Engineering:Hwasong-6
The Hwasong-6 (Korean: 《화성-6》형; lit. Mars Type 6) is a North Korean tactical ballistic missile. It is derived from the Hwasong-5, itself a derivative of the Soviet R-17 Elbrus. It carries the NATO reporting name Scud.
History
Work on an extended-range version of the Hwasong-5 began around 1984,[1] and with only relatively minor modifications, a new type was produced from 1989, designated Hwasong-6 ("Scud Mod. C" or "Scud-C"). It was first tested in June 1990, and entered full-scale production the same year, or in 1991.[2] It is likely out of production.[1] The North Koreans would later use their acquired know-how to produce domestic copies of the Scud-B to create a larger missile, the Hwasong-7.[3]
To increase range over its predecessor, the Hwasong-6 has its payload decreased to 770 kg (1,700 lb) and the length of the rocket body extended to increase the propellant by 25%; accuracy is 700–1,000 m (2,300–3,300 ft) circular error probability (CEP).[1][4] Such range is sufficient to strike targets as far away as western Japan. Its dimensions are identical to the original Hwasong-5. Due to difficulties in procuring MAZ-543 TELs, mobile launchers were produced in North Korea. By 1999, North Korea was estimated to have produced 600 to 1,000 Hwasong-6 missiles, of which 25 had been launched in tests, 300 to 500 had been exported, and 300 to 600 were in service with the Korean People's Army.[5]
The Hwasong-6 is armed with a high-explosive (HE) fragmentation or cluster warhead,[6] but it's believed that it can also carry a nuclear, chemical, or biological warhead.[1]
Before the 2015 Houthi takeover in Yemen, the country didn't have a domestic missile program, and had only a small stockpile of Soviet-made Scud-B and North Korean Hwasong-6 missiles bought in the 1980s and 1990s. These were used against the pro-Hadi forces in the summer of that year.[7][8] Since then, the Houthis have used domestically produced ballistic missiles with Iranian assistance.[7][9]
Variants
Iran
- Shahab-2
North Korea
- KN-18
Yemen
- Burkan-2
Export
The Hwasong-6 was exported to Iran, where it is designated as the Shahab-2, to Syria, where it is manufactured under licence with Chinese assistance[5] and to Yemen.[10] Myanmar also imported Hwasong-6 ballistic missiles in 2009.[11] About 25 Hwasong-6 ballistic missiles were purchased by Vietnam from North Korea in 1997.[12] In 1995, Libya purchased 5 Hwasong-6 missiles from North Korea, however they were never tested or deployed, and planned local production was cancelled in 2003 with the disarmament of Libya.[12]
Operators
Current
Egypt[2] − Reportedly purchased in 1996, unconfirmed[13]
Iran[2] − Produced locally as the Shahab-2.[14] Status uncertain[15]
Myanmar − Reported[16]
North Korea − 30+ Hwasong 5/6 launchers as of 2024[17]
Syria[2] − Scud-C[18]
Vietnam − Scud-C[19]
Non-state
- Template:Country data Hezbollah − Scud-C (reported)[20]
Former
Libya[12]
Yemen − Pre-war stocks depleted during the Yemeni civil war (2014–present). Most were converted into Burkan missiles by the Houthis[21]
See also
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Cite error: Invalid
<ref>tag; no text was provided for refs namedThreat - ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 Zaloga 2013, p. 96.
- ↑ Center for Energy and Security Studies & The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, p. 48.
- ↑ Center for Energy and Security Studies & The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, p. 46.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Bermudez, Joseph S. (1999). "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK: Longer Range Designs, 1989-Present". James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/op2/lrdes.htm.
- ↑ Center for Energy and Security Studies & The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2021, p. 62.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 Samaan 2023, p. 162.
- ↑ Williams & Shaikh 2020, pp. 15−16.
- ↑ Williams & Shaikh 2020a, pp. 41−43.
- ↑ "Houthis using missiles 'supplied by N Korea': Report claims". Al Arabiya English. 4 August 2015. https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2015/08/05/Yemen-rebels-using-missiles-supplied-by-North-Korea.
- ↑ "Junta Forms Missile Force to Guard Against External treats". 2010-07-13. https://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=18960.
- ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 "Trade Registers". https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php.
- ↑ Hinz, Fabian (16 June 2023). "After half a century Egypt’s Scuds soldier on" (in en). International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2023/06/after-half-a-century-egypts-scuds-soldier-on/. "Whether the missiles visible are the 300-km-range Scud B or the longer-range Scud C is not clear from the available [satellite] imagery. The 500-km-range Scud C – which Egypt reportedly purchased from North Korea in 1996 – is externally similar to the B model."
- ↑ Kang 2013, p. 116.
- ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024a, p. 354.
- ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024, p. 297.
- ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024, p. 282.
- ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024a, p. 386.
- ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024, p. 324.
- ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies 2024a, p. 369.
- ↑ Mitzer, Stijn; Oliemans, Joost (4 September 2022). "Houthi Drone And Missile Handbook". https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2019/09/houthi-drone-and-missile-handbook.html.
Bibliography
- Center for Energy and Security Studies; The International Institute for Strategic Studies (14 July 2021). DPRK Strategic Capabilities and Security on the Korean Peninsula: Looking Ahead. https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/dprk-strategic-capabilities-and-security-on-the-korean-peninsula---english3.pdf.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (12 February 2024). "Chapter Five: Asia" (in en). The Military Balance (Taylor & Francis) 124 (1): 218–327. doi:10.1080/04597222.2024.2298593. ISSN 0459-7222. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/04597222.2024.2298593. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies (12 February 2024a). "Chapter Six: Middle East and North Africa" (in en). The Military Balance (Taylor & Francis) 124 (1): 328–395. doi:10.1080/04597222.2024.2298594. ISSN 0459-7222. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/04597222.2024.2298594. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
- Kang, Jungmin (2013) (in en). Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea. Springer Science & Business Media. ISBN 978-94-007-6019-6. https://books.google.com/books?id=reZEAAAAQBAJ.
- Samaan, Jean-Loup (2023) (in en). New Military Strategies in the Gulf: The Mirage of Autonomy in Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-0-7556-5073-6. https://books.google.com/books?id=R2rMEAAAQBAJ.
- Williams, Ian; Shaikh, Shaan (2020). "Houthi Missile Sources". The Missile War in Yemen (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)): 15–19. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24837.12. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
- Williams, Ian; Shaikh, Shaan (2020a). "Appendix: The Houthi Missile Arsenal". The Missile War in Yemen (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)): 34–52. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24837.15. Retrieved 20 November 2024.
- Zaloga, Steven J. (2013) (in en). Scud Ballistic Missile and Launch Systems 1955–2005. Bloomsbury Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4728-0306-1. https://books.google.com/books?id=8X-HCwAAQBAJ.
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