Social:Rent-setting

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Short description: Political corruption in China
Rent-setting
InitiatorAppelbaum and Katz
Introduced1987
Synonymrent-creating[1]
Rent-setting
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Rent-setting[2] (also spelled as rent setting;[3] simplified Chinese: 设租; traditional Chinese: 設租), also known as rent-creating, [4] refers to the act of governments or bureaucrats using their power to intervene in the market, resulting in the formation of new economic rents and creating rent-seeking opportunities for certain market entities.[5] In short, it means that the power itself committed an act in order to take a bribe.[6]

The concept of rent-setting was coined by Appelbaum and Katz in 1987.[7] This theory holds that since the regulator itself may become a rent-seeker, the rent-seeker itself will become a rent-setter and thus endogenously determine the size of the rent.[7]

Rent-setting is part of the chain of the rent-seeking process. [8] It can generally be divided into three types: unintentional rent-setting, passive rent-setting and active rent-setting.[9]

In a 'power-money' transaction, rent-setting is from 'power' to 'money', while rent-seeking is often 'money-power-money increment'. [10] In fact, rent seeking and rent setting are two sides of the same behavior and cannot be separated. [11]

See also

References

  1. "Revisiting progressive reform". The Economic Observer. 2010-01-29. http://www.eeo.com.cn/2010/0129/162102.shtml. 
  2. Timothy Lane; Nina Oding; Paul J.J. Welfens (6 December 2012). Real and Financial Economic Dynamics in Russia and Eastern Europe. Springer. pp. 181–. ISBN 978-3-642-55512-1. https://books.google.com/books?id=pq19CAAAQBAJ&pg=PA181. 
  3. P. Rao (3 December 2002). The Economics of Transaction Costs: Theory, Methods and Application. Palgrave Macmillan UK. pp. 102–. ISBN 978-0-230-59768-6. https://books.google.com/books?id=Yp1_DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA102. 
  4. Chi Fulin (2002). The Next Step in China's Reform. China Economic Publishing House. ISBN 978-7-5017-5699-5. https://books.google.com/books?id=0j0jAQAAMAAJ. 
  5. Shi Yan (1 June 2014). Study of Communication Failure in Chinese Financial Media. China Social Sciences Press. pp. 50–. ISBN 978-7-5161-4572-2. https://books.google.com/books?id=7ZN8DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT50. 
  6. Chen Yijin (2016-05-07). "Distinguish between a good hospital and a bad one, then what?". Creaders.net. https://news.creaders.net/china/2016/05/07/1671873.html. 
  7. 7.0 7.1 Xie Ping; Lu Lei (2005). An Economic Analysis of Financial Corruption in China: Institutions, Behavior and Mechanism Design. Citic Press. pp. 82–. ISBN 978-7-5086-0374-2. https://books.google.com/books?id=CI7hUthPoYYC&pg=PA82. 
  8. Tak-Wing Ngo; Yongping Wu (4 December 2008). Rent Seeking in China. Routledge. pp. 193–. ISBN 978-1-134-03441-3. https://books.google.com/books?id=yUJ9AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA193. 
  9. Luo Zhixian (2002). Rule of law basis for property rights reform of state-owned enterprises. Standards Press of China. ISBN 978-7-5066-2991-1. https://books.google.com/books?id=K_RhAAAAIAAJ. 
  10. Chen Yijin (April 7, 1994). "An economic analysis of rent setting and rent seeking behaviour". Economic Research Journal. http://www.erj.cn/UploadFiles/%E8%AE%BE%E7%A7%9F%E4%B8%8E%E5%AF%BB%E7%A7%9F%E8%A1%8C%E4%B8%BA%E7%9A%84%E7%BB%8F%E6%B5%8E%E5%AD%A6%E5%88%86%E6%9E%90.pdf. 
  11. Li Beifang (2016-08-18). "It is capital, not power, that seeks rent". Utopia. http://m.wyzxwk.com/content.php?classid=14&id=369586.