Social:Presidential cabinets of the Weimar Republic
Presidential cabinets (German: Präsidialkabinette) is a term applied to a succession of governments of the Weimar Republic whose legitimacy derived exclusively from presidential emergency decrees. From April 1930 to January 1933, three chancellors, Heinrich Brüning, Franz von Papen, and Kurt von Schleicher, governed without the consent of the Reichstag, Germany's lower house of parliament.
Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution gave the President of Germany (Reichspräsident) the power to pass emergency measures which did not require parliamentary support, as long as the federal cabinet approved of them. After a grand coalition led by chancellor Hermann Müller collapsed, president Paul von Hindenburg appointed the Centre Party politician Heinrich Brüning to the chancellorship. Since Brüning did not command a majority in parliament, he governed exclusively through the president's emergency powers. Whenever the government suffered parliamentary defeats, Hindenburg would dissolve the Reichstag and enable Brüning to stay in office.
During Brüning's time in office, the fascist National Socialist German Workers' Party and its leader Adolf Hitler became an influential force in German politics. Brüning legislated to oppose the party's paramilitary activity but was replaced with Franz von Papen, a conservative advisor of the president, who sought to compromise with the forces of the radical right. His short-lived presidential government saw the NSDAP gain the largest share of seats in parliament in the election of July 1932. Unable to overcome parliamentary obstruction, he was succeeded by Kurt von Schleicher, who, in turn, gave way to Adolf Hitler on 30 January 1933.
The presidential cabinets have been interpreted as a result of scepticism towards parliamentary government in German society as well as a fundamental shift in political practice towards a strong presidential ruler. Hindenburg's decision to govern without the support of the Reichstag constitutes a milestone on Germany's progression from a multi-party democracy to a totalitarian dictatorship under Hitler.[1]
Background
Article 48
The Weimar Constitution of 1919 introduced the office of President of Germany (Reichspräsident), a directly elected head of state with a term length of 7 years. The office was given far-reaching prerogatives, including powers to appoint the federal government and to dissolve the Reichstag, the lower house of Germany's legislature.[2] Through Article 48 of the constitution,[3] the President could use emergency powers which did not require parliamentary support[4] as long as the federal cabinet approved of them.[5] The power to appoint pliable governments and to dissolve parliament should those governments lose its support meant that Presidents could, in theory, govern solely on the basis of Article 48.[5]
Government of Hermann Müller
The 1928 German federal election yielded a fractured parliament in which no single party could command a governing majority. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) had gained the most seats while parties right of centre suffered significant losses.[6] SPD politician Hermann Müller became Reichskanzler (chancellor) at the helm of an informal grand coalition including his own party, the Catholic Centre Party, and the liberal German People's Party (DVP) and German Democratic Party (DDP).[7] Although the parties of Müller's government had little in common on domestic matters, their principal aim was to guarantee the passage of the Young Plan,[8] an agreement between Germany and the Allies of World War I reducing the amount of war reparations owed.[9]
After the Young Plan was passed by parliament in early March 1930,[10] the government struggled to find a unified approach to the social and economic challenges posed by the onset of the Great Depression. Differences between the SPD and the DVP became irreconcilable after the latter had begun to align itself with the interests of heavy industry owners.[8] A rift over a structural reform of unemployment benefits led to a collapse of consensus between the coalition parties, resulting in the resignation of Müller's cabinet on 27 March 1930.[11]
Presidential cabinets
Brüning
President Paul von Hindenburg, a retired general with links to anti-parliamentary and aristocratic circles,[12] had long sought to replace the grand coalition with a conservative government that did not answer to parliament but to the president himself.[11] When Müller's cabinet resigned, Hindenburg appointed the Centre Party politician Heinrich Brüning to the office of chancellor. His brief was to form a government of right-of-centre ministers and to exclude the SPD, the largest party of the Reichstag, from government.[11] Although Brüning was to present his legislative programme to parliament, he had secured a guarantee that Hindenburg would back up his new chancellor by invoking article 48.[13]
On 3 April 1930, supported by the votes of the nationalist German National People's Party (DNVP), Brüning's government unexpectedly survived an SPD-led motion of no confidence.[14] In July 1930, Brüning intended to pass a bill that would enact harsh tax increases and reduce social spending in a bid to reduce state expenditure against the background of the Great Depression. When parliament rejected the bill, Hindenburg triggered article 48, dissolved the Reichstag, and signed the chancellor's spending plans into law using emergency powers.[15] In the view of historian Heinrich August Winkler, this step marked the transition from a 'concealed' form of presidential government to an overt one.[16]
In September 1930, the election to replace the dissolved Reichstag returned a parliament without viable coalition options: the fascist National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) led by Adolf Hitler had won the second most seats after the SPD[17] and refused to co-operate with Brüning.[18] In order to keep the NSDAP out of government, the SPD adopted a 'policy of toleration' (Tolerierungspolitik) towards Brüning's cabinet: the party vowed to oppose motions of no confidence and thereby enabled the chancellor to govern solely via article 48.[18] The legislative importance of the Reichstag rapidly deteriorated: while parliament had held 94 sessions in 1930, it only convened 13 times in 1932.[19]
Tolerated by the SPD, Brüning continued his policy of fiscal austerity, facing growing opposition from business leaders and the extreme right Harzburg Front.[20] The 1932 presidential election returned Hindenburg to power but revealed substantial popular support for the NSDAP, whose candidate Hitler had gained 36.8% of the vote. This impression was reinforced through series of state elections in the spring of 1932.[21] The government sought to counter this trend by banning party-aligned paramilitary groups including the NSDAP's Sturmabteilung and Schutzstaffel.[22] At this time, Hindenburg's advisors, chief among whom former general Kurt von Schleicher, developed plans to install a more authoritarian cabinet supported by the NSDAP. Brüning's ban on paramilitary groups ran counter to such plans and precipitated a drive to remove him from office.[23] On 29 May 1932, Hindenburg demanded the chancellor's resignation;[24] the immediate cause for this was a disagreement over the settlement of farmers in the territories east of the river Elbe.[23]
Papen
On 1 June 1932, Hindenburg appointed Franz von Papen to the office of chancellor.[25] A former member of the Centre Party,[25] Papen recruited his cabinet from the ranks of the nobility, leading the SPD-affiliated newspaper Vorwärts to describe it as Das Kabinett der Barone ('Cabinet of barons').[26] Since only the DNVP had agreed to tolerate his government, the chancellor derived his authority from Hindenburg's use of article 48.[25] Soon after Papen's appointment, Hindenburg dissolved parliament and scheduled an election for 31 July. In intervening period, the government repealed the ban on paramilitary groups and took over the government of Prussia, whose legislature had been in deadlock after a state election.[27]
The July election returned a landslide victory for Hitler's NSDAP, which won 37.4% of the vote and became the largest party in the Reichstag.[28] In the aftermath of the election, Schleicher offered Hitler an opportunity to enter into the current government. Hitler refused, demanding that he be made chancellor of a new presidential cabinet. Hindenburg brusquely rejected his demands in a meeting on 13 August.[29] Papen remained in office but was defeated in a vote on its emergency powers tabled by the opposition on 12 September. On the same day, parliament was again dissolved.[30]
Even though the NSDAP regressed from its strong showing in the previous poll, the election of 6 November 1932 did not materially alter the parliamentary deadlock.[31] Hitler again attempted to become chancellor of a presidential government. Hindenburg indicated that he would not approve Hitler's chancellorship unless he could assemble a majority in parliament, a path Hitler rejected categorically.[32] The president realised that the current cabinet had too little support to prevent another defeat and a subsequent election. Papen proposed to sidestep this problem by indefinitely postponing an election and by suppressing opposition groups with force.[33] Hindenburg, though not rigidly opposed to such plans, opted to dismiss Papen under the influence of Schleicher.[33]
Schleicher
On 3 December 1932, Schleicher was appointed chancellor and formed a cabinet of similar characteristics to that of his predecessor.[34] Although Schleicher's government survived a session of parliament from 6 to 9 December unscathed, it could not stave off a motion of no confidence indefinitely. Thus, Schleicher began contemplating a prolonged state of emergency without an elected parliament.[35] Germany's military leadership expected far-reaching strikes[35] and even the outbreak of civil war should this option be pursued.[36] The chancellor avoided this outcome by reaching out to all political groups, including the NSDAP and trade unions. His efforts were undermined by the opposition of the agricultural and industrial lobbies who resented his economic stance.[37]
In January 1933, former chancellor Papen entered into negotiations with Hitler with the aim of replacing the government of Schleicher. The pair met in Cologne on 4 January to discuss the possibility of a cabinet involving the DNVP and Hitler's own party under the leadership of both Papen and Hitler.[37] In the following days, Papen intensely lobbied Hindenburg in favour of his plan, arguing that the conservative forces in a potential new government would keep Hitler's radicalism in check.[36]
On 16 January,[36] Schleicher requested that the president dissolve the Reichstag to bring about prolonged state of emergency. Hindenburg declined and insisted that a solution with the current parliament be found.[38] Schleicher handed in the resignation of his government on 28 January. Two days later, Hindenburg gave in to Papen's suggestions and appointed Hitler to the office of chancellor.[36] Like those of his predecessors, Hitler's government was only supported by the president's use of executive power. What set him from apart from previous presidential cabinets was his leadership of a political mass movement and its paramilitary organisations.[39]
Assessment
According to historian Andreas Rödder , the presidential cabinets were the result of a wider scepticism towards parliamentary government that had taken hold in German society around 1930.[40] He argues that the accrual of executive power in the hands of the president appeared as the most practical option when the political status quo had proved ineffective.[40] For historians Udo Wengst and Johannes Hürter , on the other hand, they mark a shift in political culture which emphasised the authority of the president.[41]
Winkler writes that Hindenburg's use of Article 48 reappropriated the intent of the Weimar constitution.[42] The article was designed for use in situations of utmost danger to the nation and was to be relinquished once these had passed. In his view, Hindenburg turned an emergency device into a substitute of the original constitution. After the NSDAP had become the dominant party of German politics in the election of July 1932, parliament could no longer offer the president a path back to normal constitutional government.[42]
The president's decision to govern without the support of the Reichstag is regarded by historians as a milestone on Germany's progression from a multi-party democracy to a totalitarian dictatorship under Hitler:[1] the abolition of parliamentary government removed moderate parties from power and eroded trust among the electorate, making the anti-democratic NSDAP a more palatable political choice.[43]
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 Kolb 2013, p. 151.
- ↑ Kolb 2013, p. 19.
- ↑ Kolb 2013, pp. 19–20.
- ↑ Winkler 1993, p. 101.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Dyzenhaus 1997, p. 123.
- ↑ Kolb 2013, p. 88.
- ↑ Winkler 1993, p. 338.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 Kolb 2013, p. 90.
- ↑ "Young Plan". Encyclopædia Britannica. 1998. https://www.britannica.com/event/Young-Plan.
- ↑ Bergmann 1930, p. 583.
- ↑ 11.0 11.1 11.2 Kolb 2013, p. 132.
- ↑ Winkler 1993, p. 280.
- ↑ Schulz 1992, p. 13-15.
- ↑ Winkler 1993, pp. 377–378.
- ↑ Kolb 2013, p. 133.
- ↑ Winkler 1993, p. 381.
- ↑ Schulz 1992, p. 122.
- ↑ 18.0 18.1 Kolb 2013, p. 134.
- ↑ Kolb 2013, p. 135.
- ↑ Kolb 2013, p. 138.
- ↑ Kolb 2013, p. 139.
- ↑ Kolb 2013, p. 140.
- ↑ 23.0 23.1 Kolb 2013, pp. 140–141.
- ↑ Winkler 1993, p. 470.
- ↑ 25.0 25.1 25.2 "Franz von Papen 1879–1969" (in de). https://www.dhm.de/lemo/biografie/franz-papen.
- ↑ Winkler 1993, p. 479.
- ↑ Kolb 2013, p. 143.
- ↑ Winkler 1993, pp. 505–506.
- ↑ Kolb 2013, p. 144.
- ↑ Winkler 1993, pp. 523–524.
- ↑ Winkler 1993, pp. 536–537.
- ↑ Kolb 2013, p. 145.
- ↑ 33.0 33.1 Kolb 2013, p. 146.
- ↑ Winkler 1993, p. 557.
- ↑ 35.0 35.1 Kolb 2013, p. 147.
- ↑ 36.0 36.1 36.2 36.3 Winkler 1993, p. 606.
- ↑ 37.0 37.1 Kolb 2013, p. 148.
- ↑ Kolb 2013, pp. 149–150.
- ↑ Kolb 2013, p. 150.
- ↑ 40.0 40.1 Rödder 1999, p. 100.
- ↑ Rödder 1999, p. 101.
- ↑ 42.0 42.1 Winkler 1993, p. 604.
- ↑ Kolb 2013, p. 151-152.
Bibliography
- Bergmann, Carl (1930). "Germany and the Young Plan". Foreign Affairs 8 (4): 583–597. doi:10.2307/20030309. ISSN 0015-7120. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/20030309.pdf.
- Dyzenhaus, David (1997). "Legal Theory in the Collapse of Weimar: Contemporary Lessons?". The American Political Science Review 91 (1): 121–134. doi:10.2307/2952263. ISSN 1537-5943. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2952263.pdf.
- Kolb, Eberhard (2013) (in de). Die Weimarer Republik (8th ed.). Munich: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag. doi:10.1524/9783486718775. ISBN 978-3-486-49796-0. https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1524/9783486718775/html.
- Rödder, Andreas (1999). "Reflexionen über das Ende der Weimarer Republik. Die Präsidialkabinette 1930-1932/33. Krisenmanagement oder Restaurationsstrategie?" (in German). Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 47 (1): 87–101. ISSN 0042-5702. https://www.jstor.org/stable/30195525.pdf.
- Schulz, Gerhard (1992). Ehrlich, Ernst L. ed (in de). Von Brüning zu Hitler: Der Wandel des politischen Systems in Deutschland 1930–1933. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110848946. ISBN 978-3-11-013525-1. https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9783110848946/html.
- Winkler, Heinrich August (1993) (in de). Weimar 1918-1933. Die Geschichte der ersten deutschen Demokratie. Munich: C.H. Beck. ISBN 978-3-406-44037-3.