Biography:Joseph Melia

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Short description: Philosopher

Joseph Melia is a philosopher working in the areas of philosophy of mathematics, modal logic and possible worlds. He has made important contributions to the debate over the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument, where he argues for a "weaseling" approach to mathematical nominalism.[1][2][3] He has also argued against modalism and the modal realism of David Lewis.[4][5]

References

  1. ↑ Daly, C.; Langford, S. (2010-10-01). "Two Anti-Platonist Strategies" (in en). Mind 119 (476): 1107–1116. doi:10.1093/mind/fzq074. ISSN 0026-4423. https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/mind/fzq074. 
  2. ↑ Raley, Y. (2012-10-01). "Why the Weasel Fails" (in en). Philosophia Mathematica 20 (3): 339–345. doi:10.1093/philmat/nks017. ISSN 0031-8019. https://academic.oup.com/philmat/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/philmat/nks017. 
  3. ↑ Knowles, Robert; Liggins, David (2015). "Good weasel hunting" (in en). Synthese 192 (10): 3397–3412. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0711-7. ISSN 0039-7857. http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11229-015-0711-7. 
  4. ↑ Forbes, Graeme (1992). "Melia on Modalism". Philosophical Studies 68 (1): 57–63. doi:10.1007/BF00354469. ISSN 0031-8116. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4320343. 
  5. ↑ Paseau, Alexander (2006). "Genuine Modal Realism and Completeness". Mind 115 (459): 721–729. doi:10.1093/mind/fzl721. ISSN 0026-4423. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3840589. 




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