Engineering:Hwasong-7

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The Hwasong-7[1][lower-alpha 1] (Korean: 《화성-7》형; lit. Mars Type 7) is a single-stage, mobile liquid propellant medium-range ballistic missile developed by North Korea. Developed in the mid-1980s, it is a scaled-up adaptation of the Soviet R-17 Elbrus missiles, more commonly known by its NATO reporting name "Scud". The inventory is estimated to be around 200–300 missiles.[3] US Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimates that as of June 2017 fewer than 100 launchers were operationally deployed.[4]

It influenced the design of Pakistan's Ghauri-1 missile,[5] as well as the Iranian ghadr-110.[6][7]

Overview

Estimated maximum range of some North Korean missiles[8]

It is believed North Korea obtained R-17 designs from Egypt, and possibly modified designs from China, allowing them to reverse-engineer them into a larger and longer-distance weapon. United States reconnaissance satellites first detected this type in May 1990 at the Musudan-ri test launch facility, in northeastern North Korea.[9] In the same year, North Korea began producing Hwasong-7, and eight years later, Hwasong-7 became operational.[10][11]

The precise capabilities and specifications of the missile are unknown; even the fact of its production and deployment are controversial. It is a larger variant of the R-17, scaled up so its cross-sectional area is about doubled, with a diameter of 1.25 metres (4 ft) and a length of 15.6 metres (51 ft).[12]

Its aerodynamic design is stable, reducing the need for modern active stabilization systems while the missile is flying in the denser lower atmosphere. The Hwasong-7 uses the liquid propellant combination of TM-185 (20% gasoline and 80% kerosene) and AK-27I (27% N
2O
4 and 73% HNO
3), therefore, Hwasong-7 can only be fueled when vertical, therefore it cannot be fueled before transport as is normal for modern missiles. Its range is estimated as 900 km (560 mi) with a 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) payload to 1,000–1,500 km (620–930 mi).[12][11][13]

It has an estimated circular error probable (CEP) of 1,000–2,000 m (3,300–6,600 ft), but it can be reduced to between 190 m (620 ft) and 1,000 m (3,300 ft) with GPS guidance.[13][14] North Korea is believed to possess some 300 Hwasong-7 missiles and fewer than 50 mobile launchers.[15][16]

The Hwasong-7's technology has been exported to foreign nations (such as Iran and Pakistan) in secrecy on the basis of mutual exchange of technologies, with Iran being one of the largest beneficiaries of such technology. Successful variants were tested and deployed by Iran after developing the Shahab-3 which is roughly based on Hwasong-7.[6][17] Some press reports (including The Sunday Telegraph, Jerusalem Post, and Janes) claimed that Libya signed a contract for a total of 50 Nodong systems in October 1999, with the first batch delivered in July 2000, however such rumors proved to be false when Libya voluntarily dismantled its weapons of mass destruction programs in December 2003 and invited foreign inspectors to verify the disarmament process. In that same year, US inspectors learned that Iraq attempted to buy Nodong missiles, but the North Koreans never delivered the missiles and refused to refund the $10 million down payment.[18]

North Korea test-fired Hwasong-7 missiles in 2006 and 2014, in which North Korea fires two missiles that flew 650 km (400 mi).[19][20]

Although it has an estimated range of 1,000–1,500 km (620–930 mi), launches in March 2014 flew only 650 km (400 mi), as the missiles flew to an altitude of 160 km (99 mi) because of lofted trajectory. The missiles achieved a maximum speed of Mach 7 (8,575 km/h). U.S. and South Korean Patriot PAC-2/3 interceptors are more specialized to hit ballistic missiles up to 400 km (250 mi).[21]

On 5 September 2016, North Korea fired three missiles into the Sea of Japan, these missiles achieved about 1,000 km (620 mi) range. Initially, these missiles were believed to be Hwasong-7,[22] however, it was later revealed that the missiles used for this launch were Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER).[23][24] The United States strongly condemned the launch.[22]

To enable interception at higher altitudes, South Korea is indigenously developing the long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM),[21] and on 8 July 2016 the U.S. agreed to deploy one Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system in Seongju County, in the south of South Korea, by the end of 2017.[25]

Variant for reconnaissance satellite testing

Hwasong-7 has a variant with white livery for reconnaissance satellite cameras testing.[26]

On 18 December 2022, North Korea launched two medium-range ballistic missiles from Sohae Satellite Launching Station. These missiles flew 500 km (310 mi) with an apogee of 550 km (340 mi).[24]

According to North Korea, the missiles were test-fired by National Aerospace Technology Administration (then National Aerospace Development Administration) for testing reconnaissance satellite cameras.[27]

Based on photos released by North Korea, the missiles appear to be derived from Hwasong-7 (or Scud).[24]

Operators

Current

Unconfirmed

  •  Egypt − Reportedly was interested in buying Nodong missiles, but photographic evidence only shows Scud-Bs or possibly Scud-Cs in use.[31]
  •  Syria − Developed a localized version of the Nodong missile. Reportedly received 50 missiles and 7 TELs from North Korea in 2000.[32] According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Syrian Arab Army doesn't operate MRBMs as of 2024[33]

Failed bids

  •  Iraq − Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Baghdad placed an order for Nodong missiles and made a $10 million down payment, but North Korea never delivered the missiles.[34]

See also

  • Strategic Rocket Forces (North Korea)
  • North Korean missile tests
  • North Korean defense industry
  • Military of North Korea

Notes

  1. ↑ Also known as Rodong-1 (로동1호; 蘆洞 1號, North Korean style), Nodong-1 (노동1호; 蘆洞 1號, South Korean style), both meaning "Labor-1". South Korea romanized "Hwasong-7" as Hwaseong-7.
    Western designations for the Hwasong-7 also include: Nodong, Rodong, Scud-D, Scud Mod-D, Nodong-A.[2]

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 IISS 2024, p. 282.
  2. ↑ Cordesman, Anthony H.; Hess, Ashley (2013) (in en). The Evolving Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia: Missile, DPRK and ROK Nuclear Forces, and External Nuclear Forces. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 10. ISBN 978-1-4422-2520-6. https://books.google.com/books?id=OH3yAwAAQBAJ. 
  3. ↑ "South Korea's military to increase number of Hyunmoo missiles, says report". 2016-08-16. http://www.janes.com/article/62967/south-korea-s-military-to-increase-number-of-hyunmoo-missiles-says-report. 
  4. ↑ DIBMAC 2017, p. 25.
  5. ↑ "North Korea-Iran Missile Cooperation" (in en). 2016-09-22. https://www.38north.org/2016/09/melleman092216/. 
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Brügge, Norbert (2 May 2020). "The North-Korean/Iranian Nodong-Shahab missile family". https://b14643.eu/Spacerockets/Specials/Nodong/index.htm. 
  7. ↑ U.S. Department of Defense (2001). Proliferation: Threat and Response. DIANE Publishing. pp. 38. ISBN 1-4289-8085-7. https://fas.org/irp/threat/prolif00.pdf. 
  8. ↑ "How potent are North Korea's threats?". BBC News. 15 September 2015. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21710644. 
  9. ↑ Bluth, Christoph (July 31, 2011). Crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Potomac Books Inc.. ISBN 9781597975773. https://books.google.com/books?id=QsB7WfdvNaQC&q=rodong+satellites+1990&pg=PT59. Retrieved 17 March 2017. 
  10. ↑ "Egypt's Missile Efforts Succeed with Help from North Korea". Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. 1996. http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/egypt/miss.html. 
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 Kim, Dueyon (1 July 2013). "Fact Sheet: North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs". http://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-north-koreas-nuclear-and-ballistic-missile-programs/. 
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 Markus Schiller (2012). Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat (Report). RAND Corporation. TR-1268-TSF. ISBN 978-0-8330-7621-2. https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1268.html. Retrieved 19 January 2013. 
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 Charles P. Vick. "No-Dong 1 - North Korea". https://nuke.fas.org/guide/dprk/missile/nd-1.htm. 
  14. ↑ John Schilling, Henry (Long) Kan (2015). The Future of North Korean Nuclear Delivery Systems (Report). US-Korea Institute at SAIS. http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/NKNF_Delivery-Systems.pdf. Retrieved 30 April 2015. 
  15. ↑ Song Sang-ho (2013-03-04). "Around 70% of N.K. missiles target S. Korea". https://www.koreaherald.com/article/5248. 
  16. ↑ "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat". National Air and Space Intelligence Center (Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency). April 2009. NASIC-1031-0985-09. http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/NASIC2009.pdf. 
  17. ↑ DIBMAC 2017, p. 23.
  18. ↑ Pinkston 2008, pp. 20, 70.
  19. ↑ "North Korea test-fires 'ballistic' missiles". BBC News. 26 March 2014. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-26743197. 
  20. ↑ Choe Sang-Hun (25 March 2014). "North Korea Launches Two Midrange Missiles". New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/26/world/asia/north-korea-launches-two-midrange-missiles.html. 
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 "NK's March missile test aimed at evading interceptor systems: sources". Yonhap News Agency. 19 June 2014. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20140619004600315. 
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 "North Korea fires 3 ballistic missiles; Japan calls it 'serious threat'". 2016-09-05. https://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/05/asia/north-korea-ballistic-missiles/. 
  23. ↑ "Flashback to the Past: North Korea's "New" Extended-Range Scud". 8 November 2016. https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Scud-ER-110816_Schiller_Schmucker.pdf. 
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 24.2 "The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database". https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/north_korea_missile_test_database.xlsx. 
  25. ↑ Yoo Seungki (4 August 2016). "Shift in THAAD site in S. Korea nothing to solve controversies". Xinhua News Agency. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-08/04/c_135564043.htm. 
  26. ↑ Norbert Brügge. "NADA's small launcher". https://b14643.eu/Spacerockets/Specials/NADA's_small_launcher/index.htm. 
  27. ↑ "NADA Conducts Important Test for Development of Reconnaissance Satellite". 19 December 2022. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2022/202212/news19/20221219-01ee.html.  For images, see 1 and 2.
  28. ↑ IISS 2024a, p. 354.
  29. ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies (12 February 2025). The Military Balance 2025 (1st ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-1041049678. 
  30. ↑ IISS 2024, p. 301.
  31. ↑ Hinz, Fabian (16 June 2023). "After half a century Egypt's Scuds soldier on" (in en). International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2023/06/after-half-a-century-egypts-scuds-soldier-on/. 
  32. ↑ Cordesman, Anthony H.; Nerguizian, Aram; Popescu, Inout C. (2008) (in en). Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War. Bloomsbury Publishing USA. pp. 204−205. ISBN 978-0-313-35521-9. https://books.google.com/books?id=ooDDEAAAQBAJ&dq=nodong+missile+syria&pg=PA204. 
  33. ↑ IISS 2024a, p. 386.
  34. ↑ Pinkston 2008, p. 20.

Bibliography

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