View source for Philosophy:List of cognitive biases

{{short description|Systematic patterns of deviation from norm or rationality in judgment}}{{For|common errors in [[Logic|logic]]|List of fallacies}}
[[Philosophy:Cognitive bias|Cognitive bias]]es are systematic patterns of deviation from norm and/or rationality in judgment. They are often studied in [[Social:Psychology|psychology]], sociology and [[Finance:Behavioral economics|behavioral economics]].<ref>{{cite book| vauthors = Haselton MG, Nettle D, Andrews PW | chapter =The evolution of cognitive bias|year=2005|publisher= John Wiley & Sons Inc | location = Hoboken, NJ | veditors = Buss DM | title = The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology|pages=724–746| chapter-url=http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/comm/haselton/papers/downloads/handbookevpsych.pdf}}</ref>

Although the reality of most of these biases is confirmed by reproducible research,<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.psychologicalscience.org/tag/cognitive-bias|title=Cognitive Bias – Association for Psychological Science|website=www.psychologicalscience.org|language=en-US|access-date=2018-10-10}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| vauthors = Thomas O |date=2018-01-19|title=Two decades of cognitive bias research in entrepreneurship: What do we know and where do we go from here?|journal=Management Review Quarterly|language=en|volume=68|issue=2|pages=107–143|doi=10.1007/s11301-018-0135-9|s2cid=148611312 |issn=2198-1620}}</ref> there are often controversies about how to classify these biases or how to explain them.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Dougherty MR, Gettys CF, Ogden EE |year=1999 |title=MINERVA-DM: A memory processes model for judgments of likelihood |url=http://www.bsos.umd.edu/psyc/dougherty/PDF%20articles/Dougherty,Gettys&Ogden,1999.pdf|journal=Psychological Review |volume=106 |issue=1|pages=180–209 |doi=10.1037/0033-295x.106.1.180}}</ref> Several [[Philosophy:Cognitive bias#Common theoretical causes of some cognitive biases|theoretical causes are known for some cognitive biases]], which provides a classification of biases by their common generative mechanism (such as noisy information-processing<ref name="HilbertPsychBul">{{cite journal | vauthors = Hilbert M | title = Toward a synthesis of cognitive biases: how noisy information processing can bias human decision making | journal = Psychological Bulletin | volume = 138 | issue = 2 | pages = 211–37 | date = March 2012 | pmid = 22122235 | doi = 10.1037/a0025940 | url = http://psycnet.apa.org/psycinfo/2011-27261-001 }}</ref>). Gerd Gigerenzer has criticized the framing of cognitive biases as errors in judgment, and favors interpreting them as arising from rational deviations from logical thought.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Gigerenzer G |chapter=Bounded and Rational | veditors = Stainton RJ |title=Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science |publisher=Blackwell |year=2006 |page=129 |isbn=978-1405113045 }}</ref>

Explanations include information-processing rules (i.e., mental shortcuts), called ''[[Philosophy:Heuristics in judgment and decision-making|heuristics]]'', that the brain uses to produce [[Decision-making|decisions]] or judgments. Biases have a variety of forms and appear as cognitive ("cold") bias, such as mental noise,<ref name="HilbertPsychBul"/> or motivational ("hot") bias, such as when beliefs are distorted by [[Philosophy:Wishful thinking|wishful thinking]]. Both effects can be present at the same time.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = MacCoun RJ | title = Biases in the interpretation and use of research results | journal = Annual Review of Psychology | volume = 49 | issue = 1 | pages = 259–287 | year = 1998 | pmid = 15012470 | doi = 10.1146/annurev.psych.49.1.259 | url = http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~maccoun/MacCoun_AnnualReview98.pdf }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Nickerson RS | year=1998|title=Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises |journal=Review of General Psychology |volume=2 |issue=2 |pages=175–220 [198] |doi=10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175 |s2cid=8508954 |url= http://psy2.ucsd.edu/~mckenzie/nickersonConfirmationBias.pdf }}</ref>

There are also controversies over some of these biases as to whether they count as useless or [[Irrationality|irrational]], or whether they result in useful attitudes or behavior. For example, when getting to know others, people tend to ask [[Social:Leading question|leading question]]s which seem biased towards confirming their assumptions about the person. However, this kind of [[Confirmation bias|confirmation bias]] has also been argued to be an example of [[Philosophy:Social skills|social skill]]; a way to establish a connection with the other person.<ref name="dardenne">{{cite journal | vauthors = Dardenne B, Leyens JP |title=Confirmation Bias as a Social Skill |journal=Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin|year=1995 |volume=21 |issue=11 |pages=1229–1239 |doi=10.1177/01461672952111011 |s2cid=146709087 |url=http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/handle/2268/28639 }}</ref>

Although this research overwhelmingly involves human subjects, some findings that demonstrate bias have been found in non-human animals as well. For example, [[Philosophy:Loss aversion|loss aversion]] has been shown in monkeys and [[Philosophy:Hyperbolic discounting|hyperbolic discounting]] has been observed in rats, pigeons, and monkeys.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Alexander WH, Brown JW | title = Hyperbolically discounted temporal difference learning | journal = Neural Computation | volume = 22 | issue = 6 | pages = 1511–1527 | date = June 2010 | pmid = 20100071 | pmc = 3005720 | doi = 10.1162/neco.2010.08-09-1080 }}</ref>

==Belief, decision-making and behavioral==
These biases affect belief formation, reasoning processes, business and economic decisions, and human behavior in general.

=== Anchoring bias ===
{{Main|Philosophy:Anchoring (cognitive bias)}}
The anchoring bias, or focalism, is the tendency to rely too heavily—to "anchor"—on one trait or piece of information when making decisions (usually the first piece of information acquired on that subject).<ref>{{cite conference |url=http://www.aaai.org/Papers/Symposia/Fall/2007/FS-07-04/FS07-04-017.pdf |title=A Preliminary Research on Modeling Cognitive Agents for Social Environments in Multi-Agent Systems |conference=2007 AAAI Fall Symposium: Emergent agents and socialities: Social and organizational aspects of intelligence |website=Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence |vauthors=Zhang Y, Lewis M, Pellon M, Coleman P |pages=116–123|year=2007}}</ref><ref name="iverson2008" />
Anchoring bias includes or involves the following: 
* [[Common source bias]], the tendency to combine or compare research studies from the same source, or from sources that use the same methodologies or data.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Kim M, Daniel JL |date=2020-01-02 |title=Common Source Bias, Key Informants, and Survey-Administrative Linked Data for Nonprofit Management Research |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/15309576.2019.1657915 |journal=Public Performance & Management Review |volume=43 |issue=1 |pages=232–256 |doi=10.1080/15309576.2019.1657915 |issn=1530-9576 |url-access=subscription |access-date=23 June 2021 |s2cid=203468837}}</ref>
* [[Conservatism (belief revision)|Conservatism bias]], the tendency to insufficiently [[Belief revision|revise one's belief]] when presented with new evidence.<ref name="HilbertPsychBul" /><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = DuCharme WW |year=1970 |title=Response bias explanation of conservative human inference |journal=Journal of Experimental Psychology |volume=85 |issue=1|pages=66–74 |doi=10.1037/h0029546|hdl=2060/19700009379 |hdl-access=free }}</ref><ref name="edwards1968">{{cite book| vauthors = Edwards W |year=1968|chapter=Conservatism in human information processing| veditors = Kleinmuntz B |title=Formal representation of human judgment|pages=17–52|location=New York|publisher=Wiley}}</ref>
* [[Functional fixedness]], a tendency limiting a person to using an object only in the way it is traditionally used.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://psychologenie.com/what-does-functional-fixedness-mean-in-psychology|title=The Psychology Guide: What Does Functional Fixedness Mean?|work=PsycholoGenie|access-date=2018-10-10|language=en-US}}</ref>
* [[Law of the instrument]], an over-reliance on a familiar tool or methods, ignoring or under-valuing alternative approaches. "If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail."

=== Apophenia ===
{{Main|Apophenia}}
The tendency to perceive meaningful connections between unrelated things.<ref name=skepdic>{{cite web|title=apophenia| vauthors = Carroll RT |url=http://skepdic.com/apophenia.html|website=The Skeptic's Dictionary|access-date=17 July 2017}}</ref>
The following are types of apophenia: 
* [[Clustering illusion]], the tendency to overestimate the importance of small runs, streaks, or clusters in large samples of random data (that is, seeing phantom patterns).<ref name="iverson2008">{{cite book| veditors = Heilbronner RL | vauthors = Iverson GL, Brooks BL, Holdnack JA |chapter=Misdiagnosis of Cognitive Impairment in Forensic Neuropsychology|title=Neuropsychology in the Courtroom: Expert Analysis of Reports and Testimony|year=2008|publisher=Guilford Press|location=New York|isbn=978-1593856342|page=248}}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Illusory correlation|Illusory correlation]], a tendency to inaccurately perceive a relationship between two unrelated events.<ref name="h_and_b">{{cite journal | vauthors = Tversky A, Kahneman D | title = Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases | journal = Science | volume = 185 | issue = 4157 | pages = 1124–1131 | date = September 1974 | pmid = 17835457 | doi = 10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 | bibcode = 1974Sci...185.1124T | s2cid = 143452957 }}</ref><ref name="ReferenceB">{{cite journal | vauthors = Fiedler K |year=1991 |title=The tricky nature of skewed frequency tables: An information loss account of distinctiveness-based illusory correlations |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology |volume=60 |issue=1 |pages=24–36 |doi=10.1037/0022-3514.60.1.24}}</ref>
* [[Physics:Pareidolia|Pareidolia]], a tendency to perceive a vague and random stimulus (often an image or sound) as significant, e.g., seeing images of animals or faces in clouds, the man in the Moon, and hearing non-existent [[Philosophy:Hidden message|hidden message]]s on [[Philosophy:Backmasking|records played in reverse]].

=== Availability heuristic ===
{{Main|Availability heuristic}}
The availability heuristic (also known as the availability bias) is the tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events with greater "availability" in memory, which can be influenced by how recent the memories are or how unusual or emotionally charged they may be.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Schwarz N, Bless H, Strack F, Klumpp G, Rittenauer-Schatka H, Simons A |date=1991 |title=Ease of Retrieval as Information: Another Look at the Availability Heuristic |journal=Journal of Personality and Social Psychology |doi=10.1037/0022-3514.61.2.195 |volume=61 |issue=2 |pages=195–202 |url=http://osil.psy.ua.edu:16080/~Rosanna/Soc_Inf/week4/availability.pdf |access-date=19 Oct 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140209175640/http://osil.psy.ua.edu:16080/~Rosanna/Soc_Inf/week4/availability.pdf|archive-date=9 February 2014|url-status=dead}}</ref> The availability heuristic includes or involves the following: 
* Anthropocentric thinking, the tendency to use human analogies as a basis for reasoning about other, less familiar, biological phenomena.<ref name="Coley2012">{{cite journal|vauthors=Coley JD, Tanner KD|date=2012|title=Common origins of diverse misconceptions: cognitive principles and the development of biology thinking|journal=CBE: Life Sciences Education|volume=11|issue=3|pages=209–215|doi=10.1187/cbe.12-06-0074|pmc=3433289|pmid=22949417}}</ref>
* Anthropomorphism is characterization of animals, objects, and abstract concepts as possessing human traits, emotions, or intentions.<ref>{{cite web|title=The Real Reason We Dress Pets Like People|url=http://www.livescience.com/6141-real-reason-dress-pets-people.html|access-date=2015-11-16|website=Live Science|date=3 March 2010}}</ref> The opposite bias, of not attributing feelings or thoughts to another person, is [[Social:Dehumanization|dehumanised perception]],<ref>{{cite journal|vauthors=Harris LT, Fiske ST|date=January 2011|title=Dehumanized Perception: A Psychological Means to Facilitate Atrocities, Torture, and Genocide?|journal=Zeitschrift für Psychologie|volume=219|issue=3|pages=175–181|doi=10.1027/2151-2604/a000065|pmc=3915417|pmid=24511459}}</ref> a type of [[Philosophy:Objectification|objectification]].
* [[Philosophy:Attentional bias|Attentional bias]], the tendency of perception to be affected by recurring thoughts.<ref name="pmid17201568">{{cite journal | vauthors = Bar-Haim Y, Lamy D, Pergamin L, Bakermans-Kranenburg MJ, van IJzendoorn MH | title = Threat-related attentional bias in anxious and nonanxious individuals: a meta-analytic study | journal = Psychological Bulletin | volume = 133 | issue = 1 | pages = 1–24 | date = January 2007 | pmid = 17201568 | doi = 10.1037/0033-2909.133.1.1 | s2cid = 2861872 | url=https://people.socsci.tau.ac.il/mu/dominiquelamy/files/2014/08/Bar-Haim_et_2007.pdf }}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Frequency illusion|Frequency illusion]] or Baader–Meinhof phenomenon. The frequency illusion is that once something has been noticed then every instance of that thing is noticed, leading to the belief it has a high frequency of occurrence (a form of [[Selection bias|selection bias]]).<ref name="zwicky">{{cite web |url=http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/~myl/languagelog/archives/002386.html | vauthors = Zwicky A |title=Just Between Dr. Language and I |work=Language Log |date=2005-08-07}}</ref> The Baader–Meinhof phenomenon is the illusion where something that has recently come to one's attention suddenly seems to appear with improbable frequency shortly afterwards.<ref>{{Cite web | vauthors = Bellows A |date=March 2006 |title=The Baader-Meinhof Phenomenon |url=https://www.damninteresting.com/the-baader-meinhof-phenomenon/ |access-date=2020-02-16 |website=Damn Interesting |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | vauthors = Kershner K |date=20 March 2015 |title=What's the Baader-Meinhof phenomenon? |url=https://science.howstuffworks.com/life/inside-the-mind/human-brain/baader-meinhof-phenomenon.htm |access-date=15 April 2018 |website=howstuffworks.com}}</ref> It was named after an incidence of frequency illusion in which the Baader–Meinhof Group was mentioned.<ref>{{cite web |title=The Baader-Meinhof Phenomenon? Or: The Joy Of Juxtaposition? |url=https://www.twincities.com/2007/02/23/the-baader-meinhof-phenomenon-or-the-joy-of-juxtaposition-responsorial-23-23-23-23-23-23-23-23-23-23-23-23-23-23-23-23-23-23-23-23-23-23-23/ |website=twincities.com |date=23 February 2007 |publisher=St. Paul Pioneer Press |access-date=October 20, 2020 |quote=As you might guess, the phenomenon is named after an incident in which I was talking to a friend about the Baader-Meinhof gang (and this was many years after they were in the news). The next day, my friend phoned me and referred me to an article in that day's newspaper in which the Baader-Meinhof gang was mentioned.}}</ref>
* Implicit association, where the speed with which people can match words depends on how closely they are associated.
* Salience bias, the tendency to focus on items that are more prominent or emotionally striking and ignore those that are unremarkable, even though this difference is often irrelevant by objective standards. See also [[Philosophy:Von Restorff effect|von Restorff effect]].
* [[Selection bias]], which happens when the members of a [[Sample (statistics)|statistical sample]] are not chosen completely at random, which leads to the sample not being representative of the population.
* [[Survivorship bias]], which is concentrating on the people or things that "survived" some process and inadvertently overlooking those that did not because of their lack of visibility.
* [[Philosophy:Well travelled road effect|Well travelled road effect]], the tendency to underestimate the duration taken to traverse oft-travelled routes and overestimate the duration taken to traverse less familiar routes.

=== Cognitive dissonance ===
{{Main|Philosophy:Cognitive dissonance}}
[[Philosophy:Cognitive dissonance|Cognitive dissonance]] is the perception of contradictory information and the mental toll of it.
* [[Philosophy:Normalcy bias|Normalcy bias]], a form of [[Philosophy:Cognitive dissonance|cognitive dissonance]], is the refusal to plan for, or react to, a disaster which has never happened before.
* Effort justification is a person's tendency to attribute greater value to an outcome if they had to put effort into achieving it. This can result in more value being applied to an outcome than it actually has. An example of this is the [[Philosophy:IKEA effect|IKEA effect]], the tendency for people to place a disproportionately high value on objects that they partially assembled themselves, such as furniture from IKEA, regardless of the quality of the end product.<ref>Michael I. Norton, Daniel Mochon, Dan Ariely (2011). [https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/11-091.pdf The "IKEA Effect": When Labor Leads to Love]. Harvard Business School</ref>
* Ben Franklin effect, where a person who has performed a favor for someone is more likely to do another favor for that person than they would be if they had ''received'' a favor from that person.<ref>{{Cite news | vauthors = Lebowitz S |date=2 December 2016 |title=Harness the power of the 'Ben Franklin Effect' to get someone to like you |work=Business Insider |url=https://www.businessinsider.in/Harness-the-power-of-the-Ben-Franklin-Effect-to-get-someone-to-like-you/articleshow/55757370.cms |access-date=2018-10-10}}</ref>

=== Confirmation bias ===
{{Main|Confirmation bias}}
Confirmation bias is the tendency to search for, interpret, focus on and remember information in a way that confirms one's preconceptions.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Oswald ME, Grosjean S |title=Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory |publisher=Psychology Press |year=2004 |isbn=978-1841693514 | veditors = Pohl RF |location=Hove, UK |pages=[https://archive.org/details/cognitiveillusio0000unse/page/79 79–96] |chapter=Confirmation Bias |oclc=55124398 |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/cognitiveillusio0000unse/page/79 |via=Internet Archive }}</ref> There are multiple other cognitive biases which involve or are types of confirmation bias: 
* Backfire effect, a tendency to react to disconfirming evidence by strengthening one's previous beliefs.<ref name="SannaSchwarz2002">{{cite journal| vauthors = Sanna LJ, Schwarz N, Stocker SL |title=When debiasing backfires: Accessible content and accessibility experiences in debiasing hindsight.|journal=Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition |volume=28|issue=3 |year=2002 |pages=497–502 |issn=0278-7393 |doi=10.1037/0278-7393.28.3.497 |pmid=12018501 |url=http://www.nifc.gov/PUBLICATIONS/acc_invest_march2010/speakers/4DebiasBackfires.pdf|citeseerx=10.1.1.387.5964}}</ref>
* [[Congruence bias]], the tendency to test hypotheses exclusively through direct testing, instead of testing possible alternative hypotheses.<ref name="iverson2008" />
* Experimenter's or expectation bias, the tendency for experimenters to believe, certify, and publish data that agree with their expectations for the outcome of an experiment, and to disbelieve, discard, or downgrade the corresponding weightings for data that appear to conflict with those expectations.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Jeng M |title=A selected history of expectation bias in physics |journal=American Journal of Physics |volume=74 |issue=7 |pages=578–583 |year=2006 |doi=10.1119/1.2186333|arxiv=physics/0508199 |bibcode=2006AmJPh..74..578J |s2cid=119491123 }}</ref>
* [[Observer-expectancy effect]], when a researcher expects a given result and therefore unconsciously manipulates an experiment or misinterprets data in order to find it (see also [[Philosophy:Subject-expectancy effect|subject-expectancy effect]]).
* [[Philosophy:Selective perception|Selective perception]], the tendency for expectations to affect perception.
* [[Philosophy:Semmelweis reflex|Semmelweis reflex]], the tendency to reject new evidence that contradicts a paradigm.<ref name="edwards1968" />

=== Egocentric bias ===
{{Main|Philosophy:Egocentric bias}}
Egocentric bias is the tendency to rely too heavily on one's own perspective and/or have a different perception of oneself relative to others.<ref>{{cite book| vauthors = Schacter DL, Gilbert DT, Wegner DM |title=Psychology|date=2011|edition=2nd|publisher=Macmillan|isbn=978-1429237192|page=254|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=emAyzTNy1cUC|language=en}}</ref> The following are forms of egocentric bias: 
* [[Philosophy:Bias blind spot|Bias blind spot]], the tendency to see oneself as less biased than other people, or to be able to identify more cognitive biases in others than in oneself.<ref name="blindspot">{{cite journal|vauthors=Pronin E, Kugler MB|date=July 2007|title=Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection illusion as a source of the bias blind spot|journal=Journal of Experimental Social Psychology |volume=43|issue=4 |pages=565–578|doi=10.1016/j.jesp.2006.05.011|issn=0022-1031}}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:False consensus effect|False consensus effect]], the tendency for people to overestimate the degree to which others agree with them.<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1037/0033-2909.102.1.72 |title=Ten years of research on the false-consensus effect: An empirical and theoretical review| vauthors = Marks G, Miller N |journal=Psychological Bulletin|volume=102 |issue=1| year=1987 |pages=72–90}}</ref>
* False uniqueness bias, the tendency of people to see their projects and themselves as more singular than they actually are.<ref>{{Cite web | url=http://psychology.iresearchnet.com/social-psychology/social-cognition/false-uniqueness-bias/ | title=False Uniqueness Bias (Social PsychologyY) – IResearchNet| date=2016-01-13}}</ref>
* Forer effect or [[Philosophy:Barnum effect|Barnum effect]], the tendency for individuals to give high accuracy ratings to descriptions of their personality that supposedly are tailored specifically for them, but are in fact vague and general enough to apply to a wide range of people. This effect can provide a partial explanation for the widespread acceptance of some beliefs and practices, such as [[Unsolved:Astrology|astrology]], fortune telling, [[Biology:Graphology|graphology]], and some types of [[Medicine:Personality test|personality test]]s.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://psych.fullerton.edu/mbirnbaum/psych101/barnum_demo.htm|title=The Barnum Demonstration|website=psych.fullerton.edu|access-date=2018-10-10}}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Illusion of asymmetric insight|Illusion of asymmetric insight]], where people perceive their knowledge of their peers to surpass their peers' knowledge of them.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Pronin E, Kruger J, Savitsky K, Ross L | title = You don't know me, but I know you: the illusion of asymmetric insight | journal = Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | volume = 81 | issue = 4 | pages = 639–656 | date = October 2001 | pmid = 11642351 | doi = 10.1037/0022-3514.81.4.639 }}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Illusion of control|Illusion of control]], the tendency to overestimate one's degree of influence over other external events.<ref>{{cite journal |title=Illusions of Control: How We Overestimate Our Personal Influence | vauthors = Thompson SC |journal=Current Directions in Psychological Science |volume=8 |issue= 6 |year=1999 |pages=187–190 |issn=0963-7214|jstor=20182602 |doi=10.1111/1467-8721.00044|s2cid=145714398 }}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Illusion of transparency|Illusion of transparency]], the tendency for people to overestimate the degree to which their personal mental state is known by others, and to overestimate how well they understand others' personal mental states.
* [[Illusion of validity]], the tendency to overestimate the accuracy of one's judgments, especially when available information is consistent or inter-correlated.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Dierkes M, Antal AB, Child J, Nonaka I |title=Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge |date=2003 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0198295822 |page=22 |url={{Google books |plainurl=yes |id=JRd7RZzzw_wC |page=22 }} |access-date=9 September 2013}}</ref>
* [[Illusory superiority]], the tendency to overestimate one's desirable qualities, and underestimate undesirable qualities, relative to other people. (Also known as "Lake Wobegon effect", "better-than-average effect", or "superiority bias".)<ref name="hoorens">{{cite journal | vauthors = Hoorens V | title=Self-enhancement and Superiority Biases in Social Comparison |journal=European Review of Social Psychology |volume=4 |issue=1 |pages=113–139 |doi=10.1080/14792779343000040 |year=1993}}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Naïve cynicism|Naïve cynicism]], expecting more egocentric bias in others than in oneself.
* [[Philosophy:Naïve realism (psychology)|Naïve realism]], the belief that we see reality as it really is—objectively and without bias; that the facts are plain for all to see; that rational people will agree with us; and that those who do not are either uninformed, lazy, irrational, or biased.
* [[Philosophy:Overconfidence effect|Overconfidence effect]], a tendency to have excessive confidence in one's own answers to questions. For example, for certain types of questions, answers that people rate as "99% certain" turn out to be wrong 40% of the time.<ref name="HilbertPsychBul" /><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Adams PA, Adams JK | title = Confidence in the recognition and reproduction of words difficult to spell | journal = The American Journal of Psychology | volume = 73 | issue = 4 | pages = 544–552 | date = December 1960 | pmid = 13681411 | doi = 10.2307/1419942 | jstor = 1419942 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |chapter=Overconfidence | veditors = Pohl R | vauthors = Hoffrage U |title=Cognitive Illusions: a handbook on fallacies and biases in thinking, judgement and memory |publisher=Psychology Press |year=2004 |isbn=978-1841693514 |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/cognitiveillusio0000unse |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/cognitiveillusio0000unse }}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Sutherland|2007 |pp=172–178}}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Planning fallacy|Planning fallacy]], the tendency for people to underestimate the time it will take them to complete a given task.<ref name="temporal" />
* [[Philosophy:Restraint bias|Restraint bias]], the tendency to overestimate one's ability to show restraint in the face of temptation.
* [[Philosophy:Trait ascription bias|Trait ascription bias]], the tendency for people to view themselves as relatively variable in terms of personality, behavior, and mood while viewing others as much more predictable.
* [[Social:Third-person effect|Third-person effect]], a tendency to believe that mass-communicated media messages have a greater effect on others than on themselves.

=== Extension neglect ===
{{Main|Philosophy:Extension neglect}}
The following are forms of extension neglect: 
* [[Base rate fallacy]] or base rate neglect, the tendency to ignore general information and focus on information only pertaining to the specific case, even when the general information is more important.<ref>{{harvnb |Baron|1994|pp=224–228}}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Compassion fade|Compassion fade]], the tendency to behave more compassionately towards a small number of identifiable victims than to a large number of anonymous ones.<ref name="comp-fade">{{cite journal | vauthors = Västfjäll D, Slovic P, Mayorga M, Peters E | title = Compassion fade: affect and charity are greatest for a single child in need | journal = PLOS ONE | volume = 9 | issue = 6 | pages = e100115 | date = 18 June 2014 | pmid = 24940738 | pmc = 4062481 | doi = 10.1371/journal.pone.0100115 | bibcode = 2014PLoSO...9j0115V | doi-access = free }}</ref>
* [[Conjunction fallacy]], the tendency to assume that specific conditions are more probable than a more general version of those same conditions.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Fisk JE |title=Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory | veditors = Pohl RF |publisher=Psychology Press |location=Hove, UK |year=2004 |chapter=Conjunction fallacy |isbn=978-1841693514 |oclc=55124398 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/cognitiveillusio0000unse/page/23 23–42] |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/cognitiveillusio0000unse/page/23 }}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Duration neglect|Duration neglect]], the neglect of the duration of an episode in determining its value.<ref>Barbara L. Fredrickson and Daniel Kahneman (1993). [http://pages.ucsd.edu/~nchristenfeld/Happiness_Readings_files/Class%209%20-%20Fredrickson%201993.pdf Duration Neglect in Retrospective Evaluations of Affective Episodes]. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 65 (1) pp. 45–55. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170808092231/http://pages.ucsd.edu/~nchristenfeld/Happiness_Readings_files/Class%209%20-%20Fredrickson%201993.pdf|date=2017-08-08}}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Hyperbolic discounting|Hyperbolic discounting]], where discounting is the tendency for people to have a stronger preference for more immediate payoffs relative to later payoffs. Hyperbolic discounting leads to choices that are inconsistent over time—people make choices today that their future selves would prefer not to have made, despite using the same reasoning.<ref name="Laibson1997QJE">{{cite journal | vauthors = Laibson D |year=1997 |title=Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting |journal=[[Finance:Quarterly Journal of Economics|Quarterly Journal of Economics]] |volume=112 |issue=2 |pages=443–477 |doi=10.1162/003355397555253|citeseerx=10.1.1.337.3544 |s2cid=763839 }}</ref> Also known as current moment bias or present bias, and related to [[Dynamic inconsistency]]. A good example of this is a study showed that when making food choices for the coming week, 74% of participants chose fruit, whereas when the food choice was for the current day, 70% chose chocolate.
* [[Philosophy:Insensitivity to sample size|Insensitivity to sample size]], the tendency to under-expect variation in small samples.
* [[Philosophy:Less-is-better effect|Less-is-better effect]], the tendency to prefer a smaller set to a larger set judged separately, but not jointly.
* [[Philosophy:Neglect of probability|Neglect of probability]], the tendency to completely disregard probability when making a decision under uncertainty.<ref>{{harvnb|Baron|1994|p=353}}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Scope neglect|Scope neglect]] or scope insensitivity, the tendency to be insensitive to the size of a problem when evaluating it. For example, being willing to pay as much to save 2,000 children or 20,000 children.
* [[Zero-risk bias]], the preference for reducing a small risk to zero over a greater reduction in a larger risk.

=== False priors ===
False priors are initial beliefs and knowledge which interfere with the unbiased evaluation of factual evidence and lead to incorrect conclusions. Biases based on false priors include: 
* Agent detection bias, the inclination to presume the purposeful intervention of a sentient or intelligent [[Philosophy:Agency|agent]].
* [[Philosophy:Automation bias|Automation bias]], the tendency to depend excessively on automated systems which can lead to erroneous automated information overriding correct decisions.<ref>{{cite book| vauthors = Goddard K, Roudsari A, Wyatt JC |title=International Perspectives in Health Informatics|date=2011|publisher=IOS Press.|series=Studies in Health Technology and Informatics|volume=164|pages=17–22|chapter=Automation Bias – A Hidden Issue for Clinical Decision Support System Use|doi=10.3233/978-1-60750-709-3-17|chapter-url={{Google books |plainurl=yes |id=NsbaN_fXRe4C |page=17}}|name-list-style=vanc|issue=International Perspectives in Health Informatics}}</ref>
* Gender bias, a widespread<ref>{{Cite report|title=Tackling social norms: a game changer for gender inequalities|url=http://hdr.undp.org/en/GSNI|series=2020 Human Development Perspectives|access-date=2020-06-10|publisher=United Nations Development Programme|type=Gender Social Norms Index}}</ref> set of implicit biases that discriminate against a gender. For example, the assumption that women are less suited to jobs requiring high intellectual ability.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Bian L, Leslie SJ, Cimpian A | title = Evidence of bias against girls and women in contexts that emphasize intellectual ability | journal = The American Psychologist | volume = 73 | issue = 9 | pages = 1139–1153 | date = December 2018 | pmid = 30525794 | doi = 10.1037/amp0000427 | doi-access = free }}</ref>{{Failed verification|date=February 2022}} Or the assumption that people or animals are male in the absence of any indicators of gender.<ref>{{Cite journal| vauthors = Hamilton MC |date=1991|title=Masculine Bias in the Attribution of Personhood: People = Male, Male = People|journal=Psychology of Women Quarterly|language=en-US|volume=15|issue=3|pages=393–402|doi=10.1111/j.1471-6402.1991.tb00415.x|s2cid=143533483|issn=0361-6843}}</ref>
* Sexual overperception bias, the tendency to overestimate sexual interest of another person in oneself, and sexual underperception bias, the tendency to underestimate it.
* Stereotyping, expecting a member of a group to have certain characteristics without having actual information about that individual.

=== Framing effect ===
{{Main|Philosophy:Framing effect (psychology)}}
The framing effect is the tendency to draw different conclusions from the same information, depending on how that information is presented. Forms of the framing effect include: 
* [[Philosophy:Contrast effect|Contrast effect]], the enhancement or reduction of a certain stimulus's perception when compared with a recently observed, contrasting object.<ref>{{harvnb|Plous|1993|pp=38–41}}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Decoy effect|Decoy effect]], where preferences for either option A or B change in favor of option B when option C is presented, which is completely dominated by option B (inferior in all respects) and partially dominated by option A.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.futurelearn.com/courses/complexity-and-uncertainty/0/steps/1882|title=Evolution and cognitive biases: the decoy effect |website=FutureLearn|language=en-GB|access-date=2018-10-10}}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Default effect|Default effect]], the tendency to favor the default option when given a choice between several options.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.influenceatwork.com/inside-influence-report/how-to-use-and-improve-actions-through-enhanced-defaults/|title=The Default Effect: How to Leverage Bias and Influence Behavior |date=2012-01-11|publisher=Influence at Work|access-date=2018-10-10|language=en-US}}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Denomination effect|Denomination effect]], the tendency to spend more money when it is denominated in small amounts (e.g., coins) rather than large amounts (e.g., bills).<ref>[https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104063298 Why We Spend Coins Faster Than Bills] by Chana Joffe-Walt. ''All Things Considered'', 12 May 2009.</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Distinction bias|Distinction bias]], the tendency to view two options as more dissimilar when evaluating them simultaneously than when evaluating them separately.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Hsee CK, Zhang J | title = Distinction bias: misprediction and mischoice due to joint evaluation | journal = Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | volume = 86 | issue = 5 | pages = 680–695 | date = May 2004 | pmid = 15161394 | doi = 10.1037/0022-3514.86.5.680 | citeseerx = 10.1.1.484.9171 }}</ref>
* Domain neglect bias, the tendency to neglect relevant domain knowledge while solving interdisciplinary problems.<ref>{{Cite journal | vauthors = Mike K, Hazzan O |date=2022 |title=What Is Common to Transportation and Health in Machine Learning Education? The Domain Neglect Bias |url=https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9941067 |journal=IEEE Transactions on Education |volume=66 |issue=3 |pages=226–233 |doi=10.1109/TE.2022.3218013 |s2cid=253402007 |issn=0018-9359}}</ref>

=== Logical fallacy ===
{{Main|Fallacy}}
* [[Berkson's paradox]], the tendency to misinterpret statistical experiments involving conditional probabilities.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://brilliant.org/wiki/berksons-paradox/|title=Berkson's Paradox {{!}} Brilliant Math & Science Wiki|website=brilliant.org|language=en-us|access-date=2018-10-10}}</ref>
* [[Escalation of commitment]], irrational escalation, or sunk cost fallacy, where people justify increased investment in a decision, based on the cumulative prior investment, despite new evidence suggesting that the decision was probably wrong.
* G. I. Joe fallacy, the tendency to think that knowing about cognitive bias is enough to overcome it.<ref>{{Citation |url=https://www.hbs.edu/ris/Publication%20Files/21-084_436ebba8-c832-4922-bb6e-49d000a77df3.pdf |title=G.I. Joe Phenomena: Understanding the Limits of Metacognitive Awareness on Debiasing | vauthors = Kristal AS, Santos LR |publisher=Harvard Business School}}</ref>
* [[Gambler's fallacy]], the tendency to think that future probabilities are altered by past events, when in reality they are unchanged. The fallacy arises from an erroneous conceptualization of the [[Law of large numbers|law of large numbers]]. For example, "I've flipped heads with this coin five times consecutively, so the chance of tails coming out on the sixth flip is much greater than heads."<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gamblersfallacy.asp|title=Gambler's Fallacy/Monte Carlo Fallacy | author = Investopedia Staff |date=2006-10-29|work=Investopedia|access-date=2018-10-10|language=en-US}}</ref>
* Hot-hand fallacy (also known as "hot hand phenomenon" or "hot hand"), the belief that a person who has experienced success with a random event has a greater chance of further success in additional attempts.
* [[Philosophy:Plan continuation bias|Plan continuation bias]], failure to recognize that the original plan of action is no longer appropriate for a changing situation or for a situation that is different from anticipated.<ref>{{Cite journal| vauthors = Tuccio W |date=2011-01-01|title=Heuristics to Improve Human Factors Performance in Aviation|journal=Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research|volume=20|issue=3|doi=10.15394/jaaer.2011.1640|issn=2329-258X|doi-access=free}}</ref>
* [[Subadditivity effect]], the tendency to judge the probability of the whole to be less than the probabilities of the parts.<ref>Baron, J. (in preparation). ''Thinking and Deciding'', 4th edition. New York: Cambridge University Press.</ref>
* [[Physics:Time-saving bias|Time-saving bias]], a tendency to underestimate the time that could be saved (or lost) when increasing (or decreasing) from a relatively low speed, and to overestimate the time that could be saved (or lost) when increasing (or decreasing) from a relatively high speed.
* [[Philosophy:Zero-sum thinking|Zero-sum bias]], where a situation is incorrectly perceived to be like a zero-sum game (i.e., one person gains at the expense of another).

=== Prospect theory ===
{{Main|Philosophy:Prospect theory}}
The following relate to prospect theory: 
* [[Philosophy:Ambiguity effect|Ambiguity effect]], the tendency to avoid options for which the probability of a favorable outcome is unknown.<ref>{{harvnb|Baron|1994|p=372}}</ref>
* [[Disposition effect]], the tendency to sell an asset that has accumulated in value and resist selling an asset that has declined in value.
* Dread aversion, just as losses yield double the emotional impact of gains, dread yields double the emotional impact of savouring.<ref>{{Cite SSRN|title=Wishful Thinking, Prudent Behavior: The Evolutionary Origin of Optimism, Loss Aversion and Disappointment Aversion| vauthors = de Meza D, Dawson C |date=January 24, 2018|ssrn = 3108432}}</ref><ref>{{cite SSRN | vauthors = Dawson C, Johnson SG | title = Dread Aversion and Economic Preferences <!-- | doi = 10.2139/ssrn.3822640 --> | ssrn = 3822640 | date = 8 April 2021 }}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Endowment effect|Endowment effect]], the tendency for people to demand much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it.<ref>{{Harv|Kahneman|Knetsch|Thaler|1991|p=193}} Richard Thaler coined the term "endowment effect."</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Loss aversion|Loss aversion]], where the perceived disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility associated with acquiring it.<ref>{{Harv|Kahneman|Knetsch|Thaler|1991|p=193}} Daniel Kahneman, together with Amos Tversky, coined the term "loss aversion."</ref> (see also Sunk cost fallacy)
* [[Philosophy:Pseudocertainty effect|Pseudocertainty effect]], the tendency to make risk-averse choices if the expected outcome is positive, but make risk-seeking choices to avoid negative outcomes.<ref>{{Harvnb |Hardman|2009|p=137}}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Status quo bias|Status quo bias]], the tendency to prefer things to stay relatively the same.<ref>{{harvnb|Kahneman|Knetsch|Thaler|1991|p=193}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Baron|1994|p=382}}</ref>
* [[System justification]], the tendency to defend and bolster the status quo. Existing social, economic, and political arrangements tend to be preferred, and alternatives disparaged, sometimes even at the expense of individual and collective self-interest.

=== Self-assessment ===
* [[Philosophy:Dunning–Kruger effect|Dunning–Kruger effect]], the tendency for unskilled individuals to overestimate their own ability and the tendency for experts to underestimate their own ability.<ref name="Unskilled and unaware of it: how di">{{cite journal | vauthors = Kruger J, Dunning D | title = Unskilled and unaware of it: how difficulties in recognizing one's own incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments | journal = Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | volume = 77 | issue = 6 | pages = 1121–1134 | date = December 1999 | pmid = 10626367 | doi = 10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1121 | citeseerx = 10.1.1.64.2655 | s2cid = 2109278 }}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Hot-cold empathy gap|Hot-cold empathy gap]], the tendency to underestimate the influence of [[Philosophy:Hot-cold empathy gap#Visceral factors|visceral drives]] on one's attitudes, preferences, and behaviors.<ref>{{cite book|doi=10.1016/B978-0-12-407188-9.00003-X | vauthors = Van Boven L, Loewenstein G, Dunning D, Nordgren LF |chapter=Changing Places: A Dual Judgment Model of Empathy Gaps in Emotional Perspective Taking|volume=48 | veditors = Zanna MP, Olson JM |title=Advances in Experimental Social Psychology|year=2013|isbn=978-0124071889|pages=117–171 |publisher= Academic Press |chapter-url=http://psych.colorado.edu/~vanboven/VanBoven/Publications_files/VanBovenAdvancesVol48.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160528200926/http://psych.colorado.edu/~vanboven/VanBoven/Publications_files/VanBovenAdvancesVol48.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=2016-05-28}}</ref>
* [[Hard–easy effect]], the tendency to overestimate one's ability to accomplish hard tasks, and underestimate one's ability to accomplish easy tasks.<ref name="HilbertPsychBul" /><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Lichtenstein S, Fischhoff B | year = 1977 | title = Do those who know more also know more about how much they know? | journal = Organizational Behavior and Human Performance | volume = 20 | issue = 2| pages = 159–183 | doi = 10.1016/0030-5073(77)90001-0 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Merkle EC | title = The disutility of the hard-easy effect in choice confidence | journal = Psychonomic Bulletin & Review | volume = 16 | issue = 1 | pages = 204–213 | date = February 2009 | pmid = 19145033 | doi = 10.3758/PBR.16.1.204 | doi-access = free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Juslin P, Winman A, Olsson H | title = Naive empiricism and dogmatism in confidence research: a critical examination of the hard-easy effect | journal = Psychological Review | volume = 107 | issue = 2 | pages = 384–396 | date = April 2000 | pmid = 10789203 | doi = 10.1037/0033-295x.107.2.384 }}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Illusion of explanatory depth|Illusion of explanatory depth]], the tendency to believe that one understands a topic much better than one actually does.<ref name="Edge2017">{{cite web | title=2017 : What scientific term or concept ought to be more widely known? | vauthors = Waytz A | website=Edge.org | date=26 January 2022 | url=https://www.edge.org/response-detail/27117 | access-date=26 January 2022}}</ref><ref name="Rozenblit2002"/> The effect is strongest for explanatory knowledge, whereas people tend to be better at self-assessments for procedural, narrative, or factual knowledge.<ref name="Rozenblit2002">{{cite journal | vauthors = Rozenblit L, Keil F | title = The misunderstood limits of folk science: an illusion of explanatory depth | journal = Cognitive Science | volume = 26 | issue = 5 | pages = 521–562 | date = September 2002 | pmid = 21442007 | pmc = 3062901 | doi = 10.1207/s15516709cog2605_1 | publisher = Wiley }}</ref><ref name="Mills2004">{{cite journal | vauthors = Mills CM, Keil FC | title = Knowing the limits of one's understanding: the development of an awareness of an illusion of explanatory depth | journal = Journal of Experimental Child Psychology | volume = 87 | issue = 1 | pages = 1–32 | date = January 2004 | pmid = 14698687 | doi = 10.1016/j.jecp.2003.09.003 | publisher = Elsevier BV }}</ref>
* Impostor Syndrome, a psychological occurrence in which an individual doubts their skills, talents, or accomplishments and has a persistent internalized fear of being exposed as a fraud.  Also known as impostor phenomenon.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/basics/imposter-syndrome | title=Imposter Syndrome &#124; Psychology Today }}</ref>
* Objectivity illusion, the phenomena where people tend to believe that they are more objective and unbiased than others. This bias can apply to itself – where people are able to see when others are affected by the objectivity illusion, but unable to see it in themselves. See also ''[[Philosophy:Bias blind spot|bias blind spot]].''<ref>{{Cite APA Dictionary of Psychology|title=Objectivity illusion|access-date=2022-01-15|shortlink=objectivity-illusion}}</ref>

=== Truth judgment <span class="anchor" id="Truthiness"></span>===
* [[Philosophy:Belief bias|Belief bias]], an effect where someone's evaluation of the logical strength of an argument is biased by the believability of the conclusion.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Klauer KC, Musch J, Naumer B | title = On belief bias in syllogistic reasoning | journal = Psychological Review | volume = 107 | issue = 4 | pages = 852–884 | date = October 2000 | pmid = 11089409 | doi = 10.1037/0033-295X.107.4.852 }}</ref>
* [[Illusory truth effect]], the tendency to believe that a statement is true if it is [[Philosophy:Fluency heuristic|easier to process]], or if it has been [[Philosophy:Processing fluency|stated multiple times]], regardless of its actual veracity. These are specific cases of [[Philosophy:Truthiness|truthiness]].
* Rhyme as reason effect, where rhyming statements are perceived as more truthful. 
* [[Philosophy:Subjective validation|Subjective validation]], where statements are perceived as true if a subject's belief demands it to be true. Also assigns perceived connections between coincidences. (Compare [[Confirmation bias|confirmation bias]].)

=== Other ===
{| class="wikitable sortable"
|-
! scope="col" | Name
! scope="col" | Description
|-
|[[Philosophy:Action bias|Action bias]]
|-
| Additive bias
| The tendency to solve problems through addition, even when subtraction is a better approach.<ref>{{cite news | vauthors = Gupta S |date=7 April 2021 |title=People add by default even when subtraction makes more sense |work=Science News |url=https://www.sciencenews.org/article/psychology-numbers-people-add-default-subtract-better |access-date=10 May 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Adams GS, Converse BA, Hales AH, Klotz LE | title = People systematically overlook subtractive changes | journal = Nature | volume = 592 | issue = 7853 | pages = 258–261 | date = April 2021 | pmid = 33828317 | doi = 10.1038/s41586-021-03380-y | s2cid = 233185662 | bibcode = 2021Natur.592..258A }}</ref>
|-
| [[Attribute substitution]]
|Occurs when a judgment has to be made (of a target attribute) that is computationally complex, and instead a more easily calculated heuristic attribute is substituted. This substitution is thought of as taking place in the automatic intuitive judgment system, rather than the more self-aware reflective system.
|-
| [[Philosophy:Curse of knowledge|Curse of knowledge]]
| When better-informed people find it extremely difficult to think about problems from the perspective of lesser-informed people.<ref>{{cite book| veditors = Ackerman MS | title=Sharing expertise beyond knowledge management|year=2003|publisher=MIT Press|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|isbn=978-0262011952|edition=online|page=[https://archive.org/details/sharingexpertise0000unse/page/7 7]|url=https://archive.org/details/sharingexpertise0000unse/page/7}}</ref>
|-
| [[Philosophy:Declinism|Declinism]]
| The predisposition to view the past favorably ([[Philosophy:Rosy retrospection|rosy retrospection]]) and future negatively.<ref>{{citation |url=https://edge.org/response-detail/26669 |title=The State Of The World Isn't Nearly As Bad As You Think | vauthors = Quartz SR |publisher=Edge Foundation, Inc. |access-date=2016-02-17}}</ref>
|-
|[[Philosophy:End-of-history illusion|End-of-history illusion]]
|-
|{{vanchor|Exaggerated expectation}}
| The tendency to expect or predict more extreme outcomes than those outcomes that actually happen.<ref name="HilbertPsychBul" />
|-
| Form function attribution bias
| In [[Human–robot interaction|human–robot interaction]], the tendency of people to make systematic errors when interacting with a robot. People may base their expectations and perceptions of a robot on its appearance (form) and attribute functions which do not necessarily mirror the true functions of the robot.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Haring KS, Watanabe K, Velonaki M, Tossell CC, Finomore V | title = FFAB-The Form Function Attribution Bias in Human Robot Interaction | journal = IEEE Transactions on Cognitive and Developmental Systems | volume = 10 | issue = 4 | pages = 843–851 | doi = 10.1109/TCDS.2018.2851569 | year = 2018 | s2cid = 54459747 | doi-access = free }}</ref>
|-
|Fundamental pain bias
|The tendency for people to believe they accurately report their own pain levels while holding the paradoxical belief that others exaggerate it.<ref>{{Cite web | vauthors = Kara-Yakoubian M |date=2022-07-29 |title=Psychologists uncover evidence of a fundamental pain bias |url=https://www.psypost.org/2022/07/psychologists-uncover-evidence-of-a-fundamental-pain-bias-63613 |access-date=2022-11-27 |website=PsyPost |language=en-US}}</ref>
|-
|Hedonic recall bias
|The tendency for people who are satisfied with their wage to overestimate how much they earn, and vice versa, for people who are unsatisfied with their wage to underestimate it.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Prati A | title = Hedonic recall bias. Why you should not ask people how much they earn | journal = Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization | volume = 143 | pages = 78–97 | doi = 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.002 | year = 2017}}</ref>
|-
|[[Hindsight bias]]
| Sometimes called the "I-knew-it-all-along" effect, or the "Hindsight is 20/20" effect, is the tendency to see past events as having been predictable<ref name="hindsight">{{cite book | vauthors = Pohl RF |title=Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory | veditors = Pohl RF |publisher=Psychology Press |location=Hove, UK |year=2004 |chapter=Hindsight Bias |isbn=978-1841693514 |oclc=55124398 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/cognitiveillusio0000unse/page/363 363–378] |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/cognitiveillusio0000unse/page/363 }}</ref> before they happened. 
|-
| [[Philosophy:Impact bias|Impact bias]]
| The tendency to overestimate the length or the intensity of the impact of future feeling states.<ref name="temporal">{{cite journal | vauthors = Sanna LJ, Schwarz N | title = Integrating temporal biases: the interplay of focal thoughts and accessibility experiences | journal = Psychological Science | volume = 15 | issue = 7 | pages = 474–481 | date = July 2004 | pmid = 15200632 | doi = 10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00704.x | s2cid = 10998751 }}</ref>
|-
|[[Philosophy:Information bias (psychology)|Information bias]]
| The tendency to seek information even when it cannot affect action.<ref>{{harvnb|Baron|1994|pp=258–259}}</ref>
|-
|Interoceptive bias or [[Hungry judge effect]]
|The tendency for sensory input about the body itself to affect one's judgement about external, unrelated circumstances. (As for example, in parole judges who are more lenient when fed and rested.)<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Danziger S, Levav J, Avnaim-Pesso L | title = Extraneous factors in judicial decisions | journal = Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America | volume = 108 | issue = 17 | pages = 6889–6892 | date = April 2011 | pmid = 21482790 | pmc = 3084045 | doi = 10.1073/pnas.1018033108 | bibcode = 2011PNAS..108.6889D | doi-access = free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Zaman J, De Peuter S, Van Diest I, Van den Bergh O, Vlaeyen JW | title = Interoceptive cues predicting exteroceptive events | journal = International Journal of Psychophysiology | volume = 109 | pages = 100–106 | date = November 2016 | pmid = 27616473 | doi = 10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2016.09.003 | url = https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/549865 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Barrett LF, Simmons WK | title = Interoceptive predictions in the brain | journal = Nature Reviews. Neuroscience | volume = 16 | issue = 7 | pages = 419–429 | date = July 2015 | pmid = 26016744 | pmc = 4731102 | doi = 10.1038/nrn3950 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Damasio AR | title = The somatic marker hypothesis and the possible functions of the prefrontal cortex | journal = Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences | volume = 351 | issue = 1346 | pages = 1413–1420 | date = October 1996 | pmid = 8941953 | doi = 10.1098/rstb.1996.0125 | s2cid = 1841280 }}</ref>
|-
| [[Philosophy:Money illusion|Money illusion]]
| The tendency to concentrate on the nominal value (face value) of money rather than its value in terms of purchasing power.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Shafir E, Diamond P, Tversky A | veditors = Kahneman D, Tversky A |date=2000 |title=Choices, values, and frames |chapter=Money Illusion |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0521627498 |pages=335–355}}</ref>
|-
|Moral credential effect
| Occurs when someone who does something good gives themselves permission to be less good in the future.
|-
| Non-adaptive choice switching
| After experiencing a bad outcome with a decision problem, the tendency to avoid the choice previously made when faced with the same decision problem again, even though the choice was optimal. Also known as "once bitten, twice shy" or "hot stove effect".<ref>{{Cite journal |doi=10.7717/peerj.1035 |pmc=4476096 |pmid=26157618|title=Once bitten, twice shy: Experienced regret and non-adaptive choice switching |year=2015 | vauthors = Marcatto F, Cosulich A, Ferrante D |journal=PeerJ |volume=3 |pages=e1035 |doi-access=free }}</ref>
|-
|Mere exposure effect or <br />familiarity principle (in social psychology)
|The tendency to express undue liking for things merely because of familiarity with them.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Bornstein RF, Crave-Lemley C |title=Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory | veditors = Pohl RF |publisher=Psychology Press |location=Hove, UK |year=2004 |chapter=Mere exposure effect |isbn=978-1841693514 |oclc=55124398 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/cognitiveillusio0000unse/page/215 215–234] |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/cognitiveillusio0000unse/page/215 }}</ref>
|-
| [[Omission bias]]
| The tendency to judge harmful actions (commissions) as worse, or less moral, than equally harmful inactions (omissions).<ref>{{harvnb|Baron|1994|p=386}}</ref>
|-
| [[Philosophy:Optimism bias|Optimism bias]]
| The tendency to be over-optimistic, underestimating greatly the probability of undesirable outcomes and overestimating favorable and pleasing outcomes (see also [[Philosophy:Wishful thinking|wishful thinking]], valence effect, positive outcome bias, and compare pessimism bias).<ref>{{harvnb|Baron|1994|p=44}}</ref><ref>{{Harvnb |Hardman|2009|p=104}}</ref>
|-
|[[Philosophy:Ostrich effect|Ostrich effect]]
|Ignoring an obvious negative situation.
|-
|[[Philosophy:Outcome bias|Outcome bias]]
|The tendency to judge a decision by its eventual outcome instead of the quality of the decision at the time it was made.
|-
|Pessimism bias
|The tendency for some people, especially those with depression, to overestimate the likelihood of negative things happening to them. (compare [[Philosophy:Optimism bias|optimism bias]])
|-
|[[Philosophy:Present bias|Present bias]]
|The tendency of people to give stronger weight to payoffs that are closer to the present time when considering trade-offs between two future moments.<ref>{{Cite journal| vauthors = O'Donoghue T, Rabin M |date=1999|title=Doing it now or later|journal=American Economic Review|volume=89 | issue = 1 |pages=103–124 |doi=10.1257/aer.89.1.103|s2cid=5115877}}</ref>
|-
|[[Philosophy:Plant blindness|Plant blindness]]
|-
| Prevention bias
| When investing money to protect against risks, decision makers perceive that a dollar spent on prevention buys more security than a dollar spent on timely detection and response, even when investing in either option is equally effective.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Safi R, Browne GJ, Naini AJ |title=Mis-spending on information security measures: Theory and experimental evidence. |journal=International Journal of Information Management |date=2021 |volume=57 |issue=102291 |page=102291 | doi = 10.1016/j.ijinfomgt.2020.102291|s2cid=232041220 }}</ref>
|-
| [[Probability matching]]
| Sub-optimal matching of the probability of choices with the probability of reward in a stochastic context.
|-
| Pro-innovation bias
| The tendency to have an excessive optimism towards an invention or innovation's usefulness throughout society, while often failing to identify its limitations and weaknesses.
|-
| Projection bias
| The tendency to overestimate how much one's future selves will share one's current preferences, thoughts and values, thus leading to sub-optimal choices.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Hsee CK, Hastie R | title = Decision and experience: why don't we choose what makes us happy? | journal = Trends in Cognitive Sciences | volume = 10 | issue = 1 | pages = 31–37 | date = January 2006 | pmid = 16318925 | doi = 10.1016/j.tics.2005.11.007 | url = http://maelko.typepad.com/DecisionAndExperience.pdf | url-status = live | citeseerx = 10.1.1.178.7054 | s2cid = 12262319 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20150420205315/http://maelko.typepad.com/DecisionAndExperience.pdf | archive-date = 2015-04-20 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Trofimova I | title = An investigation of how people of different age, sex, and temperament estimate the world | journal = Psychological Reports | volume = 85 | issue = 2 | pages = 533–552 | date = October 1999 | pmid = 10611787 | doi = 10.2466/pr0.1999.85.2.533 | s2cid = 8335544 }}</ref><ref name="TroPLoS">{{cite journal|vauthors=Trofimova I|year=2014|title=Observer bias: an interaction of temperament traits with biases in the semantic perception of lexical material|journal=PLOS ONE|volume=9|issue=1|pages=e85677|bibcode=2014PLoSO...985677T|doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0085677|pmc=3903487|pmid=24475048|doi-access=free}}</ref>
|-
| [[Philosophy:Proportionality bias|Proportionality bias]]
| Our innate tendency to assume that big events have big causes, may also explain our tendency to accept conspiracy theories.<ref name="leman2007">{{cite journal | vauthors = Leman PJ, Cinnirella M | title = A major event has a major cause: Evidence for the role of heuristics in reasoning about conspiracy theories | journal = Social Psychological Review | volume = 9 | issue = 2 | pages = 18–28 | date = 2007 | doi = 10.53841/bpsspr.2007.9.2.18 | s2cid = 245126866 | url=https://pure.royalholloway.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/a-major-event-has-a-major-cause-evidence-for-the-role-of-heuristics-in-reasoning-about-conspiracy-theories(2ad8342b-f5ca-4791-b988-ae70fbfdb4b3).html}}</ref><ref name="buckley2015">{{cite journal | vauthors = Buckley T |title=Why Do Some People Believe in Conspiracy Theories? |url=https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/why-do-some-people-believe-in-conspiracy-theories/ |journal=Scientific American Mind |year=2015 |volume=26 |issue=4 |page=72 |doi=10.1038/scientificamericanmind0715-72a |access-date=26 July 2020}}</ref>
|-
| Recency illusion
| The illusion that a phenomenon one has noticed only recently is itself recent. Often used to refer to linguistic phenomena; the illusion that a word or language usage that one has noticed only recently is an innovation when it is, in fact, long-established (see also frequency illusion). Also [[Philosophy:Recency bias|recency bias]] is a [[Philosophy:Cognitive bias|cognitive bias]] that favors recent events over historic ones.  A memory bias, recency bias gives "greater importance to the most recent event",<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.imcusa.org/blogpost/334056/136102/721-Use-Cognitive-Biases-to-Your-Advantage#:~:text=Recency%20Bias%20%2D%20giving%20greater%20importance,made%20has%20a%20slight%20advantage)|title=''Use Cognitive Biases to Your Advantage'', Institute for Management Consultants, #721, December 19, 2011|access-date=April 15, 2021|archive-date=October 24, 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201024151714/https://www.imcusa.org/blogpost/334056/136102/721-Use-Cognitive-Biases-to-Your-Advantage#:~:text=Recency%20Bias%20%2D%20giving%20greater%20importance,made%20has%20a%20slight%20advantage)|url-status=dead}}</ref> such as the final lawyer's closing argument a jury hears before being dismissed to deliberate.
|-
| Systematic bias
| Judgement that arises when targets of differentiating judgement become subject to effects of regression that are not equivalent.<ref>{{Cite journal| vauthors = Fiedler K, Unkelbach C |date=2014-10-01|title=Regressive Judgment: Implications of a Universal Property of the Empirical World|journal=Current Directions in Psychological Science|language=en|volume=23|issue=5|pages=361–367|doi=10.1177/0963721414546330|s2cid=146376950|issn=0963-7214}}</ref>
|-
| [[Philosophy:Risk compensation|Risk compensation]] or Peltzman effect
| The tendency to take greater risks when perceived safety increases.
|-
| [[Philosophy:Surrogation|Surrogation]]
| Losing sight of the strategic construct that a measure is intended to represent, and subsequently acting as though the measure is the construct of interest.
|-
|Teleological Bias
|The tendency to engage in overgeneralized ascriptions of purpose to entities and events that did not arise from goal-directed action, design, or selection based on functional effects.<ref>{{Cite journal| vauthors = Kelemen D, Rottman J, Seston R |date=2013|title=Professional Physical Scientists Display Tenacious Teleological Tendencies: Purpose-Based Reasoning as a Cognitive Default |journal=Journal of Experimental Psychology:General|language=en|volume=142|issue=4|pages=1074–1083|doi=10.1037/a0030399|pmid=23067062 }}.</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| vauthors = Kelemen D, Rosset E |date=2009|title=The Human Function Compunction: teleological explanation in adults |journal=Cognition|language=en|volume=111|issue=1|pages=138–143|doi=10.1016/j.cognition.2009.01.001|pmid=19200537 |s2cid=2569743 }}</ref>
|-
| [[Philosophy:Turkey illusion|Turkey illusion]]
| Absence of expectation of sudden trend breaks in continuous developments
|-
|Unconscious bias or implicit bias
|The underlying attitudes and stereotypes that people unconsciously attribute to another person or group of people that affect how they understand and engage with them. Many researchers suggest that unconscious bias occurs automatically as the brain makes quick judgments based on past experiences and background.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Unconscious Bias|url=https://www.vanderbilt.edu/diversity/unconscious-bias/|access-date=2020-11-09|website=Vanderbilt University|language=en}}</ref>
|-
|{{vanchor | Unit bias}}
| The standard suggested amount of consumption (e.g., food serving size) is perceived to be appropriate, and a person would consume it all even if it is too much for this particular person.<ref>[https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2005/11/051121163748.htm "Penn Psychologists Believe 'Unit Bias' Determines The Acceptable Amount To Eat"]. ScienceDaily (November 21, 2005)</ref>
|-
|Value selection bias
|The tendency to rely on existing numerical data when reasoning in an unfamiliar context, even if calculation or numerical manipulation is required.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Talboy A, Schneider S | title = Reference Dependence in Bayesian Reasoning: Value Selection Bias, Congruence Effects, and Response Prompt Sensitivity | journal = Frontiers in Psychology | volume = 13 | pages = 729285 | date = 2022-03-17 | pmid = 35369253 | pmc = 8970303 | doi = 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.729285 | doi-access = free }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Talboy AN, Schneider SL | title = Focusing on what matters: Restructuring the presentation of Bayesian reasoning problems | journal = Journal of Experimental Psychology. Applied | volume = 24 | issue = 4 | pages = 440–458 | date = December 2018 | pmid = 30299128 | doi = 10.1037/xap0000187 | s2cid = 52943395 }}</ref>
|-
| [[Philosophy:Weber–Fechner law|Weber–Fechner law]]
| Difficulty in comparing small differences in large quantities.
|-
| Women are wonderful effect
| A tendency to associate more positive attributes with women than with men.
|}

=== Social ===
==== Association fallacy ====
{{Main|Philosophy:Association fallacy}}
Association fallacies include: 
* [[Philosophy:Authority bias|Authority bias]], the tendency to attribute greater accuracy to the opinion of an authority figure (unrelated to its content) and be more influenced by that opinion.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Milgram S | title = Behavioral Study of Obedience | journal = Journal of Abnormal Psychology | volume = 67 | issue = 4 | pages = 371–378 | date = October 1963 | pmid = 14049516 | doi = 10.1037/h0040525 | s2cid = 18309531 }}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Cheerleader effect|Cheerleader effect]], the tendency for people to appear more attractive in a group than in isolation.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Walker D, Vul E | title = Hierarchical encoding makes individuals in a group seem more attractive | journal = Psychological Science | volume = 25 | issue = 1 | pages = 230–235 | date = January 2014 | pmid = 24163333 | doi = 10.1177/0956797613497969 | s2cid = 16309135 }}</ref>
* [[Halo effect]], the tendency for a person's positive or negative traits to "spill over" from one personality area to another in others' perceptions of them (see also [[Philosophy:Physical attractiveness stereotype|physical attractiveness stereotype]]).<ref>{{harvnb |Baron|1994|p=275}}</ref>

==== Attribution bias ====
{{Main|Philosophy:Attribution bias}}
Attribution bias includes: 
* Actor-observer bias, the tendency for explanations of other individuals' behaviors to overemphasize the influence of their personality and underemphasize the influence of their situation (see also [[Fundamental attribution error]]), and for explanations of one's own behaviors to do the opposite (that is, to overemphasize the influence of our situation and underemphasize the influence of our own personality).
* [[Philosophy:Defensive attribution hypothesis|Defensive attribution hypothesis]], a tendency to attribute more blame to a harm-doer as the outcome becomes more severe or as personal or situational [[Philosophy:Similarity (psychology)#Social psychological approaches|similarity]] to the victim increases.
* [[Philosophy:Extrinsic incentives bias|Extrinsic incentives bias]], an exception to the ''fundamental attribution error'', where people view others as having (situational) extrinsic motivations and (dispositional) intrinsic motivations for oneself
* [[Fundamental attribution error]], the tendency for people to overemphasize personality-based explanations for behaviors observed in others while under-emphasizing the role and power of situational influences on the same behavior<ref name="TroPLoS" /> (see also actor-observer bias, [[Group attribution error|group attribution error]], positivity effect, and negativity effect).<ref name="Sutherland 2007 138–139">{{harvnb|Sutherland|2007|pp=138–139}}</ref>
* [[Group attribution error]], the biased belief that the characteristics of an individual group member are reflective of the group as a whole or the tendency to assume that group decision outcomes reflect the preferences of group members, even when information is available that clearly suggests otherwise.
* [[Philosophy:Hostile attribution bias|Hostile attribution bias]], the tendency to interpret others' behaviors as having hostile intent, even when the behavior is ambiguous or benign.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia| vauthors = Anderson KB, Graham LM |title=Hostile Attribution Bias|date=2007|encyclopedia=Encyclopedia of Social Psychology|pages=446–447|publisher=Sage Publications, Inc.|doi=10.4135/9781412956253|isbn=978-1412916707}}</ref>
* Intentionality bias, the tendency to judge human action to be intentional rather than accidental.<ref>{{Cite journal| vauthors = Rosset E |date=2008-09-01|title=It's no accident: Our bias for intentional explanations|journal=Cognition|volume=108|issue=3|pages=771–780|doi=10.1016/j.cognition.2008.07.001|issn=0010-0277|pmid=18692779|s2cid=16559459}}</ref>
* [[Just-world hypothesis]], the tendency for people to want to believe that the world is fundamentally just, causing them to rationalize an otherwise inexplicable injustice as deserved by the victim(s).
* [[Philosophy:Moral luck|Moral luck]], the tendency for people to ascribe greater or lesser moral standing based on the outcome of an event.
* [[Philosophy:Puritanical bias|Puritanical bias]], the tendency to attribute cause of an undesirable outcome or wrongdoing by an individual to a moral deficiency or lack of self-control rather than taking into account the impact of broader societal determinants .<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Kokkoris M |title=The Dark Side of Self-Control |url=https://hbr.org/2020/01/the-dark-side-of-self-control |journal=Harvard Business Review |access-date=17 January 2020|date=2020-01-16 }}</ref>
* [[Philosophy:Self-serving bias|Self-serving bias]], the tendency to claim more responsibility for successes than failures. It may also manifest itself as a tendency for people to evaluate ambiguous information in a way beneficial to their interests (see also group-serving bias).<ref>{{harvnb|Plous|1993|p=185}}</ref>
* [[Ultimate attribution error]], similar to the fundamental attribution error, in this error a person is likely to make an internal attribution to an entire group instead of the individuals within the group.

==== Conformity ====
{{Main|Conformity}}
Conformity is involved in the following: 
* [[Philosophy:Availability cascade|Availability cascade]], a self-reinforcing process in which a collective belief gains more and more plausibility through its increasing repetition in public discourse (or "repeat something long enough and it will become true").<ref>{{cite journal|vauthors=Kuran T, Sunstein CR|year=1998|title=Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation|url=https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1036&context=public_law_and_legal_theory|journal=Stanford Law Review|volume=51|issue=4|pages=683–768|doi=10.2307/1229439|jstor=1229439|s2cid=3941373}}</ref> See also [[Availability heuristic|availability heuristic]].
* [[Philosophy:Bandwagon effect|Bandwagon effect]], the tendency to do (or believe) things because many other people do (or believe) the same. Related to [[Groupthink|groupthink]] and [[Biology:Herd behavior|herd behavior]].<ref>{{cite book| vauthors = Colman A |url=https://archive.org/details/dictionaryofpsyc00colm_0/page/77|title=Oxford Dictionary of Psychology|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2003|isbn=978-0192806321|location=New York|page=[https://archive.org/details/dictionaryofpsyc00colm_0/page/77 77] }}</ref>
* {{vanchor|Courtesy bias|text=[[Philosophy:Courtesy bias|Courtesy bias]]}}, the tendency to give an opinion that is more socially correct than one's true opinion, so as to avoid offending anyone.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Psychology|vauthors=Ciccarelli S, White J|publisher=Pearson Education, Inc.|year=2014|isbn=978-0205973354|edition=4th|pages=62}}</ref>
* [[Groupthink]], the psychological [[Philosophy:Phenomenon|phenomenon]] that occurs within a [[Social:Social group|group of people]] in which the desire for harmony or conformity in the group results in an irrational or dysfunctional [[Decision-making|decision-making]] outcome. Group members try to minimize conflict and reach a consensus decision without [[Critical thinking|critical evaluation]] of alternative viewpoints by actively suppressing dissenting viewpoints, and by isolating themselves from outside influences.
* [[Philosophy:Groupshift|Groupshift]], the tendency for decisions to be more risk-seeking or risk-averse than the group as a whole, if the group is already biased in that direction
* Social desirability bias, the tendency to over-report socially desirable characteristics or behaviours in oneself and under-report socially undesirable characteristics or behaviours.<ref>{{cite journal|vauthors=Dalton D, Ortegren M|year=2011|title=Gender differences in ethics research: The importance of controlling for the social desirability response bias|journal=Journal of Business Ethics|volume=103|issue=1|pages=73–93|doi=10.1007/s10551-011-0843-8|s2cid=144155599}}</ref> See also: {{slink||Courtesy bias}}.
* Truth bias is people's inclination towards believing, to some degree, the communication of another person, regardless of whether or not that person is actually lying or being untruthful.<ref>{{cite journal| vauthors = McCornack S, Parks M |year=1986|title=Deception Detection and Relationship Development: The Other Side of Trust|journal=Annals of the International Communication Association|volume=9|pages=377–389|doi=10.1080/23808985.1986.11678616}}</ref><ref name=":1">{{cite journal| vauthors = Levine T |date=2014|title=Truth-Default Theory (TDT): A Theory of Human Deception and Deception Detection|journal=Journal of Language and Social Psychology|volume=33|pages=378–392|doi=10.1177/0261927X14535916|s2cid=146916525}}</ref>

==== Ingroup bias ====
Ingroup bias is the tendency for people to give preferential treatment to others they perceive to be members of their own groups. It is related to the following: 
* [[Not invented here]], an aversion to contact with or use of products, research, standards, or knowledge developed outside a group.
* Outgroup homogeneity bias, where individuals see members of other groups as being relatively less varied than members of their own group.<ref>{{harvnb|Plous|1993|p=206}}</ref>

==== Other social biases ====
{| class="wikitable sortable"
|-
! scope="col" style="width: 12em;" | Name
! scope="col" | Description
|-
|Assumed similarity bias
|Where an individual assumes that others have more traits in common with them than those others actually do.<ref>{{Cite APA Dictionary of Psychology|title=Assumed similarity bias|access-date=2022-01-15|shortlink=assumed-similarity-bias}}</ref>
|-
|[[Outgroup favoritism]]
|When some socially disadvantaged groups will express favorable attitudes (and even preferences) toward social, cultural, or ethnic groups other than their own.<ref>{{Citation |title=Intellectual Precursors, Major Postulates, and Practical Relevance of System Justification Theory |date=2020-07-14 |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv13qfw6w.6 |work=A Theory of System Justification |pages=49–69 |access-date=2023-12-05 |publisher=Harvard University Press|doi=10.2307/j.ctv13qfw6w.6 |s2cid=243130432 }}</ref>
|-
|[[Philosophy:Pygmalion effect|Pygmalion effect]]
|The phenomenon whereby others' expectations of a target person affect the target person's performance.
|-
|[[Social:Reactance (psychology)|Reactance]]
|The urge to do the opposite of what someone wants one to do out of a need to resist a perceived attempt to constrain one's freedom of choice (see also [[Social:Reverse psychology|Reverse psychology]]).
|-
|[[Philosophy:Reactive devaluation|Reactive devaluation]]
|Devaluing proposals only because they purportedly originated with an adversary.
|-
|[[Philosophy:Social comparison bias|Social comparison bias]]
|The tendency, when making decisions, to favour potential candidates who do not compete with one's own particular strengths.<ref>{{cite journal| vauthors = Garcia SM, Song H, Tesser A |date=November 2010|title=Tainted recommendations: The social comparison bias|journal=Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes|volume=113|issue=2|pages=97–101|doi=10.1016/j.obhdp.2010.06.002|issn=0749-5978 |name-list-style=vanc}}
* {{cite web |date=2010-10-28 |title=The Social Comparison Bias - or why we recommend new candidates who don't compete with our own strengths |website=BPS Research Digest |url=http://bps-research-digest.blogspot.com/2010/10/social-comparison-bias-or-why-we.html}}</ref>
|-
|Shared information bias
| The tendency for group members to spend more time and energy discussing information that all members are already familiar with (i.e., shared information), and less time and energy discussing information that only some members are aware of (i.e., unshared information).<ref name="F">{{cite book | vauthors = Forsyth DR | date = 2009 | title = Group Dynamics | edition = 5th | location = Pacific Grove, CA | publisher = Brooks/Cole }}</ref>
|-
|[[Philosophy:Worse-than-average effect|Worse-than-average effect]]
|A tendency to believe ourselves to be worse than others at tasks which are difficult.<ref name="Kruger, J. 1999">{{cite journal | vauthors = Kruger J | title = Lake Wobegon be gone! The "below-average effect" and the egocentric nature of comparative ability judgments | journal = Journal of Personality and Social Psychology | volume = 77 | issue = 2 | pages = 221–232 | date = August 1999 | pmid = 10474208 | doi = 10.1037/0022-3514.77.2.221 }}</ref>
|}

== Memory {{anchor|Memory biases}}<!-- This anchor maintains the redirect from "List of memory biases", to protect against rot if this section is renamed. --> ==
In [[Social:Psychology|psychology]] and [[Cognitive science|cognitive science]], a memory bias is a [[Philosophy:Cognitive bias|cognitive bias]] that either enhances or impairs the recall of a [[Memory|memory]] (either the chances that the memory will be recalled at all, or the amount of time it takes for it to be recalled, or both), or that alters the content of a reported memory. There are many types of memory bias, including:

=== Misattribution of memory ===
{{main|Misattribution of memory}}
{{excerpt|Misattribution of memory|paragraphs=1|hat=no}}
The misattributions include: 
* [[Cryptomnesia]], where a memory is mistaken for novel thought or imagination, because there is no subjective experience of it being a memory.<ref name="schacter">{{cite journal | vauthors = Schacter DL | title = The seven sins of memory. Insights from psychology and cognitive neuroscience | journal = The American Psychologist | volume = 54 | issue = 3 | pages = 182–203 | date = March 1999 | pmid = 10199218 | doi = 10.1037/0003-066X.54.3.182 | s2cid = 14882268 | url = https://semanticscholar.org/paper/379468e541ac77a984ef5bf8c69d70a4824473e5 }}</ref>
* [[False memory]], where imagination is mistaken for a memory.
* [[Social:Social cryptomnesia|Social cryptomnesia]], a failure by people and society in general to remember the origin of a change, in which people know that a change has occurred in society, but forget how this change occurred; that is, the steps that were taken to bring this change about, and who took these steps. This has led to reduced social credit towards the minorities who made major sacrifices that led to a change in societal values.<ref name="Butera 2018">{{cite book | vauthors = Butera F, Levine JM, Vernet J | chapter = Influence without credit: How successful minorities respond to social cryptomnesia |date=August 2009| title = Coping with Minority Status|pages=311–332|publisher=Cambridge University Press |language=en |doi=10.1017/cbo9780511804465.015|isbn=978-0511804465 }}</ref>
* [[Misattribution of memory#Source confusion|Source confusion]], episodic memories are confused with other information, creating distorted memories.<ref name="Lieberman2011">{{cite book| vauthors = Lieberman DA |title=Human Learning and Memory |url={{Google books |plainurl=yes |id=mJsV-Vr8Q6sC |page=432 }} |year=2011|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-1139502535|page=432}}</ref>
* [[Unsolved:Suggestibility#External|Suggestibility]], where ideas suggested by a questioner are mistaken for memory.
* The Perky effect, where real images can influence imagined images, or be misremembered as imagined rather than real

=== Other memory biases ===
{|class="wikitable sortable"
|-
! scope="col" style="width:12em;" | Name
! scope="col" | Description
|-
|Availability bias
|Greater likelihood of recalling recent, nearby, or otherwise immediately available examples, and the imputation of importance to those examples over others.
|-
|[[Philosophy:Bizarreness effect|Bizarreness effect]]
|Bizarre material is better remembered than common material.
|-
|[[Philosophy:Boundary extension|Boundary extension]]
|Remembering the background of an image as being larger or more expansive than the foreground<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = McDunn BA, Siddiqui AP, Brown JM | title = Seeking the boundary of boundary extension | journal = Psychonomic Bulletin & Review | volume = 21 | issue = 2 | pages = 370–375 | date = April 2014 | pmid = 23921509 | doi = 10.3758/s13423-013-0494-0 | s2cid = 2876131 }}</ref>
|-
|[[Philosophy:Childhood amnesia|Childhood amnesia]]
|The retention of few memories from before the age of four.
|-
|[[Philosophy:Choice-supportive bias|Choice-supportive bias]]
|The tendency to remember one's choices as better than they actually were.<ref>{{cite journal|vauthors=Mather M, Shafir E, Johnson MK|date=March 2000|title=Misremembrance of options past: source monitoring and choice|url=http://www.matherlab.com/s/Matheretal2000.pdf|url-status=live|journal=Psychological Science|volume=11|issue=2|pages=132–138|doi=10.1111/1467-9280.00228|pmid=11273420|s2cid=2468289|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090117084058/http://www.usc.edu/projects/matherlab/pdfs/Matheretal2000.pdf|archive-date=2009-01-17}}</ref>
|-
|[[Confirmation bias]]
|The tendency to search for, interpret, or recall information in a way that confirms one's beliefs or hypotheses. See also under {{slink||Confirmation bias}}.
|-
| {{vanchor|Conservatism}} or Regressive bias
| Tendency to remember high values and high likelihoods/probabilities/frequencies as lower than they actually were and low ones as higher than they actually were. Based on the evidence, memories are not extreme enough.<ref name="ReferenceA">{{cite journal | vauthors = Attneave F | title = Psychological probability as a function of experienced frequency | journal = Journal of Experimental Psychology | volume = 46 | issue = 2 | pages = 81–86 | date = August 1953 | pmid = 13084849 | doi = 10.1037/h0057955 }}</ref><ref name="Experimental Psychology 1523">{{cite journal|vauthors=Fischhoff B, Slovic P, Lichtenstein S|year=1977|title=Knowing with certainty: The appropriateness of extreme confidence|journal=Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance|volume=3|issue=4|pages=552–564|doi=10.1037/0096-1523.3.4.552|s2cid=54888532}}</ref>
|-
| {{vanchor|Consistency bias}}
|Incorrectly remembering one's past attitudes and behaviour as resembling present attitudes and behaviour.<ref>{{cite book | vauthors = Cacioppo J |title=Foundations in social neuroscience |publisher=MIT Press |location=Cambridge, MA |year=2002 |isbn=978-0262531955 |pages=130–132}}</ref>
|-
| {{vanchor|Continued influence effect}}
| Misinformation continues to influence memory and reasoning about an event, despite the misinformation having been corrected.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Cacciatore MA | title = Misinformation and public opinion of science and health: Approaches, findings, and future directions | journal = Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America | volume = 118 | issue = 15 | page = e1912437117 | date = April 2021 | pmid = 33837143 | pmc = 8053916 | doi = 10.1073/pnas.1912437117 | quote-page = 4 | quote = The CIE refers to the tendency for information that is initially presented as true, but later revealed to be false, to continue to affect memory and reasoning | doi-access = free | bibcode = 2021PNAS..11812437C }}</ref> cf. ''[[Misinformation effect|misinformation effect]]'', where the original memory is affected by incorrect information received later.
|-
| [[Philosophy:Cue-dependent forgetting|Context effect]]
| That cognition and memory are dependent on context, such that out-of-context memories are more difficult to retrieve than in-context memories (e.g., recall time and accuracy for a work-related memory will be lower at home, and vice versa).
|-
| [[Cross-race effect]]
| The tendency for people of one race to have difficulty identifying members of a race other than their own.
|-
| [[Philosophy:Egocentric bias|Egocentric bias]]
| Recalling the past in a self-serving manner, e.g., remembering one's exam grades as being better than they were, or remembering a caught fish as bigger than it really was.
|-
| [[Philosophy:Euphoric recall|Euphoric recall]]
| The tendency of people to remember past experiences in a positive light, while overlooking negative experiences associated with that event.
|-
| [[Philosophy:Fading affect bias|Fading affect bias]]
| A bias in which the emotion associated with unpleasant memories fades more quickly than the emotion associated with positive events.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Schmidt SR | title = Effects of humor on sentence memory | journal = Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition | volume = 20 | issue = 4 | pages = 953–967 | date = July 1994 | pmid = 8064254 | doi = 10.1037/0278-7393.20.4.953 | url = http://facstaff.uww.edu/eamond/road/Research/GenderJokes%28DK1%29/References%20and%20info/Effects%20of%20Humor%20on%20Sentence%20Memory.pdf | access-date = 2015-04-19 | url-status = dead | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160315061220/http://facstaff.uww.edu/eamond/road/Research/GenderJokes(DK1)/References%20and%20info/Effects%20of%20Humor%20on%20Sentence%20Memory.pdf | archive-date = 2016-03-15 }}</ref>
|-
| [[Philosophy:Generation effect|Generation effect]] (Self-generation effect)
| That self-generated information is remembered best. For instance, people are better able to recall memories of statements that they have generated than similar statements generated by others.
|-
|Gender differences in eyewitness memory
|The tendency for a witness to remember more details about someone of the same gender.
|-
| [[Philosophy:Google effect|Google effect]]
| The tendency to forget information that can be found readily online by using Internet search engines.
|-
|[[Hindsight bias]] ("I-knew-it-all-along" effect)
|The inclination to see past events as having been predictable.
|-
| {{vanchor|Humor effect}}
| That humorous items are more easily remembered than non-humorous ones, which might be explained by the distinctiveness of humor, the increased cognitive processing time to understand the humor, or the emotional arousal caused by the humor.<ref>{{cite journal| vauthors = Schmidt SR |year=2003|title=Life Is Pleasant – and Memory Helps to Keep It That Way!|journal=Review of General Psychology|volume=7|issue=2|pages=203–210|doi=10.1037/1089-2680.7.2.203 |s2cid=43179740 |url=http://www.niu.edu/jskowronski/publications/WalkerSkowronskiThompson2003.pdf}}</ref>
|-
|[[Philosophy:Illusory correlation|Illusory correlation]]
|-
|[[Illusory truth effect]] (Illusion-of-truth effect)
|People are more likely to identify as true statements those they have previously heard (even if they cannot consciously remember having heard them), regardless of the actual validity of the statement. In other words, a person is more likely to believe a familiar statement than an unfamiliar one. See also under {{slink|Truthiness}}
|-
| Lag effect
| The phenomenon whereby learning is greater when studying is spread out over time, as opposed to studying the same amount of time in a single session. See also [[Philosophy:Spacing effect|spacing effect]].
|-
| [[Biology:Leveling and sharpening|Leveling and sharpening]]
| Memory distortions introduced by the loss of details in a recollection over time, often concurrent with sharpening or selective recollection of certain details that take on exaggerated significance in relation to the details or aspects of the experience lost through leveling. Both biases may be reinforced over time, and by repeated recollection or re-telling of a memory.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Koriat A, Goldsmith M, Pansky A | title = Toward a psychology of memory accuracy | journal = Annual Review of Psychology | volume = 51 | issue = 1 | pages = 481–537 | year = 2000 | pmid = 10751979 | doi = 10.1146/annurev.psych.51.1.481 }}</ref>
|-
| [[Philosophy:Levels-of-processing effect|Levels-of-processing effect]]
| That different methods of encoding information into memory have different levels of effectiveness.<ref>Craik & Lockhart, 1972</ref>
|-
| {{vanchor|List-length effect}}
| A smaller percentage of items are remembered in a longer list, but as the length of the list increases, the absolute number of items remembered increases as well.<ref name=memcog>{{cite journal | vauthors = Kinnell A, Dennis S | title = The list length effect in recognition memory: an analysis of potential confounds | journal = Memory & Cognition | volume = 39 | issue = 2 | pages = 348–63 | date = February 2011 | pmid = 21264573 | doi = 10.3758/s13421-010-0007-6 | doi-access = free }}</ref>
|-
|[[Philosophy:Memory inhibition|Memory inhibition]]
|Being shown some items from a list makes it harder to retrieve the other items (e.g., Slamecka, 1968).
|-
| [[Misinformation effect]]
| Memory becoming less accurate because of interference from ''post-event information''.<ref>{{cite book| vauthors = Weiten W |title=Psychology: Themes and Variations |url={{Google books |plainurl=yes |id=sILajOhJpOsC |page=338 }} |year=2010|publisher=Cengage Learning|isbn=978-0495601975|page=338}}</ref> cf. ''continued influence effect'', where misinformation about an event, despite later being corrected, continues to influence memory about the event.
|-
| [[Philosophy:Modality effect|Modality effect]]
| That memory recall is higher for the last items of a list when the list items were received via speech than when they were received through writing.
|-
|[[Philosophy:State-dependent memory|Mood-congruent memory bias]] (state-dependent memory)
|The improved recall of information congruent with one's current mood.
|-
|[[Philosophy:Negativity bias|Negativity bias]] or Negativity effect
|Psychological phenomenon by which humans have a greater [[Biology:Recall (memory)|recall]] of unpleasant memories compared with positive memories.<ref name="Haizlip">{{cite journal|vauthors=Haizlip J, May N, Schorling J, Williams A, Plews-Ogan M|date=September 2012|title=Perspective: the negativity bias, medical education, and the culture of academic medicine: why culture change is hard|journal=Academic Medicine|volume=87|issue=9|pages=1205–1209|doi=10.1097/ACM.0b013e3182628f03|pmid=22836850|doi-access=free}}</ref><ref name="TroPLoS" /> (see also actor-observer bias, [[Group attribution error|group attribution error]], positivity effect, and negativity effect).<ref name="Sutherland 2007 138–139" />
|-
| [[Biology:Next-in-line effect|Next-in-line effect]]
| When taking turns speaking in a group using a predetermined order (e.g. going clockwise around a room, taking numbers, etc.) people tend to have diminished recall for the words of the person who spoke immediately before them.<ref name="Weiten2007">{{cite book| vauthors = Weiten W |title=Psychology: Themes and Variations |url={{Google books |plainurl=yes |id=Vv1vvlIEXG0C |page=260 }} |year=2007|publisher=Cengage Learning|isbn=978-0495093039|page=260}}</ref>
|-
| Part-list cueing effect
| That being shown some items from a list and later retrieving one item causes it to become harder to retrieve the other items.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Slamecka NJ | title = An examination of trace storage in free recall | journal = Journal of Experimental Psychology | volume = 76 | issue = 4 | pages = 504–513 | date = April 1968 | pmid = 5650563 | doi = 10.1037/h0025695 }}</ref>
|-
| [[Philosophy:Peak–end rule|Peak–end rule]]
| That people seem to perceive not the sum of an experience but the average of how it was at its peak (e.g., pleasant or unpleasant) and how it ended.
|-
|Persistence
|The unwanted recurrence of memories of a [[Medicine:Psychological trauma|traumatic event]].
|-
| [[Philosophy:Picture superiority effect|Picture superiority effect]]
| The notion that concepts that are learned by viewing pictures are more easily and frequently recalled than are concepts that are learned by viewing their written word form counterparts.<ref name="shepard">{{cite journal | vauthors = Shepard RN | year = 1967 | title = Recognition memory for words, sentences, and pictures | journal = Journal of Learning and Verbal Behavior | volume = 6 | pages = 156–163 | doi=10.1016/s0022-5371(67)80067-7}}</ref><ref name="McBride">{{cite journal | vauthors = McBride DM, Dosher BA | year = 2002 | title = A comparison of conscious and automatic memory processes for picture and word stimuli: a process dissociation analysis | journal = Consciousness and Cognition | volume = 11 | issue = 3| pages = 423–460 | doi=10.1016/s1053-8100(02)00007-7| pmid = 12435377 | s2cid = 2813053 }}</ref><ref name="defeyter">{{cite journal | vauthors = Defetyer MA, Russo R, McPartlin PL | year = 2009 | title = The picture superiority effect in recognition memory: a developmental study using the response signal procedure | journal = Cognitive Development | volume = 24 | issue = 3| pages = 265–273 | doi = 10.1016/j.cogdev.2009.05.002 }}</ref><ref name="whitehouse">{{cite journal | vauthors = Whitehouse AJ, Maybery MT, Durkin K | year = 2006 | title = The development of the picture-superiority effect | journal = British Journal of Developmental Psychology | volume = 24 | issue = 4| pages = 767–773 | doi = 10.1348/026151005X74153 }}</ref><ref name="ally gold">{{cite journal | vauthors = Ally BA, Gold CA, Budson AE | title = The picture superiority effect in patients with Alzheimer's disease and mild cognitive impairment | journal = Neuropsychologia | volume = 47 | issue = 2 | pages = 595–598 | date = January 2009 | pmid = 18992266 | pmc = 2763351 | doi = 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.10.010 }}</ref><ref name="curran">{{cite journal | vauthors = Curran T, Doyle J | title = Picture superiority doubly dissociates the ERP correlates of recollection and familiarity | journal = Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience | volume = 23 | issue = 5 | pages = 1247–1262 | date = May 2011 | pmid = 20350169 | doi = 10.1162/jocn.2010.21464 | s2cid = 6568038 }}</ref>
|-
|Placement bias
|Tendency to remember ourselves to be better than others at tasks at which we rate ourselves above average (also [[Illusory superiority]] or [[Philosophy:Overconfidence effect#Better-than-average effects|Better-than-average effect]])<ref name="Unskilled and unaware of it: how di"/> and tendency to remember ourselves to be worse than others at tasks at which we rate ourselves below average (also [[Philosophy:Worse-than-average effect|Worse-than-average effect]]).<ref>Kruger, J. (1999). Lake Wobegon be gone! The "below-average effect" and the egocentric nature of comparative ability judgments" ''Journal of Personality and Social Psychology'' 77(2),</ref>
|-
| Positivity effect ([[Biology:Socioemotional selectivity theory|Socioemotional selectivity theory]])
| That older adults favor positive over negative information in their memories. See also [[Philosophy:Euphoric recall|euphoric recall]]
|-
|Primacy effect
|Where an item at the beginning of a list is more easily recalled. A form of serial position effect. See also recency effect and suffix effect.
|-
| {{vanchor|Processing difficulty effect}}
| That information that takes longer to read and is thought about more (processed with more difficulty) is more easily remembered.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = O'Brien EJ, Myers JL | year = 1985 | title = When comprehension difficulty improves memory for text | url = https://scholarworks.umass.edu/umop/vol9/iss1/7| journal = Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition | volume = 11 | issue = 1| pages = 12–21 | doi = 10.1037/0278-7393.11.1.12 | s2cid = 199928680 }}</ref> See also [[Philosophy:Levels-of-processing effect|levels-of-processing effect]].
|-
|Recency effect
|A form of serial position effect where an item at the end of a list is easier to recall. This can be disrupted by the suffix effect. See also primacy effect.
|-
| [[Philosophy:Reminiscence bump|Reminiscence bump]]
| The recalling of more personal events from adolescence and early adulthood than personal events from other lifetime periods.<ref>Rubin, Wetzler & Nebes, 1986; Rubin, Rahhal & Poon, 1998</ref>
|-
| [[Philosophy:Repetition blindness|Repetition blindness]]
| Unexpected difficulty in remembering more than one instance of a visual sequence
|-
|[[Philosophy:Rosy retrospection|Rosy retrospection]]
|The remembering of the past as having been better than it really was.
|-
|Saying is believing effect
|Communicating a socially tuned message to an audience can lead to a bias of identifying the tuned message as one's own thoughts.<ref>{{cite journal | doi=10.3389/fpsyg.2021.728864 | doi-access=free | title=How Group Perception Affects What People Share and How People Feel: The Role of Entitativity and Epistemic Trust in the "Saying-Is-Believing" Effect | year=2021 | last1=Liang | first1=Tingchang | last2=Lin | first2=Zhao | last3=Souma | first3=Toshihiko | journal=Frontiers in Psychology | volume=12 | page=728864 | pmid=34630240 | pmc=8494462 }}</ref>
|-
|[[Philosophy:Self-reference effect|Self-relevance effect]]
|That memories relating to the self are better recalled than similar information relating to others.
|-
|Serial position effect
|That items near the end of a sequence are the easiest to recall, followed by the items at the beginning of a sequence; items in the middle are the least likely to be remembered.<ref name="serial_position">{{cite book| vauthors = Martin GN, Carlson NR, Buskist W |title=Psychology|publisher=Pearson Education|year=2007|edition=3rd|pages=309–310|isbn=978-0273710868}}</ref> See also recency effect, primacy effect and suffix effect.
|-
|[[Philosophy:Spacing effect|Spacing effect]]
|That information is better recalled if exposure to it is repeated over a long span of time rather than a short one.
|-
|[[Philosophy:Spotlight effect|Spotlight effect]]
|The tendency to overestimate the amount that other people notice one's appearance or behavior.
|-
|Stereotype bias or stereotypical bias
|Memory distorted towards stereotypes (e.g., racial or gender).
|-
| {{vanchor|Suffix effect}}
| Diminishment of the recency effect because a sound item is appended to the list that the subject is ''not'' required to recall.<ref>Morton, Crowder & Prussin, 1971</ref><ref name="PittEdwards2003">{{cite book| vauthors = Pitt I, Edwards AD |title=Design of Speech-Based Devices: A Practical Guide |url={{Google books |plainurl=yes |id=zQ10cPSz1lMC |page=26 }} |year=2003|publisher=Springer|isbn=978-1852334369|page=26}}</ref> A form of serial position effect. Cf. recency effect and primacy effect.
|-
|[[Subadditivity effect]]
|The tendency to estimate that the likelihood of a remembered event is less than the sum of its (more than two) mutually exclusive components.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Tversky A, Koehler DJ | year = 1994 | title = Support theory: A nonextensional representation of subjective probability | url = http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~dkoehler/reprints/support_theory.pdf | journal = Psychological Review | volume = 101 | issue = 4 | pages = 547–567 | doi = 10.1037/0033-295X.101.4.547 | access-date = 2021-12-10 | archive-date = 2017-01-09 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170109023244/http://www.arts.uwaterloo.ca/~dkoehler/reprints/support_theory.pdf | url-status = dead }}</ref>
|-
|[[Physics:Tachypsychia|Tachypsychia]]
|When time perceived by the individual either lengthens, making events appear to slow down, or contracts.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Stetson C, Fiesta MP, Eagleman DM | title = Does time really slow down during a frightening event? | journal = PLOS ONE | volume = 2 | issue = 12 | pages = e1295 | date = December 2007 | pmid = 18074019 | pmc = 2110887 | doi = 10.1371/journal.pone.0001295 | bibcode = 2007PLoSO...2.1295S | doi-access = free }}</ref>
|-
|[[Philosophy:Telescoping effect|Telescoping effect]]
|The tendency to displace recent events backwards in time and remote events forward in time, so that recent events appear more remote, and remote events, more recent.
|-
|[[Biology:Testing effect|Testing effect]]
|The fact that one more easily recall information one has read by rewriting it instead of rereading it.<ref>{{cite book| vauthors = Goldstein ED |title=Cognitive Psychology: Connecting Mind, Research and Everyday Experience|url={{Google books |plainurl=yes |id=9TUIAAAAQBAJ |page=231 }} |publisher=Cengage Learning|isbn=978-1133009122|page=231|date=2010-06-21}}</ref> Frequent testing of material that has been committed to memory improves memory recall.
|-
|[[Philosophy:Tip of the tongue|Tip of the tongue]] phenomenon
|When a subject is able to recall parts of an item, or related information, but is frustratingly unable to recall the whole item. This is thought to be an instance of "blocking" where multiple similar memories are being recalled and interfere with each other.<ref name="schacter" />
|-
|{{vanchor|Travis syndrome}}
|Overestimating the significance of the present.<ref name=travis>{{cite web|title=Not everyone is in such awe of the internet|url=https://www.standard.co.uk/news/not-everyone-is-in-such-awe-of-the-internet-6383970.html|website=Evening Standard|access-date=28 October 2015|date=2011-03-23}}</ref> It is related to chronological snobbery with possibly an appeal to novelty logical fallacy being part of the bias.
|-
|{{vanchor|Verbatim effect}}
|That the "gist" of what someone has said is better remembered than the verbatim wording.<ref>Poppenk, Walia, Joanisse, Danckert, & Köhler, 2006</ref> This is because memories are representations, not exact copies.
|-
|[[Philosophy:Von Restorff effect|von Restorff effect]]
|That an item that sticks out is more likely to be remembered than other items.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Von Restorff H | year = 1933 | title = Über die Wirkung von Bereichsbildungen im Spurenfeld (The effects of field formation in the trace field)". | journal = Psychological Research | volume = 18 | issue = 1| pages = 299–342 | doi=10.1007/bf02409636| s2cid = 145479042 }}</ref>
|-
|[[Philosophy:Zeigarnik effect|Zeigarnik effect]]
|That uncompleted or interrupted tasks are remembered better than completed ones.
|}

== See also ==
<!-- Please keep entries in alphabetical order & add a short description per  . -->
{{div col|colwidth=20em|small=yes}}
* {{annotated link|Abilene paradox}}
* {{annotated link|Social:Affective forecasting}}
* {{annotated link|Anecdotal evidence}}
* {{annotated link|Philosophy:Attribution (psychology)}}
* {{annotated link|Philosophy:Black swan theory}}
* {{annotated link|Chronostasis}}
* {{annotated link|Cognitive distortion}}
* {{annotated link|Philosophy:Dysrationalia}}
* {{annotated link|Fear, uncertainty, and doubt}}
* {{annotated link|Medicine:List of maladaptive schemas}}
* {{annotated link|Social:Media bias}}
* {{annotated link|Philosophy:Mind projection fallacy}}
* {{annotated link|Motivated reasoning}}
* {{annotated link|Observational error|aka=Systematic bias}}
* {{annotated link|Biology:Outline of public relations}}
* {{annotated link|Philosophy:Outline of thought}}
* {{annotated link|Philosophy:Pollyanna principle}}
* {{annotated link|Positive feedback}}
* {{annotated link|Social:Propaganda}}
* {{annotated link|Publication bias}}
* {{annotated link|Recall bias}}
* {{annotated link|Philosophy:Self-handicapping}}
* ''{{annotated link|Thinking, Fast and Slow}}''
{{div col end}}
<!-- Please keep entries in alphabetical order. -->

==Footnotes==
{{Reflist|30em}}

== References ==
{{refbegin}}
* {{cite book | vauthors = Baron J |year=1994 |title=Thinking and deciding |edition=2nd |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0521437325}}
* {{cite book| vauthors = Hardman D |title=Judgment and decision making: psychological perspectives|year=2009|publisher=Wiley-Blackwell|isbn=978-1405123983}}
* {{cite journal | vauthors = Kahneman D, Knetsch JL, Thaler RH |year=1991 |title=Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias |journal=The Journal of Economic Perspectives |volume=5 |issue=1 |pages=193–206 |doi=10.1257/jep.5.1.193 |doi-access=free }}
* {{cite book | vauthors = Plous S |year=1993 |title=The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making |location=New York |publisher=McGraw-Hill |isbn=978-0070504776}}
* {{cite book | vauthors = Sutherland S |title=Irrationality |publisher=Pinter & Martin |year=2007 |isbn=978-1905177073 }}
{{refend}}

== Further reading ==
{{refbegin}}
* {{cite book | vauthors = Baron J |year=2000 |title=Thinking and deciding |edition=3rd |location=New York |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0521650304}}
* {{cite book | vauthors = Bishop MA, Trout JD |year=2004 |title=Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment |location=New York |publisher=[[Organization:Oxford University Press|Oxford University Press]] |isbn=978-0195162295}}
* {{cite book | vauthors = Gilovich T |year=1993 |title=How We Know What Isn't So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life |location=New York |publisher=The Free Press |isbn=978-0029117064}}
* {{cite book | vauthors = Gilovich T, Griffin D, Kahneman D |year=2002 |title=Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment |location= Cambridge, UK |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0521796798}}
* {{cite journal | vauthors = Greenwald AG |year=1980 |title=The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of Personal History |journal=American Psychologist |volume=35 |issue=7 |issn=0003-066X|url=http://faculty.washington.edu/agg/pdf/Gwald_AmPsychologist_1980.OCR.pdf|doi=10.1037/0003-066x.35.7.603 |pages=603–618}}
* {{cite journal | vauthors = Kahneman D, Slovic P, Tversky A |year=1982 |title=Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases |journal=Science |volume=185 |issue=4157 |pages=1124–1131 |location=Cambridge, UK |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0521284141 |pmid=17835457 |doi=10.1126/science.185.4157.1124 |bibcode=1974Sci...185.1124T |s2cid=143452957 }}
* {{cite book | vauthors = Pohl RF |year=2017 |title=Cognitive illusions: Intriguing phenomena in thinking, judgment and memory |edition=2nd |location=London and New York |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1138903418}}
* {{cite journal | vauthors = Schacter DL | title = The seven sins of memory. Insights from psychology and cognitive neuroscience | journal = The American Psychologist | volume = 54 | issue = 3 | pages = 182–203 | date = March 1999 | pmid = 10199218 | doi = 10.1037/0003-066X.54.3.182 | s2cid = 14882268 | url = http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~scanlab/papers/2003_Schacter_SevenSinsSelf.pdf | url-status = dead | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20130513010136/http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~scanlab/papers/2003_Schacter_SevenSinsSelf.pdf | archive-date = May 13, 2013 }}
* {{cite book | vauthors = Tetlock PE |year=2005 |title=Expert Political Judgment: how good is it? how can we know? |location=Princeton |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=978-0691123028}}
* {{cite book | vauthors = Virine L, Trumper M |title=Project Decisions: The Art and Science |year=2007 |publisher=Management Concepts |location=Vienna, VA |isbn= 978-1567262179}}
{{refend}}

==External links==
{{DEFAULTSORT:List Of Cognitive Biases}}
[[Category:Cognitive biases|*]]
[[Category:Behavioral finance]]

{{Sourceattribution|List of cognitive biases}}