Engineering:Hwasong-6

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The Hwasong-6 (Korean: 《화성-6》형; lit. Mars Type 6) is a North Korean tactical ballistic missile. It is derived from the Hwasong-5, itself a derivative of the Soviet R-17 Elbrus. It carries the NATO reporting name Scud.

History

Work on an extended-range version of the Hwasong-5 began in North Korea around 1984,[1] and with only relatively minor modifications, a new type was produced from 1989, designated Hwasong-6 ("Scud Mod. C" or "Scud-C"). It was first tested in June 1990, and entered full-scale production the same year, or in 1991.[2] It is likely out of production.[1] The North Koreans would later use their acquired know-how to produce domestic copies of the Scud-B to create a larger missile, the Hwasong-7.[3]

To increase range over its predecessor, the Hwasong-6 payload has been decreased to 770 kg (1,700 lb) and the length of the rocket body extended to increase the propellant by 25%; accuracy is 700–1,000 m (2,300–3,300 ft) circular error probability (CEP).[1][4] Such range is sufficient to strike targets as far away as western Japan. Its dimensions are identical to the original Hwasong-5. Due to difficulties in procuring MAZ-543 TELs, mobile launchers were produced in North Korea. By 1999, North Korea was estimated to have produced 600 to 1,000 Hwasong-6 missiles, of which 25 had been launched in tests, 300 to 500 had been exported, and 300 to 600 were in service with the Korean People's Army.[5]

The Hwasong-6 is armed with a high-explosive (HE) fragmentation or cluster warhead,[6] but is believed to be capable of carrying a nuclear, chemical, or biological warhead.[1]

Before the 2015 Houthi takeover in Yemen, the country didn't have a domestic missile program, and had only a small stockpile of Soviet-made Scud-B and North Korean Hwasong-6 missiles bought in the 1980s and 1990s. These were used against the pro-Hadi forces in the summer of that year.[7][8] Since then, the Houthis have used domestically produced ballistic missiles with Iranian assistance.[7][9]

Variants

Iran

  • Shahab-2
Main article: Engineering:Shahab-2

North Korea

  • KN-18
Main article: Engineering:KN-18

Yemen

  • Burkan-2
Main article: Engineering:Burkan-2

Export

The Hwasong-6 was exported to Iran, where it is designated as the Shahab-2, to Syria, where it is manufactured under licence with Chinese assistance[5] and to Yemen.[10] Myanmar also imported Hwasong-6 ballistic missiles in 2009.[11] About 25 Hwasong-6 ballistic missiles were purchased by Vietnam from North Korea in 1997.[12] In 1995, Libya purchased 5 Hwasong-6 missiles from North Korea, however they were never tested or deployed, and planned local production was cancelled in 2003 with the disarmament of Libya.[12]

Operators

Current

  •  Egypt[2] − Reportedly purchased in 1996, unconfirmed[13]
  •  Iran[2] − Produced locally as the Shahab-2.[14] Status uncertain[15]
  •  Myanmar − Reported[16]
  •  North Korea − 30+ Hwasong 5/6 launchers as of 2024[17]
  •  Syria[2] − Scud-C[18]
  •  Vietnam − Scud-C,[19] reportedly purchased in 1998[20]

Non-state

Former

  •  Libya[12]
  •  Yemen − Pre-war stocks depleted during the Yemeni civil war (2014–present). Most were converted into Burkan missiles by the Houthis[22]

See also

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Threat
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Zaloga 2013, p. 96.
  3. ↑ Center for Energy and Security Studies & The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, p. 48.
  4. ↑ Center for Energy and Security Studies & The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, p. 46.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Bermudez, Joseph S. (1999). "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK: Longer Range Designs, 1989-Present". James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/op2/lrdes.htm. 
  6. ↑ Center for Energy and Security Studies & The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, p. 62.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Samaan 2023, p. 162.
  8. ↑ Williams & Shaikh 2020, pp. 15−16.
  9. ↑ Williams & Shaikh 2020a, pp. 41−43.
  10. ↑ "Houthis using missiles 'supplied by N Korea': Report claims". Al Arabiya English. 4 August 2015. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2015/08/05/Yemen-rebels-using-missiles-supplied-by-North-Korea. 
  11. ↑ "Junta Forms Missile Force to Guard Against External treats". 2010-07-13. https://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=18960. 
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 "Trade Registers". https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php. 
  13. ↑ Hinz, Fabian (16 June 2023). "After half a century Egypt’s Scuds soldier on" (in en). International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2023/06/after-half-a-century-egypts-scuds-soldier-on/. "Whether the missiles visible are the 300-km-range Scud B or the longer-range Scud C is not clear from the available [satellite] imagery. The 500-km-range Scud C – which Egypt reportedly purchased from North Korea in 1996 – is externally similar to the B model." 
  14. ↑ Kang 2013, p. 116.
  15. ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024a, p. 354.
  16. ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024, p. 297.
  17. ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024, p. 282.
  18. ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024a, p. 386.
  19. ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024, p. 324.
  20. ↑ "Sức mạnh tên lửa đạn đạo tầm ngắn của Việt Nam" (in vi). 2017-05-29. https://vtcnews.vn/suc-manh-ten-lua-viet-nam-mua-tu-trieu-tien-ar326175.html. 
  21. ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024a, p. 369.
  22. ↑ Mitzer, Stijn; Oliemans, Joost (4 September 2022). "Houthi Drone And Missile Handbook". https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2019/09/houthi-drone-and-missile-handbook.html. 

Bibliography

Template:Scud Template:DPRK missiles



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