Earth:Energiewende

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Energy transition scenario in Germany
Photovoltaic array and wind turbines at the Schneebergerhof wind farm in the German state of Rheinland-Pfalz
File:Power-generation-germany 2016.png
Market share of Germany's power generation 2016[1]
Jobs in the renewable energy sector in Germany in 2018.

The Energiewende (pronounced [ʔenɛʁˈɡiːˌvɛndə] (About this soundlisten); German for '"energy transition"') is the ongoing transition by Germany to a low carbon, environmentally sound, reliable, and affordable energy supply.[2] :4 The new system intends to rely heavily on renewable energy (particularly wind, photovoltaics, and hydroelectricity), energy efficiency, and energy demand management. Most if not all existing coal-fired generation are intended to be retired.[3] Legislative support for the Energiewende was passed in late 2010 and included greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions of 80–95% by 2050 (relative to 1990) and a renewable energy target of 60% by 2050.[4]

Germany has already made significant progress on its GHG emissions reduction target prior to the introduction of the program, achieving a 27% decrease between 1990 and 2014. However the country would need to maintain an average GHG emissions abatement rate of 3.5% per year to reach its Energiewende goal, equal to the maximum historical value thus far.[5]

A controversial part of the program was the phasing out Germany's fleet of nuclear reactors, to be complete by 2022[6][7] with the aim of reaching a 100% renewable energy system and reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the energy sector. While the nuclear plants shutdown was mostly completed, they however were largely replaced by fossil gas and coal[8] and most of the 2020 goals of the program were failed.[9] A study found that if Germany had postponed the nuclear phase out and phased out coal first it could have saved 1,100 lives and $12 billion in social costs per year.[10][11][12] Another article claims that Germany could have already phased out fossil fuels if it had chosen to invest in nuclear instead of renewable energy.[13]

The term Energiewende

The main renewable energy sources in Germany: biomass, wind energy, and photovoltaics

The term Energiewende is regularly used in English language publications without being translated (a loanword).[14]

The term Energiewende was first contained in the title of a 1980 publication by the German Öko-Institut, calling for the complete abandonment of nuclear and petroleum energy.[15][16]:223 The most groundbreaking claim was that economic growth was possible without increased energy consumption.[17] On 16 February 1980, the German Federal Ministry of the Environment also hosted a symposium in Berlin, called Energiewende – Atomausstieg und Klimaschutz (Energy Transition: Nuclear Phase-Out and Climate Protection). The Institute for Applied Ecology was funded by both environmental and religious organizations, and the importance of religious and conservative figures like Wolf von Fabeck and Peter Ahmels was crucial. In the following decades, the term Energiewende expanded in scope – in its present form it dates back to at least 2002.

Energiewende designates a significant change in energy policy. The term encompasses a reorientation of policy from demand to supply and a shift from centralized to distributed generation (for example, producing heat and power in small cogeneration units), which should replace overproduction and avoidable energy consumption with energy-saving measures and increased efficiency.

In a broader sense, this transition also entails a democratization of energy.[18] In the traditional energy industry, a few large companies with large centralized power stations dominate the market as an oligopoly and consequently amass a worrisome level of both economic and political power. Renewable energies, in contrast, can, as a rule, be established in a decentralized manner. Public wind farms and solar parks can involve many citizens directly in energy production.[19] Photovoltaic systems can even be set up by individuals. Municipal utilities can also benefit citizens financially, while the conventional energy industry profits a relatively small number of shareholders. Also significant, the decentralized structure of renewable energies enables creation of value locally and minimizes capital outflows from a region. Renewable energy sources therefore play an increasingly important role in municipal energy policy, and local governments often promote them.

Status

Ghg-emissionsgrafik-trend-1990-2019-nach-ksg-einteilung.png

The key policy document outlining the Energiewende was published by the German government in September 2010, some six months before the Fukushima nuclear accident.[2] Legislative support was passed in September 2010. On 6 June 2011, following Fukushima, the government removed the use of nuclear power as a bridging technology as part of their policy.[20]

After the 2013 federal elections, the new CDU/CSU and SPD coalition government continued the Energiewende, with only minor modification of its goals in the coalition agreement. An intermediate target was introduced of a 55–60% share of renewable energy in gross electricity consumption in 2035.[21] These targets were described as "ambitious".[22]The Berlin-based policy institute Agora Energiewende noted that "while the German approach is not unique worldwide, the speed and scope of the Energiewende are exceptional".[23]A particular characteristic of the Energiewende compared to other planned energy transition was the expectation that the transition is driven by citizens and not large energy utilities.[disputed – discuss] Germany's switch to renewables was described as "democratization of the energy supply".[24] The Energiewende also sought a greater transparency in relation to national energy policy formation.[25]

As of 2013, Germany was spending €1.5 billion per year on energy research in an effort to solve the technical and social issues raised by the transition,[26] which are provided by the individual federal states, universities and the government, which provided €400 million per year.[27] The government's contribution was increased to €800 million in 2017.[27]

Important aspects include ((As of November 2016)):

Energiewende policy targets and status as of 2016[28]
Target 2016 2020 2030 2040 2050
Greenhouse gas emissions
Greenhouse gas emissions (base year 1990) −27.3% −40% −55% −70% −80 to −95%
Renewable energy
Share of gross final energy consumption 14.8% 18% 30% 45% 60%
Share of gross electricity consumption 31.6% 35% 50% 65% 80%
Share of heat consumption 13.2% 14%
Share in transport sector 6.9% 10% 14%
Efficiency and consumption
Primary energy consumption (base year 2008) −6.5% −20% −50%
Final energy productivity (2008–2050) 1.1% per year
(2008–2016)		 2.1% per year
(2008–2050)
Gross electricity consumption (base year 2008) −3.6% −10% −25%
Primary energy consumption in buildings (base year 2008) −18.3% −80%
Heat consumption in buildings (base year 2008) −6.3% −20%
Final energy consumption in transport (base year 2005) 4.2% −10% −40%

In addition, there will be an associated research and development drive. A chart showing German energy legislation in 2016 is available.[29]

These targets go well beyond European Union legislation and the national policies of other European states. The policy objectives have been embraced by the German federal government and has resulted in a huge expansion of renewables, particularly wind power. Germany's share of renewables has increased from around 5% in 1999 to 22.9% in 2012, surpassing the OECD average of 18% usage of renewables.[30] Producers have been guaranteed a fixed feed-in tariff for 20 years, guaranteeing a fixed income. Energy co-operatives have been created, and efforts were made to decentralize control and profits. The large energy companies have a disproportionately small share of the renewables market. However, in some cases poor investment designs have caused bankruptcies and low returns, and unrealistic promises have been shown to be far from reality.[31] Nuclear power plants were closed, and the existing nine plants will close earlier than planned, in 2022.

One factor that has inhibited efficient employment of new renewable energy has been the lack of an accompanying investment in power infrastructure to bring the power to market. It is believed 8,300 km of power lines must be built or upgraded.[30] The different German States have varying attitudes to the construction of new power lines. Industry has had their rates frozen and so the increased costs of the Energiewende have been passed on to consumers, who have had rising electricity bills. Germans in 2013 had some of the highest electricity prices (including taxes) in Europe.[32] In comparison, its neighbors (Poland, Sweden, Denmark and nuclear-reliant France) have some of the lowest costs (excluding taxes) in the EU.[33][34]

Acceptance of power plants in the neighborhood (Germany 2014)[35]

According to a 2014 survey conducted by TNS Emnid for the German Renewable Energies Agency among 1015 respondents, 94 per cent of the Germans support the enforced expansion of Renewable Energies. More than two-thirds of the interviewees agree to renewable power plants close to their homes.[36] The share of total final energy from renewables was 11% in 2014.[37]:137

On 1 August 2014, a revised Renewable Energy Sources Act entered into force. Specific deployment corridors now stipulate the extent to which renewable energy is to be expanded in the future and the funding rates (feed-in tariffs) will no longer be fixed by the government, but will be determined by auction.[38]

Market redesign is a key part of the Energiewende. The German electricity market needs to be reworked to suit.[39] Among other things, wind and PV cannot be principally refinanced under the current marginal cost based market. Carbon pricing is also central to the Energiewende and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) needs to be reformed to create a genuine scarcity of certificates.[40] The German federal government is calling for such reform.[38] Most of the computer scenarios used to analyse the Energiewende rely on a substantial carbon price to drive the transition to low-carbon technologies.

Coal-fired generation needs to be retired as part of the Energiewende. Some argue for an explicit negotiated phase-out of coal plants, along the lines of the well-publicized nuclear phase-out.[41] Coal comprised 42% of electricity generation in 2015. If Germany is to limit its contribution to a global temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, as declared in the 2015 Paris Agreement, a complete phase-out of fossil fuels together with a shift to 100% renewable energy is required by about 2040.[42]

The Energiewende is made up of various technical building blocks. Electricity storage, while too expensive at present, may become a useful technology in the future.[43][44] Energy efficiency has a key but currently under-recognised role to play.[45] Improved energy efficiency is one of Germany's official targets. Greater integration with adjoining national electricity networks can offer mutual benefits — indeed, systems with high shares of renewables can use geographical diversity to offset intermittency.[46]

Germany invested €1.5 billion in energy research in 2013.[47] Of that the German federal government spent €820 million supporting projects ranging from basic research to applications.[38] The federal government also foresees an export role for German expertise in the area.[38]

The social and political dimensions of the Energiewende have been subject to study. Strunz argues that the underlying technological, political and economic structures will need to change radically — a process he calls regime shift.[48] Schmid, Knopf, and Pechan analyse the actors and institutions that will be decisive in the Energiewende and how latency in the national electricity infrastructure may restrict progress.[49]

On 3 December 2014, the German federal government released its National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency (NAPE) in order to improve the uptake of energy efficiency.[50][51] The areas covered are the energy efficiency of buildings, energy conservation for companies, consumer energy efficiency, and transport energy efficiency. German industry is expected to make a sizeable contribution.

An official federal government report on progress under the Energiewende, updated for 2014, notes that:[4]

  • energy consumption fell by 4.7% in 2014 (from 2013) and at 13132 petajoules reached it lowest level since 1990
  • renewable generation is the number-one source of electricity
  • energy efficiency increased by an average annual 1.6% between 2008 and 2014
  • final energy consumption in the transport sector was 1.7% higher in 2014 than in 2005
  • for the first time in more than ten years, electricity prices for household customers fell at the beginning of 2015

A commentary on the progress report expands on many of the issues raised.[52]

Slow progress on transmission network reinforcement has led to a deferment of new windfarms in northern Germany.[53] The German cabinet earlier approved costly underground cabling in October 2015 in a bid to dispel local resistance against above-ground pylons and to speed up the expansion process.[54]

Analysis by Agora Energiewende in late-2016 suggests that Germany will probably miss several of its key Energiewende targets, despite recent reforms to the Renewable Energy Sources Act and the wholesale electricity market. The goal to cut emissions by 40% by 2020 "will most likely be missed ... if no further measures are taken" and the 55–60% share of renewable energy in gross electricity consumption by 2035 is "unachievable" with the current plans for renewables expansion.[55][56] In November 2016, Agora Energiewende reported on the impact of the new EEG (2017) and several other related new laws. It concludes that this new legislation will bring "fundamental changes" for large sections of the energy industry, but have limited effect on the economy and on consumers.[57][58]

The 2016 Climate Action Plan for Germany, adopted on 14 November 2016, introduced sector targets for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.[59][60] The goal for the energy sector is shown in the table. The plan states that the energy supply must be "almost completely decarbonised" by 2050, with renewables as its main source. For the electricity sector, "in the long-term, electricity generation must be based almost entirely on renewable energies" and "the share of wind and solar power in total electricity production will rise significantly". Notwithstanding, during the transition, "less carbon-intensive natural gas power plants and the existing most modern coal power plants play an important role as interim technologies".[61]

Sector targets for greenhouse gas emission reductions for 2030 [60]:4[61]
Sector 1990 2014 2030 Reduction
(2030 relative 1990)
Energy 466 358 175–183 61–62%
Buildings 209 119 70–72 66–67%
Transport 163 160 95–98 40–42%
Industry 283 181 140–143 49–51%
Agriculture 88 72 58–61 31–34%
Other 39 12 5 87%
Total 1248 902 543–562 55–56%
  • Units: million tonnes CO
    2    eq    .
  • 1990 and 2014 values are actual.

The fifth monitoring report on the Energiewende for 2015 was published in December 2016. The expert commission which wrote the report warns that Germany will probably miss its 2020 climate targets and believes that this could threaten the credibility of the entire endeavor. The commission puts forward a number of measures to address the slowdown, including a flat national CO
2 price imposed across all sectors, a greater focus on transport, and full market exposure for renewable generation. Regarding the carbon price, the commission thinks that a reformed EU ETS would be better, but that achieving agreement across Europe is unlikely.[62][63]

Since 2017, it had become clear that the Energiewende was not progressing at the anticipated speed, with the country's climate policy regarded as "lackluster" and the energy transition "stalling." [64][65] High electricity prices, growing resistance against the use of wind turbines over their environmental and potential health impacts, and regulatory hurdles, have been identified as causes for this.[66][67] As of 2017 Germany imports more than half of its energy.[68]

In March 2019, Chancellor Merkel formed a so-called climate cabinet to find a consensus on new emissions reduction measures to meet 2030 targets. The result was the Climate Action Programme 2030, which Berlin adopted on 9 October 2019.[69] The Programme contains plans for a carbon pricing system for the heating and transportation sectors, which are not covered by the EU ETS. It also includes tax- and other incentives to encourage energy-efficient building renovations, higher EV subsidies and more public transport investments. The IEA report concludes that "The package represents a clear step in the right direction towards Germany meeting its 2030 targets."[69]

As result of phasing out nuclear power and, in long term, coal, Germany declared increased reliance on fossil gas.[8]

We will have phased out nuclear energy by 2022. We have a very difficult problem, namely that almost the only sources of energy that will be able to provide baseload power are coal and lignite. Naturally, we cannot do without baseload energy. Natural gas will therefore play a greater role for another few decades. I believe we would be well advised to admit that if we phase out coal and nuclear energy then we have to be honest and tell people that we’ll need more natural gas.

In 2020 a number of previously shut down fossil gas plants were restarted quoting "heavy fluctuations of level of power generated from the wind and sun".[70]

The 2020 climate goals were successful in the following areas:[9][71]

  • closure of nuclear plants
  • increasing renewable energy share

The following climate goals however failed:

  • reducing greenhouse gas emissions
  • increasing renewable energy share in the transport sector
  • reducing primary energy consumption
  • final energy productivity.

Citizen support and participation

(As of 2016), citizen support for the Energiewende remains high, with recent surveys indicating that about 80–90% of the public are in favor.[72] One reason for the high acceptance is the substantial participation of German citizens in the Energiewende, as private households, land owners, or members of energy cooperatives (Genossenschaft).[73] A 2016 survey showed that roughly one in two Germans would consider investing in community renewable energy projects.[74] Manfred Fischedick, Director of the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy has commented that "if people participate with their own money, for example in a wind or solar power plant in their area, they will also support [the Energiewende]."[73] A 2010 study shows the benefits to municipalities of community ownership of renewable generation in their locality.[75]

The share of renewable energy owned by citizens has decreased since the beginning of the Energiewende.[1]

Estimates for 2012 suggested that almost half the renewable energy capacity in Germany was owned by citizens through energy cooperatives and private initiatives.[76] More specifically, citizens accounted for nearly half of all installed biogas and solar capacity and half of the installed onshore wind capacity.[73][77] However, changes in energy policy, starting with the Renewable Energy Sources Act in 2014, have jeopardized the efforts of citizens to participate.[73][78] The share of citizen-owned renewable energy has since dropped to 42.5% as of 2016.[79]

The Renewable Energy Sources Act provides compensation to wind turbine operators for every kilowatt-hour of electricity not produced if wind power surpasses peak grid capacity, while grid operators must splice electricity from renewable sources into the grid even in times of low or no demand for it.[80] This can lead to a negative price of electricity, which grid operators have begun to pass on to customers, estimated to be costing them an extra €4 billion in 2020. This has resulted in greater resistance to certain Energiewende policies, specifically wind power.[80]

By 2019 Germany also saws a significant increase of organized opposition against on-shore wind farms, especially in Bavaria[81] and Baden-Württemberg.[82]

Computer studies

Much of the policy development for the Energiewende is underpinned by computer models, run mostly by universities and research institutes. The models are usually based on scenario analysis and are used to investigate different assumptions regarding the stability, sustainability, cost, efficiency, and public acceptability of various sets of technologies. Some models cover the entire energy sector, while others are confined to electricity generation and consumption. A 2016 book investigates the usefulness and limitations of energy scenarios and energy models within the context of the Energiewende.[83]

A number of computer studies confirm the feasibility of the German electricity system being 100% renewable in 2050. Some investigate the prospect of the entire energy system (all energy carriers) being fully renewable too.

2009 WWF study

In 2009 WWF Germany published a quantitative study prepared by the Öko-Institut, Prognos, and Hans-Joachim Ziesing.[84] The study presumes a 95% reduction in greenhouse gases by the year 2050 and covers all sectors. The study shows that the transformation from a high-carbon to a low-carbon economy is possible and affordable. It notes that by committing to this transformation path, Germany could become a model for other countries.

2011 German Advisory Council on the Environment study

A 2011 report from the German Advisory Council on the Environment (SRU) concludes that Germany can attain 100% renewable electricity generation by 2050.[85][86] The German Aerospace Center (DLR) REMix high-resolution energy model was used for the analysis. A range of scenarios were investigated and a cost-competitive transition with good security of supply is possible.

The authors presume that the transmission network will continue to be reinforced and that cooperation with Norway and Sweden would allow their hydro generation to be used for storage. The transition does not require Germany's nuclear phase-out (Atomausstieg) to be extended nor the construction of coal-fired plants with carbon capture and storage (CCS). Conventional generation assets need not be stranded and an orderly transition should prevail. Stringent energy efficiency and energy saving programs can bring down the future costs of electricity.

2015 Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project study

The Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project (DDPP) aims to demonstrate how countries can transform their energy systems by 2050 in order to achieve a low-carbon economy. The 2015 German country report, produced in association with the Wuppertal Institute, examines the official target of reducing domestic GHG emissions by 80% to 95% by 2050 (compared with 1990).[87] Decarbonization pathways for Germany are illustrated by means of three ambitious scenarios with energy-related emission reductions between 1990 and 2050 varying between 80% and more than 90%. Three strategies strongly contribute to GHG emission reduction:

  • energy efficiency improvements (in all sectors but especially in buildings)
  • increased use of domestic renewables (with a focus on electricity generation)
  • electrification and (in two of the scenarios also) use of renewable electricity-based synthetic fuels (especially in the transport and industry sector)

In addition, some scenarios use controversially:

  • final energy demand reductions through behavioral changes (modal shift in transport, changes in eating and heating habits)
  • net imports of electricity from renewable sources or of bioenergy
  • use of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology to reduce industry sector GHG emissions (including cement production)

Potential co-benefits for Germany include increased energy security, higher competitiveness of and global business opportunities for companies, job creation, stronger GDP growth, smaller energy bills for households, and less air pollution.

2015 Fraunhofer ISE study

Using the model REMod-D (Renewable Energy Model – Germany),[88] this 2015 Fraunhofer ISE study investigates several system transformation scenarios and their related costs.[89] The guiding question of the study is: how can a cost-optimised transformation of the German energy system — with consideration of all energy carriers and consumer sectors — be achieved while meeting the declared climate protection targets and ensuring a secure energy supply at all times. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is explicitly excluded from the scenarios. A future energy scenario emitting 85% less CO2 emissions than 1990 levels is compared with a reference scenario, which assumes that the German energy system operates in 2050 the same way as it does today. Under this comparison, primary energy supply drops 42%. The total cumulative costs depend on the future prices for carbon and oil. If the penalty for CO2 emissions increases to €100/tonne by 2030 and thereafter remains constant and fossil fuel prices increase annually by 2%, then the total cumulative costs of today's energy system are 8% higher than the costs required for the minus 85% scenario up to 2050. The report also notes:

From the macroeconomic perspective, the transformation of Germany's energy system demands a significant shift in cash flow, moving the cash spent on energy imports today to spend it instead on new investments in systems, their operation and maintenance. In this respect a transformed energy system requires a large expenditure for local added value, a factor which also does not appear in the shown cost analysis.[89]:8

2015 DIW study

A 2015 study uses DIETER or Dispatch and Investment Evaluation Tool with Endogenous Renewables, developed by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin, Germany. The study examines the power storage requirements for renewables uptake ranging from 60% to 100%. Under the baseline scenario of 80% (the German government target for 2050), grid storage requirements remain moderate and other options on both the supply side and demand side offer flexibility at low cost. Nonetheless storage plays an important role in the provision of reserves. Storage becomes more pronounced under higher shares of renewables, but strongly depends on the costs and availability of other flexibility options, particularly on biomass availability. The model is fully described in the study report.[90]

2016 acatech study

A 2016 acatech-lead study focused on so-called flexibility technologies used to balance the fluctuations inherent in power generation from wind and photovoltaics.[91][92] Set in 2050, several scenarios use gas power plants to stabilise the backbone of energy system, ensuring supply security during several weeks of low wind and solar radiation. Other scenarios investigate a 100% renewable system and show these to be possible but more costly. Flexible consumption and storage control (demand-side management) in households and the industrial sector is the most cost-efficient means of balancing short-term power fluctuations. Long-term storage systems, based on power-to-X, are only viable if carbon emissions are to be reduced by more than 80%. On the question of costs, the study notes:

Assuming that the price of emissions allowances in 2050 will significantly surpass its current level, a power generation system boasting a high percentage of wind and photovoltaics will, as a rule, come cheaper than a system dominated by fossil fuel power plants.[91]:7

2016 Stanford University study

The Atmosphere/Energy Program at Stanford University has developed roadmaps for 139 countries to achieve energy systems powered only by wind, water, and sunlight (WWS) by 2050.[93][94] In the case of Germany, total end-use energy drops from 375.8 GW for business-as-usual to 260.9 GW under a fully renewable transition. Load shares in 2050 would be: on-shore wind 35%, off-shore wind 17%, wave 0.08%, geothermal 0.01%, hydro-electric 0.87%, tidal 0%, residential PV 6.75%, commercial PV 6.48%, utility PV 33.8%, and concentrating solar power 0%. The study also assess avoided air pollution, eliminated global climate change costs, and net job creation. These co-benefits are substantial.

Criticisms

Components electricity price Germany
Components of the German electricity price for households in 2016[95]

The Energiewende has been criticized for the high costs, the early nuclear phase-out which increased carbon emissions, continuation or even increase in use of fossil fuels,[96] risks to power supply stability and the environmental damage of biomass.

German association of local utilities VKU said the strategy creates significant risks to the stability of power supply in case of "lengthy periods" of weather unsuitable for wind and solar generation since energy storage in Germany is "largely non-existent".[97] In 2020 power production from fossil gas reached all-time high in Germany.[96]

After introduction of the original Renewable Energy Act in 2000, there was a focus on long term costs, while in later years this has shifted to a focus on short term costs and the "financial burden" of the Energiewende while ignoring environmental externalities of fossil fuels.[98] Electricity prices for household customers in Germany have been generally increasing in the last decade.[4] The renewable energy levy to finance green power investment is added to Germans' electricity unit price. The surcharge (22.1% in 2016) pays the state-guaranteed price for renewable energy to producers and is 6.35 cents per kWh in 2016.[99]

A comprehensive study, published in Energy Policy in 2013, reported that Germany's nuclear power phase-out, to be complete by 2022, is contradictory to the goal of the climate portion of the program.[100] The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recognizes nuclear as one of the lowest lifecycle emissions energy sources available, lower than even solar, and only bested (slightly) by wind.[101] The US National Renewable Energy Lab (NREL) also cites nuclear as a very low lifecycle emissions source.[102] In June 2019, an open letter to "the leadership and people of Germany", written by almost 100 Polish environmentalists and scientist, urged Germany to "reconsider the decision on the final decommissioning of fully functional nuclear power plants" for the benefit of the fight against global warming.[103]

German Economy and Energy Minister Sigmar Gabriel admitted "For a country like Germany with a strong industrial base, exiting nuclear and coal-fired power generation at the same time would not be possible."[104][105] Germany's CO
2 emissions were escalating in 2012 and 2013 and it is planned to reopen some of the dirtiest brown coal mines that had previously been closed. Coal generated electricity increased to 45% in 2013, the highest level since 2007.[106] Nonetheless, in 2014 carbon emissions had declined again. More renewable energy had been generated and a greater energy efficiency had been achieved.[99] From 1999 to 2014 renewable energy production rose from 29 TWh to 161 TWh, while nuclear power fell from 180 to 97 TWh and coal power production fell from 291 to 265 TWh.[98]

As nuclear and coal power plants are being phased out, the government has begun to promote the use of natural gas in order to bridge the gap between fossil fuels and low-carbon energy sources.[107][108] This move has been criticised by interntional observers, who argue that fossil fuel gas is "essentially methane, which constitutes at least one-third of global warming and is leaking into the atmosphere all across the gas production and delivery chain." It is also a more potent greenhouse gas than carbon-dioxide.[109] It is also feared that the European Union, but particularly Germany, is making itself overly dependent on Russia for gas supplies via Nord Stream 2, thereby undermining its energy security.[110]

Germany's electricity transmission network is currently inadequately developed, therefore lacking the capability of delivering offshore wind energy produced on the Northern coast to industrial regions in the country's South. The transmission system operators are planning to build 4000 additional kilometers of transmission lines until 2030.[111]

Energy grid expert Manfred Haferburg criticized the program for "throwing away the world's best nuclear power plants like garbage" and, in the wake of COVID-19 pandemics, likened the program to a hypothetical takeover of German healthcare sector by "homeopaths and naturethreapists", at the same time warning about blackouts impacting hospital operations during the epidemics.[112]

Biomass

Biomass made up 7.0% of Germany's power generation mix in 2017.[113] Biomass has the potential to be a carbon-neutral fuel because growing biomass absorbs carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and a portion of the carbon absorbed remains in the ground after harvest.[114] However, using biomass as a fuel produces air pollution in the form of carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide, NOx (nitrogen oxides), VOCs (volatile organic compounds), particulates and other pollutants, although biomass produces less sulfur dioxide than coal.[115][116]

Between 2004 and 2011 policies lead on to around 7000 km² new maize-fields for biomass-energy by ploughing-up of at least 2700 km² of permanent grassland. This released large amounts of climate active gases, loss of biodiversity and potential of groundwater recharge.[117]

See also

  • Bundesnetzagentur
  • Electricity sector in Germany
  • Energieeinsparverordnung – German building energy regulations
  • Energy in Germany
  • Energy modeling
  • Federal Network Agency
  • Fossil fuel phase-out
  • The Fourth Revolution: Energy
  • German Renewable Energy Act
  • German Solar Industry Association
  • Germany National Renewable Energy Action Plan
  • KfW IPEX-Bank
  • List of countries by renewable electricity production
  • Low-carbon economy
  • Passivhaus
  • Renewable energy commercialization
  • Renewable energy in Germany
  • Renewable energy in the European Union
  • Soft energy path
  • Wildpoldsried


References

  1. ↑ Germany's Electricity Mix 2016
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi); Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) (28 September 2010). Energy concept for an environmentally sound, reliable and affordable energy supply. Berlin, Germany: Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi). http://www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/energy-concept,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi,sprache=en,rwb=true.pdf. Retrieved 2016-05-01. 
  3. ↑ Flexibility concepts for the German power supply in 2050: ensuring stability in the age of renewable energies. Berlin, Germany: acatech — National Academy of Science and Engineering. 2016. ISBN 978-3-8047-3549-1. http://www.acatech.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Baumstruktur_nach_Website/Acatech/root/de/Publikationen/Kooperationspublikationen/Stellungnahme_Flexibility_concepts.pdf. Retrieved 2016-04-28. [yes|permanent dead link|dead link}}]
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 The Energy of the Future: Fourth "Energy Transition" Monitoring Report — Summary. Berlin, Germany: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi). November 2015. https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/EN/Publikationen/vierter-monitoring-bericht-energie-der-zukunft-kurzfassung.pdf. Retrieved 2017-11-18. 
  5. ↑ Hillebrandt, Katharina, ed (2015). Pathways to deep decarbonization in Germany. Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) and Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI). http://deepdecarbonization.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/DDPP_DEU.pdf. Retrieved 2016-04-28. 
  6. ↑ Bruninx, Kenneth; Madzharov, Darin; Delarue, Erik; D'haeseleer, William (2013). "Impact of the German nuclear phase-out on Europe's electricity generation — a comprehensive study". Energy Policy 60: 251–261. doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2013.05.026. https://www.mech.kuleuven.be/en/tme/research/energy_environment/Pdf/wpen2012-15. Retrieved 2016-05-12. 
  7. ↑ "Reflections on Germany’s nuclear phaseout - Nuclear Engineering International". https://www.neimagazine.com/features/featurereflections-on-germanys-nuclear-phaseout-7941915/. 
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 "Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the 49th World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Davos on 23 January 2019" (in en). https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/speech-by-federal-chancellor-angela-merkel-at-the-49th-world-economic-forum-annual-meeting-in-davos-on-23-january-2019-1574188. 
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 Welle (www.dw.com), Deutsche. "Germany to fall short of 2020 climate goals: report | DW | 06.02.2019" (in en-GB). https://www.dw.com/en/germany-to-fall-short-of-2020-climate-goals-report/a-47395605. 
  10. ↑ Nathanael Johnson (8 January 2020). "The cost of Germany turning off nuclear power: Thousands of lives". Grist. https://grist.org/energy/the-cost-of-germany-going-off-nuclear-power-thousands-of-lives/. Retrieved 8 January 2020. "Multiple studies since then suggest that Germany did more harm than good. In the latest of these studies, a working paper recently published by the National Bureau of Economic Research, three economists modeled Germany’s electrical system to see what would have happened if it had kept those nuclear plants running. Their conclusion: It would have saved the lives of 1,100 people a year who succumb to air pollution released by coal burning power plants." 
  11. ↑ Olaf Gersemann (6 January 2020). "Das sind die wahren Kosten des Atomausstiegs" (in de). Die Welt. https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/plus204786230/Atomausstieg-Was-die-Energiewende-wirklich-kostet.html. Retrieved 8 January 2020. "But now there is an initial, far more comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. The key finding: expressed in 2017 dollar values, the nuclear phase-out costs more than $ 12 billion a year. Most of it is due to human suffering." 
  12. ↑ Stephen Jarvis; Olivier Deschenes; Akshaya Jha (December 2019). "The Private and External Costs of Germany's Nuclear Phase-Out". National Bureau of Economic Research. doi:10.3386/w26598. http://www.nber.org/papers/w26598. Retrieved 8 January 2020. "We find that the lost nuclear electricity production due to the phase-out was replaced primarily by coal-fired production and net electricity imports. The social cost of this shift from nuclear to coal is approximately 12 billion dollars per year. Over 70% of this cost comes from the increased mortality risk associated with exposure to the local air pollution emitted when burning fossil fuels.". 
  13. ↑ "With Nuclear Instead of Renewables, California & Germany Would Already Have 100% Clean Electricity" (in en-US). http://environmentalprogress.org/big-news/2018/9/11/california-and-germany-decarbonization-with-alternative-energy-investments. 
  14. ↑ Jungjohann, Arne; Morris, Craig (June 2014). The German coal conundrum. Washington, DC, USA: Heinrich Böll Stiftung. http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/German_Coal_Conundrum.pdf. Retrieved 2016-10-07. "The term Energiewende – the country's transition away from nuclear power to renewables with lower energy consumption – is now commonly used in English." 
  15. ↑ Krause, Florentin; Bossel, Hartmut; Müller-Reißmann, Karl-Friedrich (1980) (in German). Energie-Wende: Wachstum und Wohlstand ohne Erdöl und Uran. Germany: S Fischer Verlag. ISBN 978-3-10-007705-9. http://www2.hu-berlin.de/sachbuchforschung/CONTENT/SBDB/pix/PDF/Krause-Energie-Inhalt.pdf. Retrieved 2016-06-14. 
  16. ↑ Jacobs, David (2012). "The German Energiewende: history, targets, policies and challenges". Renewable Energy Law and Policy Review 3 (4): 223–233.  In support of the claim that Krause et al (1980) was the first use of the term Energiewende.
  17. ↑ "Origin of the term "Energiewende"". https://book.energytransition.org/origin-term-energiewende. 
  18. ↑ Paulitz, Henrik. "Dezentrale Energiegewinnung — Eine Revolutionierung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse" (in German). http://www.ippnw.de/atomenergie/energiewende/artikel/de/dezentrale-energiegewinnung-eine-r.html. 
  19. ↑ "Mit Bürgerengagement zur Energiewende" (in German). 2011. http://www.dnr.de/publikationen/umwelt-aktuell---archiv-2011/102011/mit-buergerengagement-zur-energiewende.html. 
  20. ↑ The Federal Government's energy concept of 2010 and the transformation of the energy system of 2011. Bonn, Germany: Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and Nuclear Safety (BMU). October 2011. http://www.germany.info/contentblob/3043402/Daten/3903429/BMUBMWi_Energy_Concept_DD.pdf. Retrieved 2016-06-16. 
  21. ↑ "Overview CDU/CSU and SPD present Coalition Agreement – 55% to 60% renewables by 2035 and more". Germany. 27 November 2013. http://www.germanenergyblog.de/?page_id=14825. 
  22. ↑ Buchan, David (June 2012). The Energiewende — Germany's gamble. Oxford, UK: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. ISBN 978-1-907555-52-7. https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/SP-261.pdf. Retrieved 2016-05-12. 
  23. ↑ Agora Energiewende (2015). Understanding the Energiewende: FAQ on the ongoing transition of the German power system. Berlin, Germany: Agora Energiewende. http://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2015/Understanding_the_EW/Agora_Understanding_the_Energiewende.pdf. Retrieved 2016-04-29. 
  24. ↑ Jungjohann, Arne; Morris, Craig (2016). Energy Democracy. Germany's Energiewende to Renewables.. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-3-319-31890-5. https://www.palgrave.com/de/book/9783319318905. 
  25. ↑ Consulting with energy scenarios : requirements for scientific policy advice. Berlin, Germany: acatech — National Academy of Science and Engineering. 2016. ISBN 978-3-8047-3550-7. http://www.akademienunion.de/fileadmin/redaktion/user_upload/Publikationen/Stellungnahmen/Stellungnahme_Energy_scenarios.pdf. Retrieved 2016-11-09. 
  26. ↑ Schiermeier, Quirin (10 April 2013). "Renewable power: Germany's energy gamble: an ambitious plan to slash greenhouse-gas emissions must clear some high technical and economic hurdles". Nature. doi:10.1038/496156a. http://www.nature.com/news/renewable-power-germany-s-energy-gamble-1.12755. 
  27. ↑ 27.0 27.1 Curry, Andrew (2019-03-27). "Germany faces its future as a pioneer in sustainability and renewable energy" (in en). Nature 567 (7749): S51–S53. doi:10.1038/d41586-019-00916-1. PMID 30918376. 
  28. ↑ "Sixth 'Energy Transition' Monitoring Report - The Energy of the Future, Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, June 2018
  29. ↑ Overview of legislation governing Germany's energy supply system: key strategies, acts, directives, and regulations / ordinances. Berlin, Germany: Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi). May 2016. http://www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/gesetzeskarte,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=en,rwb=true.pdf. Retrieved 2016-04-29. 
  30. ↑ 30.0 30.1 "Germany's energy transformation Energiewende". The Economist. 28 July 2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21559667. 
  31. ↑ Latsch, Gunther; Seith, Anne; Traufetter, Gerald (30 January 2014). "Gone with the wind: weak returns cripple German renewables". Der Spiegel. http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/wind-power-investments-in-germany-proving-riskier-than-thought-a-946367.html. 
  32. ↑ "Troubled turn: Germany's national energy project is becoming a cause for disunion". The Economist. 7 February 2013. https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21571440-germanys-national-energy-project-becoming-cause-disunion-troubled-turn. 
  33. ↑ Electricity prices for industrial consumers Eurostat, October 2015
  34. ↑ Electricity prices (table) Eurostat, October 2016
  35. ↑ "A powerplant in your neighborhood?: acceptance of power plants close to the home". 2014. http://strom-report.de/renewable-energy. 
  36. ↑ "Akzeptanzumfrage 2014: 92 Prozent der Deutschen unterstützen den Ausbau Erneuerbarer Energien". http://www.unendlich-viel-energie.de/themen/akzeptanz2/akzeptanz-umfrage/akzeptanzumfrage-2014. 
  37. ↑ REN21 (2015). Renewables 2015: global status report. Paris, France: REN21 Secretariat. ISBN 978-3-9815934-6-4. http://www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/REN12-GSR2015_Onlinebook_low1.pdf. Retrieved 2016-06-14. 
  38. ↑ 38.0 38.1 38.2 38.3 Making a success of the energy transition: on the road to a secure, clean and affordable energy supply. Berlin, Germany: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi). September 2015. http://www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/making-a-success-of-the-energy-transition,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=en,rwb=true.pdf. Retrieved 2016-06-07. 
  39. ↑ Agora Energiewende (2013). 12 insights on Germany's Energiewende : a discussion paper exploring key challenges for the power sector. Berlin, Germany: Agora Energiewende. http://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2012/12-Thesen/Agora_12_Insights_on_Germanys_Energiewende_web.pdf. Retrieved 2016-04-29. 
  40. ↑ Agora Energiewende (2015). The role of emissions trading in the energy transition: perspectives and limitations on current reform proposals. Berlin, Germany: Agora Energiewende. http://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2014/Kohledialog/Agora_Background_Roll_of_Emission_Trading_web.pdf. Retrieved 2016-04-29. 
  41. ↑ Agora Energiewende (2016). Eleven principles for a consensus on coal: concept for a stepwise decarbonisation of the German power sector (Short version). Berlin, Germany: Agora Energiewende. http://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2015/Kohlekonsens/Agora_Kohlekonsens_KF_EN_WEB.pdf. Retrieved 2016-04-29. 
  42. ↑ Quaschning, Volker (20 June 2016) (in German). Sektorkopplung durch die Energiewende: Anforderungen an den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien zum Erreichen der Pariser Klimaschutzziele unter Berücksichtigung der Sektorkopplung. Berlin, Germany: Hochschule für Technik und Wirtschaft Berlin. http://pvspeicher.htw-berlin.de/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/HTW-2016-Sektorkopplungsstudie.pdf. Retrieved 2016-06-23. 
  43. ↑ Agora Energiewende (2014). Electricity storage in the German energy transition: analysis of the storage required in the power market, ancillary services market and the distribution grid. Berlin, Germany: Agora Energiewende. http://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2013/speicher-in-der-energiewende/Agora_Speicherstudie_EN_web.pdf. Retrieved 2016-04-29. 
  44. ↑ Schill, Wolf-Peter; Diekmann, Jochen; Zerrahn, Alexander (2015). "Power storage: an important option for the German energy transition". DIW Economic Bulletin 5 (10): 137–146. ISSN 2192-7219. https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/108856/1/820492299.pdf. Retrieved 2016-06-09. 
  45. ↑ Agora Energiewende (2014). Benefits of energy efficiency on the German power sector : summary of key findings from a study conducted by Prognos AG and IAEW. Berlin, Germany: Agora Energiewende. http://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2012/positive-effekte-energieeffizienz/Agora_ECF_RAP_System_Benefit_Study_short_version_web.pdf. Retrieved 2016-04-29. 
  46. ↑ Agora Energiewende (2015). Increased integration of the Nordic and German electricity systems : modelling and assessment of economic and climate effects of enhanced electrical interconnection and the additional deployment of renewable energies. Berlin, Germany: Agora Energiewende. http://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2014/nordic-german-integration-project/Agora_Increased_Integration_Nordics_Germany_SHORT_WEB.pdf. Retrieved 2016-04-29. 
  47. ↑ Schiermeier, Quirin (10 April 2013). "Renewable power: Germany's energy gamble: an ambitious plan to slash greenhouse-gas emissions must clear some high technical and economic hurdles". Nature. doi:10.1038/496156a. http://www.nature.com/news/renewable-power-germany-s-energy-gamble-1.12755. 
  48. ↑ Strunz, Sebastian (2014). "The German energy transition as a regime shift". Ecological Economics 100: 150–158. doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2014.01.019. 
  49. ↑ Schmid, Eva; Knopf, Brigitte; Pechan, Anna (2015). Who puts the German Energiewende into action? : characterizing arenas of change and implications for electricity infrastructure. http://www.transformation-des-energiesystems.de/sites/default/files/de_zentral_Schmid_Best_Paper.pdf. Retrieved 2016-05-01. 
  50. ↑ "National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency (NAPE): making more out of energy". http://www.bmwi.de/EN/Topics/Energy/Energy-Efficiency/nape,did=667778.html. 
  51. ↑ Making more out of energy: National Action Plan on Energy Efficiency. Berlin, Germany: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi). December 2014. http://www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/nape-national-action-plan-on-energy-efficiency,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=en,rwb=true.pdf. Retrieved 2016-06-07. 
  52. ↑ Löschel, Andreas; Erdmann, Georg; Staiß, Frithjof; Ziesing, Hans-Joachim (November 2015). Statement on the Fourth Monitoring Report of the Federal Government for 2014. Germany: Expert Commission on the "Energy of the Future" Monitoring Process. https://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/V/vierter-monitoringbericht-energie-der-zukunft-stellungnahme-zusammenfassung-englisch,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf. Retrieved 2016-06-09. 
  53. ↑ Oltermann, Philip (11 October 2016). "Germany takes steps to roll back renewable energy revolution". The Guardian (London, United Kingdom). https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/oct/11/germany-takes-steps-to-roll-back-renewable-energy-revolution. 
  54. ↑ Chambers, Madeline (7 October 2015). "German cabinet agrees to costly underground power lines". Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/germany-energy-power-idUSL8N12722320151007. 
  55. ↑ "Energiewende: What do the new laws mean?". Clean Energy Wire (CLEW) (Berlin, Germany). 14 October 2016. https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/germany-set-miss-climate-goals-think-tank/energiewende-what-do-new-laws-mean. 
  56. ↑ (in German) Energiewende: Was bedeuten die neuen Gesetze? – 102/06-H-2016/DE. Berlin, Germany: Agora Energiewende. https://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2016/EEG-FAQ/Agora_Hintergrund_FAQ-EEG_WEB.pdf. Retrieved 2016-11-08. 
  57. ↑ "Energiewende: What do the new laws mean?". Clean Energy Wire (CLEW) (Berlin, Germany). 18 November 2016. https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/vw-cuts-23000-german-jobs-putting-jobs-climate/energiewende-what-do-new-laws-mean. 
  58. ↑ Argyropoulos, Daniel; Godron, Philipp; Graichen, Patrick; Litz, Philipp; Pescia, Dimitri; Podewils, Christoph; Redl, Christian; Ropenus, Stephanie et al. (November 2016). Energiewende: What do the new laws mean?: Ten questions and answers about EEG 2017, the Electricity Market Act, and the Digitisation Act — 103/07-H-2016/EN. Berlin, Germany: Agora Energiewende. https://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2016/EEG-FAQ/Agora_FAQ-EEG_EN_WEB.pdf. Retrieved 2016-11-22. 
  59. ↑ (in German) Klimaschutzplan 2050: Kabinettbeschluss vom 14. November 2016. Berlin, Germany: Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, Bau und Reaktorsicherheit (BMUB). 14 November 2016. http://www.bmub.bund.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Klimaschutz/klimaschutzplan_2050_bf.pdf. Retrieved 2016-11-17. 
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  62. ↑ Egenter, Sven; Wehrmann, Benjamin (15 December 2016). "Experts call for CO
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  70. ↑ "StackPath". https://www.uniper.energy/news/uniper-and-co-shareholder-decide-to-return-irsching-4-and-5-gas-power-plants-to-the-market/. 
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  74. ↑ "About one in two Germans is willing to financially participate in solar photovoltaic or wind power capacity". St Gallen, Switzerland. 8 September 2016. http://www.unisg.ch/en/wissen/newsroom/aktuell/rssnews/forschung-lehre/2016/september/energiewende-deutschland-investoren-umfrage-08september2016. 
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  77. ↑ University of Lüneburg; Nestle, Uwe (April 2014) (in German). Marktrealität von Bürgerenergie und mögliche Auswirkungen von regulatorischen Eingriffen — Eine Studie für das Bündnis Bürgerenergie e.V. (BBEn) und dem Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland e.V. (BUND). http://www.leuphana.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Forschungseinrichtungen/professuren/finanzierung-finanzwirtschaft/files/Studie_Marktrealitaet_von_Buergerenergie_Leuphana_FINAL_23042014.pdf. Retrieved 2016-09-09. 
  78. ↑ Morris, Craig (24 February 2015). "Few new German energy co-ops in 2014". Berlin, Germany. http://energytransition.de/2015/02/few-new-german-energy-coops-in-2014/. 
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  81. ↑ "An ill wind blows for the onshore power industry". 2019-08-20. https://www.politico.eu/article/an-ill-wind-blows-for-the-onshore-power-industry/. 
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  83. ↑ Dieckhoff, Christian; Leuschner, Anna, eds (November 2016) (in German). Die Energiewende und ihre Modelle: Was uns Energieszenarien sagen können – und was nicht. Bielefeld, Germany: transcript Verlag. ISBN 978-3-8376-3171-5. 
  84. ↑ WWF Germany (2009). Blueprint Germany : a strategy for a climate safe 2050. Berlin, Germany: WWF Germany. http://www.wwf.de/fileadmin/fm-wwf/Publikationen-PDF/blueprint_germany_wwf.pdf. Retrieved 2016-05-01. 
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  90. ↑ Zerrahn, Alexander; Schill, Wolf-Peter (2015). A greenfield model to evaluate long-run power storage requirements for high shares of renewables — DIW discussion paper 1457. Berlin, Germany: German Institute for Economic Research (DIW). http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.498475.de/dp1457.pdf. Retrieved 2016-07-07. 
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