Democratic theory
Theory
Early theory
Aristotle’s democratic theory contrasted rule by the many with rule by the few and with rule by a single individual. He distinguished democracy (closely related to timocracy) from oligarchy, aristocracy, and elitism, and opposed all of them to tyranny, autocracy, or absolute monarchy. Aristotle further argued that each system had both a virtuous and a corrupt form, considering democracy to be the degenerate counterpart of timocracy.
This framework is discussed in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where he analyzes the moral foundations of political regimes and their tendency to decay when virtue is lost.[1][2]
A common assumption among early and Renaissance republican theorists was that democracy could survive only in small political communities. Drawing lessons from the Roman Republic’s transition toward monarchy as it expanded and contracted, they argued that increases in territory and population inevitably produced tyranny. Democracy was therefore viewed as historically fragile and rare, viable only in small-scale political units that were themselves vulnerable to conquest by larger powers.
Montesquieu famously summarized this view by stating that a small republic is destroyed by external force, whereas a large republic is destroyed by internal corruption. Jean-Jacques Rousseau similarly maintained that small states are naturally suited to republican government, medium-sized states to monarchy, and large empires to despotism.[3]
Contemporary theory
Modern political theory contains several distinct and competing conceptions of democracy.
Aggregation
The theory of aggregative democracy holds that the primary purpose of democratic procedures is to collect and aggregate citizens’ preferences in order to determine public policy. From this perspective, democratic participation is centered on voting, with the option receiving the most votes becoming law or policy.
A minimalist version of this view treats elections as mechanisms of competition among political elites. Joseph Schumpeter articulated this position by defining democracy as a system in which leaders gain power through competitive elections. Later proponents of this view include William H. Riker, Adam Przeworski, and Richard Posner.
Related to this approach is the median voter theorem, which predicts that policies will tend to converge toward the preferences of the median voter. Anthony Downs argued that ideological political parties act as intermediaries between citizens and governments, structuring competition and representation. He developed this argument in An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957).
By contrast, proponents of direct democracy argue that citizens should vote directly on laws and policies rather than acting through representatives. From this perspective, political participation is intrinsically valuable, educative, and socially formative, and direct participation can serve as a check on elite domination. According to this view, citizens do not truly rule themselves unless they directly decide public policy.
Polyarchy
Robert A. Dahl proposed that the core democratic principle is that, in binding collective decisions, each person’s interests should receive equal consideration, even if outcomes do not satisfy everyone equally. He used the term polyarchy to describe political systems characterized by a specific set of institutions and practices that approximate democracy in large, complex societies.
Chief among these institutions are free and fair elections used to select representatives who oversee public policy. However, Dahl emphasized that polyarchic systems may still fall short of full democracy if social conditions such as poverty or inequality prevent effective political participation.[4]
Ronald Dworkin similarly argued that democracy is not merely procedural but substantive, requiring equal respect and concern for citizens as moral agents rather than simply adherence to formal voting rules.[5]
Deliberation
Deliberative democracy is based on the idea that democracy consists fundamentally in government by deliberation rather than by voting alone. According to this approach, a democratic decision is legitimate only if it is preceded by authentic deliberation, understood as reasoned discussion free from systematic distortions of unequal political power, such as those arising from economic inequality or organized interest-group influence.
If deliberation does not lead to consensus, decisions may then be reached through majority rule. Advocates of this model argue that deliberation enhances legitimacy by encouraging justification, mutual respect, and public reasoning.[6][7][8]
Citizens’ assemblies are widely regarded as practical examples of deliberative democracy in action. Empirical studies of such assemblies suggest that deliberation can lead participants to revise their opinions, engage more deeply with evidence, and reach decisions perceived as more legitimate. Recent reports have identified citizens’ assemblies as an increasingly popular institutional mechanism for public decision-making in democratic systems.[9][10][11][12]
References
- ↑ Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VIII, Chapter 10, 1160a.31–1161a.9. Internet Classics Archive.
- ↑ Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Aristotle.”
- ↑ Daniel Deudney, Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village, Princeton University Press, 2008.
- ↑ Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, Yale University Press, 1989.
- ↑ Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible Here?, Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 134.
- ↑ Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy?, Princeton University Press, 2002.
- ↑ Joshua Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, MIT Press, 1997.
- ↑ Ethan J. Leib, “Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?”, Buffalo Law Review, Vol. 54, 2006.
- ↑ Mark E. Warren and Hilary Pearse, Designing Deliberative Democracy: The British Columbia Citizens' Assembly, Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- ↑ Jane Suiter, David M. Farrell, and Eoin O’Malley, “When do deliberative citizens change their opinions?”, International Political Science Review, Vol. 37, No. 2, 2016.
- ↑ Graham Smith, Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation, Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- ↑ OECD, Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions: Catching the Deliberative Wave, 2020.
