Engineering:Hwasong-11C

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The Hwasong-11C[lower-alpha 1] (Korean: 《화성포-11다》형; lit. Mars Artillery Type 11C) is a North Korean single-stage, solid-fueled short-range ballistic missile. It was first displayed during a military parade on 14 January 2021. As the larger variant of Hwasong-11A (KN-23), Hwasong-11C has a heavier warhead compared to its baseline version. North Korean state media claimed that the Hwasong-11C's warhead is 2,500 kg (5,500 lb). First test of Hwasong-11C occurred on 25 March 2021.

Hwasong-11C also has a larger version with a 4,500 kg (9,900 lb) warhead, which was first tested on 1 July 2024.

Description

Hwasong-11C is the enlarged variant of the Hwasong-11A, with a closely similar design.[7][8] The missile's range is estimated to be about 600–900 km (370–560 mi).[4][9] It also has an aeroballistic trajectory, made it harder for missile defenses to intercept.[10] The estimated length and diameter of Hwasong-11C are about 9.6–9.8 m (31–32 ft) and 1.1–1.2 m (3 ft 7 in–3 ft 11 in) respectively. The solid-fueled rocket engine likely has an extra segment. It is also fitted to a longer TEL with five axles and an additional two sections.[9][11][12] The nose cone is similar in shape to the Hwasong-11B (KN-24).[13]

Based on information from the 25 March 2021 test, it appears that Hwasong-11C is longer and have a more conical nose compared with the base version. North Korea claimed the missile to be equipped with a 2,500 kg (5,500 lb) warhead. According to 38 North, such a large warhead weight is almost certainly exaggerated.[14] It is possible that such a large payload claim could be using for propaganda purpose, intended to give the impression that North Korea is keeping pace with their adversary's missile advancements, as the South Korean Hyunmoo-4 has a 2,000 kg (4,400 lb) warhead and the Hwasong-11C was proclaimed as the world's largest warhead weight.[15] The new weapon would be able to almost completely cover South Korea from its launch site. If it can perform as claimed by North Korea, the weapon would be a powerful bunker buster weapon.[13] United Nations Security Council (UNSC) member states have questioned whether the 2.5-tonne warhead claim could refer to the entire weight of the missile after burnout, not just the warhead weight.[9]

According to a member state of the UNSC, if Hwasong-11C is equipped with a lighter payload, the missile can have a longer range and become a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM).[12]

Alongside with heavy warhead, Hwasong-11C is also claimed to be capable of carrying the Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warhead.[16][17]

History

Hwasong-11C made its public debut on 14 January 2021 in a military parade. At the time of public debut, six Hwasong-11C launchers were seen, each launcher had two missiles. North Korea did not name these missiles.[7]

Hwasong-11C had its maiden flight test on 25 March 2021, and a further test-fire occurred on 28 September 2022.[18] Between two test-fires, Hwasong-11C was displayed in the "Self-Defence 2021" military exhibition, as well as the 25 April 2022 military parade, when twelve Hwasong-11C missiles were displayed. Like the March 2021 tests, North Korea also opted to not disclose the missile's official designation in these appearances.[10][19]

The missile's official name was revealed in the KCNA's report on the new Hwasan-31 nuclear warhead in late March 2023.[20][21]

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as of 2025, North Korea is possessing more than six Hwasong-11C launchers. These launchers are assessed as "in test" by the IISS.[22]: 268 

List of tests

Confirmed tests

Attempt Date Location Number of missiles tested Outcome Additional notes References
1 25 March 2021 Yonpo Airport, near Hamhung and Sondok Airport, Chongpyong County (both in South Hamgyong Province) 2 Success According to North Korea, the missiles flew 600 km (370 mi) and were equipped with a 2,500 kg (5,500 lb) warhead. South Korean and Japanese analysis initially said they only flew 420–450 km (260–280 mi) while reaching an apogee of 60 km (37 mi). Later, South Korea revised their estimate and agreed with the North Korean statement of a 600 km (370 mi) range, saying the discrepancy resulted from blind spots in radar coverage due to the Earth's curvature. North Korea called Hwasong-11C as "new-type tactical guided projectile" without revealing official name in this test. [14][18][23][24]
2 28 September 2022 Sunan, Pyongyang 2 Success Both missiles reached 50 km (31 mi) apogee. One of the two missiles flew 350 km (220 mi), the other flew 300 km (190 mi). According to the information released by North Korea on 10 October 2022, the test-fire, which was guided by Kim Jong Un, was a nuclear warhead loading and launch simulation test for "neutralizing the airports in the operation zones of south Korea". Like the March 2021 tests, North Korea also did not reveal the missile's official name in this test. [18][25]

Unconfirmed tests

Member states of the United Nations Security Council alleged that the then-unnamed Hwasong-11C was test-fired on 25 May 2022 and 5 June 2022.[19]

Variants

Hwasong-11C-4.5

Hwasong-11C-4.5
TypeShort-range ballistic missile
Place of originNorth Korea
Service history
In service2024–present
Used byKorean People's Army Strategic Force
Production history
Designed2024
Specifications
Warhead4,500 kg (9,900 lb)
EngineSolid-propelled engine
Operational
range
640–900 km (400–560 mi)
Launch
platform
Mobile TEL

The 4.5 tons warhead version of Hwasong-11C, called Hwasong-11C-4.5[lower-alpha 2] (《화성포-11다-4.5》; lit. Mars Artillery Type 11C-4.5) is named after its 4.5-ton warhead.[28][29]

Description

Images of the Hwasong-11C-4.5
September 2024 test
Missile hitting target

Hwasong-11C-4.5 is capable of carrying a 4,500 kg (9,900 lb) warhead, an increase from the 2,500 kg (5,500 lb) warhead of the baseline Hwasong-11C.[28][30] It is launched from a road-mobile TEL.[31]

Assuming that the diameters of Hwasong-11C and its 4.5-ton warhead variant are similar, the Hwasong-11C-4.5 appears to be longer than its baseline version, possibly due to the lengthened missile body and heavier warhead.[32]

The description of the 320 km (200 mi) "medium range" in the 18 September 2024 test suggests a maximum range of 640 km (400 mi) for this variant.[33] However, another source claims a range of 900 km (560 mi) for Hwasong-11C-4.5.[31]

List of tests

Attempt Date (Pyongyang Standard Time) Location Outcome Additional notes References
1 1 July 2024 Jangyon County, South Hwanghae Province Success North Korea stated that the missile was launched with a simulated 4.5 tons warhead to verify its flight stability and target accuracy at the range of 90–500 km (56–311 mi). The test was carried out by the North Korea's Missile Administration.

According to South Korean military officials, the 1 July launch involved two missiles, one of which, possibly the baseline Hwasong-11C, flew 120 km (75 mi) before exploding and failing inland, and the other flew 600 km (370 mi). No apogee information was released, but the missiles possibly achieved 100 km (62 mi) apogee.

North Korea did not publish any photos of the test.

[16][18][28][34][35][36]
2 18 September 2024 Kaechon Airport, South Pyongan Province Success Reportedly, the missile was equipped with a 4.5-ton conventional warhead. The test-fire, which was organized by the Missile Administration, was supervised by Kim Jong Un and senior officials. The missile flew 320 km (200 mi) before hitting an inland target. A "strategic" cruise missile was also launched along with Hwasong-11C-4.5 in this test. According to South Korea, two missiles were launched and flew 400 km (250 mi).

This test was likely delayed from a scheduled test in July 2024, which was planned to be conducted with a 250 km (160 mi) range.

This is the first time North Korea has released images of Hwasong-11C-4.5.

[18][27][29][32]
Unconfirmed 22 October 2025 Ryokpho District, Pyongyang Success South Korean military detected the launch of multiple ballistic missiles at 8:10 a.m., and the missiles flew about 350 km (220 mi).

North Korean state media confirmed the launch of two missiles, which was organized by the Missile Administration. However, given the description of "hypersonic projectiles" by North Korea, it is possible that the launch may involve Hwasong-11E, although there is no clear evidence for this.

The missiles flew in a northeast direction and hit their preset target in Orang County, North Hamgyong Province, 430 km (270 mi) away from launch point.

[31][37][38][39][40]

Hwasong-11E

The Hwasong-11E is a Hwasong-11C-based missile with hypersonic glide vehicle, first displayed in 2025 during a military exhibition.[41]

See also

  • Hwasong-11A (KN-23)
  • Hwasong-11D
  • Hwasong-11S
  • Hyunmoo-4

Notes

  1. ↑ Also known as Hwasong-11Da, Hwasongpho-11Da, Hwasongpho-11Da-2.5.[1][2][3]
    Unofficial or reported external designations of Hwasong-11C include KN-23A, KN-23B and KN-30.[4][5][6]
  2. ↑ Also known as Hwasong-11Da-4.5,[26] Hwasongpho-11Da-4.5.[27]

References

  1. ↑ Jo Jang-won (23 September 2024). "[Sejong Focus Analysis of North Korea's Test Launch of Missile with 4.5-Ton Super-Large Warhead"]. https://sejong.org/web/boad/22/egoread.php?itm=&txt=&pg=6&bd=22&seq=11861. "The "Hwasongpho-11-Da" is an improved version of the KN-23 (North Korean Iskander) with an increased range and ability to accommodate larger warheads. It appears that North Korea refers to the 2.5-ton warhead variant as "Hwasongpho-11-Da-2.5," and the 4.5-ton variant as "Hwasongpho-11-Da-4.5"." 
  2. ↑ B. Volodymyr (14 January 2024). "North Korea threat: Existing and potential ballistic weapons in the Russian arsenal". https://militarnyi.com/en/articles/north-korea-threat-existing-and-potential-ballistic-weapons-in-the-russian-arsenal/. 
  3. ↑ Tianran Xu (8 August 2023). "Brief on 27 July 2023 Parade of the DPRK". https://opennuclear.org/publication/brief-27-july-2023-parade-dprk. 
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 A.B. Abrams (2024-01-08). "KN-23B deployments against Ukraine could be major boon for North Korea’s wider defence exports". https://www.dailynk.com/english/kn-23b-deployments-against-ukraine-could-be-major-boon-for-north-koreas-wider-defence-exports/. 
  5. ↑ Delory, Stéphane; Bondaz, Antoine; Maire, Christian (2023). "North Korean Short Range Systems: Military consequences of the development of the KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25". Foundation for Strategic Research. pp. 64-65. https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS.pdf. 
  6. ↑ "[단독美, 北 CRBM에 코드명 ‘KN-35’ 붙였다…KN-25 이후 30번대 넘버링 첫 확인"] (in ko). 2025-04-13. https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25328185. 
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 "S/2021/211". 4 March 2021. pp. 14, 101. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2021_211.pdf. 
  8. ↑ "S/2024/215". 7 March 2024. p. 124. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S%202024%20215.pdf. 
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 "DPRK Military Parade Viewbook 2022". 2022-04-21. p. 13. https://opennuclear.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/DPRK%20Parade%20ViewBook%2020220421.pptx_.pdf. 
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 Xu, Tianran (2 May 2022). "25 April 2022 DPRK Parade". p. 21. https://opennuclear.org/sites/default/files/2022-05/25%20April%202022%20DPRK%20parade_0_0.pdf. 
  11. ↑ "Pukguksong GLBM-3". https://b14643.eu/Spacerockets/Specials/Pukguksong_GLBM-3/index.htm. 
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 "S/2021/777". 8 September 2021. pp. 86, 90. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2021_777_E.pdf. 
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 "ONN Korean Peninsula Risk Assessment, March 2021". 3 April 2021. p. 16. https://opennuclear.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/ONN%20Korean%20Peninsula%20Risk%20Assessment_%20March%202021%20%28FINAL%29.pdf. 
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 Vann H. Van Diepen (30 March 2021). "Initial Analysis of North Korea's March 25 SRBM Launches". https://www.38north.org/2021/03/initial-analysis-of-north-koreas-march-25-srbm-launches/. 
  15. ↑ Lee, Sangsoo (7 May 2021). "Missile Deployments on the Korean Peninsula: An Accelerating Arms Race". https://www.38north.org/2021/05/missile-deployments-on-the-korean-peninsula-an-accelerating-arms-race/. 
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 Colin Zwirko (2 July 2024). "North Korea says it tested new tactical missile variant at two different ranges". https://www.nknews.org/2024/07/north-korea-says-it-tested-new-tactical-missile-variant-at-two-different-ranges/. 
  17. ↑ Yang Uk (29 June 2023). "북한의 최신 핵무기 개발 현황: 핵그림자를 드리우는 북한의 인지전 시도". https://www.asaninst.org/bbs/board.php?bo_table=s1_1&wr_id=397. 
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 18.2 18.3 18.4 "The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database". https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/north_korea_missile_test_database.xlsx. 
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 "S/2022/668". 7 September 2022. p. 21. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n22/608/53/pdf/n2260853.pdf. 
  20. ↑ Colin Zwirko (3 April 2023). "North Korea reveals internal names for several missile systems: Analysis". https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-reveals-internal-names-for-several-missile-systems-analysis/. 
  21. ↑ "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Work for Mounting Nuclear Warheads on Ballistic Missiles". 28 March 2023. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2023/202303/news28/20230328-01ee.html. 
  22. ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies (12 February 2025). The Military Balance 2025 (1st ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-1041049678. 
  23. ↑ "Seoul says North Korean SRBMs test-launched on 25 March travelled 600 km". 29 April 2021. https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/seoul-says-north-korean-srbms-test-launched-on-25-march-travelled-600-km. 
  24. ↑ "Academy of Defence Science Test-fires New-type Tactical Guided Projectile". 26 March 2021. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2021/202103/news26/20210326-03ee.html. 
  25. ↑ "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Military Drills of KPA Units for Operation of Tactical Nukes". 10 October 2022. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2022/202210/news10/20221010-01ee.html.  For images, see these images: 1, 2 and 3.
  26. ↑ "Triều Tiên phóng thử một tên lửa đạn đạo có khả năng mang đầu đạn siêu lớn" (in vi). 1 July 2024. https://nhandan.vn/trieu-tien-phong-thu-mot-ten-lua-dan-dao-co-kha-nang-mang-dau-dan-sieu-lon-post817118.html. 
  27. ↑ 27.0 27.1 "DPRK Missile Administration and Academy of Defence Sciences Make Public Important Scientific Research Achievements". 19 September 2024. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/7d5be7e17d208cb7d8e0e4118aa52d67.kcmsf. 
  28. ↑ 28.0 28.1 28.2 "DPRK Missile Administration Conducts Test-fire of New-type Tactical Ballistic Missile". 2 July 2024. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/841c0d7c2c6cf2f2c8928f7bfb021616.kcmsf. 
  29. ↑ 29.0 29.1 Shreyas Reddy (19 September 2024). "North Korea tests 'explosive power' of new ballistic missile". https://www.nknews.org/2024/09/north-korea-tests-explosive-power-of-new-ballistic-missile/. 
  30. ↑ "北朝鮮が「火星砲-11タ-4.5」短距離弾道弾の試射に成功、弾頭重量を2.5トン→4.5トンに増強". 2 July 2024. https://news.yahoo.co.jp/expert/articles/8d78a9f785ed103202f822bc4552af6319804b59. 
  31. ↑ 31.0 31.1 31.2 Đào Cảnh (24 October 2025). "Khám phá công nghệ tên lửa Hwasong-11DA-4.5 tầm bắn 900km, tốc độ Mach 6, 'siêu đầu đạn' 4.5 tấn". https://vietnamnet.vn/ten-lua-hwasong-11da-4-5-tam-ban-900km-toc-do-mach-6-sieu-dau-dan-4-5-tan-2455585.html. 
  32. ↑ 32.0 32.1 "北朝鮮が「火星砲-11タ-4.5」短距離弾道ミサイルの2回目の試射、着弾場所は内陸部". 19 September 2024. https://news.yahoo.co.jp/expert/articles/1896ed3997b40740a16abf15a30d32901e1c16d2. 
  33. ↑ Kim Jong-won (2024-10-01). "Error: no |title= specified when using {{Cite web}}" (in ko). https://www.newspim.com/news/view/20241001000042. 
  34. ↑ "Jonathan's Space Report No. 835" (in en). 2024-07-25. https://planet4589.org/space/jsr/back/news.835.txt. 
  35. ↑ "N. Korea tests new ballistic missile with super-large 4.5-ton warhead" (in en). 2024-07-02. https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2024/07/02/MLOMGOZNOFEYLIR3PP4B3CKZDA/. 
  36. ↑ Federico Giuliani (2024-07-05). ""Testato l'Hwasong-11C-4.5": cosa sappiamo del misterioso super missile di Kim" (in it). https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/difesa/testato-lhwasong-11c-45-cosa-sappiamo-dellultimo-misterioso-2342286.html. 
  37. ↑ "DPRK Missile Administration Tests Important Weapon System". 2025-10-23. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/997f57721a1a602b9db55a871cb7e037.kcmsf. 
  38. ↑ Lee Minji (2025-10-23). "(2nd LD) N. Korea says it tested 2 hypersonic projectiles, successfully hit target". https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251023000552315. 
  39. ↑ "North confirms launch of 'important' hypersonic weapon that could possibly reach APEC host city". 2025-10-23. https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-10-23/national/northKorea/North-confirms-launch-of-important-hypersonic-weapon-that-could-possibly-reach-APEC-host-city-/2427451. 
  40. ↑ Colin Zwirko (2025-10-23). "North Korea claims it successfully test launched new ‘hypersonic’ missiles". https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/north-korea-says-it-successfully-test-launched-new-hypersonic-missiles/. 
  41. ↑ Joseph Trevithick (2025-10-06). "New North Korean Hypersonic Missile Unveiled At Pyongyang Arms Expo". Recurrent Ventures. https://www.twz.com/land/new-north-korean-hypersonic-missile-unveiled-at-pyongyang-arms-expo. 

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