Philosophy:Chinese New Left

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Chinese New Left
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The Chinese New Left is a term used in the China to describe a diverse range of left-wing political philosophies that emerged in the 1990s that are critical of the economic reforms instituted under Deng Xiaoping, which emphasized policies of market liberalization and privatization to promote economic growth and modernization.[1]

Chinese intellectual Wang Hui links the emergence of New Leftism with the financial crisis of 1997 and the 1999 United States bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which damaged the credibility of liberalism in China, as well as the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre.[2] Some of the Chinese New Left intellectuals enjoyed prominence, especially with the rise of Chongqing Communist Party secretary Bo Xilai, who promoted a set of socio-economic policies collectively termed the "Chongqing model", though they suffered a blow after the end of Bo's career in 2012 due to the Wang Lijun incident.

There is an ambiguity of the term New Left in discourse drawing from the diversity of the movement. Generally speaking, the New Left can be applied to a person who embraces leftist theories, ideals, and traditions rooted in variations of socialist ideology, and other schools criticizing postmodernism and neoliberalism.[3]

The New Left's relationship with Maoism and capitalism is complicated. Although some schools of thought suggest that the New Left wants the return to mass political movements of the Mao Zedong era and an abandonment of capitalism, others believe that it combines capitalism's open markets with socialist elements (particularly in rural China).[4] Additionally, the views within the New Left are diverse, ranging from hardline Maoists to more moderate social democrats.[5]

Terminology

Cui Zhiyuan is the first person to be called China's "New Left".

The term was first used by Chinese journalist Yang Ping, who published a review in the 21 July 1994, issue of Beijing Youth Daily about intellectual Cui Zhiyuan's article "New Evolution, Analytical Marxism, Critical Law, and China's Reality", remarking that China had produced its own "New Left wing".[6][7]

Although many New Left intellectuals oppose certain Maoist approaches, the term "New Left" implies some agreement with Maoism. Since it is associated with the ultra-leftism of the Cultural Revolution, many scholars and intellectuals supporting socialist approaches and reforms, but opposing the radical and brutal approaches of the Maoist period, do not completely accept the "New Left" label.[8] Some are concerned about the fact that adopting leftism implies that China, historically different from the West, is still using a Western model to strategise its reforms and would be limited by how the West defines the Left. Intellectual Wang Hui explains the origin of, and his skepticism about, the term:

The first stirring of a more critical view of official marketization goes back to 1993 ... But it wasn't until 1997–98 that the label New Left became widely used, to indicate positions outside the consensus. Liberals adopted the term, relying on the negative identification of the 'Left' with late Maoism, to imply that these must be a throw-back to the Cultural Revolution. Up until then, they had more frequently attacked anyone who criticised the rush to marketization as a "conservative" - this is how Cui Zhiyuan was initially described, for example. From 1997 onwards, this altered. The standard accusatory term became "New Left" ... Actually, people like myself have always been reluctant to accept this label, pinned on us by our adversaries. Partly, this is because we have no wish to be associated with the Cultural Revolution, or for that matter, with what might be called the "Old Left" of the reform-era CCP. But it is also because the term New Left is a Western one, with a very distinct set of connotations – generational and political – in Europe and America. Our historical context is Chinese, not Western, and it is doubtful whether a category imported so explicitly from the West could be helpful in today's China.[9]

However, liberal intellectual Xu Youyu points out that Wang Hui's performance in his interview with the New Left Review suggests that he fully understood that the term was inevitably generated by social change and intellectual antagonism in China.[10]

Origin

The concept of the New Left arose in China during the 1990s.[11] According to New Left theory, market-economy challenges stem from the fact that under Chinese economic reform, the market economy has become the dominant economic system; China's socialist economic reforms have brought the country into the global capitalist sphere.[12]

The development of the New Left is correlated to increased Chinese nationalism after its period of low-profile presence on the world stage during the Deng Xiaoping era. It is seen as a response to problems faced by China during its modernization drive since the 1980s, which has led to growing social inequality between the coast and hinterlands, and rich and poor. Some scholars believe that, based on its unique and drastic 20th-century economic and political changes, China cannot adopt the social-democratic, capitalist model of many Western countries.[13]

The Chinese New Left is concerned with the country's social-inequality issues. Some scholars believe that although the movement is not yet mature, it is likely to embed itself in Chinese society over the next century (assuming that polarization continues).[8] Strikes, sit-ins, slow-downs, and peasant uprisings, sporadic due to government suppression, are on the rise and may become more organized with the development of the New Left.[8]

Although they are skeptical and critical of capitalism, New Leftists recognize its influence on China and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of capitalist models. Cui Zhiyuan, a leading New Left intellectual, believes that it is imperative that socialism and capitalism are not viewed as opposites.[14] According to Zhang Xudong, "An advocate for New Deal-style economic and social policies in China was considered to be liberal in the 1980s, but as 'New Left' by the century's end." This overlap suggests that ideals set forth by the New Left strongly resemble the democratic socialism of the 1980s.[15][16]

Intellectual views

Economics plays a significant role in the Chinese New Left, whose development is closely associated with Chinese economic reform. Many supporters of the New Left generally believe that a leftist economic model should be found to tackle China's dependence on exports and savings, reduce the growing economic gap between rural and urban areas, and stimulate private business through public ownership and state planning. The capitalist free-market model applied in most social-democratic programs is undesirable because, instead of challenging and reforming the existing market economy and representative democracy, it seeks to moderate the social consequences of structural division and hierarchy. A suitable, sustainable market model is vital for China's leftist movement.[17] At the same time, the New Left criticized market reforms by citing the damage they caused to the countryside as an argument.[18]

New Left economist Cui Zhiyuan believes that a labour-capital partnership, based on the ideas of James Meade and John Maynard Keynes, can be used to introduce some flexibility to the labour market. Outside shareholders own capital-share certificates; workers own labour and share certificates, which replace a fixed wage and reduce the conflict of interest between workers and capitalists. Any decision that will improve one group (by raising the dividend on its share) will automatically raise the dividend on the shares of the other group.[17] Many New Left intellectuals are confident in the outcome of collective economic-development planning, anticipating rural industrialization.[13]

In 2010, when asked about the difference between the New Left in China and the New Left in the West, Professor Ding Xueliang of the Social Sciences Department of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology replied that, "there is no New Left in China at all, because the primary claim of the New Left is that human rights are greater than sovereignty", "The New Left in the West, they oppose the governments of their own countries on the one hand and the monopolies of their own countries on the other. Although their practical path may not be realistic, they at least have courage. The 'New Left' in China mostly appeals to the government, so how can this be called the New Left?"[19]

Social movements

According to the Financial Times in 2016, several experts estimate that if there were free elections in China, a neo-Maoist candidate would win. This Maoist revival movement precedes the tenure of Xi Jinping, whose own revival of Mao-era elements seem to be intended as a conciliatory move towards the neo-Maoists. It is believed that the rising popularity of neo-Maoism is due to the growing economic dislocation and inequality under market reforms and globalisation.[20]

Critiques of Jiang Zemin's 2001 decision to allow private business people to become party members,[21] referring to the decision as "political misconduct" and "ideological confusions", helped fuel the rise of what would become known as the New Left movement.[22]

Neo-Maoists first became prominent under Hu Jintao's administration, delivering far-left attacks on CCP policy from websites such as Utopia, or MaoFlag. They expanded into a political movement through association with the Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai, and succeeded in surviving crackdowns. It is believed that the CCP leadership is reluctant to eradicate these groups due to their connection with CCP history and ideology.[23]

Maoism and neo-Maoism have been increasingly popular after the rise of Xi Jinping among millennials and poor Chinese people, and they are more frequently covered by foreign media.[24][25][26][27]

Nanjie Village and land reform

A building and a wall in Nanjie Village, on which is written "Mao Zedong is a man, not a god, but Mao Zedong Thought is better than god". (毛泽东是人不是神，毛泽东思想胜过神)

National Public Radio's website posted a story about Nanjie on 13 May 2011, calling it a prime example of recent "re-collectivizations" inspired by Mao's ideas: "The furniture and appliances in each home are identical, including the big red clocks with Chairman Mao's head, radiating psychedelic colours to the tune "The East Is Red." [Villager] Huang Zunxian owns virtually nothing in his apartment. The possessions are owned by the collective, right down to the couch cushions .... " Some villages around the country have followed Nanjie's example and re-collectivized."[28]

During the 1990s, rural industry began to stagnate and China's large peasant population was seen as a hindrance to the country's development. Popular demand for further modernization, urbanization, and marketization began to outweigh the successes of the previous Township and Village Enterprises. Cui Zhiyuan and Gan Yang began to establish small, rural industries and collectives to mitigate the increasing socioeconomic gap and provide an alternative to large-scale capitalism.[29]

Although Hegang has had the largest number of laid-off workers since 1996, the city has registered China's highest rate of economic growth. Cui Zhiyuan suggests that the cause of this phenomenon is its "combining public land ownership and the market". Hegang has focused on stimulating its real estate market to stimulate the development of related industries.[30]

Of the Chinese Communist Party's current ideology, the idea of privatising China's countryside has not been accepted and it remains in public hands. Although most non-urban land is used privately, it cannot be sold (unlike urban property).

In 2008, the Third Session of the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (Chinese: 中国共产党第十七届中央委员会第三次全体会议) began a new round of land-privatization reforms,[31] but these measures were limited; the transfer of land remains ambiguous, not "officially endorsed and encouraged".[32]

Zhengzhou incident

On 24 December 2004, four Chinese protesters were sentenced to three-year prison terms for distributing leaflets entitled "Mao Forever Our Leader" at a gathering in Zhengzhou honouring Mao Zedong on the anniversary of his birth.[33] Attacking the current leadership as "imperialist revisionists," the leaflets called on lower-level cadres to "change the current line (of the party) and return to the socialist road". The Zhengzhou incident is one of the first manifestations of public nostalgia for the Mao era reported by the international press, although it is unclear whether these feelings are widespread. It is an example of Marxist Chinese New Leftism in action.[citation needed]

Chinese New Leftists are often criticised by liberal intellectuals such as Liu Junning, who consider China as not liberal enough economically and politically. These liberals think that inequality and the widening gap between rich and poor are serious problems which exist in every developing country. Democracy and personal freedom are seen as important for China, although perhaps not attainable in the near future.[citation needed]

Maoist Communist Party of China

A group of workers and students formed the Maoist Communist Party of China in 2008, an underground, non-recognized political party opposing the ruling Communist Party government.[34] A reported party manifesto, The Ten Declarations of the Maoist Communist Party of China, was posted on the Internet, in which the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party was questioned. The party advocates a reversal of the Deng Xiaoping reforms and a return to socialism.[citation needed]

Chongqing model

Politician Bo Xilai was promoted in October 2007 to party chief of Chongqing, a troubled province with high levels of pollution and unemployment and poor public health. Bo began a policy of expanding state-owned industries, in contrast with the rest of China, which was embracing market reforms. He led an economic reform of the region which was known as the Chongqing model and focused on expanding state influence in the economy, anti-corruption campaigns, and the promotion of "Red Culture". The policy also supported strong public welfare programs for the poor, unemployed, and elderly.[35][36]

Bo began the Red Culture Movement in 2008, which promoted Maoist culture in opposition to the capitalist culture that characterized the Chinese reformists. Radio and television played Maoist propaganda and students were organized to "return to the countryside" and promote the singing of "red songs" during this period.[37]

From 2009 to 2011, Chongqing began prosecuting alleged Triad members in the Chongqing gang trials.[38] An estimated 4,781 people were arrested during the crackdown.[39] The prosecution was controversial in its use of torture, forced confessions, and inhumane treatment of witnesses.[40][41]

In 2013, Bo was found guilty of corruption and sentenced to life imprisonment. He is incarcerated at Qincheng Prison. Bo was removed as Chongqing's party chief and lost his seat on the Politburo. Bo's supporters formed the Zhi Xian Party to protest his conviction, but it was swiftly banned.[42]

Xi era

"Long live Chairman Mao! Long live Chairman Gonzalo! Protracted People's War!" (毛主席万岁！贡萨罗主席万岁！持久人民战争！) graffiti on a wall at Qinghua South Road, Beijing, 6 December 2021.

The Xi administration, while imposing political controls on businesses, has also promoted greater economic liberalisation in Shenzhen, which was then held up as a model for the rest of China. In September 2020, the former mayor and party chief of Shenzhen, Li Youwei, published a sharply-worded commentary in Wen Wei Po, warning that due to the resurgence of leftists discussing class struggle, China was at a crossroads for economic reform.[43] In 2021, The New York Times reported that Maoism is being revived among China's generation Z due to China's growing wealth gap and the 996 working hour system, as they call for a crackdown on capitalists and posting "À la lanterne!" on the social medias.[44]

2015 Luoyang meeting

In February 2015, a group from 13 provinces and municipalities in China, calling themselves "Chinese Maoists Communists", held a two-day secret meeting in Luoyang, calling for a "new socialist revolution" to "reverse the restoration of capitalism". The group seemed to claim to have party elders as backers. The group was quietly arrested.[20] Luoyang was an industrial area that declined after the Chinese economic reforms of the 1990s and experienced extensive unemployment as a result. Maoist nostalgia is pervasive in the city. The neo-Maoists received online support across many blogs, Weibo, and websites such as RedChina.net. However some neo-Maoist groups refused to back it, typically those who regarded Xi Jinping's policies as sufficiently aligned to their neo-Maoist agenda.[45]

2017 Guangzhou incident

In November 2017, a group of Maoist students and workers was arrested in Guangzhou for organizing a Maoist salon.[46][47]

2018 Cultural Revolution anniversary celebrations

On the 52nd anniversary of the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, dozens of neo-Maoists from all over China gathered in Hong Kong for commemorations, saying that their activities had been banned in the mainland. They wore Mao-era blue military uniforms and waved hammer-and-sickle flags. These Maoist groups are highly critical of the CCP's market economics, which they claim are responsible for rising inequality and corruption.[48]

Jasic protests

A number of Maoist students participated in the July–August 2018 Jasic incident, protesting in support of factory workers and workers' rights.[49] The students formed the Jasic Workers Solidarity Group, which included #Me Too advocate Yue Xin.[27][50] The rally was largely organized through the popular far-left neo-Maoist online forum website Utopia.[51] Fifty student advocates were later arrested; their whereabouts are unknown.[49] Political suppression has been expanded to universities, factories, and the general public.[52] Student leaders of the Jasic protests have been detained, punished and subjected to forced education by the CCP.

Common prosperity

After Xi's emphasis on a more equal society and promotion of the term "common prosperity", Li Guangman, a retired newspaper editor affiliated with the Chinese New Left, published an article that claims a "profound revolution" was close that would take the party closer to masculinity and its socialist roots.[53][54] Major Chinese state news agencies published the article, including People's Daily and Xinhua News Agency, setting off widespread worries about parallels to the Cultural Revolution. In response, the news agencies tried to downplay the incident by not carrying the article in their print versions, some of them removing the article from their sites and, in the case of People's Daily, publishing a front-page editorial in support of market forces.[55]

See also

  • Huaxi Village
  • Nanjie
  • Red tourism

References

  1. ↑ Wang, Hui (2003). "The New Criticism". in Chaohua, Wang. One China, Many Paths. London: Verso. pp. 55–86. ISBN 1-85984-537-1. 
  2. ↑ Wang, Hui (2003). "The New Criticism". in Chaohua, Wang. One China, Many Paths. London: Verso. pp. 61–63. ISBN 1-85984-537-1. 
  3. ↑ Goldman, Merle (2015). "Review of China and New Left Visions: Political and Cultural Interventions". The China Journal (73): 266–269. doi:10.1086/679242. ISSN 1324-9347. 
  4. ↑ Cui, Zhiyuan. "How to Comprehend Today's China." Contemporary Chinese Thought. 37.4 (2006). Print.
  5. ↑ "The princelings are coming". The Economist. 25 June 2011. http://www.economist.com/node/18832046. 
  6. ↑ Huang, Paulos (19 May 2015). "Chinese New Leftism Between the Leviathan of State and the Wild Horse of Liberalism in the Light of Christianity". Yearbook of Chinese Theology 2015. Brill. p. 163. ISBN 978-90-04-29364-9. https://brill.com/display/book/edcoll/9789004293649/B9789004293649_010.xml. Retrieved 3 January 2023. 
  7. ↑ Shi, Anshu; Lachapelle, François; Galway, Matthew (March 2018). "The recasting of Chinese socialism: The Chinese New Left since 2000" (in en). China Information 32 (1): 155. doi:10.1177/0920203X18760416. ISSN 0920-203X. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0920203X18760416. Retrieved 3 January 2023. 
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 Zhao, Bin (March 1997). "Consumerism, Confucianism, Communism: Making Sense of China Today". New Left Review (222): 43–59. ISSN 0028-6060. http://0-newleftreview.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/I/222/bin-zhao-consumerism-confucianism-communism-making-sense-of-china-today. 
  9. ↑ One China, Many Paths, edited by Chaohua Wang, page 62
  10. ↑ Xu, Youyu (2007). "进入21世纪的自由主义和新左派" (in zh-hans). Modern China Studies (2). https://www.modernchinastudies.org/cn/issues/past-issues/96-mcs-2007-issue-2/1006-21.html. Retrieved 2022-08-08. "虽然汪晖在国内一再表示他反对用‘新左派’和‘自由主义’来说明知识界的分歧和论争，谴责这是‘给别人戴帽子的方式’，但他在接受英国《新左派评论》杂志采访所发表的谈话表明，他完全清楚这两个名称的出现是中国社会条件变化和知识界立场分化的产物。". 
  11. ↑ Anshu, Shi; Lachapelle, François; Galway, Matthew (March 2018). "The recasting of Chinese socialism: The Chinese New Left since 2000". China Information 32 (1): 140. doi:10.1177/0920203X18760416. ISSN 0920-203X. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0920203X18760416. Retrieved 22 October 2022. "The unhappy political, economic, and social consequences that accompanied rapid market transformation in the 1990s produced the context in which the New Left rose to the forefront of contemporary debates on China’s direction.". 
  12. ↑ Hui, Wang; Karl, Rebecca E. (7 March 2002), "Contemporary Chinese Thought and the Question of Modernity", Whither China? (Duke University Press): pp. 161–198, doi:10.1215/9780822381150-006, ISBN 9780822381150 
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 Hui, Wang; Karl, Rebecca E. (1998). "Contemporary Chinese Thought and the Question of Modernity". Social Text (55): 9–44. doi:10.2307/466684. ISSN 0164-2472. 
  14. ↑ Mishra, Pankaj (2006-10-15). "China's New Leftist" (in en-US). The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/magazine/15leftist.html. 
  15. ↑ Zhang, Xudong, "The Making of the Post-Tiananmen Intellectual Field: A Critical Overview." In Whither China? Intellectual Politics in Contemporary Chin, ed. Xudong Zhang (1-75). Durham: Duke University Press, 2001, p.16.
  16. ↑ Gan, Yang "Zhongguo ziyouzuopai de youlai" (Origins of the Chinese Liberal Left). In Sichao: Zhongguo 'xinzuopai' jiqi yingxiang (Ideological Trends: The Chinese "New Left" and its Influence), ed. Gong Yang (110-120). Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003.
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 Dallmayr, Fred R; Zhao, Tingyang (2012). Contemporary Chinese political thought : debates and perspectives. University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 9780813136424. OCLC 757463443. 
  18. ↑ Hook, Leslie (April 2007). "The Rise of China's New Left". Far Eastern Economic Review: 1–8. https://www.viet-studies.com/kinhte/China_new_left_FEER.pdf. Retrieved 29 July 2023. 
  19. ↑ Li, Zongtao. "丁学良:中国只有老左派，没有新左派" (in zh-hans). Sohu News (Southern People Weekly). http://news.sohu.com/20100827/n274518781.shtml. Retrieved 2022-12-13. "中国根本就没有新左派。新左派的首要主张就是人权大于主权，中国有这样的新左派吗？[……]新左派在西方，左手打本国政府，右手打本国大公司，两边不讨好。虽然他指的那条路未必现实，但他至少有那个勇气。而中国的新左派主要是抱政府大腿的，哪来的新左派啊！" 
  20. ↑ 20.0 20.1 Jamil Anderlini (30 September 2016). "The return of Mao: a new threat to China's politics". Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/63a5a9b2-85cd-11e6-8897-2359a58ac7a5. 
  21. ↑ "China Allows Its Capitalists To Join Party - The Washington Post". The Washington Post. 2022-07-23. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2001/07/02/china-allows-its-capitalists-to-join-party/98c51d3e-590c-4f1b-a52a-132b3def1281/. 
  22. ↑ Moore, Scott (2022). China's next act: how sustainability and technology are reshaping China's rise and the world's future. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 17. ISBN 978-0-19-760401-4. OCLC 1316703008. https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1316703008. 
  23. ↑ Mark, Magnier (25 June 2019). "The underrated influence of modern neo-Maoists on China's Communist Party". South China Morning Post. https://amp.scmp.com/culture/article/3016066/still-alive-and-kicking-underrated-influence-neo-maoists-todays-china. 
  24. ↑ "Why Beijing isn't Marxist enough for China's radical millennials" (in en). South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2147487/why-beijing-isnt-marxist-enough-chinas-radical. 
  25. ↑ Zhe, Zhan Dou. "Chinese authorities increase crackdown on workers and students" (in en-gb). www.marxist.com. https://www.marxist.com/chinese-authorities-increase-crackdown-on-workers-and-students.htm. 
  26. ↑ Hernández, Javier C. (28 September 2018). "China's Leaders Confront an Unlikely Foe: Ardent Young Communists" (in en). The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/28/world/asia/china-maoists-xi-protests.html. 
  27. ↑ 27.0 27.1 Zhan, Dou Zhe; Young, Parson. "China: JASIC workers' struggle reveals rising class tensions" (in en-gb). www.marxist.com. https://www.marxist.com/china-jasic-workers-struggle-reveals-rising-class-tensions.htm. 
  28. ↑ Kuhn, Anthony (4 August 2006). "Retro Communes: China's New Utopia?". https://www.npr.org/2006/08/04/5583917/retro-communes-chinas-new-utopia. 
  29. ↑ Carter, Lance. "A Chinese Alternative? Interpreting the Chinese New Left Politically." China Study Group. Insurgent Notes 1, 7 March 2010. Web. 9 May 2012. Archived from original.
  30. ↑ Cui, Zhiyuan. "How to Comprehend Today's China." Contemporary Chinese Thought. 37.4 (2006): 5. Print.
  31. ↑ The resolution on rural land reform in simplified Chinese can be found at [1].
  32. ↑ Jialin Zhang, China's Slow-motion Land Reform, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 1 February 2010.
  33. ↑ Maoists in China Get Three Year Prison Sentences for Leafleting: A Report on the Case of the Zhengzhou Four , Monthly Review, January 2005.
  34. ↑ "After India, Nepal, China under Maoist threat? - Times of India". The Times of India. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/After-India-Nepal-China-under-Maoist-threat/articleshow/6446130.cms?referral=PM. 
  35. ↑ "China's Falling Star". 19 March 2012. https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2012/03/19/chinas-falling-star-bo-xilai/. 
  36. ↑ Chun, Lin (22 April 2012). "China's leaders are cracking down on Bo Xilai and his Chongqing model | Lin Chun". The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/apr/22/china-leaders-cracking-down-chongqing-xilai. 
  37. ↑ Tania Branigan (22 April 2011). "Red songs ring out in Chinese city's new cultural revolution". The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/22/red-songs-chinese-cultural-revolution. 
  38. ↑ LaFraniere, Sharon (27 March 2012). "Crime Crackdown Adds to Scandal Surrounding Former Chinese Official". The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/world/asia/bo-xilais-china-crime-crackdown-adds-to-scandal.html?_r=1&hpw. 
  39. ↑ "Police held in China gang probe". BBC News (UK: BBC). 21 August 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8213357.stm. 
  40. ↑ Spegele, Brian (5 October 2012). "China's 'New Left' Grows Louder". Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390443493304578038121620762516. 
  41. ↑ Buckley, Chris (22 July 2017). "From Political Star to 'a Sacrificial Object' in China". The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/22/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-sun-zhengcai-chongqing-.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FBo%20Xilai&action=click&contentCollection=timestopics&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=collection. 
  42. ↑ Heng Shao (17 December 2013). "Bizarre China Report: The Grand Wedding, Power Play & Smog-Inspired Creativity". Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/hengshao/2013/12/17/bizarre-china-report-the-grand-wedding-power-play-smog-inspired-creativity/. 
  43. ↑ Wang, Xiangwei (17 October 2020). "Carrie Lam's non-speech said it all: Hong Kong and Shenzhen have swapped roles". China Briefing. South China Morning Post. https://amp.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/3105889/carrie-lams-non-speech-said-it-all-hong-kong-and-shenzhen-have. 
  44. ↑ Yuan, Li (8 July 2021). "'Who Are Our Enemies?' China's Bitter Youths Embrace Mao". The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/08/business/china-mao.html. 
  45. ↑ Jude Blanchette (2019). China's New Red Guards: The Return of Radicalism and the Rebirth of Mao Zedong. Oxford University Press. pp. 156–158. ISBN 978-0190605858. 
  46. ↑ "Justice for the Eight Comrades". https://socialistworker.org/2018/02/28/justice-for-the-eight-comrades. 
  47. ↑ "100 Chinese sign letter calling for release of Maoist intellectual". 23 December 2017. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2125541/chinese-scholars-sign-open-letter-calling-release. 
  48. ↑ Jun Mai; Choi Chi-yuk. "The last Maoists in China find refuge in capitalist Hong Kong". South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2147634/last-maoists-china-find-refuge-capitalist-hong-kong. 
  49. ↑ 49.0 49.1 "Young Marxists are going missing in China after protesting for workers". CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/13/asia/china-student-marxist-missing-intl/index.html. 
  50. ↑ "Fears for young Marxist activist missing after police raid in China" (in en). South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2167955/fears-young-marxist-activist-missing-after-police-raid-china. 
  51. ↑ Lau, Mimi (10 August 2018). "Chinese Maoists join students in fight for workers' rights" (in en). South China Morning Post (South China Morning Post). https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2158991/chinese-maoists-join-students-fight-workers-rights. 
  52. ↑ "Chinese campus crackdown on young Marxist activists expands in major cities". 14 November 2018. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2173090/chinese-campus-crackdown-young-marxist-activists-expands-major. 
  53. ↑ Mai, Jun (3 October 2021). "Beijing gives Chinese blogger a voice, rattling business, intellectuals" (in en). South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3150019/chinese-blogger-rails-against-party-enemies-and-rattles. 
  54. ↑ Lau, Mimi (24 December 2021). "First they attacked liberals, then private firms: rise of China's ultra-leftists" (in en). South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/3160864/ultra-leftist-voices-are-making-themselves-heard-china-what. 
  55. ↑ Buckley, Chris (9 September 2021). "Incendiary Essay Ignites Guessing Over Xi's Plans for China" (in en-US). The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/09/world/asia/china-li-guangman.html. 

External links

About Chinese 'New Left' theorist Wang Hui:



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