Engineering:Hwasong-11A

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The Hwasong-11A[lower-alpha 1] (Korean: 《화성포-11가》형; lit. Mars Artillery Type 11A),[lower-alpha 2] also known as KN-23 under the United States’s naming convention,[8] is a North Korean single-stage, solid-fueled short-range ballistic missile.

Design

The Hwasong-11A bears an external resemblance to the Russian Iskander-M and South Korean Hyunmoo-2B short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), being distinguished by its elongated cable raceway, different jet vane actuators and smooth base. Like the Iskander-M, it flies in a quasi-ballistic trajectory, flattening out below an altitude of about 50 km (31 mi) where the atmosphere is dense enough so the missile's fins can change course along its flight path.[8][9][10]

It is believed to have a range of about 240–900 km (150–560 mi), putting all of South Korea within range. It is possible that the missile can have a better range with a reduced payload. The missile's warhead section has enough space for up to 1,500 kg (3,300 lb) of high explosives compared to 700 kg (1,500 lb) for Hwasong-5 (Scud-B) and 800 kg (1,800 lb) of 9K720 Iskander. With a 500 kg (1,100 lb) warhead, the missile has an estimated range of 450 km (280 mi). The warhead can be conventional, likely unitary or submunition, or nuclear. The Hwasong-11A is also capable of carrying the Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warhead. Its active steering capability could make it accurate to within 35–200 m (115–656 ft) CEP, depending whether the missile uses satellite guidance or INS alone.[8][9][10][11][12][13][14]

The Hwasong-11A's launch platform is diverse. It can be launched from wheeled (four-axle) or tracked transporter erector launcher (TEL), as well as railway car and silo.[15][16][17] The four-axle truck used in test-fires is different from the truck used to carrying Hwasong-11A during 8 February 2018 military parade.[18]

It is significantly larger than the Iskander, with estimated length and diameter to be 7.5–8.7 m (25–29 ft) and 0.95–1.1 m (3 ft 1 in–3 ft 7 in) respectively. The missile likely using the same 1.1 m (3 ft 7 in) diameter motor as the Pukguksong-1. The motor is somewhat lengthened, having only one stage, compared to the Pukguksong-1. The motor has a very different structure, compared to the Iskander. Its TEL has more space for the missile, as it lacks the structure immediately after the cab.[8][19][20]

The missile is likely to replace older liquid-fueled North Korean SRBMs, like the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6. Being road-mobile and solid-fueled, it can be moved and fired more rapidly, making it more difficult for an opposing force to locate and target before firing. Once launched, the missile's low apogee, short overall flight time, and ability to conduct a terminal "pull-up" maneuver makes it harder to detect and be intercepted by traditional missile defense systems. Its increased accuracy also reduces the number of missiles that would be needed to destroy a single target.[8][9][10]

The Hwasong-11A is likely to feature some form of foreign involvement such as parts, as when compared to the later developed Hwasong-11B (KN-24), the Korean Central News Agency focuses mainly on the deployment of the missile, with little coverage on its research. While the Hwasong-11B are called "Juche projectiles", it is never mentioned for the Hwasong-11A. The focus on the combat-readiness of the system suggests that it had been deployed for a while but not tested, like the Hwasong-10.[21] It still bears significant differences from the 9K720 Iskander.[22]

History

North Korea first displayed the Hwasong-11A publicly in a military parade on 8 February 2018. The first flight test was on 4 May 2019. Five days later, North Korea test-fired another two missiles.[8][9]

On 17 May 2019, the missile was designated by the United States Forces Korea as KN-23. Further test-fires were carried out on 25 July and 6 August 2019, as well as in 2021, 2022 and 2023. Except for two tests on 6 October 2022 and 19 March 2023, which had one missile launched, all tests of Hwasong-11A had two missiles test-fired.[8][9][23]

After the confirmation of KN-24's official designation (Hwasong-11B) in October 2021, it was suggested that the official designation of the missile, then known by its United States’s designation (KN-23), could be Hwasong-11A.[24] During the “Weaponry Exhibition-2023” military exhibition held in July 2023, North Korea confirmed this designation.[25]

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as of 2025, North Korea is possessing more than 17 Hwasong-11A launchers, in road- and rail-mobile variants.[26]: 268 

Nearly two years since the revelation of the official designation, on 9 May 2025, North Korea named Hwasong-11A in state media for the first time as part of their coverage for a missile test that occurred on the previous day.[4]

Usage during Russian invasion of Ukraine

The missile was highly likely used during the Russian invasion of Ukraine. An unknown number of North Korean ballistic missiles were transferred to Russia in October 2023, according to declassified US intelligence informations. Based on debris left by Russian attacks on Ukrainian targets on 30 December 2023, the ring housing the control vanes have been identified as the characteristics of Hwasong-11A and Hwasong-11B missiles.[27] The barometer on the missile was found to have a Hangul character, and various parts of the missile were stamped with the possible factory name.[20]

According to the Conflict Armament Research, 75% of components in the guidance control system for the Hwasong-11A fired at Kharkiv are based on American parts.[28] They also indicated that some of the missiles were newly produced.[29]

During the Kharkiv strikes of 2 January 2024, Ukrainian authorities noted that the missiles used were of North Korean origin, noting that the shape and design were different than that of Iskander missiles. On 29 April 2024, the UNSC confirmed that the munitions used during the strike were that of Hwasong-11A missiles.[30][31]

On 7 May 2024, Ukrainian sources reported that the missiles have a high failure rate. According to these officials, half of the North Korean missiles lost their programmed trajectories and exploded in the air.[32] In February 2025, it was also reported the Hwasong-11A has been used in Ukraine,[33] with an improved CEP of 50–100 m (160–330 ft).[34]

According to Ukraine, at the start of 2025, North Korea had supplied Russia 148 Hwasong-11A and 11B missiles. Ukraine also claimed that Russia launched Hwasong-11A in the 23 April 2025 Russian attack on civilians in Kyiv.[35] According to Reuters's information from a Ukrainian source, the Hwasong-11A missiles were armed with a 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) warhead.[36]

List of tests

Attempt Date (Pyongyang Standard Time) Location Number of missiles tested Outcome Additional notes References
1 4 May 2019 Hodo Peninsula, Kangwon Province or Wonsan 2 Success These missiles reaching an apogee of 60 km and a range of 240 km (150 mi). The footage was apparently manipulated, and the missiles were probably fired from two different vehicles. Kim Jong Un oversaw the test. [8][9][19][23][37]
2 9 May 2019 Baegun, North Pyongan Province or Kusong 2 Success Both missiles achieved 50 km (31 mi) apogee. One had a range of 420 km (260 mi) and the other had 270 km (170 mi). At least one missile may have used depressed trajectory. Kim Jong Un supervised the test-fire. [8][9][23][38]
3 25 July 2019 Hodo Peninsula, Kangwon Province[23] 2 Success Both missiles again reaching 50 km (31 mi) in altitude, but demonstrating greater ranges of 430 km (270 mi) and 690 km (430 mi), before landing in the Sea of Japan. Kim Jong Un supervised the test-fire. [8][9][23][39]
4 6 August 2019 Kwail Airport, South Hwanghae Province[23] 2 Success Two missiles were launched and overflew the North Korean capital region. These missile achieved an apogee of 37 km (23 mi) out to 450 km (280 mi). Kim Jong Un supervised the test-fire. [8][9][23][40]
5 27 January 2022 Hungnam, Hamhung, South Hamgyong Province 2 Success These missiles flew 190 km (120 mi) to a maximum altitude of 20 km (12 mi) and demonstrated depressed trajectory. North Korea stated the test was to confirm the power of an air burst conventional warhead. Taken together, this suggests that the missile is operational. [23][41]
6 1 October 2022 Sunan District, Pyongyang 2 Success These missiles achieved 50 km (31 mi) apogee. One missile flew 400 km (250 mi), the other flew 350 km (220 mi). Kim Jong Un oversaw the test. [23][42]
7 6 October 2022 Samsok District, Pyongyang 1 Success The missile achieved 50 km (31 mi) apogee and flew 800 km (500 mi). The missile was launched just about 15 minutes after the launch of a KN-25 (600 mm multiple rocket launcher) missile and may have used an irregular trajectory. Kim Jong Un oversaw the test. [23][42]
8 14 March 2023 Jangyon County, South Hwanghae Province 2 Success According to North Korea, these missiles hit the target 611.4 km (379.9 mi) away. South Korea said that these missiles had flown 620 km (390 mi). [23][43][44]
9 27 March 2023 Chunghwa County, North Hwanghae Province or Ryokpho District, Pyongyang 2 Success These missiles achieved 50 km (31 mi) apogee and flew 350 km (220 mi). According to North Korea, the missiles exploded at an altitude of about 500 m above a target near Kimchaek. [23][45]
10 8 May 2025 Wonsan At least 1 Success Kim Jong Un oversaw the test along with senior officials. The missile achieved 100 km (62 mi) apogee, flew 800 km (500 mi) and was launched along with five to eight 600 mm multiple rocket launcher (KN-25) missiles. [4][46][47]

Variants

Along with the base version, Hwasong-11A has some variants:

Railway-borne missile

Design and development

On 15 September 2021, North Korea test-fired two missiles from a modified railway car, rather than the typical road-mobile launcher. These missiles appeared to be baseline Hwasong-11A versions. They flew much further than any previous flight of the weapon, and went an even greater distance than the larger variant tested earlier in 2021. Such excess range could indicate it hadn't previously been tested out to its maximum range, or that the design underwent modifications such as a reduced payload or flight profile improvements. The launch railcar used two side-by-side erector/launcher mechanisms like the side-by-side arrangement used in the TEL. The use of a rail-mobile system is unusual for an SRBM, as road-mobile launchers are easier for deploying and hiding relatively small missiles, while railway missiles are restricted to the rail network. Adding railway launchers may be an effort to further increase and diversify the country's SRBM missile force, since modifying existing railcars to fire missiles could be a way to supplement a limited number of launch trucks, or possibly to test the concept before applying it to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). A rail-borne ICBM would have advantages over one carried by a wheeled TEL, as such large liquid-fueled missiles carried in railway cars would be able to move more places and be kept in a higher readiness state.[16][48]

On 14 January 2022, North Korea again tested railway-launched Hwasong-11A. The next day, the Korean Central News Agency released photos of the test.[49]

List of tests

Attempt Date (Pyongyang Standard Time) Location Number of missiles tested Outcome Additional notes Reference(s)
1 15 September 2021 Yangdok County, South Hamgyong Province 2 Success These missiles, which launched from railcar, travelled 800 km (500 mi), to a maximum altitude of 60 km (37 mi). [23]
2 14 January 2022 Uiju County, North Pyongan Province 2 Success These missiles, which launched from railcar, flew 430 km (270 mi) and achieved 36 km (22 mi) apogee. [23]
3 2 November 2022 Unknown Unknown Unknown Information based on images released by the Korean Central News Agency on 7 November 2022. The missile appears to be railway-borne. [50][51]

Silo-based missile

Design and development

On 19 March 2023, North Korea test-fired a baseline Hwasong-11A from an underground silo that is located within Sohae Satellite Launching Station. The silo was constructed for less than two months. This is the first time North Korea has launched a missile from silo.[17][23]

The usage of a silo can help North Korea to fire missiles with little warning while avoiding outside surveillance.[52]

List of tests

Attempt Date (Pyongyang Standard Time) Location Number of missiles tested Outcome Additional notes References
1 19 March 2023 Sohae Satellite Launching Station 1 Success The missile reached 50 km (31 mi) apogee, flew 800 km (500 mi) and may have utilized an irregular trajectory. Kim Jong Un and his daughter oversaw the test. [23][53]

Larger variant

Hwasong-11C is the larger version of Hwasong-11A, claimed to have a 2.5 tons warhead.[1]

A variant with 4.5 tons warhead, called Hwasong-11C-4.5, was tested on 1 July 2024 and 18 September 2024.[54][55]

Smaller variant

Hwasong-11D is the smaller variant of Hwasong-11A, with reduced range.[1]

It was tested on 16 April 2022, 2 November 2022, 9 March 2023 and 17 May 2024.[23][50]

Hypersonic glide vehicle variant

The Hwasong-11E is a Hwasong-11C-based variant of Hwasong-11A with hypersonic glide vehicle, first displayed in 2025 during a military exhibition.[56]

SLBM variant

Hwasong-11S is the underwater-launched version of Hwasong-11A.[1]

It was tested two times, on 19 October 2021 and 25 September 2022.[23]

See also

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(KN-24)

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Notes

  1. ↑ Also known without using United States’s designation as Hwasong-11Ga, Hwasongpho-11Ga, Hwasong-11Ka, Hwasongpho-11Ka, Kimskander.[1][2][3][4][5] South Korea also refers to Hwasong-11A as 19-1 SRBM under its naming convention.[6][7]
  2. ↑ Also written in Korean as 《화성-11가》형 (Mars Type 11A).

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Tianran Xu (8 August 2023). "Brief on 27 July 2023 Parade of the DPRK". https://opennuclear.org/publication/brief-27-july-2023-parade-dprk. 
  2. ↑ Anastasia Barannikova (15 March 2024). "Nuclear strategy of the DPRK: Doctrine evolution and future prospects". https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/nuclear-strategy-of-the-dprk-doctrine-evolution-and-future-prospects/. 
  3. ↑ "North Korea: Kim Jong Un oversees tactical ballistic missile drill". 9 May 2025. https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20250509_07/. 
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 4.2 "Joint Striking Drill of Long-range Artillery and Missile Systems of Sub-units of KPA on Eastern Front Conducted". 9 May 2025. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/0bf90f4d74cc557f997fc1289b9d8e55.kcmsf. 
  5. ↑ Danh Toại (16 May 2019). "Mỹ giải mã 'Kimskander' Triều Tiên: có thể vượt qua hệ thống phòng thủ". https://thanhnien.vn/my-giai-ma-kimskander-cua-trieu-tien-co-the-vuot-qua-he-thong-phong-thu-185850559.htm. 
  6. ↑ "韓国軍国防白書2020の北朝鮮ミサイル比較図から大きさ推定値" (in ja). 3 February 2021. https://news.yahoo.co.jp/expert/articles/50f17a7f826e7fd244df8d42a167c898a72fff7e. 
  7. ↑ Noh Ji-won (20 January 2020). "N. Korea’s “new large-caliber guided rockets” were actually SRBMs, S. Korean military says". https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/925128.html. 
  8. ↑ 8.00 8.01 8.02 8.03 8.04 8.05 8.06 8.07 8.08 8.09 8.10 "KN-23". 1 July 2019. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kn-23/. 
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8 "KN-23". https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/north-korea/kn-23/. 
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 10.2 Michael Elleman (9 October 2019). "North Korea’s New Short-Range Missiles: A Technical Evaluation". https://www.38north.org/2019/10/melleman100919/. 
  11. ↑ "Report to Congress on North Korea's Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs". United States Naval Institute. 26 January 2023. https://news.usni.org/2023/01/26/report-to-congress-on-north-koreas-nuclear-weapons-and-missile-programs. 
  12. ↑ "Tên lửa KN-23 'bản sao Iskander-M' có thể bắn xa tới 900 km" (in vi). 23 January 2024. https://www.anninhthudo.vn/ten-lua-kn-23-ban-sao-iskander-m-co-the-ban-xa-toi-900-km-post565213.antd. 
  13. ↑ Delory, Stéphane; Bondaz, Antoine; Maire, Christian (2023). "North Korean Short Range Systems: Military consequences of the development of the KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25". Foundation for Strategic Research. https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS.pdf. 
  14. ↑ Trà Khánh (11 April 2023). "Giải mã đầu đạn hạt nhân Triều Tiên khiến Mỹ và đồng minh lo sợ" (in vi). https://vtcnews.vn/giai-ma-dau-dan-hat-nhan-trieu-tien-khien-my-va-dong-minh-lo-so-ar763933.html. 
  15. ↑ Xu, Tianran (2 May 2022). "25 April 2022 DPRK Parade". p. 19. https://opennuclear.org/sites/default/files/2022-05/25%20April%202022%20DPRK%20parade_0_0.pdf. 
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 Vann H. Van Diepen (17 September 2021). "It’s the Launcher, Not the Missile: Initial Evaluation of North Korea’s Rail-Mobile Missile Launches". https://www.38north.org/2021/09/its-the-launcher-not-the-missile-initial-evaluation-of-north-koreas-rail-mobile-missile-launches/. 
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 Ankit Panda (21 March 2023). "North Korea’s new silo-based missile raises risk of prompt preemptive strikes". https://www.nknews.org/pro/north-koreas-new-silo-based-missile-raises-risk-of-prompt-preemptive-strikes/. 
  18. ↑ "DPRK Military Parade Viewbook 2022". 2022-04-21. p. 11. https://opennuclear.org/sites/default/files/2022-04/DPRK%20Parade%20ViewBook%2020220421.pptx_.pdf. 
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 "Pukguksong GLBM-2 and GLBM-3". https://www.b14643.eu/Spacerockets/Specials/Pukguksong_GLBM-2/index.htm. 
  20. ↑ 20.0 20.1 "Documenting a North Korean missile in Ukraine" (in en-US). Conflict Armament Research. 2024-01-19. https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/3a4e9d713f59426d9d1ea3881abecbf3. 
  21. ↑ "A Tale of Two Missiles: Analysis of KCNA Reports on North Korea's KN-23 and KN-24 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles" (in en). https://datayo.org/p/stories/8jzzpJxnZhMCzDA6/a-tale-of-two-missiles-analysis-of-kcna-reports-on-north-koreas-kn-23-and-kn-24-short-range-ballistic-missiles. 
  22. ↑ Jeffrey Lewis (2019-06-05). "Preliminary Analysis: KN-23 SRBM" (in en-US). https://nonproliferation.org/preliminary-analysis-kn-23-srbm/. 
  23. ↑ 23.00 23.01 23.02 23.03 23.04 23.05 23.06 23.07 23.08 23.09 23.10 23.11 23.12 23.13 23.14 23.15 23.16 23.17 "The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database". https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/north_korea_missile_test_database.xlsx. 
  24. ↑ "仮説：KN-24が火星11BならばKN-23は火星11Aである". 2021-10-14. https://news.yahoo.co.jp/expert/articles/b4c08fadce8e6884ce7ceb0525b47e30537bf0cf. 
  25. ↑ "KN-23（イスカンデル擬き）は火星11Aである". 30 July 2023. https://news.yahoo.co.jp/expert/articles/1330c9dbf74b936ff69767bbc403a565b7d4fb84. 
  26. ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies (12 February 2025). The Military Balance 2025 (1st ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-1041049678. 
  27. ↑ "White House says Russia used missiles from North Korea to strike Ukraine". 5 January 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/white-house-north-korea-recently-provided-russia-with-ballistic-missiles-2024-01-04/. 
  28. ↑ Anton Sokolin (21 February 2024). "North Korea used US parts in ballistic missile Russia fired at Ukraine: Report". NK News. Archived from the original on 2024-02-22. https://archive.today/20240222024150/https://www.nknews.org/2024/02/north-korea-used-us-parts-in-ballistic-missile-russia-fired-at-ukraine-report/. 
  29. ↑ Anton Sokolin (12 September 2024). "Newly made North Korean missile used in Russian strike on Ukraine: Report". https://www.nknews.org/2024/09/newly-made-north-korean-missile-used-in-russian-strike-on-ukraine-report/. 
  30. ↑ "Ukraine shows evidence Russia fired North Korea missile at Kharkiv". 6 January 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-shows-evidence-russia-fired-north-korea-missile-kharkiv-2024-01-06/. 
  31. ↑ Nichols, Michelle (29 April 2024). "Exclusive: UN experts say North Korea missile landed in Ukraine's Kharkiv". https://www.reuters.com/world/un-experts-say-north-korea-missile-landed-ukraines-kharkiv-2024-04-29/. 
  32. ↑ "Exclusive: Ukraine examines N.Korean missile debris amid fears of Moscow-Pyongyang axis". 7 May 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-examines-nkorean-missile-debris-amid-fears-moscow-pyongyang-axis-2024-05-07/. 
  33. ↑ Mike Firn, ed (10 February 2025). "North Korea’s increasingly accurate missiles raise concerns". https://www.rfa.org/english/korea/2025/02/11/north-missiles-precision-accuracy-ukraine/. 
  34. ↑ Tom Balmforth (6 February 2025). "Exclusive: Ukraine sees marked improvement in accuracy of Russia's North Korean missiles". https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/ukraine-sees-marked-improvement-accuracy-russias-north-korean-missiles-2025-02-06/. 
  35. ↑ Tom Balmforth (24 April 2025). "Missile that killed 12 in Russian strike on Kyiv was North Korean, Zelenskiy says". https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/missile-that-killed-eight-russian-strike-kyiv-was-nkorean-kyiv-source-says-2025-04-24/. 
  36. ↑ Justin McCurry (25 April 2025). "From ammunition to ballistic missiles: how North Korea arms Russia in the Ukraine war". Tokyo, Japan. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/apr/25/how-north-korea-arms-russia-in-ukraine-war. 
  37. ↑ "Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Strike Drill of Defence Units in Frontline Area and on Eastern Front". 5 May 2019. http://www.ryongnamsan.edu.kp/univ/en/revodaily/7647966b7343c29048673252e490f736. 
  38. ↑ "Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Strike Drill of Defence Units in Forefront Area and on Western Front". 10 May 2019. http://www.ryongnamsan.edu.kp/univ/en/revodaily/54229abfcfa5649e7003b83dd4755294. 
  39. ↑ "Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Power Demonstration Fire of New-Type Tactical Guided Weapon". 26 July 2019. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2019/201907/news26/20190726-01ee.html.  For images, see 1 and 2.
  40. ↑ "Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Watches Demonstration Fire of New-Type Tactical Guided Missiles". 7 August 2019. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2019/201908/news07/20190807-01ee.html.  For images, see 1 and 2.
  41. ↑ Vann H. Van Diepen (31 January 2022). "North Korea's Fifth and Sixth Rounds of January Missile Launches". 38 North (The Henry L. Stimson Center). https://www.38north.org/2022/01/north-koreas-fifth-and-sixth-rounds-of-january-missile-launches/. 
  42. ↑ 42.0 42.1 "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Military Drills of KPA Units for Operation of Tactical Nukes". 10 October 2022. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2022/202210/news10/20221010-01ee.html.  For images, see 1, 2, 3, 4.
  43. ↑ "North Korea confirms firing of two ground-to-ground ballistic missiles Tuesday". 15 March 2023. https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2023/03/15/national/northKorea/GGM-ground-to-ground-missile-north-korea/20230315095648866.html. 
  44. ↑ "Missile Launching Drill Conducted in DPRK". 15 March 2023. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2023/202303/news15/20230315-01ee.html. 
  45. ↑ "Army Unit in Charge of Important Operation Task in Central Front Conducts Missile Firing Drill". 28 March 2023. https://korea-dpr.com/army-unit-in-charge-of-important-operation-task-on-central-front-conducts-missile-firing-drill/. 
  46. ↑ Colin Zwirko (2025-05-09). "North Korean missile test simulates nuclear attack on US-ROK forces: State media". https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/north-korea-simulates-nuclear-attack-on-us-rok-with-missile-test/. 
  47. ↑ Vann H. Van Diepen (2025-07-31). "North Korea Continues to Improve Nuclear Posture". https://www.38north.org/2025/07/north-korea-continues-to-improve-nuclear-posture/. 
  48. ↑ "The First DPRK Missile Launch from a Rail-Mobile Launcher". 17 September 2021. https://opennuclear.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/Report%20on%20DPRK%20Launch%20from%20a%20Rail%20Launcher-compressed.pdf. 
  49. ↑ Shin, Hyonhee. "North Korea tests railway-borne missile in latest launch amid rising tension with U.S." (in english). Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-used-railway-born-missile-fridays-test-kcna-2022-01-14/. 
  50. ↑ 50.0 50.1 "S/2023/171". 7 March 2023. p. 182. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/037/94/pdf/n2303794.pdf. 
  51. ↑ "北朝鮮が11月2日～5日のミサイル大量発射を報告" (in ja). 2022-11-07. https://news.yahoo.co.jp/expert/articles/5652fd5b89ecf5d0d90bf6514f8957cb6b282c0f. 
  52. ↑ "North Korea's use of missile silo could mean less warning of launches - analysts". 20 March 2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-use-missile-silo-could-mean-less-warning-launches-analysts-2023-03-20/. 
  53. ↑ Kim Tong-hyung (20 March 2023). "North Korea: Latest missile simulated nuclear counterattack". Seoul, South Korea. https://apnews.com/article/north-korea-kim-jong-un-nuclear-missile-8b92c652009c79751c33cbb49886e920. 
  54. ↑ "DPRK Missile Administration Conducts Test-fire of New-type Tactical Ballistic Missile". 2 July 2024. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/841c0d7c2c6cf2f2c8928f7bfb021616.kcmsf. 
  55. ↑ Shreyas Reddy (19 September 2024). "North Korea tests 'explosive power' of new ballistic missile". https://www.nknews.org/2024/09/north-korea-tests-explosive-power-of-new-ballistic-missile/. 
  56. ↑ Joseph Trevithick (2025-10-06). "New North Korean Hypersonic Missile Unveiled At Pyongyang Arms Expo". Recurrent Ventures. https://www.twz.com/land/new-north-korean-hypersonic-missile-unveiled-at-pyongyang-arms-expo. 

Template:DPRK missiles



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