Dubins–Spanier theorems

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Short description: Measure theory theorems

The Dubins–Spanier theorems are several theorems in the theory of fair cake-cutting. They were published by Lester Dubins and Edwin Spanier in 1961.[1] Although the original motivation for these theorems is fair division, they are in fact general theorems in measure theory.

Setting

There is a set [math]\displaystyle{ U }[/math], and a set [math]\displaystyle{ \mathbb{U} }[/math] which is a sigma-algebra of subsets of [math]\displaystyle{ U }[/math].

There are [math]\displaystyle{ n }[/math] partners. Every partner [math]\displaystyle{ i }[/math] has a personal value measure [math]\displaystyle{ V_i: \mathbb{U} \to \mathbb{R} }[/math]. This function determines how much each subset of [math]\displaystyle{ U }[/math] is worth to that partner.

Let [math]\displaystyle{ X }[/math] a partition of [math]\displaystyle{ U }[/math] to [math]\displaystyle{ k }[/math] measurable sets: [math]\displaystyle{ U = X_1 \sqcup \cdots \sqcup X_k }[/math]. Define the matrix [math]\displaystyle{ M_X }[/math] as the following [math]\displaystyle{ n\times k }[/math] matrix:

[math]\displaystyle{ M_X[i,j] = V_i(X_j) }[/math]

This matrix contains the valuations of all players to all pieces of the partition.

Let [math]\displaystyle{ \mathbb{M} }[/math] be the collection of all such matrices (for the same value measures, the same [math]\displaystyle{ k }[/math], and different partitions):

[math]\displaystyle{ \mathbb{M} = \{M_X \mid X\text{ is a }k\text{-partition of } U\} }[/math]

The Dubins–Spanier theorems deal with the topological properties of [math]\displaystyle{ \mathbb{M} }[/math].

Statements

If all value measures [math]\displaystyle{ V_i }[/math] are countably-additive and nonatomic, then:

  • [math]\displaystyle{ \mathbb{M} }[/math] is a compact set;
  • [math]\displaystyle{ \mathbb{M} }[/math] is a convex set.

This was already proved by Dvoretzky, Wald, and Wolfowitz. [2]

Corollaries

Consensus partition

A cake partition [math]\displaystyle{ X }[/math] to k pieces is called a consensus partition with weights [math]\displaystyle{ w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_k }[/math] (also called exact division) if:

[math]\displaystyle{ \forall i \in \{1,\dots, n\}: \forall j \in \{1,\dots, k\}: V_i(X_j) = w_j }[/math]

I.e, there is a consensus among all partners that the value of piece j is exactly [math]\displaystyle{ w_j }[/math].

Suppose, from now on, that [math]\displaystyle{ w_1, w_2, \ldots, w_k }[/math] are weights whose sum is 1:

[math]\displaystyle{ \sum_{j=1}^k w_j =1 }[/math]

and the value measures are normalized such that each partner values the entire cake as exactly 1:

[math]\displaystyle{ \forall i \in \{1,\dots, n\}: V_i(U) = 1 }[/math]

The convexity part of the DS theorem implies that:[1]:5

If all value measures are countably-additive and nonatomic,
then a consensus partition exists.

PROOF: For every [math]\displaystyle{ j \in \{1,\dots, k\} }[/math], define a partition [math]\displaystyle{ X^j }[/math] as follows:

[math]\displaystyle{ X^j_j = U }[/math]
[math]\displaystyle{ \forall r\neq j: X^j_r = \emptyset }[/math]

In the partition [math]\displaystyle{ X^j }[/math], all partners value the [math]\displaystyle{ j }[/math]-th piece as 1 and all other pieces as 0. Hence, in the matrix [math]\displaystyle{ M_{X^j} }[/math], there are ones on the [math]\displaystyle{ j }[/math]-th column and zeros everywhere else.

By convexity, there is a partition [math]\displaystyle{ X }[/math] such that:

[math]\displaystyle{ M_X = \sum_{j=1}^k w_j\cdot M_{X^j} }[/math]

In that matrix, the [math]\displaystyle{ j }[/math]-th column contains only the value [math]\displaystyle{ w_j }[/math]. This means that, in the partition [math]\displaystyle{ X }[/math], all partners value the [math]\displaystyle{ j }[/math]-th piece as exactly [math]\displaystyle{ w_j }[/math].

Note: this corollary confirms a previous assertion by Hugo Steinhaus. It also gives an affirmative answer to the problem of the Nile provided that there are only a finite number of flood heights.

Super-proportional division

A cake partition [math]\displaystyle{ X }[/math] to n pieces (one piece per partner) is called a super-proportional division with weights [math]\displaystyle{ w_1, w_2, ..., w_n }[/math] if:

[math]\displaystyle{ \forall i \in 1\dots n: V_i(X_i) \gt w_i }[/math]

I.e, the piece allotted to partner [math]\displaystyle{ i }[/math] is strictly more valuable for him than what he deserves. The following statement is Dubins-Spanier Theorem on the existence of super-proportional division :6

Theorem — With these notations, let [math]\displaystyle{ w_1, w_2, ..., w_n }[/math] be weights whose sum is 1, assume that the point [math]\displaystyle{ w:=(w_1, w_2, ..., w_n) }[/math] is an interior point of the (n-1)-dimensional simplex with coordinates pairwise different, and assume that the value measures [math]\displaystyle{ V_1, ..., V_n }[/math] are normalized such that each partner values the entire cake as exactly 1 (i.e. they are non-atomic probability measures). If at least two of the measures [math]\displaystyle{ V_i, V_j }[/math] are not equal ( [math]\displaystyle{ V_i\neq V_j }[/math]), then super-proportional divisions exist.

The hypothesis that the value measures [math]\displaystyle{ V_1, ..., V_n }[/math] are not identical is necessary. Otherwise, the sum [math]\displaystyle{ \sum_{i=1}^n V_i(X_i) =\sum_{i=1}^n V_1(X_i) \gt \sum_{i=1}^n w_i =1 }[/math] leads to a contradiction.

Namely, if all value measures are countably-additive and non-atomic, and if there are two partners [math]\displaystyle{ i,j }[/math] such that [math]\displaystyle{ V_i\neq V_j }[/math], then a super-proportional division exists.I.e, the necessary condition is also sufficient.

Sketch of Proof

Suppose w.l.o.g. that [math]\displaystyle{ V_1 \neq V_2 }[/math]. Then there is some piece of the cake, [math]\displaystyle{ Z\subseteq U }[/math], such that [math]\displaystyle{ V_1(Z)\gt V_2(Z) }[/math]. Let [math]\displaystyle{ \overline{Z} }[/math] be the complement of [math]\displaystyle{ Z }[/math]; then [math]\displaystyle{ V_2(\overline{Z})\gt V_1(\overline{Z}) }[/math]. This means that [math]\displaystyle{ V_1(Z) + V_2(\overline{Z}) \gt 1 }[/math]. However, [math]\displaystyle{ w_1+w_2\leq 1 }[/math]. Hence, either [math]\displaystyle{ V_1(Z)\gt w_1 }[/math] or [math]\displaystyle{ V_2(\overline{Z})\gt w_2 }[/math]. Suppose w.l.o.g. that [math]\displaystyle{ V_1(Z)\gt V_2(Z) }[/math] and [math]\displaystyle{ V_1(Z)\gt w_1 }[/math] are true.

Define the following partitions:

  • [math]\displaystyle{ X^1 }[/math]: the partition that gives [math]\displaystyle{ Z }[/math] to partner 1, [math]\displaystyle{ \overline{Z} }[/math] to partner 2, and nothing to all others.
  • [math]\displaystyle{ X^i }[/math] (for [math]\displaystyle{ i\geq 2 }[/math]): the partition that gives the entire cake to partner [math]\displaystyle{ i }[/math] and nothing to all others.

Here, we are interested only in the diagonals of the matrices [math]\displaystyle{ M_{X^j} }[/math], which represent the valuations of the partners to their own pieces:

  • In [math]\displaystyle{ \textrm{diag}(M_{X^1}) }[/math], entry 1 is [math]\displaystyle{ V_1(Z) }[/math], entry 2 is [math]\displaystyle{ V_2(\overline{Z}) }[/math], and the other entries are 0.
  • In [math]\displaystyle{ \textrm{diag}(M_{X^i}) }[/math] (for [math]\displaystyle{ i\geq 2 }[/math]), entry [math]\displaystyle{ i }[/math] is 1 and the other entires are 0.

By convexity, for every set of weights [math]\displaystyle{ z_1, z_2, ..., z_n }[/math] there is a partition [math]\displaystyle{ X }[/math] such that:

[math]\displaystyle{ M_X = \sum_{j=1}^n {z_j\cdot M_{X^j}}. }[/math]

It is possible to select the weights [math]\displaystyle{ z_i }[/math] such that, in the diagonal of [math]\displaystyle{ M_X }[/math], the entries are in the same ratios as the weights [math]\displaystyle{ w_i }[/math]. Since we assumed that [math]\displaystyle{ V_1(Z)\gt w_1 }[/math], it is possible to prove that [math]\displaystyle{ \forall i \in 1\dots n: V_i(X_i) \gt w_i }[/math], so [math]\displaystyle{ X }[/math] is a super-proportional division.

Utilitarian-optimal division

A cake partition [math]\displaystyle{ X }[/math] to n pieces (one piece per partner) is called utilitarian-optimal if it maximizes the sum of values. I.e, it maximizes:

[math]\displaystyle{ \sum_{i=1}^n{V_i(X_i)} }[/math]

Utilitarian-optimal divisions do not always exist. For example, suppose [math]\displaystyle{ U }[/math] is the set of positive integers. There are two partners. Both value the entire set [math]\displaystyle{ U }[/math] as 1. Partner 1 assigns a positive value to every integer and partner 2 assigns zero value to every finite subset. From a utilitarian point of view, it is best to give partner 1 a large finite subset and give the remainder to partner 2. When the set given to partner 1 becomes larger and larger, the sum-of-values becomes closer and closer to 2, but it never approaches 2. So there is no utilitarian-optimal division.

The problem with the above example is that the value measure of partner 2 is finitely-additive but not countably-additive.

The compactness part of the DS theorem immediately implies that:[1]:7

If all value measures are countably-additive and nonatomic,
then a utilitarian-optimal division exists.

In this special case, non-atomicity is not required: if all value measures are countably-additive, then a utilitarian-optimal partition exists.[1]:7

Leximin-optimal division

A cake partition [math]\displaystyle{ X }[/math] to n pieces (one piece per partner) is called leximin-optimal with weights [math]\displaystyle{ w_1, w_2, ..., w_n }[/math] if it maximizes the lexicographically-ordered vector of relative values. I.e, it maximizes the following vector:

[math]\displaystyle{ {V_1(X_1) \over w_1}, {V_2(X_2) \over w_2}, \dots , {V_n(X_n) \over w_n} }[/math]

where the partners are indexed such that:

[math]\displaystyle{ {V_1(X_1) \over w_1} \leq {V_2(X_2) \over w_2} \leq \dots \leq {V_n(X_n) \over w_n} }[/math]

A leximin-optimal partition maximizes the value of the poorest partner (relative to his weight); subject to that, it maximizes the value of the next-poorest partner (relative to his weight); etc.

The compactness part of the DS theorem immediately implies that:[1]:8

If all value measures are countably-additive and nonatomic,
then a leximin-optimal division exists.

Further developments

  • The leximin-optimality criterion, introduced by Dubins and Spanier, has been studied extensively later. In particular, in the problem of cake-cutting, it was studied by Marco Dall'Aglio.[3]

See also

References

  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 Dubins, Lester Eli; Spanier, Edwin Henry (1961). "How to Cut a Cake Fairly". The American Mathematical Monthly 68 (1): 1–17. doi:10.2307/2311357. 
  2. Dvoretzky, A.; Wald, A.; Wolfowitz, J. (1951). "Relations among certain ranges of vector measures". Pacific Journal of Mathematics 1: 59–74. doi:10.2140/pjm.1951.1.59. 
  3. Dall'Aglio, Marco (2001). "The Dubins–Spanier optimization problem in fair division theory". Journal of Computational and Applied Mathematics 130 (1–2): 17–40. doi:10.1016/S0377-0427(99)00393-3. Bibcode2001JCoAM.130...17D. 
  4. Neyman, J (1946). "Un théorèm dʼexistence". C. R. Acad. Sci. 222: 843–845.