Philosophy:Agent causation
Agent causation, or Agent causality, is an idea in philosophy which states that a being who is not an event—namely an agent—can cause events (particularly the agent's own actions). Agent causation contrasts with event causation, which occurs when an event causes another event.[1][2] Whether agent causation as a concept is logically sound is itself a topic of philosophical debate.[1]
Defenders of this theory include Thomas Reid and Roderick Chisholm. Reid believed that agents are the only beings who have a will, and considered having a will to be a necessary condition of being considered the cause of an event.[3]
Proponents
Thomas Reid is credited as the founder of the theory of agent causation.[4] In Essays on the Active Powers of Man (1788), Reid described an agent as one who has "power over the determinations of his own will."[5] He held that agents are the only beings who have a will, and considered having a will to be a necessary condition of being considered the cause of an event.[3]
Agent causation has been adopted by both compatibilists and incompatibilists alike.[1] Defending a compatibilist interpretation, Ned Markosian proposed a situation in which a person's actions, caused by nothing other than their own agency, have shaped their moral character over their lifetime to compel them to always do the right thing.[6] Roderick Chisholm's incompatibilist view contends that a free action is an action that originates from within the agent alone, not as the result of a prior event.[7] While still subject to debate, agent causation is generally considered to align with incompatibilist theory.[1]
Libertarians have offered agent causation as a defense of their incompatibilist belief that only undetermined, uncaused actions are free.[8] One objection to this belief argues that an undetermined action is one that occurs at random, and freedom does not follow from random, "by chance" action.[9] Agent causation counter-proposes the idea that an action need not be classified as either determined or random, but rather can occur under an agent's control.[10]
See also
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 "Agent Causation - Bibliography". PhilPapers. http://philpapers.org/browse/agent-causation. Retrieved 2016-11-23.
- ↑ "Agent-Causality". informationphilosopher.com. http://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/agent-causality.html. Retrieved 2016-11-23.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 Rowe, William L. (1991). "Responsibility, Agent-Causation, and Freedom: An Eighteenth-Century View". Ethics 101 (2): 237–257. doi:10.1086/293287. ISSN 0014-1704. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2381862.
- ↑ Nichols, Ryan; Yaffe, Gideon (2021), Zalta, Edward N., ed., Thomas Reid (Summer 2021 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/reid/, retrieved 2021-09-21
- ↑ Reid, Thomas (1788-01-01), Haakonssen, Knud; Harris, James A, eds., "Essays on the Active Powers of Man", The Edinburgh Edition of Thomas Reid: Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Edinburgh University Press): pp. 1, doi:10.1093/oseo/instance.00106526, ISBN 9780748617081, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oseo/instance.00106526, retrieved 2021-09-21
- ↑ Markosian, Ned (September 1999). "A Compatibilist Version Of The Theory Of Agent Causation". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (3): 257–277. doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00083. ISSN 0279-0750. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0114.00083.
- ↑ Feldman, Richard; Feldman, Fred (2021), Zalta, Edward N., ed., Roderick Chisholm (Summer 2021 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/chisholm/, retrieved 2021-09-21
- ↑ "Libertarianism". https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/libertarianism.html.
- ↑ Goldman, Alvin I.; Nozick, Robert (January 1983). "Philosophical Explanations.". The Philosophical Review 92 (1): 81. doi:10.2307/2184523. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2184523.
- ↑ Pink, Thomas (2004). Free will : a very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-151806-5. OCLC 77519071. https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/77519071.
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