Philosophy:Animalism

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Short description: Philosophical theory that humans are animals

In the philosophical subdiscipline of ontology, animalism is a theory of personal identity that asserts that humans are animals.[1] The concept of animalism is advocated by philosophers Eric T. Olson, Peter Van Inwagen, Paul Snowdon, Stephan Blatti, David Hershenov and David Wiggins.({{{1}}}, {{{2}}})[page needed] The view stands in contrast to positions such as John Locke's psychological criterion for personal identity or various forms of mind–body dualism, such as Richard Swinburne's account.

Thinking-animal argument

A common argument for animalism is known as the thinking-animal argument. It asserts the following:[2]

  1. A person that occupies a given space also has a Homo sapiens animal occupying the same space.
  2. The Homo sapiens animal is thinking.
  3. The person occupying the space is thinking.
  4. Therefore, a human person is also a human animal.

Use of term in ethics

A less common, but perhaps increasing, use of the term animalism is to refer to the ethical view that all or most animals are worthy of moral consideration.[3] It may be similar, though not necessarily, to sentientism.

References

Footnotes

Bibliography

  • Blatti, Stephan; Snowdon, Paul, eds (2016). Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, & Identity. Oxford University Press. 
  • Garrett, Brian (1998). Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-16573-0. 
  • Olson, Eric T. (2007). What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology. Oxford University Press. 
  • Snowdon, Paul (2017). Persons, Animals, Ourselves. Oxford University Press. 

Further reading