Engineering:Hwasong-11C

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The Hwasong-11C (Korean: 《화성포-11다》형; lit. Mars Artillery Type 11C) is a North Korean single-stage, solid-fueled short-range ballistic missile. It was first displayed during a military parade on 14 January 2021. A larger variant of the Hwasong-11A, Hwasong-11C has a heavier warhead compared to its baseline version, with the payload mass being claimed by North Korean state media as 2,500 kg (5,500 lb). First test of Hwasong-11C occurred on 25 March 2021.

Hwasong-11C also has a larger version with a 4,500 kg (9,900 lb) warhead, first tested on 1 July 2024.

Description

Hwasong-11C is the enlarged variant of the Hwasong-11A, with a closely similar design.[1][2] The missile's range is estimated from 600 km (370 mi) to a high-end estimation of 900 km (560 mi).[3][4] It also has an aeroballistic trajectory, made it harder for missile defenses to intercept.[5] The estimated length and diameter of Hwasong-11C are 10.2 m (33 ft) and 1.26 m (4 ft 2 in), respectively.[6] It is fitted to a longer TEL with five axles and an additional two sections.[4][7] The nose cone is similar in shape to the Hwasong-11B.[8]

Based on information from the 25 March 2021 test, it appears that Hwasong-11C is longer and have a more conical nose compared with the base version. North Korea claimed the missile to be equipped with a 2,500 kg (5,500 lb) warhead. According to 38 North, such a large warhead weight is almost certainly exaggerated.[9] It is possible that such a large payload claim could be using for propaganda purpose, intended to give the impression that North Korea is keeping pace with their adversary's missile advancements, as the South Korean Hyunmoo-4 has a 2,000 kg (4,400 lb) warhead and the Hwasong-11C was proclaimed as the world's largest warhead weight.[10] The new weapon would be able to almost completely cover South Korea from its launch site. If it can perform as claimed by North Korea, the weapon would be a powerful bunker buster weapon.[8] United Nations Security Council (UNSC) member states have questioned whether the 2.5-tonne warhead claim could refer to the entire weight of the missile after burnout, not just the warhead weight.[4]

The missile also uses the most powerful known solid propellant rocket motor developed by North Korea as of December 2021. It is longer and stronger than Hwasong-11A's engine, as Hwasong-11C's engine likely has an extra segment and produces a thrust of 406.871 kN (41.4893 tf).[6][7]

According to a member state of the UNSC, if Hwasong-11C is equipped with a lighter payload, the missile can have a longer range and become a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM).[11]

Alongside with heavy warhead, Hwasong-11C is also claimed to be capable of carrying the Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warhead.[12][13]

Naming

The official designation of Hwasong-11C was confirmed through photo evidence in March 2023. However, given the blurred suffix, the name displayed was very difficult to confirm, and the then-ambiguous name might also be read as Hwasong-11E, which is the name of a hypersonic missile unveiled in late 2025.[14] Other romanization variants also include Hwasong-11Da and Hwasongpho-11Da.[15][16] However, in its earlier launches, the Hwasong-11C was simply referred to as "new-type tactical guided projectile" and later, "tactical ballistic missile".[17][18]

On 23 September 2024, South Korean analyst Jo Jang-won wrote for the Sejong Institute, suggested that the two variants of Hwasong-11C were internally named Hwasongpho-11-Da-2.5 and Hwasongpho-11-Da-4.5.[15]

Unofficial external designations of Hwasong-11C include KN-23A and KN-23B, cited in analyses.[3][19] In April 2025, it was revealed that Hwasong-11C had been designated KN-30 by the US military under its naming convention.[20]

The name of Hwasong-11C's 4.5-ton warhead variant was revealed just after its maiden test in July 2024.[21]

History

Hwasong-11C made its public debut on 14 January 2021 during a military parade. At the time of public debut, six Hwasong-11C launchers were seen, each launcher had two missiles.[1] North Korea did not name these missiles.[22]

Hwasong-11C underwent its maiden flight test on 25 March 2021, the first North Korean state media-reported ballistic missile test since March 2020.[23][24] It was organized by the Academy of Defence Sciences.[25] A further test-fire occurred on 28 September 2022.[26] Between the test-fires, Hwasong-11C was displayed in the "Self-Defence 2021" military exhibition, as well as the 25 April 2022 military parade, when twelve Hwasong-11C missiles mounted on 5-axle launchers were displayed.[5][27]

The missile's official name was revealed in the Korean Central News Agency's report on the new Hwasan-31 nuclear warhead in late March 2023,[28] and continued testing resulted in a 4.5-ton warhead variant in July 2024.[29]

Images published by North Korean state media during a Kim Jong Un's missile factory visit in 2025 suggested that Hwasong-11C has been entered mass production.[30] According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as of 2026, North Korea is possessing more than six "in test" Hwasong-11C launchers.[31]: 277 

There are speculations that Hwasong-11C has been used by Russian forces in its war against Ukraine.[3][32]

List of tests

Confirmed tests

Attempt Date Location Number of missiles tested Outcome Additional notes References
1 25 March 2021 Yonpo Airfield, near Hamhung and Sondok Airport, Chongpyong County (both in South Hamgyong Province) 2 Success Initial data from South Korea and Japan showed the missiles were launched from Hamju County at 7:06 a.m. and 7:25 a.m. local time, with their analysis initially saying they only flew 420–450 km (260–280 mi) while reaching an apogee of 60 km (37 mi). Later, the missiles were confirmed to be launched from two different airfields located in South Hamgyong Province. According to North Korea, the "new-type tactical guided projectiles" flew 600 km (370 mi) and each missile was equipped with a 2,500 kg (5,500 lb) warhead. A month after the launch, South Korea revised their estimate and agreed with the North Korean statement of a 600 km (370 mi) range, saying the discrepancy resulted from blind spots in radar coverage due to the Earth's curvature. [23][26][33][34]
2 28 September 2022 Sunan, Pyongyang 2 Success South Korea detected the launch at 6:10 p.m. and 6:20 p.m. local time from Sunan. Both missiles reached 50 km (31 mi) apogee and flew 300–350 km (190–220 mi). Information released by North Korea on 10 October 2022 confirmed the test-fire was a nuclear warhead loading and launch simulation test for "neutralizing the airports in the operation zones of south Korea", with Kim Jong Un attending. North Korea published images of the test without naming the missile. [18][26][35]

Unconfirmed tests

Member states of the United Nations Security Council alleged that the then-unnamed Hwasong-11C was test-fired on 25 May 2022 and 5 June 2022.[27]

Variants

Hwasong-11C-4.5

Hwasong-11C-4.5
TypeShort-range ballistic missile
Place of originNorth Korea
Service history
In service2024–present
Used byKorean People's Army Strategic Force
Production history
Designed2024
Specifications
Warhead4,500 kg (9,900 lb)
EngineSolid-propelled engine
Operational
range
500–900 km (310–560 mi)
Flight altitude50–100 km (31–62 mi)
SpeedMach 5–Mach 6 (6,125–7,350 km/h; 3,806–4,567 mph)
Guidance
system
INS combined with satellite navigation
Accuracy5–30 m (16–98 ft)
Launch
platform
Mobile TEL

The 4.5 tons warhead version of Hwasong-11C, called Hwasong-11C-4.5[lower-alpha 1] (《화성포-11다-4.5》; lit. Mars Artillery Type 11C-4.5) is named after its 4.5-ton warhead.[38]

Description

Images of the Hwasong-11C-4.5
September 2024 test
Missile hitting target

Hwasong-11C-4.5 is capable of carrying a 4,500 kg (9,900 lb) warhead,[39] an increase from the 2,500 kg (5,500 lb) warhead of the baseline Hwasong-11C.[40][41] It is nine times heavier than Hwasong-11A's payload mass. This payload capacity focuses on countering larger targets, such as military bases, aircraft carriers and strategic infrastructures.[42] It is developed due to the introduction of a Hyunmoo ballistic missile variant with super-large warhead by South Korea.[43]

Hwasong-11C-4.5 can be launched from a road-mobile TEL, which is capable of carrying two missiles. Its range is estimated from 500 km (310 mi) to 900 km (560 mi), depending on payload capacity. It can flew in a quasi-ballistic trajectory, with a flight altitude of 50–100 km (31–62 mi). The missile uses a guidance system combining INS and satellite navigation, thus reducing CEP to 5–30 m (16–98 ft). The solid-fueled composite engine burns for 20–30 seconds, and the missile can achieve a speed of Mach 5–Mach 6 (6,125–7,350 km/h; 3,806–4,567 mph) at terminal phase.[42]

Assuming that the diameters of Hwasong-11C and its 4.5-ton warhead variant are similar, the Hwasong-11C-4.5 appears to be longer than its baseline version, possibly due to the lengthened missile body and heavier warhead.[43]

History

In 2021, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un listed super-large warhead on its list of high-tech weapons that North Korea wanted to develop.[29]

The first test flight of Hwasong-11C-4.5 occurred on 1 July 2024.[44][45] A further launch took place on 18 September 2024,[46][47] after some delays from a planned launch in July.[43]

An alleged third test occurred on 22 October 2025,[42] but it could also involved Hwasong-11E,[48] given the "hypersonic projectile" claim by North Korea.[49]

List of tests

Attempt Date (Pyongyang Standard Time) Location Outcome Additional notes References
1 1 July 2024 Jangyon County, South Hwanghae Province Success North Korea statement did not carry photos of the test, while claiming the missile to be launched with a simulated 4.5 tons warhead to verify its flight stability and target accuracy at the range of 90–500 km (56–311 mi). The test was carried out by the Missile Administration.

According to South Korean military officials, the 1 July launch involved two missiles, one of which, possibly the baseline Hwasong-11C, flew 120 km (75 mi) before exploding and failing inland, and the other flew 600 km (370 mi). No apogee information was released, but the missiles possibly achieved 100 km (62 mi) apogee, according to American astrophysicist Jonathan McDowell.

2 18 September 2024 Kaechon Airport, South Pyongan Province Success The first test-fire with image publication of Hwasong-11C-4.5, it was conducted with two 4.5-ton conventional warhead-armed missiles. It was organized by the Missile Administration and supervised by Kim Jong Un. The missile flew 320 km (200 mi) before hitting an inland target. A "strategic" cruise missile was also launched along with Hwasong-11C-4.5 in this test. According to South Korea, two missiles were launched and flew 400 km (250 mi).

This test was likely delayed from a scheduled test in July 2024, which was planned to be conducted with a 250 km (160 mi) range.

[43][50][51]
Unconfirmed 22 October 2025 Ryokpho District, Pyongyang Success South Korean military detected the launch of multiple ballistic missiles at 8:10 a.m., flying about 350 km (220 mi) before landing inland. However, given the description of "hypersonic projectiles" by North Korea, it is possible that the launch may also involve Hwasong-11E.

North Korean state media confirmed the Missile Administration-organized launch, with two missiles being fired. It flew in a northeast direction and hit their preset target at Kwesang Peak, located in Orang County, North Hamgyong Province, 430 km (270 mi) away from launch point.

[52][53][54]

Hwasong-11E

The Hwasong-11E is a Hwasong-11C-based missile with hypersonic glide vehicle, first displayed in 2025 during a military exhibition.[55]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ Also known as Hwasong-11Da-4.5[36] and Hwasongpho-11Da-4.5.[37]

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 "S/2021/211". United Nations. 4 March 2021. pp. 14, 101. https://docs.un.org/en/S/2021/211. 
  2. ↑ "S/2024/215". United Nations. 7 March 2024. p. 124. https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/215. 
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Abrams, A.B. (2024-01-08). "KN-23B deployments against Ukraine could be major boon for North Korea’s wider defence exports". https://www.dailynk.com/english/kn-23b-deployments-against-ukraine-could-be-major-boon-for-north-koreas-wider-defence-exports/. 
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 "DPRK Military Parade Viewbook 2022". 2022-04-21. p. 13. https://opennuclear.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/DPRK%20Parade%20ViewBook%2020220421.pptx_.pdf. 
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Xu, Tianran (2 May 2022). "25 April 2022 DPRK Parade". p. 21. https://opennuclear.org/sites/default/files/2022-05/25%20April%202022%20DPRK%20parade_0_0.pdf. 
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Chang, Young-Keun (December 2021). Korea Journal of Military Affairs (Korea Institute for Military Affairs) 10 (2): 167–186. doi:10.33528/kjma.2021.12.10.167. ISSN 1228-2804. https://www.kima.re.kr/3.html?html=3-3-2.html&uid=570&s=2. Retrieved 2026-05-22. 
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Brügge, Norbert. "Pukguksong GLBM-3". Norbert Brügge. https://b14643.eu/Spacerockets/Specials/Pukguksong_GLBM-3/index.htm. 
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 Shin, Jaewoo; Bedenko, Veronika; Besaw, Clayton; Xu, Tianran (3 April 2021). "ONN Korean Peninsula Risk Assessment, March 2021". p. 16. https://opennuclear.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/ONN%20Korean%20Peninsula%20Risk%20Assessment_%20March%202021%20%28FINAL%29.pdf. 
  9. ↑ Van Diepen, Vann H. (30 March 2021). "Initial Analysis of North Korea's March 25 SRBM Launches". https://www.38north.org/2021/03/initial-analysis-of-north-koreas-march-25-srbm-launches/. 
  10. ↑ Lee, Sangsoo (7 May 2021). "Missile Deployments on the Korean Peninsula: An Accelerating Arms Race". https://www.38north.org/2021/05/missile-deployments-on-the-korean-peninsula-an-accelerating-arms-race/. 
  11. ↑ "S/2021/777". United Nations. 8 September 2021. p. 86. https://docs.un.org/en/S/2021/777. 
  12. ↑ Zwirko, Colin (2 July 2024). "North Korea says it tested new tactical missile variant at two different ranges". https://www.nknews.org/2024/07/north-korea-says-it-tested-new-tactical-missile-variant-at-two-different-ranges/. 
  13. ↑ Yang, Uk (29 June 2023). "Error: no |title= specified when using {{Cite web}}". https://www.asaninst.org/bbs/board.php?bo_table=s1_1&wr_id=397. 
  14. ↑ Zwirko, Colin (3 April 2023). "North Korea reveals internal names for several missile systems: Analysis". in Derr, Arius. NK News. https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-korea-reveals-internal-names-for-several-missile-systems-analysis/. 
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 Jo, Jang-won (23 September 2024). "[Sejong Focus Analysis of North Korea's Test Launch of Missile with 4.5-Ton Super-Large Warhead"]. https://sejong.org/web/boad/22/egoread.php?itm=&txt=&pg=6&bd=22&seq=11861. "The "Hwasongpho-11-Da" is an improved version of the KN-23 (North Korean Iskander) with an increased range and ability to accommodate larger warheads. It appears that North Korea refers to the 2.5-ton warhead variant as "Hwasongpho-11-Da-2.5," and the 4.5-ton variant as "Hwasongpho-11-Da-4.5"." 
  16. ↑ Xu, Tianran (8 August 2023). "Brief on 27 July 2023 Parade of the DPRK". https://opennuclear.org/publication/brief-27-july-2023-parade-dprk. 
  17. ↑ "Academy of Defence Science Test-fires New-type Tactical Guided Projectile". 26 March 2021. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2021/202103/news26/20210326-03ee.html. 
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Military Drills of KPA Units for Operation of Tactical Nukes". 10 October 2022. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2022/202210/news10/20221010-01ee.html.  For images, see 1, 2 and 3.
  19. ↑ Delory, Stéphane; Bondaz, Antoine; Maire, Christian (2023). "North Korean Short Range Systems: Military consequences of the development of the KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25". Foundation for Strategic Research. pp. 64-65. https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS.pdf. 
  20. ↑ Lee, Geun-pyeong; Lee, Yu-jeong (2025-04-13). "Error: no |title= specified when using {{Cite web}}" (in ko). https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25328185. 
  21. ↑ "DPRK Missile Administration Conducts Test-fire of New-type Tactical Ballistic Missile". 2 July 2024. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2024/202407/news02/20240702-09ee.html. 
  22. ↑ Trevithick, Joseph (2021-03-26). "North Korea Carried Out The First Known Test Of Its Newest Ballistic Missile". Recurrent Ventures. https://www.twz.com/39944/north-korea-carried-out-the-first-known-test-of-its-newest-ballistic-missile. "However, the pictures that North Korea released of this latest test show that that the weapon is not the KN-23, but rather appears to be a ballistic missile the country publicly debuted at a military parade in Pyongyang in January. This new weapon, the formal designation of which is unknown, as is the U.S. nomenclature, is notably larger, as evidenced by its 10-wheeled transporter-erector-launcher (TEL)." 
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 "Giải mã loại tên lửa "xịn" của Triều Tiên vừa được phóng" (in vi). Lang Son Newspaper and Radio, Television. 2021-03-26. https://langsontv.vn/news/462/23493/giai-ma-loai-ten-lua-xin-cua-trieu-tien-vua-duoc-phong. 
  24. ↑ "БНАСАУ шинэ загварын пуужин туршсанаа албан ёсоор мэдээллээ". 2021-03-27. https://www.mnb.mn/i/232292. 
  25. ↑ Thanh Phương (2021-03-26). "Triều Tiên xác nhận tiến hành thử tên lửa đạn đạo". Kon Tum Radio and Television Station. https://kontumtv.vn/tin-tuc/tin-the-gioi/trieu-tien-xac-nhan-thu-nghiem-ten-lua-chien-thuat-moi. 
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 26.2 "The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database". 2024-11-12. https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/cns-north-korea-missile-test-database/. 
  27. ↑ 27.0 27.1 "S/2022/668". United Nations. 7 September 2022. p. 21. https://docs.un.org/en/S/2022/668. 
  28. ↑ JSF (2023-04-04). "Error: no |title= specified when using {{Cite web}}". https://news.yahoo.co.jp/expert/articles/ceada2fe6fd0461ab527a25c9c8140f104bf9fb7. 
  29. ↑ 29.0 29.1 "Triều Tiên xác nhận phóng tên lửa đạn đạo mang đầu đạn siêu lớn" (in vi). Bac Ninh Newspaper and Radio – Television. 2024-07-02. https://bacninhtv.vn/tin-tuc/24/166246/trieu-tien-xac-nhan-phong-ten-lua-dan-dao-mang-dau-dan-sieu-lon. 
  30. ↑ Zhang, Jiaxin (2025-12-26). "Error: no |title= specified when using {{Cite web}}". https://military.china.com/news/13004177/20251226/49112571.html. 
  31. ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies (24 February 2026). The Military Balance 2026 (1st ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-1041314240. 
  32. ↑ Abrams, A. B. (2024-08-06). "North Korea Closes Russia’s Anti-Tank Missile Gap With Ukraine". https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/north-korea-closes-russias-anti-tank-missile-gap-with-ukraine/. "The KN-23B ballistic missile system and KN-25 rocket artillery system confirmed to have been deployed by Russian forces in early January are notable prior examples. Both enjoy far longer ranges among other advantages compared to analogous Russian systems." 
  33. ↑ Dominguez, Gabriel; Kim, Dae Young (29 April 2021). "Seoul says North Korean SRBMs test-launched on 25 March travelled 600 km". https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/seoul-says-north-korean-srbms-test-launched-on-25-march-travelled-600-km. 
  34. ↑ "Tiếp tục phóng vật thể, Triều Tiên vẫn “dò” phản ứng của Mỹ?" (in vi). Ninh Binh News & Radio, Television Station. 2021-03-25. https://nbtv.vn/tiep-tuc-phong-vat-the-trieu-tien-van-do-phan-ung-cua-my-11257.html. 
  35. ↑ "Triều Tiên phóng 2 tên lửa đạn đạo ra vùng biển phía Đông". Gia Lai Newspaper and Radio, Television. 2022-09-29. https://gialaitv.vn/trieu-tien-phong-2-ten-lua-dan-dao-ra-vung-bien-phia-dong/. 
  36. ↑ "Triều Tiên phóng thử một tên lửa đạn đạo chiến thuật mới" (in vi). Hanoi Media Group. 2024-07-02. https://hanoionline.vn/trieu-tien-phong-thu-mot-ten-lua-dan-dao-chien-thuat-moi-248958.htm. 
  37. ↑ Kim, Jack (2024-07-02). "North Korea says it tested ballistic missile capable of carrying super-large warhead". https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-says-it-tested-ballistic-missile-capable-carrying-super-large-2024-07-01/. 
  38. ↑ Zwirko, Colin (25 September 2024). "North Korea’s new inland missile target range located in wildlife sanctuary". NK News. https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-koreas-new-inland-missile-target-range-located-in-wildlife-reserve/. 
  39. ↑ "Ông Kim Jong-un thị sát thử tên lửa, kêu gọi tăng cường năng lực hạt nhân". Lang Son Newspaper and Radio, Television. 2024-09-19. https://langsontv.vn/news/462/75421/ong-kim-jong-un-thi-sat-thu-ten-lua-keu-goi-tang-cuong-nang-luc-hat-nhan. 
  40. ↑ "Triều Tiên phóng thử một tên lửa đạn đạo có khả năng mang đầu đạn siêu lớn" (in vi). 1 July 2024. https://nhandan.vn/trieu-tien-phong-thu-mot-ten-lua-dan-dao-co-kha-nang-mang-dau-dan-sieu-lon-post817118.html. 
  41. ↑ JSF (2 July 2024). "Error: no |title= specified when using {{Cite web}}". https://news.yahoo.co.jp/expert/articles/8d78a9f785ed103202f822bc4552af6319804b59. 
  42. ↑ 42.0 42.1 42.2 Đào Cảnh (24 October 2025). "Khám phá công nghệ tên lửa Hwasong-11DA-4.5 tầm bắn 900km, tốc độ Mach 6, 'siêu đầu đạn' 4.5 tấn". https://vietnamnet.vn/ten-lua-hwasong-11da-4-5-tam-ban-900km-toc-do-mach-6-sieu-dau-dan-4-5-tan-2455585.html. 
  43. ↑ 43.0 43.1 43.2 43.3 JSF (19 September 2024). "Error: no |title= specified when using {{Cite web}}". https://news.yahoo.co.jp/expert/articles/1896ed3997b40740a16abf15a30d32901e1c16d2. 
  44. ↑ Giuliani, Federico (2024-07-05). ""Testato l'Hwasong-11C-4.5": cosa sappiamo del misterioso super missile di Kim" (in it). https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/difesa/testato-lhwasong-11c-45-cosa-sappiamo-dellultimo-misterioso-2342286.html. 
  45. ↑ Kim, Soo-yeon (2 July 2024). "(2nd LD) N. Korea says it test-fired new tactical ballistic missile capable of carrying super-large warhead". https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240702000552315. 
  46. ↑ Kim, Jong-won (2024-10-01). "Error: no |title= specified when using {{Cite web}}" (in ko). https://www.newspim.com/news/view/20241001000042. 
  47. ↑ "Triều Tiên trình làng tên lửa đạn đạo mới với đầu đạn siêu lớn" (in vi). Bac Ninh Newspaper and Radio – Television. 2024-09-19. https://bacninhtv.vn/tin-tuc/24/169820/trieu-tien-tri-nh-la-ng-ten-lua-dan-dao-moi-voi-dau-dan-sieu-lon. 
  48. ↑ Zwirko, Colin (2025-10-23). "North Korea claims it successfully test launched new ‘hypersonic’ missiles". https://www.nknews.org/2025/10/north-korea-says-it-successfully-test-launched-new-hypersonic-missiles/. 
  49. ↑ "DPRK Missile Administration Tests Important Weapon System". 2025-10-23. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/997f57721a1a602b9db55a871cb7e037.kcmsf. 
  50. ↑ "DPRK Missile Administration and Academy of Defence Sciences Make Public Important Scientific Research Achievements". 19 September 2024. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2024/202409/news19/20240919-01ee.html. 
  51. ↑ Reddy, Shreyas (19 September 2024). "North Korea tests 'explosive power' of new ballistic missile". https://www.nknews.org/2024/09/north-korea-tests-explosive-power-of-new-ballistic-missile/. 
  52. ↑ "Triều Tiên tuyên bố phóng thử thành công 2 tên lửa siêu vượt âm". Quang Ngai Newspaper and Radio, Television. 2025-10-23. https://quangngaitv.vn/trieu-tien-tuyen-bo-phong-thu-thanh-cong-2-ten-lua-sieu-vuot-am-6509063.html. 
  53. ↑ Lee, Minji (2025-10-23). "(2nd LD) N. Korea says it tested 2 hypersonic projectiles, successfully hit target". https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20251023000552315. 
  54. ↑ Chung, Yeong-gyo; Lee, Yu-jung (2025-10-23). "North confirms launch of 'important' hypersonic weapon that could possibly reach APEC host city". https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/2025-10-23/national/northKorea/North-confirms-launch-of-important-hypersonic-weapon-that-could-possibly-reach-APEC-host-city-/2427451. 
  55. ↑ Trevithick, Joseph (2025-10-06). "New North Korean Hypersonic Missile Unveiled At Pyongyang Arms Expo". Recurrent Ventures. https://www.twz.com/land/new-north-korean-hypersonic-missile-unveiled-at-pyongyang-arms-expo. 

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