Philosophy:Alief (mental state)

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In philosophy and psychology, an alief is an automatic or habitual belief-like attitude, particularly one that is in tension with a person's explicit beliefs.[1] For example, a person standing on a transparent balcony may believe that they are safe, but alieve that they are in danger. A person watching a sad movie may believe that the characters are completely fictional, but their aliefs may lead them to cry nonetheless. A person who is hesitant to eat fudge that has been formed into the shape of feces, or who exhibits reluctance in drinking from a sterilized bedpan may believe that the substances are safe to eat and drink, but may alieve that they are not.

The term alief was introduced by Tamar Gendler, a professor of philosophy and cognitive science at Yale University, in a pair of influential articles published in 2008.[2] Since the publication of these original articles, the notion of alief has been utilized by Gendler and others — including Paul Bloom[3] and Daniel Dennett[4] — to explain a range of psychological phenomena in addition to those listed above, including the pleasure of stories,[3] the persistence of positive illusions,[4] certain religious beliefs,[5] and certain psychiatric disturbances, such as phobias and obsessive–compulsive disorder.[4]

References

  1. Tamar Szabó Gendler, Alief and Belief. PhilPapers. 2009-01-27. doi:10.5840/jphil20081051025. http://philpapers.org/rec/GENAAB. Retrieved 2010-06-01. 
  2. "Philosopher's Annual". Philosophersannual.org. http://www.philosophersannual.org/. Retrieved 2010-05-27. 
  3. 3.0 3.1 Bloom, Paul (2011). How Pleasure Works: The New Science of Why We Like What We Like. W. W. Norton & Co. ISBN 978-0393340006. 
  4. 4.0 4.1 4.2 T. McKay, Ryan; Dennett, Daniel (2009). "The Evolution of Misbelief". Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6): 493–510. doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990975. PMID 20105353. https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/28933/11/evolution_of_misbelief.pdf. 
  5. K. Mitch Hodge (2011). "On Imagining the Afterlife". Journal of Cognition and Culture 11 (3–4): 367–389. doi:10.1163/156853711X591305. 

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