Philosophy:Definist fallacy
The definist fallacy (sometimes called the Socratic fallacy, after Socrates)[1] is a logical fallacy, identified by William Frankena in 1939, that involves the definition of one property in terms of another.[2]
Overview
The philosopher William Frankena first used the term definist fallacy in a paper published in the British analytic philosophy journal Mind in 1939.[3] In this article he generalized and critiqued G. E. Moore's naturalistic fallacy, which argued that good cannot be defined by natural properties, as a broader confusion caused by attempting to define a term using non-synonymous properties.[4] Frankena argued that naturalistic fallacy is a complete misnomer because it is neither limited to naturalistic properties nor necessarily a fallacy. On the first word (naturalistic), he noted that Moore rejected defining good in non-natural as well as natural terms.[5]
Frankena rejected the idea that the second word (fallacy) represented an error in reasoning – a fallacy as it is usually recognized – rather than an error in semantics.[6] In Moore's open-question argument, because questions such as "Is that which is pleasurable good?" have no definitive answer, then pleasurable is not synonymous with good. Frankena rejected this argument as: the fact that there is always an open question merely reflects the fact that it makes sense to ask whether two things that may be identical in fact are.[7] Thus, even if good were identical to pleasurable, it makes sense to ask whether it is; the answer may be "yes", but the question was legitimate. This seems to contradict Moore's view which accepts that sometimes alternative answers could be dismissed without argument; however, Frankena objects that this would be committing the fallacy of begging the question.[6]
See also
- List of fallacies
References
- ↑ William J. Prior, "Plato and the 'Socratic Fallacy'", Phronesis 43(2) (1998), pp. 97–113.
- ↑ Bunnin, Nicholas; Yu, Jiyuan (2008), The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy, John Wiley & Sons, p. 165, ISBN 978-0-470-99721-5, https://books.google.com/books?id=LdbxabeToQYC&pg=PA165
- ↑ Frankena, W. K. (October 1939). "The Naturalistic Fallacy". Mind (Oxford University Press) 48 (192): 464–477. doi:10.1093/mind/XLVIII.192.464.
- ↑ Preston, Aaron (December 30, 2005). "Moore, George Edward". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/moore/. Retrieved March 31, 2011.
- ↑ Hamid, Md. Abdul (1989). G.E. Moore: A Study of His Ethics. Mittal Publications. pp. 93–96. ISBN 978-81-7099-174-8. https://books.google.com/books?id=lxnsElfqa70C&pg=PA94.
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 Ridge, Michael (June 26, 2008). "Moral Non-Naturalism". in Edward N. Zalta. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism/. Retrieved March 31, 2011.
- ↑ Flew, Antony (1984). "Definist fallacy". A Dictionary of Philosophy. Macmillan. p. 85. ISBN 978-0-312-20923-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=MmJHVU9Rv3YC&pg=PA85.
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