Social:Biological Threat Reduction

Biological Threat Reduction (BTR) is an arm of the Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, an initiative housed within the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The Soviet Union developed "the world's largest biological weapons program, employing an estimated 60,000 people at more than 50 sites," In the wake of the deconstruction of the USSR after 1991, these people needed to be retrained and the facilities needed to be decommissioned. Prior to the Obama administration, the program addressed key aspects of the US effort to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons from the ex-Soviet nations, because "Many activities have facilitated professional ties among important specialists... and have enhanced the containment of biological materials, technologies, equipment, and expertise that, if misused, could result in serious biological threats." Obama involved the World Health Organization in a novel program called CTR2.0 and in 2014 the Russians chose not to renew the Nunn-Lugar agreement, which had a 20-year term when it was originally signed.

The program was split into four departments:

• Biological Infrastructure Elimination
• Biosafety/Biosecurity, which housed the Threat Agent Detection and Response (TADR) network
• Cooperative Biological Research, with research laboratory upgrades and research projects
• Program Administration with contractor-led Threat Reduction Support Centers: the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow (which was relocated to Kazakhstan in 2015) and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU), based in Kiev.

History

The BTR program was started in 1992 and in the 15 years to 2007, and carried out activities in Russia , Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine . The US government spent more than $430 million from Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 through FY2007. The outlays for this program prior to FY1998 were inconsequential.

In 2010, Black & Veatch commissioned Ukraine's first Bio-Safety Level 3 laboratory. This was the first BSL-3 laboratory commissioned for the DTRA. Constructed under the Biological Threat Reduction Integrating Contracts program "to renovate a decades-old facility into a state-of-the-art diagnostics laboratory that will become the nexus of Ukraine’s biosurveillance network... Ukrainian personnel in molecular diagnostics, biosafety, operations and maintenance, and laboratory management techniques" were trained over three years from 2010 to "provide Ukrainian scientists with the necessary resources to manage the BSL-3 laboratory and the Ukrainian biosurveillance system."

In October 2012, the second Putin administration declared that Russia would not extend the Nunn-Lugar agreement without changes in the text, and the program was terminated on 16 December 2014 while John Kerry was Secretary of State amid disagreements over the March 2014 Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. This split led to the removal to Nur-Sultan of the ISTC, which formerly was housed in Moscow.

The Department of Defense's (DOD's) biological threat reduction program accounted for nearly 60% in the FY2016 budget request. It grew from a program focused on dismantling the vast biological weapons complex in Russia in the pre-Obama era into a tool used to promote “best practices” at biological laboratories with dangerous pathogens and to develop disease surveillance systems on several continents, particularly Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.

Over the years, the wider Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) effort (of which the BTR is part) shifted from an emergency response to impending chaos in the USSR to a broader program seeking to keep weapons away from rogue nations or terrorist groups. It has also grown from a DOD-centered effort to include projects funded not only by the DOD but also the US State Department, the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Together, these agencies sought nearly $1.67 billion for these programs in FY2016. Although initially focused on the former USSR, these programs now seek to engage partners around the world.

Synopsis

Under CTR 1.0

The Soviet weapons complex developed a broad range of biological pathogens for use against plants, animals, and humans. Russia reportedly continued to pursue research and development of biological agents in the 1990s, even as the security systems and supporting infrastructure at its facilities began to deteriorate. The US began to provide Russia with CTR assistance to improve safety and security at its biological weapons sites and to help employ biological weapons scientists during the late 1990s, even though Russia has not provided a complete inventory of the sites or people involved in biological weapons work.

The CTR program supported at least four separate BTR programs, working at dozens of sites that include many weapons facilities. Through the Biological Weapons Infrastructure Elimination program (BWIE), the US helped Russia eliminate the infrastructure and equipment at those Biological Research and Production Centers (BRPCs) that have the capability to produce biological weapons (BW), such as the Vector Institute in Koltsovo, Novosibirsk Oblast and the Biokombinat lab in Georgia. Through the Biosecurity and Biosafety program, the US helped to enhance safety and security at these centers to ensure the safe and secure storage and handling of biological pathogens. This program has been combined with the BW Threat Agent Detection and Response program, which seeks to develop modern surveillance, warning, and response networks and to help secure Russia’s central storage facilities for BW pathogens. Finally, through the Cooperative Biodefense Research program, the US and Russia are using cooperative research projects to increase transparency and discourage the “leakage” of Russian biological weapons knowledge to other nations. Each of these programs is implemented through the International Science and Technology Centers, because DOD has been unable to conclude implementing agreements with the relevant ministries in Russia.

The BTR program also supports activities in other former Soviet states, including Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. DOD is also negotiating an agreement to begin work in Armenia. For example, CTR funding helped destroy the huge biological weapons production facility in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan: the Stepnogorsk Scientific and Technical Institute for Microbiology.

The potential proliferation of biological weapons poses one of the key challenges for US nonproliferation assistance to Russia. According to the General Accounting Office, progress in gaining Russia’s cooperation and implementing these projects has been very slow. The United States has found it particularly difficult to gain access to four key military facilities. The problem is further aggravated by the fact that Russia is reducing the size of its complex, leaving many scientists potentially unemployed or underemployed. In addition, biological pathogens are small and easily transported, further increasing the proliferation risk.

Between FY1997 and FY2011, DOD appropriated around $1.1 billion for these projects, with significant increases in the amount of both the request and the appropriation in recent years. The Bush Administration requested $54.2 million for these programs in FY2004. Congress approved this amount but attached some restrictions to the funding. In its version of the FY2004 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1588), the House had sought to prohibit funding cooperative research at any site in the Soviet Union until the Secretary of Defense could certify that the site did not house any prohibited biological weapons research, until the facility had conducted an assessment of its vulnerability to the loss or theft of pathogens and until it had begun to implement measures to reduce its vulnerability to the loss or theft of biological agents. The conference committee modified this measure, stating that CTR could not fund cooperative research at a facility until the Secretary of Defense determines that no prohibited research occurs at the facility and until the facility plans to implement appropriate security measures. It also permitted the use of up to 25% of the funds authorized for the project to be expended on making these determinations.

The Bush II Administration requested, and Congress authorized, a similar amount—$55 million— for biological weapons proliferation prevention in FY2005. However, within this total, the Administration shifted funding away from Cooperative Biodefense Research projects, reducing this area from $36.6 million in FY2004 to $13.1 million in FY2005, towards bio-security and bio- safety efforts. This shift reflected, in part, the congressional concerns with possible U.S. support for ongoing Russian biological weapons programs. It also derived from the Administration’s plans to expand U.S. bio-safety and bio-security assistance into facilities in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and Georgia. The Bush II Administration requested, and Congress approved, an additional $60.8 million for BW proliferation prevention in FY2006. It requested an additional $68.4 million for FY2007, and the 109th Congress approved this request in the FY2007 Defense Authorization Bill. This legislation also mandated that the National Academy of Sciences pursue a study that would analyze the challenges and identify opportunities for further cooperation between Russian and the United States on biological weapons proliferation prevention.

The Bush Administration requested $144.5 million for Biological Weapons Threat Reduction programs in FY2008, with the funding split between Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Threat Agent Detection and Response ($125.75 million) and Cooperative Biological Research ($18.75 million). This request represents a significant expansion in U.S. biological weapons nonproliferation assistance for the Soviet Union and reflects growing concerns about the threat of biological weapons proliferation. But some believe this increase may not be sufficient. Senator Richard Lugar sought to add $100 million for the CTR program in FY2008, with the express purpose of expanding and accelerating biological weapons nonproliferation programs. The Senate reduced this amount but still added $50 million to the program for FY2008. According to the Senate Armed Services Committee Report on the bill (S.Rept. 110-77), this funding would support programs throughout the former Soviet Union and accelerate high-priority efforts. The committee also requested that the National Academy of Sciences prepare a report on how the United States might cooperate with other nations in preventing the proliferation of biological weapons. The conference committee (H.Rept. 110-477) authorized $158.5 million for this program area and retained the request for a study by the National Academy of Sciences. The Bush Administration further increased the request for BWTR program in FY2009 to $184.5 million. As in FY2008, these funds were split between Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Threat Agent Detection and Response ($160 million) and Cooperative Biological Research ($24.4 million). Congress authorized this request for FY2009.

The Obama Administration requested $152 million for BTR in FY2010. Within this request, the Biosafety, Biosecurity, and Threat Agent Detection and Response program would receive $133.3 million, a reduction from its FY2009 appropriation of $174.3 million, and Cooperative Biological Research projects would receive $26.5 million, an increase over its appropriated level of $18.8 million in FY2009. Congress authorized the requested amount. At the same time, House Armed Services, in its report on the FY2010 Defense Authorization Bill (H.Rept. 111-166) called on DOD continue its efforts to strengthen the biological threat reduction programs and to pursue more interagency coordination. In addition, in recognition of the fact that biological weapons proliferation prevention has consumed a growing proportion of the CTR budget, the HASC encouraged DOD “to maintain a strong focus on ... other threat reduction challenges, including preventing the proliferation of chemical and nuclear weapons and weapons-related materials, technologies, and expertise.”

For FY2011, the Obama Administration requested $209 million for Biological Threat reduction, with $184.7 million allocated to Biosafety, Biosecuirty and Threat Agent Detection and Response, and $24 million allocated to Cooperative Biological Research. Congress approved this request in the FY2011 Defense Authorization Act and the continuing resolution for FY2011 appropriations. The Obama Administration has requested $259.5 million for this effort in FY2012.

Under CTR 2.0

The US Department of State launched its own global biosecurity engagement program (subsequently designated the Biosecurity Engagement Program or BEP) in 2006. Simultaneously, the International Health Regulations (2005) "to build their capacities to detect, assess, and report emerging infectious disease outbreaks, and to provide assistance as needed to respond with healthcare and public health control measures." A National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report entitled "Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction", was released in 2009 and the programmatic modifications described in the report necessary to address the changing international security environment in the future were described as “CTR 2.0.” So the Obama Administration broadened the BTR programme that was originally meant to reduce threats posed by the Soviet dissolution, and allowed the World Health Organization to become involved in the so-called "Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework".

Further geographical expansion of engagements occurred under the Obama administration, largely through the BTR program, and expansion occurred through a shift in emphasis to increasing security by strengthening detection/diagnostic and disease surveillance capabilities. DTRA, working primarily in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, placed a new emphasis on university-to-university collaborations by soliciting collaborative research proposals from U.S. and partner-country academic institutions. Program leadership added influenza to the list of threat agents authorized for collaboration, because of the security consequences of a major pandemic and the global concern about the potential consequences of such an event, and greatly increased its efforts in global disease surveillance. From a functional perspective, Congress provided DOD with co-mingling authority, requested in the 2009 NAS report, which allowed the CTR Program to accept funding contributions from "appropriate" outside organizations and foreign governments. The CTR 2.0 program was given limited notwithstanding authority by allowing the use of funds regardless of the restraints of any other law.