopadhyaya|2001|pp=103-106}}<!--START OF NOTE-->{{refn|group=note|An often-used explanation in Madhyamaka literature is the perception of a snake. The perception of a real snake is ''tathya-samvrti'', concretely existing. In contrast, a rope which is mistakenly perceived as a snake is ''mithya-samvrti''. Ultimately both are false, but "the snake-seen-in-the-rope" is less true than the "snake-seen-in-the-snake." This gives an epistemological hierarchy in which ''tathya-samvrti'' stands above ''mithya-samvrti''.<ref group=web name="urbandharma"/>{{sfn|Chattopadhyaya|2001|pp=103-106}} Another example given in Madhyamaka literature to distinguish between ''tathya-samvrti'' and ''mithya-samvrti'' is "water-seen-in-the-pool" (''loka samvriti'') as contrasted with "water-seen-in-the-mirage" (''aloka samvriti'').}}<!--END OF NOTE--><!--START OF NOTE-->{{refn|group=note|''Mithya-samvrti'' or "false samvrti" cam also be given as ''asatya'', "untruth."<ref group=web name="urbandharma"/> Compare Peter Harvey, noting that in Chandogya Upanishad 6.15.3 [[Philosophy:Brahman|Brahman]] is ''satya'', and Richard Gombrich, commenting on the Upanishadic identity of microcosm and macrocosm, c.q. Atman and Brahman, which according to the Buddha is ''asat'', "something that does not exist."{{sfn|Gombrich|1990|p=15}} Compare also Atiśa: "One may wonder, "From where did all this come in the first place, and to where does it depart now?" Once examined in this way, [one sees that] it neither comes from anywhere nor departs to anywhere. All inner and outer phenomena are just like that."{{sfn|Brunholzl|2004|p=295}}}}<!--END OF NOTE-->

Nagarjuna's ''[[Religion:Mūlamadhyamakakārikā|Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]]'' provides a logical defense for the claim that all things are empty (sunyata) of an inherently-existing self-nature.{{sfn|Garfield|2002|p=91}} Sunyata, however, is also shown to be "empty", and Nagarjuna's assertion of "the emptiness of emptiness" prevents sunyata from constituting a higher or ultimate reality.{{sfn|Garfield|2002|p=38–39}}{{sfn|Siderits|2003}}{{refn|group=note|See also [http://emptinessteachings.com/2014/09/11/the-two-truths-of-buddhism-and-the-emptiness-of-emptiness/ Susan Kahn, ''The Two Truths of Buddhism and The Emptiness of Emptiness'']}}{{refn|group=note|Some have interpreted ''paramarthika satya'' or "ultimate truth" as constituting a metaphysical 'Absolute' or [[Philosophy:Noumenon|noumenon]], an "ineffable ultimate that transcends the capacities of discursive reason."{{sfn|Siderits|2003}} For example T.R.V. Murti (1955), ''The Central Philosophy of Buddhism'', who gave a neo-Kantian interpretation.{{sfn|Westerhoff|2009|p=9}}}} Nagarjuna's view is that "the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth".{{sfn|Siderits|2003}} According to Siderits, Nagarjuna is a "semantic anti-dualist" who posits that there are only conventional truths.{{sfn|Siderits|2003}} Jay L. Garfield explains: {{quote|Suppose that we take a conventional entity, such as a table. We analyze it to demonstrate its emptiness, finding that there is no table apart from its parts [...] So we conclude that it is empty. But now let us analyze that emptiness […]. What do we find? Nothing at all but the table’s lack of inherent existence [...] To see the table as empty [...] is to see the table as conventional, as dependent.{{sfn|Garfield|2002|p=38–39}}}}

In [[Biography:Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]]'s ''[[Religion:Mūlamadhyamakakārikā|Mūlamadhyamakakārikā]]'' the two truths doctrine is used to defend the identification of dependent origination (''pratītyasamutpāda'') with emptiness (''śūnyatā''): {{quote|The Buddha's teaching of the Dharma is based on two truths: a truth of worldly convention and an ultimate truth. Those who do not understand the distinction drawn between these two truths do not understand the Buddha's profound truth. Without a foundation in the conventional truth the significance of the ultimate cannot be taught. Without understanding the significance of the ultimate, liberation is not achieved.<ref>Nagarjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārika 24:8–10. Jay L. Garfield|''Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way'': pp. 296, 298</ref>}}

In Nagarjuna's own words: {{quote|8. The teaching by the Buddhas of the dharma has recourse to two truths:<br/>
The world-ensconced truth and the truth which is the highest sense.<br/>
9. Those who do not know the distribution (vibhagam) of the two kinds of truth<br/>
Do not know the profound "point" (tattva) in the teaching of the Buddha.<br/>
10. The highest sense of the truth is not taught apart from practical behavior,<br/>
And without having understood the highest sense one cannot understand nirvana.<ref>[http://www.orientalia.org/article492.html Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Verse 24] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050208100348/http://www.orientalia.org/article492.html |date=February 8, 2005 }}</ref>}}

[[Biography:Nagarjuna|Nāgārjuna]] based his statement of the two truths on the Kaccāyanagotta Sutta. In the Kaccāyanagotta Sutta, the [[Biography:Gautama Buddha|Buddha]], speaking to the monk Kaccayana Gotta on the topic of right view, describes the middle Way between nihilism and eternalism: {{quote|By and large, Kaccayana, this world is supported by a polarity, that of existence and non-existence. But when one sees the origination of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "non-existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one. When one sees the cessation of the world as it actually is with right discernment, "existence" with reference to the world does not occur to one.<ref>Source: [https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn12/sn12.015.than.html Kaccāyanagotta Sutta on Access to Insight] (accessed: Sept 14th 2023) </ref>}}

According to Chattopadhyaya, although Nagarjuna presents his understanding of the two truths as a clarification of the teachings of the Buddha, the two truths doctrine as such is not part of the earliest Buddhist tradition.{{sfn|Chattopadhyaya|2001|p=21-3,94,104}}

====Buddhist Idealism====

=====Yogacara=====
The Yogacara school of Buddhism distinguishes the Three Natures and the [[Philosophy:Trikaya|Trikaya]]. The Three Natures are:<ref>{{cite book |title=Buddhist Epistemology |author=S.R. Bhatt & Anu Meherotra |pages=7 |year=1967}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition |author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya |pages=107 |year=2001}}</ref>
*''Paramarthika'' (transcendental reality), also referred to as ''Parinispanna'' in Yogacara literature:''The level of a storehouse of consciousness that is responsible for the appearance of the world of external objects. It is the only ultimate reality.''
*''Paratantrika'' (dependent or empirical reality): ''The level of the empirical world experienced in ordinary life''. For example, the snake-seen-in-the-snake.
*''Parikalpita'' (imaginary). For example, the snake-seen-in-a-dream.

=====Lankavatara Sutra=====
The Lankavatara Sutra took an idealistic turn in apprehending reality. [[Biography:D. T. Suzuki|D. T. Suzuki]] writes the following: {{quote|The ''Lanka'' is quite explicit in assuming two forms of knowledge: the one for grasping the absolute or entering into the realm of Mind-only, and the other for understanding existence in its dual aspect in which logic prevails and the Vijnanas are active. The latter is designated Discrimination (''vikalpa'') in the ''Lanka'' and the former transcendental wisdom or knowledge (''prajna''). To distinguish these two forms of knowledge is most essential in Buddhist philosophy.}}

===East Asian Buddhism===

When Buddhism came to China from Gandhara (now Afghanistan) and {{wipe|India}} in the first/second century CE, it was initially adapted to the Chinese culture and understanding. Buddhism was exposed to [[Philosophy:Confucianism|Confucianist]]{{sfn|Brown Holt|1995}} and [[Philosophy:Taoism|Taoist]]{{sfn|Goddard |2007|p=10}}{{sfn|Verstappen|2004|p=5}}{{sfn|Fowler|2005|p=79}} influences. Neo-Taoist concepts were taken over in Chinese Buddhism.{{sfn|Oh|2000}} Concepts such as [[Philosophy:Essence-Function|"T’i -yung"]] (Essence and Function) and "Li-Shih" (Noumenon and Phenomenon) were first taken over by Hua-yen Buddhism,{{sfn|Oh|2000}} which consequently influenced Chán deeply.{{sfn|Dumoulin|2005a|p=45-49}}

The two truths doctrine was another point of confusion. Chinese thinking took this to refer to two ''ontological truths'': reality exists of two levels, a relative level and an absolute level.{{sfn|Lai|2003|p=11}} Taoists at first misunderstood sunyata to be akin to the Taoist non-being.{{sfn|Lai|2003|p=8}} In Madhyamaka the two truths are two ''epistemological truths'': two different ways to look at reality. Based on their understanding of the Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra the Chinese supposed that the teaching of the Buddha-nature was, as stated by that sutra, the final Buddhist teaching, and that there is an essential truth above sunyata and the two truths.{{sfn|Lai|2003}}

====Hua-yen Buddhism====

The Huayan school or Flower Garland is a tradition of [[Philosophy:Mahayana|Mahayana]] Buddhist [[Philosophy:Philosophy|philosophy]] that flourished in {{wipe|China}} during the Tang period. It is based on the Sanskrit Flower Garland Sutra (S. ''Avataṃsaka Sūtra'', C. ''Huayan Jing'') and on a lengthy Chinese interpretation of it, the Huayan Lun.  The name Flower Garland is meant to suggest the crowning glory of profound understanding.

The most important philosophical contributions of the Huayan school were in the area of its metaphysics. It taught the doctrine of the mutual containment and interpenetration of all phenomena, as expressed in [[Philosophy:Indra's net|Indra's net]]. One thing contains all other existing things, and all existing things contain that one thing.

Distinctive features of this approach to Buddhist philosophy include:
* Truth (or reality) is understood as encompassing and interpenetrating falsehood (or illusion), and vice versa
* Good is understood as encompassing and interpenetrating evil
* Similarly, all mind-made distinctions are understood as "collapsing" in the enlightened understanding of emptiness (a tradition traced back to the Buddhist philosopher [[Biography:Nagarjuna|Nagarjuna]])

Huayan teaches the Four Dharmadhatu, four ways to view reality:
# All dharmas are seen as particular separate events;
# All events are an expression of the absolute;
# Events and essence interpenetrate;
# All events interpenetrate.{{sfn|Garfield|Edelglass|2011|p=76}}

====Absolute and relative in Zen====
{{main article|Philosophy:Zen}}
[[File:DogenP2.JPG|thumb|Dogen]]

The teachings of Zen are expressed by a set of polarities: Buddha-nature - sunyata,{{sfn|Kasulis|2003|pp=26–29}}{{sfn|McRae|2003|pp=138–142}} absolute-relative,{{sfn|Liang-Chieh|1986|p=9}} sudden and gradual enlightenment.{{sfn|McRae|2003|pp=123–138}}

The [[Philosophy:Prajnaparamita|Prajnaparamita Sutras]] and [[Philosophy:Madhyamaka|Madhyamaka]] emphasized the non-duality of form and emptiness: form is emptiness, emptiness is form, as the Heart Sutra says.{{sfn|Liang-Chieh|1986|p=9}}
The idea that the ultimate reality is present in the daily world of relative reality fitted into the Chinese culture which emphasized the mundane world and society. But this does not tell how the absolute is present in the relative world. This question is answered in such schemata as [[Philosophy:Five Ranks|the Five Ranks of Tozan]]{{sfn|Kasulis|2003|p=29}} and the Oxherding Pictures.

====Essence-function in Korean Buddhism====

The polarity of absolute and relative is also expressed as "essence-function". The absolute is essence, the relative is function. They can't be seen as separate realities, but interpenetrate each other. The distinction does not "exclude any other frameworks such as ''neng-so'' or "subject-object" constructions", though the two "are completely different from each other in terms of their way of thinking".<ref>Park, Sung-bae  (1983). ''Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment.'' SUNY series in religious studies. SUNY Press. {{ISBN|0-87395-673-7}}, {{ISBN|978-0-87395-673-4}}. Source: [https://books.google.com/books?id=_A2QS03MP5EC&q=Sung-bae+Park] (accessed: Friday April 9, 2010), p.147</ref>

In Korean Buddhism, essence-function is also expressed as "body" and "the body's functions": {{quote|[A] more accurate definition (and the one the Korean populace is more familiar with) is "body" and "the body's functions". The implications of "essence/function" and "body/its functions" are similar, that is, both paradigms are used to point to a nondual relationship between the two concepts.<ref>Park, Sung-bae (2009). ''One Korean's approach to Buddhism: the mom/momjit paradigm''. SUNY series in Korean studies: SUNY Press. {{ISBN|0-7914-7697-9}}, {{ISBN|978-0-7914-7697-0}}. Source: [https://books.google.com/books?id=TEAq0ldHjVYC&dq=essence-function+nondual&pg=PA11] (accessed: Saturday May 8, 2010), p.11</ref>}}

A metaphor for essence-function is "A lamp and its light", a phrase from the ''Platform Sutra'', where Essence is lamp and Function is light.<ref>Lai, Whalen (1979). "Ch'an Metaphors: waves, water, mirror, lamp". ''Philosophy East & West''; Vol. 29, no.3, July, 1979, pp.245–253. Source: [http://www.thezensite.com/ZenEssays/HistoricalZen/ChanMetaphors.htm] (accessed: Saturday May 8, 2010)</ref>

===Tibetan Buddhism===

====Nyingma====
The '''Nyingma''' tradition is the oldest of the four major schools of Tibetan Buddhism. It is founded on the first translations of Buddhist scriptures from [[Social:Sanskrit|Sanskrit]] into [[Social:Classical Tibetan|Tibetan]], in the eighth century. Ju Mipham (1846–1912) in his commentary to the ''Madhyamālaṃkāra'' of [[Philosophy:Śāntarakṣita|Śāntarakṣita]] (725–788) says:<ref>Commentary to the first [[Couplet|couplet]] of quatrain/śloka 72 of the root text, (725–788) — Blumenthal, James (2008). "Śāntarakṣita", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Source: [http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/saantarak-sita/] (accessed: February 28, 2009), as rendered into English by the Padmakara Translation Group (2005: p. 304)</ref>
{{quote|If one trains for a long time in the union of the two truths, the stage of acceptance (on the path of joining), which is attuned to primordial wisdom, will arise. By thus acquiring a certain conviction in that which surpasses intellectual knowledge, and by training in it, one will eventually actualize it. This is precisely how the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas have said that liberation is to be gained.<ref>Shantarakshita (author); Ju Mipham (commentator); Padmakara Translation Group (translators)(2005). ''The Adornment of the Middle Way: Shantarakshita's Madhyamakalankara with commentary by Jamgön Mipham.'' Boston, Massachusetts, US: Shambhala Publications, Inc. {{ISBN|1-59030-241-9}} (alk. paper), p. 304</ref>{{refn|group=note|"Primordial wisdom" is a rendering of ''[[Philosophy:Jñāna|jñāna]]'' and "that which surpasses intellectual knowledge" may be understood as the direct perception (Sanskrit: ''pratyakṣa'') of(''dharmatā''). "Conviction" may be understood as a gloss of [[Philosophy:Faith in Buddhism|faith]] (''śraddhā'').  An effective analogue for "union", a rendering of the relationship held by the two truths, is ''interpenetration''.}}}}

The following sentence from Mipham's exegesis of [[Philosophy:Śāntarakṣita|Śāntarakṣita]]'s'' Madhyamālaṃkāra'' highlights the relationship between the absence of ''[[Catuṣkoṭi#Four Extremes|the four extremes]]'' (''mtha'-bzhi'') and the nondual or ''indivisible two truths'' (''bden-pa dbyer-med''): {{quote|The learned and accomplished [masters] of the Early Translations considered this simplicity beyond the four extremes, this abiding way in which the two truths are indivisible, as their own immaculate way.<ref>Doctor, Thomas H. (trans.) Mipham, Jamgon Ju.(author)(2004). '' Speech of Delight: Mipham's Commentary of Shantarakshita's Ornament of the Middle Way''. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications. {{ISBN|1-55939-217-7}}, p. 127</ref>{{refn|group=note|Blankleder and Fletcher of the Padmakara Translation Group give a somewhat different translation:<br/>
"The learned and accomplished masters of the Old Translation school take as their stainless view the freedom from all conceptual constructs of the four extremes, the ultimate reality of the two truths inseparably united."<ref>Shantarakshita (author); Mipham (commentator); Padmakara Translation Group (translators)(2005). ''The Adornment of the Middle Way: Shantarakshita's Madhyamakalankara with commentary by Jamgön Mipham.'' Boston, Massachusetts, US: Shambhala Publications, Inc. {{ISBN|1-59030-241-9}} (alk. paper), p. 137</ref>}}}}

==Understanding in other traditions==

===Jainism===
Anekāntavāda (Sanskrit: अनेकान्तवाद, "many-sidedness") refers to the Jain doctrine about metaphysical truths that emerged in ancient India.[1] It states that the ultimate truth and reality is complex and has multiple aspects.[2] Anekantavada has also been interpreted to mean non-absolutism, "intellectual Ahimsa",[3] religious pluralism,[4] as well as a rejection of fanaticism that leads to terror attacks and mass violence.

The origins of anekāntavāda can be traced back to the teachings of Mahāvīra (599–527 BCE), the 24th Jain Tīrthankara.[10] The dialectical concepts of syādvāda "conditioned viewpoints" and nayavāda "partial viewpoints" arose from anekāntavāda in the medieval era, providing Jainism with more detailed logical structure and expression. 

The Jain philosopher Kundakunda distinguishes between two perspectives of truth:

*''vyavahāranaya'' or ‘mundane perspective’
*''niścayanaya'' or ‘ultimate perspective’, also called “supreme” (''paramārtha'') and “pure” (''śuddha'')<ref>Long, Jeffery; Jainism: An Introduction, page 126.</ref>

For Kundakunda, the mundane realm of truth is also the relative perspective of normal folk, where the workings of [[Philosophy:Karma|karma]] operate and where things emerge, last for a certain duration and perish. The ultimate perspective meanwhile, is that of the liberated [[Philosophy:Jiva|jiva]], which is "blissful, energetic, perceptive, and omniscient".<ref>Long, Jeffery; Jainism: An Introduction, page 126.</ref>

===Advaita Vedanta===
Advaita took over from the Madhyamika the idea of levels of reality.{{sfn|Renard|2004|p=130}} Usually two levels are being mentioned,{{sfn|Renard|2004|p=131}} but Shankara uses sublation as the criterion to postulate an ontological hierarchy of three levels.{{sfn|Puligandla|1997|p=232}}<ref group=web name=Discrimination>[http://www.advaita-vision.org/discrimination/ advaita-vision.org, ''Discrimination'']</ref>{{refn|group=note|According to Chattopadhyaya, the Advaita Vedantists retain the term paramartha-satya or parmarthika-satya for the ultimate truth, and for the ''loka samvriti'' of the Madhyamakas they use the term ''vyahvarika satya'' and for ''aloka samvriti'' they use the term ''pratibhasika'':<ref>{{cite book |title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition |author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya |pages=107, 104 |year=2001}}</ref>}}

* {{IAST|Pāramārthika}} (paramartha, absolute), the absolute level, "which is absolutely real and into which both other reality levels can be resolved".<ref group=web name=Discrimination /> This experience can't be sublated by any other experience.{{sfn|Puligandla|1997|p=232}}
* {{IAST|Vyāvahārika}} (vyavahara), or samvriti-satya{{sfn|Renard|2004|p=131}} (empirical or pragmatical), "our world of experience, the phenomenal world that we handle every day when we are awake".<ref group=web name=Discrimination /> It is the level in which both ''[[Philosophy:Jiva|jiva]]'' (living creatures or individual souls) and ''Iswara'' are true; here, the material world is also true.
* {{IAST|Prāthibhāsika}} (pratibhasika, apparent reality, unreality), "reality based on imagination alone".<ref group=web name=Discrimination /> It is the level in which appearances are actually false, like the illusion of a snake over a rope, or a dream.

===Mīmāṃsā refutation of Two Truths Doctrine===
Chattopadhyaya notes that the eighth-century [[Philosophy:Mīmāṃsā|Mīmāṃsā]] philosopher [[Biography:Kumārila Bhaṭṭa|Kumārila Bhaṭṭa]] rejected the ''Two Truths Doctrine'' in his ''Shlokavartika''.<ref name="Bhaṭṭa"/> Bhaṭṭa was highly influential with his defence of the Vedic rituals against medieval [[Religion:Buddhism|Buddhist]] rejections of these rituals. Some believe that his influence contributed to the decline of Buddhism in India{{sfn|Sheridan|1995|p=198-201}} since his lifetime coincides with the period in which Buddhism began to decline.{{sfn|Sharma|1980|p=5-6}} According to Kumarila, the two truths doctrine is an idealist doctrine, which conceals the fact that "the theory of the nothingness of the objective world" is absurd: {{quote|[O]ne should admit that what does not exist, exists not; and what does exist, exists in the full sense. The latter alone is true, and the former false. But the idealist just cannot afford to do this. He is obliged instead to talk of 'two truths', senseless though this be.<ref name="Bhaṭṭa"/><!--START OF NOTE-->{{refn|group=note|Kumārila Bhaṭṭa: "The idealist talks of some 'apparent truth' or 'provisional truth of practical life', i.e. in his terminology, of ''samvriti satya''. However, since in his own view, there is really no truth in this 'apparent truth', what is the sense of asking us to look at it as some special brand of truth as it were? If there is truth in it, why call it false at all? And, if it is really false, why call it a kind of truth?

Truth and falsehood, being mutually exclusive, there cannot be any factor called 'truth' as belonging in common to both--no more than there can by any common factor called 'treeness' belonging to both the tree and the lion, which are mutually exclusive.

On the idealist's own assumption, this 'apparent truth' is nothing but a synonym for the 'false'. Why, then, does he use this expression? Because it serves for him a very important purpose. It is the purpose of a verbal hoax. It means falsity, though with such a pedantic air about it as to suggest something apparently different, as it were. This is in fact a well known trick. Thus, to create a pedantic air, one can use the word ''vaktrasava'' [literally mouth-wine] instead of the simpler word ''lala'', meaning saliva [''vancanartha upanyaso lala-vaktrasavadivat''].

But why is this pedantic air? Why, instead of simply talking of falsity, is the verbal hoax of an 'apparent truth' or samvriti? The purpose of conceiving this samvriti is only to conceal the absurdity of the theory of the nothingness of the objective world, so that it can somehow be explained why things are imagined as actually existing when they are not so.

Instead of playing such verbal tricks, therefore, one should speak honestly. This means: one should admit that what does not exist, exists not; and what does exist, exists in the full sense. The latter alone is true, and the former false. But the idealist just cannot afford to do this. He is obliged instead to talk of 'two truths', senseless though this be."<ref name="Bhaṭṭa">{{cite book |title=''What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy'' 5th edition |author=Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya |pages=370–1 |year=2001}}</ref>}}<!--END OF NOTE-->}}

===Correspondence with Pyrrhonism===
{{Pyrrhonism sidebar}} 
{{main|Philosophy:Similarities between Pyrrhonism and Buddhism}}
McEvilley notes a correspondence between Greek [[Philosophy:Pyrrhonism|Pyrrhonism]] and [[Philosophy:Madhyamaka|Madhyamaka]] doctrines: {{quote|Sextus says <ref>Sextus Empericus, ''Outlines of Pyrrhonism'', II.14–18; ''Anthologia Palatina'' (Palatine Anthology), VII. 29–35, and elsewhere</ref> that there are two criteria:
# [T]hat by which we judge reality and unreality, and
# [T]hat which we use as a guide in everyday life.
According to the first criterion, nothing is either true or false[.] [I]nductive statements based on direct observation of phenomena may be treated as either true or false for the purpose of making everyday practical decisions.<br/>
The distinction, as Conze<ref>Conze 1959, pp. 140–141)</ref> has noted, is equivalent to the Madhyamaka distinction between "Absolute truth" (''paramārthasatya''), "the knowledge of the real as it is without any distortion,"<ref name="Conze 1959: p. 244">Conze (1959: p. 244)</ref> and "Truth so-called" (''saṃvṛti satya''), "truth as conventionally believed in common parlance.<ref name="Conze 1959: p. 244"/><ref>{{cite book |first=Thomas |last=McEvilley |title=The Shape of Ancient Thought |publisher=Allworth Communications |year=2002 |isbn=1-58115-203-5}}, p. 474</ref>}}

Thus in Pyrrhonism "absolute truth" corresponds to [[Philosophy:Acatalepsy|acatalepsy]] and "conventional truth" to [[Philosophy:Phantasiai|phantasiai]].

==See also==
* [[Religion:Index of Buddhism-related articles|Index of Buddhism-related articles]]
* [[Biography:Nagarjuna|Nagarjuna]]
* [[Philosophy:Sacca|Sacca]]
* Simran
* [[Tetralemma]]
* [[Philosophy:Upaya|Upaya]]
* [[Philosophy:Secular Buddhism|Secular Buddhism]]
*{{annotated link|Philosophy:Double truth}}

==Notes==
{{reflist|group=note|2}}

==References==
{{Reflist|30em}}

==Sources==

===Published sources===
{{columns-list|colwidth=30em|
{{refbegin}}
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* {{Citation |last=Brunholzl |first=Karl |year=2004 |title=Center of the Sunlit Sky |publisher=Snowlion}}
* {{Citation |last=Chattopadhyaya |first=Debiprasad |year=2001 |title=What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy |edition=5th |publisher=People's Publishing House}}
* Conze, Edward (1959). ''Buddhism: Its Essence and Development''. New York, US: Harper and Row.
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* {{Citation |last=Garfield |first=Jay |year=2002 |title=Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-cultural Interpretation |publisher=Oxford University Press}}
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* Gethin, Rupert. ''Foundations of Buddhism.'' pp.&nbsp;207, 235–245
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* Lopez, Donald S., "A Study of Svatantrika", Snow Lion Publications, 1987, pp.&nbsp;192–217.
* McCagney, Nancy. ''The Philosophy of Openness.'' Rowman and Littlefield, 1997
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* Monier-Williams, Monier; Leumann, Ernst; Cappeller, Carl (1899). [http://www.sanskrit-lexicon.uni-koeln.de/scans/MW72Scan/2014/web/index.php A Sanskrit-English Dictionary], etymologically and philologically arranged with special reference to cognate Indo-European languages, Oxford: The Clarendon press
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* {{Citation |last=Nakamure |first=Hajime |year=1980 |title=Indian Buddhism: A Survey with Bibliographical Notes |publisher=Motilal Banarsidass Publ.}}
* Newland, Guy (1992). ''The Two Truths: in the Mādhyamika Philosophy of the Ge-luk-ba Order of Tibetan Buddhism''. Ithaca, New York, US: Snow Lion Publications. {{ISBN|0-937938-79-3}}
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* {{Citation |last=Puligandla |first=Ramakrishna |year=1997 |title=Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy |place=New Delhi |publisher=D.K. Printworld (P) Ltd.}}
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* {{Citation |last=Seyfort Ruegg |first=David |year=1981 |title=The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India |publisher=Otto Harrassowitz Verlag}}
* {{Citation |last=Sharma |first=Peri Sarveswara |year=1980 |title=Anthology of Kumārilabhaṭṭa's Works |publisher=Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass}}
* {{Citation |last=Sheridan |first=Daniel P. |year=1995 |chapter=Kumarila Bhatta |title=Great Thinkers of the Eastern World |editor-first=Ian |editor-last=McGready |place=New York |publisher=Harper Collins |isbn=0-06-270085-5 |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/greatthinkersofe00mcgr }}
* {{Citation |last=Siderits |first=Mark |year=2003 |title=On the Soteriological Significance of Emptiness |journal=Contemporary Buddhism |volume=4 |issue=1|pages=9–23 |doi=10.1080/1463994032000140158 |s2cid=144783831 }}
* {{Citation |last=Stcherbatsky |first=Theodore |year=1989 |title=Madhyamakakārikā |publisher=Motilal Banarsidass Publ.}}
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* {{Citation |last=Wilber |first=Ken |year=2000 |title=Integral Psychology |publisher=Shambhala Publications}}
{{refend}}
}}

===Web-sources===
{{reflist|group=web}}

==External links==
* [http://buddhism.about.com/b/2012/04/02/where-did-the-two-truths-come-from.htm Barbara O'Brien: The Two Truths. What Is Reality?]


[[Category:Buddhist philosophical concepts]]
[[Category:Theories of truth]]

{{Sourceattribution|Two truths doctrine}}