View source for Philosophy:Virtue ethics

{{Short description|Normative ethical theories}}
{{Use Oxford spelling|date=August 2021}}
{{Socrates}}
{{Roman Catholic Church|expanded=philosophy}}
'''Virtue ethics''' (also '''aretaic ethics''',{{efn|Pronounced {{IPAc-en|ˌ|ær|ə|ˈ|t|eɪ|.|ɪ|k}}.}}<ref>{{cite book |editor-first1=David |editor-last1=Carr |editor-first2=Jan |editor-last2=Steutel |year=1999 |title=Virtue Ethics and Moral Education |publisher=Routledge |page=22 |isbn=9780415170734}}</ref> from [[Social:Ancient Greek|Greek]] {{lang|grc|ἀρετή}} [{{transliteration|grc|aretḗ}}]) is an approach that treats [[Philosophy:Virtue|virtue]] and [[Philosophy:Moral character|character]] as the primary subjects of [[Philosophy:Ethics|ethics]], in contrast to other ethical systems that put consequences of voluntary acts, principles or rules of conduct, or obedience to divine authority in the primary role.<ref>{{cite book|first=Daniel|last=Statman|chapter=Introduction to Virtue Ethics|title=Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader|publisher=Edinburgh University Press|year=1997|isbn=0878402217|page=7|quote=[Virtue Ethics] refers to a rather new (or renewed) approach to ethics, according to which the basic judgments in ethics are judgments about character.}}</ref>

Virtue ethics is usually contrasted with two other major approaches in ethics, [[Philosophy:Consequentialism|consequentialism]] and [[Philosophy:Deontology|deontology]], which make the goodness of outcomes of an action (consequentialism) and the concept of moral duty (deontology) central. While virtue ethics does not necessarily deny the importance to ethics of goodness of states of affairs or of moral duties, it emphasizes virtue, and sometimes other concepts, like {{transliteration|grc|[[Philosophy:Eudaimonia|eudaimonia]]}}, to an extent that other ethics theories do not.

== Key concepts ==
===Virtue and vice===
{{Main|Philosophy:Virtue|Philosophy:Moral character}}
In virtue ethics, a [[Philosophy:Virtue|virtue]] is a characteristic disposition to think, feel, and act well in some domain of life.<ref>{{multiref2
|2={{Cite journal|title=Virtue and Duty: Negotiating Between Different Ethical Traditions|journal=[[Philosophy:Journal of Value Inquiry|Journal of Value Inquiry]]|url=https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10790-015-9520-y|last=Annas|first=Julia|date=2015-09-22|volume=49|issue=4|via=SpringerLink|doi=10.1007/s10790-015-9520-y|page=609|s2cid=143268990}}
}}</ref> In contrast, a [[Philosophy:Vice|vice]] is a characteristic disposition to think, feel, and act poorly. Virtues are not everyday habits; they are [[Social:Trait theory|character traits]], in the sense that they are central to someone’s [[Philosophy:Personality|personality]] and what they are like as a person.

In early versions and some modern versions of virtue ethics, a virtue is defined as a character trait that promotes or exhibits human excellence ("flourishing and wellbeing", {{transliteration|grc|[[Philosophy:Eudaimonia|eudaimonia]]}}) in the person who exhibits it.<ref>{{cite book|first=Daniel|last=Statman|chapter=Introduction to Virtue Ethics|title=Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader|publisher=Edinburgh University Press|year=1997|isbn=0878402217|page=8|quote=Virtues are viewed as necessary conditions for, or as constitutive elements of, human flourishing and wellbeing.}}</ref> Some modern versions of virtue ethics do not define virtues in terms of human excellence or flourishing, and some go so far as to define virtues as traits that tend to promote some other good that is defined independently of the virtues, thereby subsuming virtue ethics under (or somehow merging it with) consequentialist ethics.<ref>{{cite book|first=Gregory Velazco y|last=Trianosky|editor-first=Daniel|editor-last=Statman|chapter=What is Virtue Ethics All About?|title=Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader|publisher=Edinburgh University Press|year=1997|isbn=0878402217|page=48|quote=What is surprising today is how many of the most influential writers on the virtues today in fact defend some sort of teleological if not specifically utilitarian answer.}}</ref>

To Aristotle, a virtue was not a skill that made you better able to achieve {{transliteration|grc|eudaimonia}} but was itself an expression of {{transliteration|grc|eudaimonia}}—{{transliteration|grc|eudaimonia}} in activity.<ref>{{cite book|first=Gregory Velazco y|last=Trianosky|editor-first=Daniel|editor-last=Statman|chapter=What is Virtue Ethics All About?|title=Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader|publisher=Edinburgh University Press|year=1997|isbn=0878402217|page=47|quote=[Aristotle regards virtue as] a constitutive element of the human good rather than merely a means to its attainment.}}</ref>

In contrast with consequentialist and deontological ethical systems, in which one may be called upon to do the right thing even though it is not in one's own interests (one is to do it instead for the greater good, or out of duty), in virtue ethics, one does the right thing because it is in one's own interests. Part of training in practical virtue ethics is to come to see the coincidence of one's [[Philosophy:Enlightened self-interest|enlightened self-interest]] and the practice of the virtues, so that one is virtuous willingly, gladly, and enthusiastically because one knows that being virtuous is the best thing one can do with oneself.{{r|NE|at=I}}

=== Virtue and emotion ===
In [[Philosophy:Ancient Greek philosophy|ancient Greek]] and modern eudaimonic virtue ethics, virtues and vices are complex dispositions that involve both [[Philosophy:Affect (psychology)|affective]] and intellectual components.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Morality of Happiness|last=Annas|first=Julia|publisher=[[Organization:Oxford University Press|Oxford University Press]]|year=1993|isbn=0-19-507999-X|location=New York|pages=48–49}}</ref> That is, they are dispositions that involve both being able to reason well about the right thing to do (see below on {{transliteration|grc|[[Philosophy:Phronesis|phronesis]]}}), and also to engage emotions and feelings correctly.

For example, a generous person can reason well about when and how to help people, and such a person also helps people with pleasure and without conflict. In this, virtuous people are contrasted not only with vicious people (who reason poorly about what to do and are emotionally attached to the wrong things) and with the [[Philosophy:Incontinence|incontinent]] (who are tempted by their feelings into doing the wrong thing even though they know what is right), but also with the merely continent (whose emotions tempt them toward doing the wrong thing but whose strength of will lets them do what they know is right).

According to [[Biography:Rosalind Hursthouse|Rosalind Hursthouse]], in Aristotelian virtue ethics, the emotions have moral significance because "virtues (and vices) are all dispositions not only to act, but to feel emotions, as ''re''actions as well as impulses to action... [and] In the person with the virtues, these emotions will be felt on the ''right'' occasions, toward the ''right'' people or objects, for the ''right'' reasons, where 'right' means 'correct'..."<ref>{{cite book|first=Rosalind|last=Hursthouse|editor-first=Daniel|editor-last=Statman|chapter=Virtue Ethics and the Emotions|title=Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader|publisher=Edinburgh University Press|year=1997|isbn=0878402217|page=108}}</ref>

==={{transliteration|grc|Phronesis}} and {{transliteration|grc|eudaimonia}}===
{{transliteration|grc|[[Philosophy:Phronesis|Phronesis]]}} ({{lang|grc|φρόνησις}}; prudence, practical virtue, or practical wisdom) is an acquired trait that enables its possessor to identify the best thing to do in any given situation.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Pincoffs|first=Edmund|year=1971|title=Quandary ethics|journal=Mind|volume=80|number=320|pages=552–571|doi=10.1093/mind/LXXX.320.552 }}</ref> Unlike theoretical wisdom, practical reason results in action or decision.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/aristotle-ethics/|title=Aristotle's Ethics|last=Kraut|first=Richard|date=2016-01-01|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Spring 2016|access-date=2016-05-05|archive-date=2019-03-18|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190318050904/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/aristotle-ethics/|url-status=live}}</ref> As John McDowell puts it, practical wisdom involves a "perceptual sensitivity" to what a situation requires.<ref>{{cite journal|last=McDowell|first=John|title=Virtue and Reason|journal=The Monist|year=1979|volume=62 |issue=3 |pages=331–350 |doi=10.5840/monist197962319 }}</ref>

{{transliteration|grc|[[Philosophy:Eudaimonia|Eudaimonia]]}} ({{lang|grc|εὐδαιμονία}}) is a state variously translated from Greek as 'well-being', 'happiness', 'blessedness', and in the context of virtue ethics, 'human flourishing'.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Pojman|first1=L.P.|last2=Fieser|first2=J.|year=2009|chapter=Virtue Theory|title=Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong|pages=146–169|edition=6th|location=Belmont, Calif.|publisher=Wadsworth}}</ref> {{transliteration|grc|Eudaimonia}} in this sense is not a subjective, but an objective, state. It characterizes the well-lived life.

According to [[Biography:Aristotle|Aristotle]], the most prominent exponent of {{transliteration|grc|eudaimonia}} in the Western philosophical tradition, {{transliteration|grc|eudaimonia}} defines the goal of human life. It consists of exercising the characteristic human quality—[[Philosophy:Reason|reason]]—as the soul's most proper and nourishing activity. In his ''Nicomachean Ethics'', Aristotle, like Plato before him, argued that the pursuit of {{transliteration|grc|eudaimonia}} is an "activity of the soul in accordance with perfect virtue",{{r|NE|at=I}} which further could only properly be exercised in the characteristic human community—the {{transliteration|grc|polis}} or [[Earth:City-state|city-state]].<ref name=Politics>{{cite book|last=Aristotle|title=Politics}}</ref>

Although {{transliteration|grc|eudaimonia}} was first popularized by Aristotle, it now belongs to the tradition of virtue theories generally.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/#Prel |title=Virtue Ethics |last=Hursthouse |first=Rosalind |date=8 Dec 2016 |website=[[Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]] |publisher=Stanford University |access-date=11 May 2020 |quote=Although modern virtue ethics does not have to take a 'neo-Aristotelian' or eudaimonist form..., almost any modern version still shows that its roots are in ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of three concepts derived from it. These are {{transliteration|grc|arête}} (excellence or virtue), {{transliteration|grc|phronesis}} (practical or moral wisdom) and {{transliteration|grc|eudaimonia}} (usually translated as happiness or flourishing). |archive-date=23 September 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180923114551/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/#Prel |url-status=live }}</ref> For the virtue theorist, {{transliteration|grc|eudaimonia}} describes that state achieved by the person who lives the proper human life, an outcome that can be reached by practicing the virtues. A virtue is a habit or quality that allows the bearer to succeed at his, her, or its purpose. The virtue of a knife, for example, is sharpness; among the virtues of a racehorse is speed. Thus, to identify the virtues for human beings, one must have an account of what is the human purpose.

Not all modern virtue ethics theories are eudaimonic; some place another end in place of {{transliteration|grc|eudaimonia}}, while others are non-teleological: that is, they do not account for virtues in terms of the results that the practice of the virtues produce or tend to produce.<ref>{{cite book|first=Daniel|last=Statman|chapter=Introduction to Virtue Ethics|title=Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader|publisher=Edinburgh University Press|year=1997|isbn=0878402217|page=11|quote=[I]t is important to notice (1.) that virtue ethics is not necessarily tied to the notion of wellbeing; and (2.) that according to some philosophers, virtue ethics is necessarily, or at least typically, of a ''non''-teleological nature.}}</ref>

==History of virtue==
{{Catholic philosophy}}
Like much of the Western tradition, virtue theory originated in ancient Greek philosophy.

Virtue ethics began with [[Biography:Socrates|Socrates]], and was subsequently developed further by [[Biography:Plato|Plato]], [[Biography:Aristotle|Aristotle]], and the Stoics.<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{Cite journal|last=Gardiner|first=P.|date=2003-10-01|title=A virtue ethics approach to moral dilemmas in medicine|url=https://jme.bmj.com/content/29/5/297|journal=Journal of Medical Ethics|language=en|volume=29|issue=5|pages=297–302|doi=10.1136/jme.29.5.297|issn=0306-6800|pmc=1733793|pmid=14519840|archive-date=2019-11-06|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191106092549/https://jme.bmj.com/content/29/5/297|url-status=live}}
|2={{cite book|first=John|last=Bowin|chapter-url=https://people.ucsc.edu/~jbowin/virtue.pdf|chapter=Aristotle's Virtue Ethics|title=A Companion to World Literature|editor-first=Ken|editor-last=Seigneurie|year=2020|publisher=John Wiley & Sons}}
|3={{cite book | title=Plato: Oxford Bibliographies Online Research Guide | publisher=Oxford University Press, USA | date=2010 | isbn=978-0-19-980902-8|page= [https://books.google.com/books?id=IiXfj1PCr9YC&dq=Virtue+ethics+began+with+Socrates&pg=PA10 10]}}
}}</ref> Virtue ethics concentrates on the character of the individual, rather than the acts (or consequences thereof) of the individual. There is debate among adherents of virtue ethics concerning what specific virtues are praiseworthy. However, most theorists agree that ethics is demonstrated by the practice of virtues. 

Plato and Aristotle's treatments of virtues are not the same. Plato believes virtue is effectively an end to be sought, for which a friend might be a useful means. Aristotle states that the virtues function more as means to safeguard human relations, particularly authentic friendship, without which one's quest for happiness is frustrated.

Discussion of what were known as the four [[Philosophy:Cardinal virtues|cardinal virtues]]—[[Philosophy:Wisdom|wisdom]], [[Philosophy:Justice|justice]], fortitude, and [[Philosophy:Temperance (virtue)|temperance]]—can be found in Plato's ''[[Social:Republic (Plato)|Republic]]''. The virtues also figure prominently in Aristotle's ethical theory found in ''Nicomachean Ethics''.{{r|NE}}

Virtue theory was inserted into the study of [[History:History|history]] by moralistic historians such as Livy, [[Philosophy:Plutarch|Plutarch]], and Tacitus. The Greek idea of the virtues was passed on in Roman philosophy through [[Biography:Cicero|Cicero]] and later incorporated into [[Religion:Christianity|Christian]] moral theology by [[Biography:Ambrose|Ambrose]] of Milan. During the [[Philosophy:Scholasticism|scholastic]] period, the most comprehensive consideration of the virtues from a theological perspective was provided by [[Biography:Thomas Aquinas|Thomas Aquinas]] in his ''[[Philosophy:Summa Theologica|Summa Theologiae]]'' and his ''Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics''.<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{cite book|last=Aquinas|first=Thomas|title=[[Philosophy:Summa Theologica|Summa Theologica]]|year=1485}}
|2={{cite book|last=Aquinas|first=Thomas|title=Commentary on the Ten Books of Ethics|year=1272}}
}}</ref>

After the Reformation, Aristotle's ''Nicomachean Ethics'' continued to be the main authority for the discipline of ethics at Protestant universities until the late seventeenth century, with over fifty Protestant commentaries published on the ''Nicomachean Ethics'' before 1682.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Sytsma|first=David|date=2021|title=Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Protestantism|journal=Academia Letters|language=en|volume=1650|pages=1–8|doi=10.20935/AL1650|s2cid=237798959|url=https://philarchive.org/rec/SYTANE }}</ref>

Though the tradition receded into the background of European philosophical thought in the past few centuries, the term "virtue" remained current during this period, and in fact appears prominently in the tradition of classical republicanism or [[Philosophy:Classical liberalism|classical liberalism]]. This tradition was prominent in the intellectual life of 16th-century Italy, as well as 17th- and 18th-century Britain and America; indeed the term "virtue" appears frequently in the work of [[Biography:Niccolò Machiavelli|Niccolò Machiavelli]], [[Biography:David Hume|David Hume]], the republicans of the English Civil War period, the 18th-century English Whigs, and the prominent figures among the [[Philosophy:Scottish Enlightenment|Scottish Enlightenment]] and the American Founding Fathers.

===Contemporary "aretaic turn"<!--"Aretaic turn" redirects here-->===
Although some [[Philosophy:Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] philosophers (e.g. [[Biography:David Hume|Hume]]) continued to emphasise the virtues, with the ascendancy of [[Philosophy:Utilitarianism|utilitarianism]] and [[Philosophy:Deontology|deontological ethics]], virtue theory moved to the margins of Western [[Philosophy:Philosophy|philosophy]]. The contemporary revival of virtue theory is frequently traced to the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay "Modern Moral Philosophy".<ref>{{cite journal|last=Anscombe|first=G. E. M.|title=Modern Moral Philosophy|year=1958|journal=Philosophy|volume=33|number=124|pages=1–19|doi=10.1017/s0031819100037943|jstor=3749051|s2cid=197875941|doi-access=free}}</ref> Following this:
* In the 1976 paper "[[Philosophy:The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories|The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories]]", Michael Stocker summarises the main aretaic criticisms of deontological and consequentialist ethics.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Stocker | first1 = Michael | year = 1976 | title = The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories | journal = The Journal of Philosophy | volume = 73 | issue = 14| pages = 453–466 | doi = 10.2307/2025782 | jstor = 2025782 }}</ref>
* Philosopher, psychologist, and encyclopedist Mortimer Adler appealed to [[Philosophy:Aristotelian ethics|Aristotelian ethics]], and the virtue theory of happiness or {{transliteration|grc|[[Philosophy:Eudaimonia|eudaimonia]]}} throughout his published work.
* [[Biography:Philippa Foot|Philippa Foot]], published a collection of essays in 1978 entitled ''Virtues and Vices''.<ref>{{cite book|first=Philippa|last=Foot|title=Virtues and Vices|year=1978|location=Oxford|publisher=Basil Blackwell|isbn=0631127496|url=https://archive.org/details/virtuesvices0000unse_l8l3|url-access=registration}}</ref>
* [[Biography:Alasdair MacIntyre|Alasdair MacIntyre]] made an effort to reconstruct a virtue-based theory in dialogue with the problems of modern and [[Philosophy:Postmodernism|postmodern]] thought; his works include ''[[Philosophy:After Virtue|After Virtue]]'' and ''Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry''.<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{cite book|last=MacIntyre|first=Alasdair|title=After Virtue|location=Notre Dame, Ind.|publisher=University of Notre Dame Press|year=1981|isbn=0-268-00594-X|url=https://archive.org/details/aftervirtue0000unse|url-access=registration}}
|2={{cite book|last=MacIntyre|first=Alasdair|title=Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry|location=Notre Dame, Ind.|publisher=University of Notre Dame Press|year=1990|isbn=0-268-01877-4|url=https://archive.org/details/threerivalversio0000maci_w3q5|url-access=registration}}
}}</ref>
* Paul Ricoeur accorded an important place to Aristotelian teleological ethics in his hermeneutical [[Philosophy:Phenomenology|phenomenology]] of the subject, most notably in his book ''Oneself as Another''.<ref>{{cite book|last=Ricoeur|first=Paul|title=Oneself as Another|translator-first=Kathleen|translator-last=Blamey|location=Chicago|publisher=University of Chicago Press|year=1992|isbn=0-226-71329-6|orig-year=1990|url=https://archive.org/details/oneselfasanother0000ricu|url-access=registration}}</ref>
* Theologian [[Biography:Stanley Hauerwas|Stanley Hauerwas]] found the language of virtue helpful in his own project.
* [[Biography:Roger Crisp|Roger Crisp]] and Michael Slote edited a collection of important essays titled ''Virtue Ethics''.<ref>{{cite book|title=Virtue Ethics|last1=Crisp|first1=Roger|last2=Slote|first2=Michael|year=1997|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Oxford}}</ref>
* [[Biography:Martha Nussbaum|Martha Nussbaum]] and Amartya Sen employed virtue theory in theorising the [[Social:Capability approach|capability approach]] to [[Finance:International development|international development]].
* [[Biography:Julia Annas|Julia Annas]] wrote ''The Morality of Happiness'' (1993).<ref>{{cite book|last=Annas|first=Julia|title=The Morality of Happiness|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=1993|isbn=0-19-509652-5|url=https://archive.org/details/moralityofhappin0000anna|url-access=registration}}</ref>
* [[Biography:Lawrence C. Becker|Lawrence C. Becker]] identified current virtue theory with [[Philosophy:Stoicism|Greek Stoicism]] in ''A New Stoicism.'' (1998).<ref name="Becker1998">{{cite book |last1=Becker |first1=Lawrence C. |title=A New Stoicism |date=1998 |publisher=Princeton University Press |location=Princeton, N.J. |isbn=978-0691009643 |page=30|url=https://archive.org/details/newstoicism0000beck|url-access=registration}}</ref>
* [[Biography:Rosalind Hursthouse|Rosalind Hursthouse]] published ''On Virtue Ethics'' (1999).<ref>{{cite book|last=Hursthouse|first=Rosalind|title=On Virtue Ethics|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=1999|isbn=0-19-924799-4|url=https://archive.org/details/onvirtueethics00hurs|url-access=registration}}</ref>
* Psychologist Martin Seligman drew on classical virtue ethics in conceptualizing [[Social:Positive psychology|positive psychology]].
* Psychologist Daniel Goleman opens his book on Emotional Intelligence with a challenge from Aristotle's ''Nicomachean Ethics''.<ref>{{cite book|title-link=Emotional Intelligence|title=Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ|last=Goleman|first=Daniel|date=1995|publisher=Bantam Books|isbn=978-0-553-38371-3|location=Aristotle's Challenge, pp. xix–xxiv}}</ref>
* [[Biography:Michael Sandel|Michael Sandel]] discusses Aristotelian ethics to support his ethical theory of justice in his book ''Justice: What's the Right Thing to Do?''

The '''aretaic turn'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> in moral philosophy is paralleled by analogous developments in other philosophical disciplines. One of these is [[Philosophy:Epistemology|epistemology]], where a distinctive [[Philosophy:Virtue epistemology|virtue epistemology]] was developed by [[Biography:Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski|Linda Zagzebski]] and others. In political theory, there has been discussion of "virtue politics", and in legal theory, there is a small but growing body of literature on [[Philosophy:Virtue jurisprudence|virtue jurisprudence]]. The aretaic turn also exists in {{wipe|United States of America}} [[Philosophy:Constitutional theory|constitutional theory]], where proponents argue for an emphasis {{clarify|text=on virtue and vice of constitutional [[Social:Adjudicator|adjudicator]]s|date=July 2023}}.{{cn|reason=|date=October 2023}}

Aretaic approaches to morality, epistemology, and jurisprudence have been the subject of intense debates. One criticism focuses on the problem of guidance; opponents, such as Robert Louden in his article "Some Vices of Virtue Ethics", question whether the idea of a virtuous moral actor, believer, or judge can provide the guidance necessary for action, belief formation, or the resolution of legal disputes.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Louden|first=Robert B.|title=On some vices of virtue ethics|journal=American Philosophical Quarterly|volume=21|issue=3|year=1984|pages=227–236}}</ref>

== Lists of virtues ==
There are several lists of virtues. Socrates argued that virtue is knowledge, which suggests that there is really only one virtue.<ref>Plato, ''Meno''.</ref> The Stoics identified four [[Philosophy:Cardinal virtues|cardinal virtues]]: wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance. Wisdom is subdivided into good sense, good calculation, quick-wittedness, discretion, and resourcefulness. Justice is subdivided into piety, honesty, equity, and fair dealing. Courage is subdivided into endurance, confidence, high-mindedness, cheerfulness, and industriousness. Temperance or moderation is subdivided into good discipline, seemliness, modesty, and self-control.<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{cite web |last1=Stephens |first1=William O. |title=Stoic Ethics |url=https://iep.utm.edu/stoiceth/ |website=www.iep.utm.edu |access-date=14 February 2023}}
|2={{cite web |last1=Cicero |first1=Marcus Tullius |trans-title=On Moral Duties|title=De Officiis |url=https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/cicero-on-moral-duties-de-officiis |website=www.oll.libertyfund.org |access-date=14 February 2023}}
}}</ref>

John McDowell argues that virtue is a "perceptual capacity" to identify how one ought to act, and that all particular virtues are merely "specialized sensitivities" to a range of reasons for acting.<ref>{{cite journal|last=McDowell|first=John|title=Virtue and reason|journal=The Monist|volume=62|number=3|year=1979|pages=331–350|doi=10.5840/monist197962319 }}</ref>

;Aristotle's list
Aristotle identifies approximately 18 virtues that demonstrate a person is performing their human function well.<ref name=NE>{{cite book|author=Aristotle|editor=Andronicus|title=Nicomachean Ethics}}</ref> He distinguished virtues pertaining to emotion and desire from those relating to the mind.{{r|NE|at=II}} The first he calls moral virtues, and the second intellectual virtues (though both are "moral" in the modern sense of the word).

;Moral virtues
Aristotle suggested that each moral virtue was a mean (see golden mean) between two corresponding vices, one of excess and one of deficiency. Each intellectual virtue is a mental skill or habit by which the mind arrives at truth, affirming what is or denying what is not.{{r|NE|at=VI}} In the ''Nicomachean Ethics'' he discusses about 11 moral virtues:
{| class="wikitable" width="100%" border="0" cellspacing="3"
! width="24%" bgcolor="#E8EAFF" |'''SPHERE OF ACTION OR FEELING'''
! width="24%" bgcolor="#E8EAFF" |'''EXCESS'''
! width="24%" bgcolor="#E8EAFF" |'''MEAN: MORAL VIRTUE'''
! width="24%" bgcolor="#E8EAFF" |'''DEFICIENCY'''
|-
| align="center" |Fear and confidence
| align="center" |Rashness
| align="center" |'''[[Social:Courage|Courage]]''' in the face of fear{{r|NE|at=III.6–9}}
| align="center" |Cowardice
|-
| align="center" |Pleasure and pain
| align="center" |Licentiousness / self-indulgence
| align="center" |'''[[Philosophy:Temperance (virtue)#Aristotle|Temperance]]''' in the face of pleasure and pain{{r|NE|at=III.10–12}}
| align="center" |Insensibility
|-
| align="center" |Getting and spending (minor)
| align="center" |Prodigality
| align="center" |'''Liberality''' with wealth and possessions{{r|NE|at=IV.1}}
| align="center" |Illiberality / meanness
|-
| align="center" |Getting and spending (major)
| align="center" |Vulgarity / tastelessness
| align="center" |'''[[Philosophy:Magnificence (history of ideas)#Aristotle|Magnificence]]''' with great wealth and possessions{{r|NE|at=IV.2}}
| align="center" |Pettiness / stinginess
|-
| align="center" |Honour and dishonour (major)
| align="center" |Vanity
| align="center" |'''[[Philosophy:Magnanimity|Magnanimity]]''' with great honors{{r|NE|at=IV.3}}
| align="center" |Pusillanimity
|-
| align="center" |Honour and dishonour (minor)
| align="center" |Ambition/empty vanity
| align="center" |'''Proper ambition''' with normal honors{{r|NE|at=IV.4}}
| align="center" |Unambitiousness / undue humility
|-
| align="center" |Anger
| align="center" |Irascibility
| align="center" |'''[[Philosophy:Patience|Patience]]/good temper'''{{r|NE|at=IV.5}}
| align="center" |Lack of spirit/unirascibility
|-
| align="center" |Self-expression
| align="center" |Boastfulness
| align="center" |'''[[Philosophy:Honesty|Truthfulness]]''' with self-expression{{r|NE|at=IV.7}}
| align="center" |Understatement / mock modesty
|-
| align="center" |Conversation
| align="center" |Buffoonery
| align="center" |'''[[Philosophy:Wit|Wittiness]]''' in conversation{{r|NE|at=IV.8}}
| align="center" |Boorishness
|-
| align="center" |Social conduct
| align="center" |Obsequiousness
| align="center" |'''Friendliness''' in social conduct{{r|NE|at=IV.6}}
| align="center" |Cantankerousness
|-
| align="center" |Shame
| align="center" |Shyness
| align="center" |'''Modesty''' in the face of shame or shamelessness{{r|NE|at=IV.9}}
| align="center" |Shamelessness
|-
| align="center" |Indignation
| align="center" |Envy
| align="center" |'''[[Religion:Righteous indignation|Righteous indignation]]''' in the face of injury{{r|NE|at=IV.5}}
| align="center" |Malicious enjoyment / spitefulness
|}

;Intellectual virtues
# {{transliteration|grc|[[Philosophy:Nous|Nous]]}} (intelligence), which apprehends fundamental truths (such as definitions, self-evident principles){{r|NE|at=VI.11}}
# {{transliteration|grc|[[Philosophy:Episteme|Episteme]]}} (science), which is skill with inferential reasoning (such as proofs, syllogisms, demonstrations){{r|NE|at=VI.6}}
# {{transliteration|grc|Sophia}} (theoretical wisdom), which combines fundamental truths with valid, necessary inferences to reason well about unchanging truths.{{r|NE|at=VI.5}}
Aristotle also mentions several other traits: 
* {{transliteration|grc|Gnome}} (good sense) – passing judgment, "sympathetic understanding"{{r|NE|at=VI.11}}
* {{transliteration|grc|Synesis}} (understanding) – comprehending what others say, does not issue commands
* {{transliteration|grc|[[Philosophy:Phronesis|Phronesis]]}} (practical wisdom) – knowledge of what to do, knowledge of changing truths, issues commands{{r|NE|at=VI.8}}
* {{transliteration|grc|Techne}} (art, craftsmanship){{r|NE|at=VI.4}}

Aristotle's list is not the only list, however. As [[Biography:Alasdair MacIntyre|Alasdair MacIntyre]] observed in ''[[Philosophy:After Virtue|After Virtue]]'', thinkers as diverse as [[Biography:Homer|Homer]], the authors of the [[Religion:New Testament|New Testament]], [[Biography:Thomas Aquinas|Thomas Aquinas]], and [[Biography:Benjamin Franklin|Benjamin Franklin]] have all proposed lists.<ref>{{cite book|last=MacIntyre|first=Alasdair|title=After Virtue|location=Notre Dame, Ind.|publisher=University of Notre Dame Press|year=1981|isbn=0-268-00594-X|url=https://archive.org/details/aftervirtue0000unse|url-access=registration|at=Chapter 14}}</ref>

==Criticisms==
Regarding which are the most important virtues, Aristotle proposed the following nine: wisdom; prudence; justice; fortitude; courage; liberality; magnificence; magnanimity; temperance.{{cn|date=July 2023}} In contrast, philosopher [[Biography:Walter Kaufmann (philosopher)|Walter Kaufmann]] proposed as the four cardinal virtues ambition/humility, love, courage, and honesty.<ref>{{cite book|last=Kaufmann|first=Walter|year=1961|title=The Faith Of A Heretic|publisher=Doubleday & Co.|pages=317–338}}</ref>{{non-sequitur|reason=why is this a criticism?|date=July 2023}}

Regarding virtues supposedly applicable to women, many would have once considered a virtuous woman to be quiet, servile, and industrious.{{citation needed|date=January 2024}} This conception of female virtue no longer holds true in many modern societies.{{citation needed|date=January 2024}} Proponents of virtue theory sometimes argue that a central feature of a virtue is its ''universal applicability''.{{citation needed|date=January 2024}} In other words, any character trait defined as a virtue must reasonably be universally regarded as a virtue for all people.{{citation needed|date=January 2024}} According to this view, it is inconsistent to claim, for example, servility as a female virtue, while at the same time not proposing it as a male one.

Other proponents of virtue theory, notably [[Biography:Alasdair MacIntyre|Alasdair MacIntyre]], respond to this objection by arguing that any account of the virtues must indeed be generated out of the community in which those virtues are to be practiced: the very word ''ethics'' implies {{transliteration|grc|[[Philosophy:Ethos|ethos]]}}. That is to say that the virtues are, and necessarily must be, grounded in a particular time and place. What counts as a virtue in {{BCE|4th-century}} Athens would be a ludicrous guide to proper behaviour in {{CE|21st-century}} Toronto and vice versa. To take this view does not necessarily commit one to the argument that accounts of the virtues must therefore be static: moral activity—that is, attempts to contemplate and practice the virtues—can provide the cultural resources that allow people to change, albeit slowly, the {{transliteration|grc|[[Philosophy:Ethos|ethos]]}} of their own societies. 

MacIntyre appears to take this position in his seminal work on virtue ethics, ''After Virtue''. One might cite (though MacIntyre does not) the rapid emergence of [[Social:Abolitionism|abolitionist]] thought in the slave-holding societies of the 18th-century Atlantic world as an example of this sort of change: over a short period of time, perhaps 1760 to 1800, in Britain, France, and British America, slave-holding, previously thought to be morally neutral or even virtuous, rapidly became seen as vicious among wide swathes of society. While the emergence of abolitionist thought derived from many sources, the work of David Brion Davis, among others,{{who|date=January 2011}} established that one source was the rapid, internal evolution of moral theory among certain sectors of these societies, notably the [[Religion:Quakers|Quakers]].

Another objection to virtue theory is that virtue ethics does not focus on what ''sorts of actions'' are morally permitted and which ones are not, but rather on what sort of qualities someone ought to foster in order to become a good person. In other words, while some virtue theorists may not condemn, for example, murder as an inherently immoral or impermissible sort of action, they may argue that someone who commits a murder is severely lacking in several important virtues, such as [[Philosophy:Compassion|compassion]] and fairness. Still, antagonists of the theory often object that this particular feature of the theory makes virtue ethics useless as a universal norm of acceptable conduct suitable as a base for legislation. Some virtue theorists concede this point, but respond by opposing the very notion of legitimate legislative [[Philosophy:Authority|authority]] instead, effectively advocating some form of [[Social:Anarchism|anarchism]] as the political ideal.{{Citation needed|date=March 2013}} Others argue that laws should be made by virtuous legislators. Still, others argue that it is possible to base a judicial system on the moral notion of virtues rather than rules. Aristotle himself saw his ''Nicomachean Ethics'' as a prequel for his ''Politics'' and felt that the point of politics was to create the fertile soil for a virtuous citizenry to develop in, and that one purpose of virtue was that it helps you to contribute to a healthy {{transliteration|la|polis}}.{{r|NE|at=X.9}}{{r|Politics}}

Some virtue theorists might respond to this overall objection with the notion of a "bad act" also being an act characteristic of [[Philosophy:Vice|vice]].{{Citation needed|date=January 2008}} That is to say that those acts that do not aim at virtue, or that stray from virtue, would constitute our conception of "bad behavior". Although not all virtue ethicists agree to this notion, this is one way the virtue ethicist can re-introduce the concept of the "morally impermissible". One could raise an objection that he is committing an [[Philosophy:Argument from ignorance|argument from ignorance]] by postulating that what is not virtuous is unvirtuous. In other words, just because an action or person 'lacks of evidence' for virtue does not, [[Philosophy:Ceteris paribus|all else constant]], imply that said action or person is unvirtuous.

=== Subsumed in deontology and utilitarianism ===

[[Biography:Martha Nussbaum|Martha Nussbaum]] suggested that while virtue ethics is often considered to be anti-[[Philosophy:Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]], "suspicious of theory and respectful of the wisdom embodied in local practices",<ref name="Nussbaum">{{cite journal|last=Nussbaum|first=Martha C.|title=Virtue Ethics: A Misleading Category?|journal=The Journal of Ethics|year=1999|volume=3|issue=3|pages=163–201|jstor=25115613|doi=10.1023/A:1009877217694|s2cid=141533832}}</ref> it is actually neither fundamentally distinct from, nor does it qualify as a rival approach to deontology and utilitarianism. She argues that philosophers from these two Enlightenment traditions often include theories of virtue. She pointed out that [[Biography:Immanuel Kant|Kant's]] "Doctrine of Virtue" (in ''The Metaphysics of Morals'') "covers most of the same topics as do classical Greek theories", "that he offers a general account of virtue, in terms of the strength of the will in overcoming wayward and selfish inclinations; that he offers detailed analyses of standard virtues such as courage and self-control, and of vices, such as avarice, mendacity, servility, and pride; that, although in general, he portrays inclination as inimical to virtue, he also recognizes that sympathetic inclinations offer crucial support to virtue, and urges their deliberate cultivation."<ref name="Nussbaum" />

Nussbaum also points to considerations of virtue by utilitarians such as [[Biography:Henry Sidgwick|Henry Sidgwick]] (''[[Philosophy:The Methods of Ethics|The Methods of Ethics]]''), [[Biography:Jeremy Bentham|Jeremy Bentham]] (''The Principles of Morals and Legislation''), and [[Biography:John Stuart Mill|John Stuart Mill]], who writes of moral development as part of an argument for the moral equality of women (''The Subjection of Women''). She argues that contemporary virtue ethicists such as Alasdair MacIntyre, [[Biography:Bernard Williams|Bernard Williams]], [[Biography:Philippa Foot|Philippa Foot]], and [[Biography:John McDowell|John McDowell]] have few points of agreement and that the common core of their work does not represent a break from Kant.

=== Kantian critique ===

Immanuel Kant's position on virtue ethics is contested. Those who argue that Kantian deontology conflicts with virtue ethics include Alasdair MacIntyre, Philippa Foot, and Bernard Williams.<ref>{{cite book|last=MacIntyre|first=Alasdair|title=After Virtue|location=Notre Dame, Ind.|publisher=University of Notre Dame Press|year=1981|isbn=0-268-00594-X|url=https://archive.org/details/aftervirtue0000unse|url-access=registration|pages = 42, 112}}</ref> In the ''[[Philosophy:Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals|Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals]]'' and the ''[[Philosophy:Critique of Practical Reason|Critique of Practical Reason]]'', Immanuel Kant offers many different criticisms of ethical frameworks and against moral theories before him.{{citation needed|date=February 2021}} Kant rarely mentioned Aristotle by name but did not exclude his moral philosophy of virtue ethics from his critique. Many Kantian arguments against virtue ethics claim that virtue ethics is inconsistent, or sometimes that it isn't a real moral theory at all.<ref>{{Cite journal|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20126582|url-access=subscription|jstor = 20126582|title = The Kantian Critique of Aristotle's Moral Philosophy: An Appraisal|last1 = Sullivan|first1 = Roger J.|journal = The Review of Metaphysics|year = 1974|volume = 28|issue = 1|pages = 24–53}}</ref>

In "What Is Virtue Ethics All About?",<ref>{{cite book|first=Gregory Velazco y|last=Trianosky|editor-first=Daniel|editor-last=Statman|chapter=What is Virtue Ethics All About?|title=Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader|publisher=Edinburgh University Press|year=1997|isbn=0878402217|pages=47–55}}</ref> Gregory Velazco y Trianosky identified the key points of divergence between virtue ethicists and what he called "neo-Kantianism", in the form these nine neo-Kantian moral assertions:

# The crucial moral question is "what is it right/obligatory to do?"
# Moral judgments are those that concern the rightness of actions.
# Such judgments take the form of rules or principles.
# Such rules or principles are universal, not respecting persons.
# They are not based on some concept of human good that is independent of moral goodness.
# They take the form of [[Philosophy:Categorical imperative|categorical imperative]]s that can be justified independently of the desires of the person they apply to.
# They are motivating; they can compel action in an agent, also independently of that agent's desires.
# An action, in order to be morally virtuous, must be motivated by this sort of moral judgment (not, for example, merely coincidentally aligned with it).
# The virtuousness of a character trait, or virtue, derives from the relationship that trait has to moral judgments, rules, and principles.

Trianosky says that modern sympathizers with virtue ethics almost all reject neo-Kantian claim #1, and many of them also reject certain of the other claims.

=== Utopianism and pluralism ===

Robert B. Louden criticizes virtue ethics on the basis that it promotes a form of unsustainable utopianism. Trying to arrive at a single set of virtues is immensely difficult in contemporary societies as, according to Louden, they contain "more ethnic, religious, and class groups than did the moral community which Aristotle theorized about" with each of these groups having "not only its own interests but its own set of virtues as well". Louden notes in passing that MacIntyre, a supporter of virtue-based ethics, has grappled with this in ''After Virtue'' but that ethics cannot dispense with building rules around acts and rely only on discussing the [[Philosophy:Moral character|moral character]] of persons.<ref name="Louden">{{cite journal|last=Louden|first=Robert B.|title=On Some Vices of Virtue Ethics|journal=American Philosophical Quarterly|date=July 1984|volume=21|issue=3|pages=227–236|jstor=20014051}}</ref>

== Topics in virtue ethics ==

=== Virtue ethics as a category ===
Virtue contrasts with deontological and consequentialist ethics (the three being together the most predominant contemporary normative ethical theories).

[[Philosophy:Deontological ethics|Deontological ethics]], sometimes referred to as duty ethics, places the emphasis on adhering to ethical principles or duties. How these duties are defined, however, is often a point of contention and debate in deontological ethics. One predominant rule scheme used by deontologists is divine command theory. Deontology also depends upon meta-ethical [[Philosophy:Philosophical realism|realism]], in that it postulates the existence of moral absolutes that make an action moral, regardless of circumstances. Immanuel Kant is considered one of the foremost theorists of deontological ethics.

The next predominant school of thought in normative ethics is [[Philosophy:Consequentialism|consequentialism]]. While deontology places the emphasis on doing one's duty, consequentialism bases the morality of an action upon its outcome. Instead of saying that one has a moral duty to abstain from murder, a consequentialist would say that we should abstain from murder because it causes undesirable effects. The main contention here is what outcomes should/can be identified as objectively desirable.  

The greatest happiness principle of [[Biography:John Stuart Mill|John Stuart Mill]] is a commonly adopted criteria for what is objectively desirable. Mill asserts that the desirability of an action is the net amount of happiness it brings, the number of people it brings it to, and the duration of the happiness. He tries to delineate classes of happiness, some preferable to others, but there is a great deal of difficulty in classifying such concepts.
{{repetition section|date=July 2023}}
A virtue ethicist identifies virtues, desirable characteristics, that an excellent person embodies. Exhibiting these virtues is the aim of ethics, and one's actions are a reflection of one's virtues. To the virtue philosopher, action cannot be used as a demarcation of morality, because a virtue encompasses more than just a simple selection of action. Instead, a virtue is a way of being that leads the person exhibiting the virtue to make certain "virtuous" types of choices consistently in each situation. There is a great deal of disagreement within virtue ethics over what are virtues and what are not. There are also difficulties in identifying what is the "virtuous" action to take in all circumstances, and how to define a virtue.

Consequentialist and deontological theories often still employ the term ''virtue'', but in a restricted sense, namely as a tendency or disposition to adhere to the system's principles or rules. In other words, in those theories, virtue is secondary, and the principles or rules are primary. These very different senses of what constitutes virtue, hidden behind the same word, are a potential source of confusion.<ref>{{cite book|first=Daniel|last=Statman|chapter=Introduction to Virtue Ethics|title=Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader|publisher=Edinburgh University Press|year=1997|isbn=0878402217|page=7|quote=[A] view shared by both deontologists and utilitarians... [is that] the value of character traits is dependent on the value of the conduct that these traits tend to produce, and it is the concept of right behavior that it theoretically prior, not that of virtue. In reversing the order of justification, virtue ethics is calling for a real revolution in ethical thought...}}</ref>

This disagreement over the meaning of virtue points to a larger conflict between virtue theory and its philosophical rivals. A system of virtue theory is only intelligible if it is teleological: that is, if it includes an account of the purpose (''telos'') of human life, or in popular language, the [[Philosophy:Meaning of life|meaning of life]].{{Citation needed|date=January 2011}} Obviously, strong claims about the purpose of human life, or of what the good life for human beings is, will be controversial. Virtue theory's necessary commitment to a teleological account of human life thus puts the tradition in tension with other dominant approaches to normative ethics, which, because they focus on actions, do not bear this burden.{{Citation needed|date=January 2011}}

=== Virtue and politics ===
Virtue theory emphasises Aristotle's belief in the {{transliteration|grc|polis}} as the acme of political organisation,{{cn|reason=Aristotle certainly did, but does virtue theory as a whole?|date=July 2023}} and the role of the virtues in enabling human beings to flourish in that environment. Classical republicanism in contrast emphasises Tacitus' concern that power and luxury can corrupt individuals and destroy liberty, as Tacitus perceived in the transformation of the Roman Republic into the Roman Empire; virtue for classical republicans is a shield against this sort of corruption and a means to preserve the good life one has, rather than a means by which to achieve the good life one does not yet have. Another way to put the distinction between the two traditions is that virtue ethics relies on Aristotle's fundamental distinction between the human-being-as-he-is from the human-being-as-he-should-be, while classical republicanism relies on the Tacitean distinction of the risk-of-becoming.<ref>{{cite book|first=J.G.A.|last=Pocock|title=The Machiavellian Moment|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=1975|isbn=0-691-11472-2|lccn=2002112936}}</ref>

Virtue ethics has a number of contemporary applications.

;Social and political philosophy
Within the field of social ethics, Deirdre McCloskey argues that virtue ethics can provide a basis for a balanced approach to understanding capitalism and capitalist societies.<ref>{{cite book | last=McCloskey | first=Deirdre N. | title=The Bourgeois Virtues | publisher=University of Chicago Press | year= 2007 | isbn=978-0-226-55664-2}}</ref>
;Education
Within the field of philosophy of education, James Page argues that virtue ethics can provide a rationale and foundation for peace education.<ref>{{cite book | last1=Page | first1=James | last2=Page | first2=James Smith | title=Peace Education: Exploring Ethical and Philosophical Foundations | publisher=Information Age Pub Incorporated | date=2008 | isbn=978-1-59311-889-1}}</ref>
; Health care and medical ethics
Thomas Alured Faunce argued that whistleblowing in the healthcare setting would be more respected within clinical governance pathways if it had a firmer academic foundation in virtue ethics.<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{cite journal|last=Faunce|first=T.A.|title=Developing and Teaching the Virtue-Ethics Foundations of Healthcare Whistle Blowing|journal=Monash Bioethics Review|year=2004|volume=23|number=4|pages=41–55|doi=10.1007/BF03351419 |pmid=15688511 |s2cid=195243797 }}
|2={{cite journal|last1=Faunce|first1=T.A.|last2=Jefferys|first2=S.|title=Whistleblowing and Scientific Misconduct: Renewing Legal and Virtue Ethics Foundations|journal=Journal of Medicine and Law|year=2007|volume=26|number=3|pages=567–584|pmid=17970253}}
}}</ref> He called for whistleblowing to be expressly supported in the [[Organization:UNESCO|UNESCO]] Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights.<ref>{{cite journal | last1=Faunce | first1=T. A. | last2=Nasu | first2=H. | title=Normative Foundations of Technology Transfer and Transnational Benefit Principles in the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights | journal=Journal of Medicine and Philosophy | publisher=Oxford University Press (OUP) | volume=34 | issue=3 | date=23 April 2009 | issn=0360-5310 | doi=10.1093/jmp/jhp021 | pages=296–321| pmid=19395367 }}</ref> Barry Schwartz argues that "practical wisdom" is an antidote to much of the inefficient and inhumane bureaucracy of modern health care systems.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.ted.com/talks/barry_schwartz_on_our_loss_of_wisdom?language=en|title=Our loss of wisdom|last=Schwartz|first=Barry|website=www.ted.com|date=16 February 2009 |access-date=2016-05-05|archive-date=2016-05-07|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160507134559/http://www.ted.com/talks/barry_schwartz_on_our_loss_of_wisdom?language=en|url-status=live}}</ref>
;Technology and the virtues
In her book ''Technology and the Virtues'',<ref>{{Cite book|title=Technology and the Virtues: A Philosophical Guide to a Future Worth Wanting|date=2016|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0190498511|location=Oxford; New York}}</ref> Shannon Vallor proposed a series of 'technomoral' virtues that people need to cultivate in order to flourish in our socio-technological world: Honesty (Respecting Truth), Self-control (Becoming the Author of Our Desires), Humility (Knowing What We Do Not Know), Justice (Upholding Rightness), Courage (Intelligent Fear and Hope), Empathy (Compassionate Concern for Others), Care (Loving Service to Others), Civility (Making Common Cause), Flexibility (Skillful Adaptation to Change), Perspective (Holding on to the Moral Whole), and Magnanimity (Moral Leadership and Nobility of Spirit).

==See also==
{{div col|colwidth=35em}} 
{{div col end}}

==Notes==
{{notelist}}

==References==
{{reflist}}

==Further reading==
*{{cite journal|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/1399830|url-access=subscription|title=Virtue: Confucius and Aristotle|first=Jiyuan|last=Yu|journal=Philosophy East and West|year=1998|volume=48 |issue=2 |pages=323–47|doi=10.2307/1399830 |jstor=1399830 }}
*{{cite book|title=Introduction to Virtue Ethics|last=Devettere|first=Raymond J.|year=2002|publisher=Georgetown University Press|location=Washington, D.C.}}
*{{cite book|title=An Introduction to Virtue Ethics|last=Taylor|first=Richard|year=2002|publisher=Prometheus Books|location=Amherst}}
*{{cite book|title=Virtue Ethics|editor-last=Darwall|editor-first=Stephen|year=2003|publisher=B. Blackwell|location=Oxford}}
*{{cite book|title=Virtue Ethics: a Pluralistic View|last=Swanton|first=Christine|year=2003|publisher=Oxford University Press|location=Oxford}}
*{{cite book|title=Virtue Ethics, Old and New|editor-last=Gardiner|editor-first=Stephen M.|year=2005|publisher=Cornell University Press|location=Ithaca}}
*{{cite book|editor-last=Russell|editor-first=Daniel C.|title=The Cambridge Companion to Virtue Ethics|date=2013|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=New York}}

==External links==
* {{cite IEP |url-id=virtue |title=Virtue Ethics}}
* {{cite SEP |url-id=ethics-virtue |title=Virtue Ethics |first=Rosalind |last=Hursthouse |}}
* {{cite SEP |url-id=moral-character |title=Moral Character |first=Marcia |last=Homiak}}
* [http://www.rsrevision.com/Alevel/ethics/virtue_ethics/ Virtue Ethics – summary, criticisms and how to apply the theory]
* [https://lsolum.blogspot.com/archives/2003_11_01_lsolum_archive.html Legal theory lexicon: Virtue ethics] by Larry Solum.
* [https://www.VirtueScience.com The Virtue Ethics Research Hub]
* [https://www.orionphilosophy.com/stoic-blog/4-stoic-virtues/ The Four Stoic Virtues]

{{Aristotelianism}}
{{Catholic virtue ethics}}
{{Ethics}}
{{Philosophy topics}}
{{Stoicism}}

[[Category:Virtue ethics| ]]
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