Organization:Arctic Council

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Arctic Council
A logo consisting of a circular illustration of an arctic fox overlapping with a circular world map to form an infinity symbol.
  members
  observers
FormationSeptember 19, 1996; 29 years ago (1996-09-19) (Ottawa Declaration)
TypeIntergovernmental organization
PurposeForum for promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic states, with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities
HeadquartersTromsø, Norway (since 2012)
Membership
8 member countries
  • Canada
  • Denmark
  • Finland
  • Iceland
  • Norway
  • Russia
  • Sweden
  • United States
Main organ
Secretariat
Websitearctic-council.org
Part of a series on
Indigenous rights
Indalo symbol
Rights
Governmental organizations
NGOs and political groups
Issues
Legal representation
Category

The Arctic Council is a high-level intergovernmental forum that addresses issues faced by the Arctic governments and the indigenous people of the Arctic region. At present, eight countries exercise sovereignty over the lands within the Arctic Circle, and these constitute the member states of the council: Canada; Denmark; Finland; Iceland; Norway; Russia; Sweden; and the United States. Other countries or national groups can be admitted as observer states, while organizations representing the concerns of indigenous peoples can be admitted as indigenous permanent participants.[1]

History

The first step towards the formation of the Council occurred in 1991 when the eight Arctic countries signed the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). The 1996 Ottawa Declaration[2] established the Arctic Council[3] as a forum for promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic states, with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on issues such as sustainable development and environmental protection.[4][5] The Arctic Council has conducted studies on climate change, oil and gas, and Arctic shipping.[1][5][6][7]

In 2011, the Council member states concluded the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement, the first binding treaty concluded under the council's auspices.[5][8]

On March 3, 2022, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the United States declared that they will not attend meetings of the Arctic Council under Russian chairmanship because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[9][10] The same countries issued a second statement on June 8, 2022 that declared their intent to resume cooperation on a limited number of previously approved Arctic Council projects that do not involve Russian leadership or participation.[11][12]

Membership and participation

The council is made up of member and observer states, Indigenous permanent participants, and observer organizations.[1]

Members

Only states with territory in the Arctic can be members of the council. The member states consist of the following:[1]

  • Canada
  • Kingdom of Denmark
  • Finland
  • Iceland
  • Norway
  • The Russian Federation
  • Sweden
  • The United States

Observers

Observer status is open to non-Arctic states approved by the Council at the Ministerial Meetings that occur once every two years. Observers have no voting rights in the council. As of September 2021, thirteen non-Arctic states have observer status.[13] Observer states receive invitations for most Council meetings. Their participation in projects and task forces within the working groups is not always possible, but this poses few problems as few observer states want to participate at such a detailed level.[5][14]

As of 2025, observer states included:[13]

  • Germany, 1998
  • Netherlands, 1998
  • Poland, 1998
  • United Kingdom, 1998
  • France, 2000
  • Spain, 2006
  • China, 2013
  • India, 2013
  • Italy, 2013
  • Japan, 2013
  • South Korea, 2013
  • Singapore, 2013
  • Switzerland, 2017

In 2011, the Council clarified its criteria for admission of observers, most notably including a requirement of applicants to "recognize Arctic States' sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic" and "recognize that an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean including, notably, the Law of the Sea, and that this framework provides a solid foundation for responsible management of this ocean".[5]

Pending observer status

Pending observer states need to request permission for their presence at each individual meeting; such requests are routine and most of them are granted. At the 2013 Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna, Sweden — the European Union (EU) requested full observer status. It was not granted, mostly because the members do not agree with the EU ban on hunting seals.[15] Although the European Union has a specific Arctic policy and is active in the region, the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine prevents it from reconsidering its status within the Arctic Council.[16]

The role of observers was re-evaluated, as were the criteria for admission. As a result, the distinction between permanent and ad hoc observers were dropped.[15]

Future observer status

In 2023, Brazil expressed its interest in joining the Arctic Council as the first non-Arctic Latin American observer.[17]

Indigenous permanent participants

As of 2023, six Arctic indigenous communities have Permanent Participant status.[5] These groups are represented by

  • The Aleut International Association (AIA), representing more than 15,000 Aleuts in Russia and the United States (Alaska).[18]
  • The Gwich'in Council International (GCI), representing 9,000 Gwichʼin people in Canada (Northwest Territories and Yukon) and the United States (Alaska).[19]
  • The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), representing 180,000 Inuit in Canada (Inuit Nunangat), Greenland, Russia (Chukotka) and the United States (Alaska).[20]
  • The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), representing 250,000 Indigenous peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East.[21]
  • The Saami Council, representing more than 100,000 Sámi of Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden.[22]

However prominent the role of indigenous peoples, the Permanent Participant status does not confer any legal recognition as peoples. The Ottawa Declaration, the Arctic Council's founding document, explicitly states (in a footnote):

"The use of the term 'peoples' in this declaration shall not be construed as having any implications as regard the rights which may attach to the term under international law."[23]

The Indigenous Permanent Participants are assisted by the Arctic Council Indigenous Peoples Secretariat.[1]

Observer organizations

Approved intergovernmental organizations and Inter-parliamentary institutions (both global and regional), as well as non-governmental organizations can also obtain Observer Status.[13]

Organizations with observer status currently include the Arctic Parliamentarians,[24] International Union for Conservation of Nature, the International Red Cross Federation, the Nordic Council, the Northern Forum,[25] United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment Programme; the Association of World Reindeer Herders,[26] Oceana,[27] the University of the Arctic, and the World Wide Fund for Nature-Arctic Programme.

Administrative aspects

Foreign Minister Timo Soini of Finland chairs the May 2019 ministerial meeting.

Meetings

Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, in Reykjavík, Iceland in 2021

Arctic Council members agreed to action points on protecting the Arctic but most have never materialized.[28]

List of Arctic Council Ministerial Meetings
Date(s) City Country
17–18 September 1998 Iqaluit Canada
13 October 2000 Barrow United States
10 October 2002 Inari Finland
24 November 2004 Reykjavík Iceland
26 October 2006 Salekhard Russia
29 April 2009 Tromsø Norway
12 May 2011 Nuuk Greenland, Denmark
15 May 2013 Kiruna Sweden
24 April 2015 Iqaluit Canada
10–11 May 2017 Fairbanks United States
7 May 2019 Rovaniemi Finland
19–20 May 2021 Reykjavík Iceland
11 May 2023 Salekhard Russia[29]
12 May 2025 Tromsø Norway[30]

Chairmanship

Chairmanship of the Council rotates every two years.[31] The current chair is Denmark, which serves until the Ministerial meeting in 2027.[32]

  • Canada (1996–1998)[33]
  • United States (1998–2000)[34]
  • Finland (2000–2002)[35]
  • Iceland (2002–2004)[35]
  • Russia (2004–2006)[35]
  • Norway (2006–2009)[35]
  • Denmark (2009–2011)[35][36]
  • Sweden (2011–2013)[31][37]
  • Canada (2013–2015)[38]
  • United States (2015–2017)[34]
  • Finland (2017–2019)[39][40]
  • Iceland (2019–2021)
  • Russia (2021–2023)
  • Norway (2023-2025)[41]
  • Denmark (2025-2027)[42]

Norway, Denmark, and Sweden have agreed on a set of common priorities for the three chairmanships. They also agreed to a shared secretariat 2006–2013.[35]

The secretariat

In 2012, the Council moved towards creating a permanent secretariat in Tromsø, Norway.[5][43]

Past directors

  • Magnús Jóhannesson (Iceland) February 2013-October 2017[44]
  • Nina Buvang Vaaja (Norway) October 2017-August 2021[45]
  • Mathieu Parker (Canada) August 2021 – Present

The Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat

It is costly for the Permanent participants to be represented at every Council meeting, especially since they take place across the entire circumpolar realm. To enhance the capacity of the PPs to pursue the objectives of the Arctic Council and to assist them to develop their internal capacity to participate and intervene in Council meetings, the Council provides financial support to the Indigenous Peoples' Secretariat (IPS).[46]


In September 2017, Anna Degteva replaced Elle Merete Omma as the executive secretary for the Indigenous Peoples´ Secretariat.[47]

Working groups, programs and action plans

Arctic Council working groups

Programs and action plans

Security and geopolitical issues

Before signing the Ottawa Declaration, a footnote was added stating; "The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security".[56] In 2019, United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that circumstances had changed and "the region has become an arena for power and for competition. And the eight Arctic states must adapt to this new future".[57] The council is often in the middle of security and geopolitical issues since the Arctic has peculiar interests to Member States and Observers. Changes in the Arctic environment and participants of the Arctic Council have led to a reconsideration of the relationship between geopolitical matters and the role of the Arctic Council. Disputes over land and ocean in the Arctic had been extremely limited. The only outstanding land dispute was between Canada and Denmark, the Whisky War, over Hans Island, which was resolved in the summer of 2022 with agreement to split the island in half.[58] There are oceanic claims between the United States and Canada in the Beaufort Sea.[59][60]

Claims to the Arctic Seabed and Arctic Sea.

The major territorial disputes are over exclusive rights to the seabed under the central Arctic high seas. Due to climate change and melting of the Arctic sea-ice, more energy resources and waterways are now becoming accessible. Large reserves of oil, gas and minerals are located within the Arctic. This environmental factor generated territorial disputes among member states. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea allows states to extend their exclusive right to exploit resources on and in the continental shelf if they can prove that seabed more than 200 nautical miles (370 km; 230 mi) from baselines is a natural prolongation of the land. Canada, Russia, and Denmark (via Greenland) have all submitted partially overlapping claims to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), which is charged with confirming the continental shelf's outer limits. Once the CLCS makes its rulings, Russia, Denmark, and Canada will need to negotiate to divide their overlapping claims.[61]

Disputes also exist over the nature of the Northwest Passage and the Northeast Passage / Northern Sea Route. Canada claims the entire Northwest Passage are Canadian Internal Waters, which means Canada would have total control over which ships may enter the channel. The United States believes the Passage is an international strait, which would mean any ship could transit at any time, and Canada could not close the Passage. Russia's claims over the Northern Sea Route are significantly different. Russia only claims small segments of the Northern Sea Route around straits as internal waters. However, Russia requires all commercial vessels to request and obtain permission to navigate in a large area of the Russian Arctic exclusive economic zone under Article 234 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which grants coastal states greater powers over ice-covered waters.

Canadian sovereignty over the Northwest Passage arouses substantial public concern in Canada. A poll indicated that half of Canadian respondents said Canada should try to assert its full sovereignty rights over the Beaufort Sea compared to just 10 percent of Americans.[62] New commercial trans-Arctic shipping routes can be another factor of conflicts. A poll found that Canadians perceive the Northwest Passage as their internal Canadian waterway whereas other countries assert it is an international waterway.[62]

The increase in the number of observer states drew attention to other national security issues. Observers have demonstrated their interests in the Arctic region. China has explicitly shown its desire to extract natural resources in Greenland.[63]

Military infrastructure is another point to consider. Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia are rapidly increasing their defence presence by building up their militaries in the Arctic and developing their building infrastructure.[64]

However, some say that the Arctic Council facilitates stability despite possible conflicts among member states.[5] Norwegian Admiral Haakon Bruun-Hanssen has suggested that the Arctic is "probably the most stable area in the world". They say that laws are well established and followed.[63] Member states think that the sharing cost of the development of Arctic shipping-lanes, research, etc., by cooperation and good relationships between states is beneficial to all.[65]

Looking at these two different perspectives, some suggest that the Arctic Council should expand its role by including peace and security issues as its agenda. A 2010 survey showed that large majorities of respondents in Norway, Canada, Finland, Iceland, and Denmark were very supportive on the issues of an Arctic nuclear-weapons free zone.[66] Although only a small majority of Russian respondents supported such measures, more than 80 percent of them agreed that the Arctic Council should cover peace-building issues.[67] Paul Berkman suggests that solving security matters in the Arctic Council could save members the much larger amount of time required to reach a decision in United Nations. However, as of June 2014, military security matters are often avoided.[68] The focus on science and resource protection and management is seen as a priority, which could be diluted or strained by the discussion of geopolitical security issues.[69]

Reactions to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

The Arctic Council faced an unprecedented challenge in 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. In response, the Council’s seven other member states condemned the invasion, halting cooperative projects involving Russia and effectively freezing much of the Council’s multilateral work.[70] This response highlighted deeper divisions between Russia and the Western bloc within the Council, straining the inclusivity that had previously characterized its operations.

Despite these challenges, the Council successfully transitioned its chairmanship from Russia to Norway in 2023, demonstrating its capacity to maintain institutional continuity under difficult circumstances.[71] However, relations with Russia within the Council remain strained, and questions persist about how the Council will navigate its relationship with Russia moving forward.[72] This period has underscored the increasing relevance of geopolitical considerations in the Council’s operations. While originally focused on environmental protection and sustainable development, the Arctic Council now finds itself grappling with the broader realities of global power politics and their impact on regional governance.[70]

Observer status and geopolitical tensions

The observer status system within the Arctic Council has increasingly become a source of geopolitical tension. Observers include non-Arctic states such as China, Japan, and South Korea, alongside intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. China’s inclusion as a permanent observer in 2013 sparked significant debate among member states.[73] While observers lack decision-making power, their participation has raised concerns about the influence of powerful non-Arctic actors on the Council’s governance.

China’s growing interest in Arctic resources and shipping routes has fueled broader strategic concerns.[74] Some opinions view its participation as a necessary step toward fostering international cooperation, while others see it as a potential risk to Arctic sovereignty.[73] These tensions reflect the challenge of balancing inclusivity with the need to safeguard regional interests, a dynamic that has become increasingly prominent in the Council’s activities.[75]

Discourse and media narratives

Media narratives have played a significant role in shaping perceptions of the Arctic Council and its activities. The China threat narrative, for example, portrays China as leveraging its observer status to pursue economic and strategic advantages in the Arctic.[73] These portrayals have contributed to broader geopolitical concerns, despite evidence that China has largely adhered to the Council’s cooperative norms.

Similarly, the concept of a resource rush in the Arctic has been amplified by media portrayals, framing the region as a potential hotspot for conflict over resources and maritime routes.[76][74] While such narratives have heightened attention to the Arctic’s strategic importance, they often oversimplify the Council’s efforts to maintain neutrality and collaborative governance. These dynamics illustrate the increasing complexity of balancing the Arctic Council’s original mission with growing global interest in the region.[75]

See also

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 "About the Arctic Council". The Arctic Council. April 7, 2011. https://arctic-council.org/about/. 
  2. ↑ "Arctic Council: Founding Documents". http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/4-founding-documents. 
  3. ↑ Axworthy, Thomas S. (March 29, 2010). "Canada bypasses key players in Arctic meeting". https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2010/03/29/axworthy_canada_bypasses_key_players_in_arctic_meeting.html. 
  4. ↑ Savage, Luiza Ch. (May 13, 2013). "Why everyone wants a piece of the Arctic". Rogers Digital Media. http://www.macleans.ca/2013/05/13/why-the-world-wants-the-arctic/. 
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 Buixadé Farré, Albert; Stephenson, Scott R.; Chen, Linling; Czub, Michael; Dai, Ying; Demchev, Denis; Efimov, Yaroslav; Graczyk, Piotr et al. (October 16, 2014). "Commercial Arctic shipping through the Northeast Passage: Routes, resources, governance, technology, and infrastructure". Polar Geography 37 (4): 298–324. doi:10.1080/1088937X.2014.965769. Bibcode: 2014PolGe..37..298B. https://discovery.dundee.ac.uk/files/8813253/Commercial_Arctic_shipping_through_the_Northeast_Passage_routes_resources_governance_technology_and_infrastructure.pdf. 
  6. ↑ Lawson W Brigham (September–October 2021). "Think Again: The Arctic". Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/16/think_again_the_arctic?page=full. Retrieved 2013-09-24. 
  7. ↑ Brigham, L.; McCalla, R.; Cunningham, E.; Barr, W.; VanderZwaag, D.; Chircop, A.; Santos-Pedro, V.M.; MacDonald, R. et al. (2009). Brigham, Lawson; Santos-Pedro, V.M.; Juurmaa, K.. eds. Arctic marine shipping assessment (AMSA). Norway: Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), Arctic Council. http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/detect/documents/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.pdf. 
  8. ↑ Koring, Paul (12 May 2011). "Arctic treaty leaves much undecided". The Globe and Mail. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/americas/arctic-treaty-leaves-much-undecided/article2017510/. 
  9. ↑ "Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation following Russia's Invasion of Ukraine". 3 March 2022. https://via.ritzau.dk/pressemeddelelse/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine?publisherId=2012662&releaseId=13645015. 
  10. ↑ "Canada, six other states pull back from Arctic Council in protest over Ukraine". 3 March 2022. https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/article/canada-six-other-states-pull-back-from-arctic-council-in-protest-over-ukraine/. 
  11. ↑ Canada, Global Affairs (2022-06-08). "Joint statement on limited resumption of Arctic Council cooperation". https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/06/joint-statement-on-limited-resumption-of-arctic-council-cooperation.html. 
  12. ↑ Schreiber, Melody (2022-06-08). "Arctic Council nations to resume limited cooperation — without Russia" (in en-US). https://www.arctictoday.com/arctic-council-nations-to-resume-limited-cooperation-without-russia/. 
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 "Observers". Arctic Council Secretariat (2021). Arctic Council. https://arctic-council.org/about/observers/. 
  14. ↑ Ghattas, Kim (2013-05-14). "Arctic Council: John Kerry steps into Arctic diplomacy". Bbc.co.uk. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-22528594. 
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 "The EU and the Arctic Council". April 20, 2015. http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_eu_and_the_arctic_council3005. 
  16. ↑ Morcillo Pazos, Adrián & López Coca, Pau (2022). Comparison of EU and Chinese policies in the Arctic : new challenges in the Arctic after the Ukraine war. Quaderns IEE, Vol. 1, Nº. 2, pp. 87-114. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=8570467
  17. ↑ "Brazilian ambassador to Russia: Brazil plans to become an observer country in the Arctic Council". 25 January 2023. https://arctic.ru/international/20230125/1015091.html. 
  18. ↑ "Aleut International Association". Arctic Council. https://arctic-council.org/about/permanent-participants/aia/. 
  19. ↑ "Gwich'in Council International". Arctic Council. https://arctic-council.org/about/permanent-participants/gci/. 
  20. ↑ "Gwich'in Council International". Arctic Council. https://arctic-council.org/about/permanent-participants/icc/. 
  21. ↑ "Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North". Arctic Council. https://arctic-council.org/about/permanent-participants/raipon/. 
  22. ↑ "Saami Council". Arctic Council. https://arctic-council.org/about/permanent-participants/saami-council/. 
  23. ↑ Bloom, Evan T. (1999). "Establishment of the Arctic Council". The American Journal of International Law 93 (3): 712–722. doi:10.2307/2555272. 
  24. ↑ "Arctic Parliamentarians". Arcticparl.org. http://www.arcticparl.org/. 
  25. ↑ "Northern Forum". Northern Forum. http://www.northernforum.org. 
  26. ↑ "Association of World Reindeer Herders". http://arcticportal.org/portal/icr-new/assn.-of-world-reindeer-herders. 
  27. ↑ "The Arctic Council". http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/462-observer-oceana. 
  28. ↑ Press briefing, Arctic Council Annual Meeting, Nuuk May 2011 Stop talking – start protecting 2012.
  29. ↑ "13. Thirteenth Meeting of the Arctic Council in Salekhard, Russian Federation, May 11, 2023". https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/collections/964b77b7-8cb5-481e-943c-4e158559e5d2. 
  30. ↑ Secretariat, Arctic Council (6 June 2025). "14th Meeting of the Arctic Council - Meeting Summary". https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/items/c4352f1c-f29c-4bb4-8544-24ee1eb95550. "The 14th meeting of the Arctic Council took place on 12 May 2025 in Tromsø, Norway, and virtually, from 15:00 to 17:00 CEST. The hybrid format permitted small delegations from the outgoing and incoming Chairships to attend in person, while an additional 110 attendees joined the meeting online" 
  31. ↑ 31.0 31.1 Troniak, Shauna (May 1, 2013). "Canada as Chair of the Arctic Council". Library of Parliament Research Publications. http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2013-20-e.htm. 
  32. ↑ "Denmark assumes chair of Arctic Council" (in en-US). 2025-05-12. https://www.eunews.it/en/2025/05/12/denmark-assumes-chair-of-arctic-council/. 
  33. ↑ "Canadian Chairmanship Program 2013–2015" (in en-gb). https://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/our-work2/8-news-and-events/226-canadian-chairmanship-program-2013-2015. 
  34. ↑ 34.0 34.1 "Secretary Tillerson Chairs 10th Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting" (in en-US). U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/05/270816.htm. 
  35. ↑ 35.0 35.1 35.2 35.3 35.4 35.5 "Arctic Council Secretariat" (in en-gb). https://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/the-arctic-council-secretariat. 
  36. ↑ (in en) The Kingdom of Denmark. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council 2009–2011. 2009-04-29. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1565. 
  37. ↑ "Council of American Ambassadors". https://www.americanambassadors.org/publications/ambassadors-review/fall-2011/sweden-assumes-the-chairmanship-of-the-arctic-council. 
  38. ↑ Category: About (2011-04-07). "The Norwegian, Danish, Swedish common objectives for their Arctic Council chairmanships 2006–2013". http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/arctic-council/about-arctic-council. 
  39. ↑ "The Arctic Council". https://arctic-council.org/en/. 
  40. ↑ "Finland's Chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2017–2019". https://um.fi/finland-s-chairmanship-of-the-arctic-council-in-2017-2019. 
  41. ↑ "Norway's Chairship - Arctic Council 2023-2025". May 12, 2023. https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/items/7f64630d-cc5f-4d38-baa4-178c72a63293. 
  42. ↑ "Kingdom of Denmark's Chairship, 2025-2027" (in en). https://arctic-council.org/about/kingdom-of-denmarks-chairship-2025-2027/. 
  43. ↑ "Travel of Deputy Secretary Burns to Sweden and Estonia". State.gov. 2012-05-14. https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/05/189840.htm. 
  44. ↑ Secretariat, Arctic Council (2018). "Arctic Council Secretariat annual report 2017" (in en). https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/2168. 
  45. ↑ "Introducing Mathieu Parker: The new director of the Arctic Council Secretariat" (in en). https://arctic-council.org/news/introducing-mathieu-parker-the-new-director-of-the-arctic-council-secretariat/. 
  46. ↑ "Terms, Reference and Guidelines". http://arctic-council.org/filearchive/IPS%20Terms%20of%20Reference%20and%20Guidelines.pdf. 
  47. ↑ Arctic Council Secretariat (2018). "Arctic Council Secretariat annual report 2017" (in en). https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/2168. 
  48. ↑ "Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme". Amap.no. http://www.amap.no/. 
  49. ↑ "Conservation of Arctic Flora & Fauna (CAFF)". Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna. http://www.caff.is/. 
  50. ↑ "Emergency Prevention, Preparedness & Response". Eppr.arctic-council.org. 2013-06-04. http://eppr.arctic-council.org/. 
  51. ↑ "Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment". Pame.is. 2013-06-13. http://www.pame.is/. 
  52. ↑ "Oops! We couldn't find this page for you". https://arcticportal.org/page-not-found. 
  53. ↑ "Sustainable Development Working Group". Portal.sdwg.org. 2013-08-27. http://portal.sdwg.org/. 
  54. ↑ "Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP)". Acap.arctic-council.org. http://acap.arctic-council.org/. 
  55. ↑ Arctic Biodiversity Assessment
  56. ↑ "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa, Canada, 1996)". May 10, 2017. https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/international_relations-relations_internationales/arctic-arctique/declaration_ac-declaration_ca.aspx?lang=eng. 
  57. ↑ Dams, Ties; van Schaik, Louise; Stoetman, Adája (2020). Presence before power: why China became a near-Arctic state (Report). Clingendael Institute. pp. 6–19. 
  58. ↑ "Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark, together with Greenland, reach historic agreement on long-standing boundary disputes". June 14, 2022. https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/06/canada-and-the-kingdom-of-denmark-together-with-greenland-reach-historic-agreement-on-long-standing-boundary-disputes.html. 
  59. ↑ "Transnational Issues CIA World Fact Book". CIA. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/united-states/. 
  60. ↑ "Sea Changes". http://www.institutenorth.org/servlet/download?id=35. 
  61. ↑ Overfield, Cornell (April 21, 2021). "An Off-the-Shelf Guide to Extended Continental Shelves and the Arctic". https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/shelf-guide-extended-continental-shelves-and-arctic. 
  62. ↑ 62.0 62.1 Jill Mahoney. "Canadians rank Arctic sovereignty as top foreign-policy priority". The Globe and Mail. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canadians-rank-arctic-sovereignty-as-top-foreign-policy-priority/article563348/. 
  63. ↑ 63.0 63.1 "Outsiders in the Arctic: The roar of ice cracking". The Economist. 2013-02-02. https://www.economist.com/news/international/21571127-will-asian-countries-consolidate-or-disrupt-arctic-stability-roar-ice-cracking. 
  64. ↑ "The Arctic: Five Critical Security Challenges | ASPAmerican Security Project". Americansecurityproject.org. http://americansecurityproject.org/featured-items/2013/the-arctic-five-critical-security-challenges/. 
  65. ↑ "Arctic politics: Cosy amid the thaw". The Economist. 2012-03-24. https://www.economist.com/international/2012/03/24/cosy-amid-the-thaw. 
  66. ↑ Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Security Public Opinion Survey , EKOS, January 2011
  67. ↑ Janice Gross Stein And Thomas S. Axworthy. "The Arctic Council is the best way for Canada to resolve its territorial disputes". The Globe and Mail. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/the-arctic-council-is-the-best-way-for-canada-to-resolve-its-territorial-disputes/article574575/. 
  68. ↑ Berkman, Paul (2014-06-23). "Stability and Peace in the Arctic Ocean through Science Diplomacy". Science & Diplomacy 3 (2). http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2014/stability-and-peace-in-arctic-ocean-through-science-diplomacy. 
  69. ↑ Northam, Jackie (June 16, 2016). "U.S.-Russia Relations Are Frosty But They're Toasty On The Arctic Council". https://www.npr.org/2016/06/16/482279767/u-s-russia-relations-are-frosty-but-theyre-toasty-on-the-arctic-council. 
  70. ↑ 70.0 70.1 Soliman-Hunter, T. (2022). War, exclusion, and geopolitical tension: the accepted normal in Arctic Council Governance? Lauda, 104, 64-69. https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe2022120769829
  71. ↑ Fujio, O. (2022). Changing Arctic governance landscape: The Arctic Council navigating through geopolitical turbulence. Lauda, 104, 102-107. https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi-fe2022120769801
  72. ↑ Gustator. (October 9, 2023). A time of great opportunity for reconfiguring the governance of the Arctic. Polar Journal. https://polarjournal.ch/en/2024/10/09/a-time-of-great-opportunity-for-reconfiguring-the-governance-of-the-arctic/
  73. ↑ 73.0 73.1 73.2 Willis, M., & Depledge, D. (2015). How we learned to stop worrying about China’s Arctic ambitions: understanding China’s admission to the Arctic Council, 2004-2013. In L. C. Jensen & G. Hønneland (Eds.), Handbook of the politics of the Arctic. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
  74. ↑ 74.0 74.1 Lasserre, F. (2015). Case studies of shipping along Arctic routes. Polar Geography.
  75. ↑ 75.0 75.1 Filimonova, N., Obydenkova, A., & Vieira, V. G. R. (2023). Geopolitical and economic interests in environmental governance: explaining observer state status in the Arctic Council. Climate Change, 176(50). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-023-03490-8
  76. ↑ Rottem, S. V. (2020). "The Arctic Council: Challenges and Opportunities in a Changing Arctic." Polar Geography.

Bibliography

  • Danita Catherine Burke. 2020. Diplomacy and the Arctic Council. McGill Queen University Press.
  • Wiseman, Matthew (2020). "The Future of the Arctic Council". in Coates, Ken; Holroyd, Carin. The Palgrave Handbook of Arctic Policy and Politics. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. pp. 439–452. ISBN 978-3-030-20556-0. 

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