Engineering:Hwasong-7

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The Hwasong-7 (Korean: 《화성-7》형; lit. Mars Type 7) is a single-stage, mobile liquid propellant medium-range ballistic missile developed by North Korea. Developed in the mid-1980s, it is a scaled-up adaptation of the Soviet R-17 Elbrus missiles, more commonly known by its NATO reporting name "Scud". The inventory is estimated to be around 200–300 missiles.[1] US Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center estimates that as of June 2017 fewer than 100 launchers were operationally deployed.[2]

It influenced the design of Pakistan's Ghauri-1 missile,[3] as well as the Iranian Ghadr-110.[4][5]

Description

Estimated maximum range of some North Korean missiles, including Hwasong-7[6]

Hwasong-7 is a larger variant of the R-17, scaled up so its cross-sectional area is about doubled, with a diameter of 1.25 metres (4 ft) and a length of 15.6 metres (51 ft). The precise capabilities and specifications of the missile are unknown; even the fact of its production and deployment are controversial.[7]

Its aerodynamic design is stable, reducing the need for modern active stabilization systems while the missile is flying in the denser lower atmosphere.[7] The Hwasong-7 uses the liquid propellant combination of TM-185 (20% gasoline and 80% kerosene) and AK-27I (27% N
2O
4 and 73% HNO
3).[8] Unlike modern missiles, Hwasong-7 can only be fueled when vertical, meaning it cannot be fueled before transport. With a 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) warhead, its range is estimated to be 900 km (560 mi).[7] Further range analysis includes a range of 1,000–1,500 km (620–930 mi)[9] to a high-end estimation of 2,000 km (1,200 mi), meaning all South Korean territories, as well as Japan, Russia and China are covered by Hwasong-7's range.[10]

It has an estimated circular error probable (CEP) of 1,000–2,000 m (3,300–6,600 ft), but it can be reduced to between 190 m (620 ft) and 1,000 m (3,300 ft) with GPS guidance.[8][11] North Korea is believed to possess some 300 Hwasong-7 missiles and fewer than 50 mobile launchers.[12][13]

To enable interception at higher altitudes, South Korea is indigenously developing the long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM),[14] and on 8 July 2016 the U.S. agreed to deploy one Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile defense system in Seongju County, in the south of South Korea, by the end of 2017.[15]

Naming

The "Hwasong-7" is the North Korean internal designation for the missile.[16] The missile is also known by external designations from Western analysts, including Rodong-1, No Dong-1,[17] Rodong,[18] Nodong, Scud-D,[19] Scud Mod-D and Nodong-A.[20]

Variant for reconnaissance satellite testing

Hwasong-7 has a variant with white livery for reconnaissance satellite cameras testing.[21] On 18 December 2022, North Korea launched two medium-range ballistic missiles from Sohae Satellite Launching Station, flying 500 km (310 mi) with an apogee of 550 km (340 mi).[22] According to North Korea, the test was organized by the National Aerospace Development Administration to evaluate reconnaissance satellite components, including camera and data transmission system.[23] Released images included an photo indicating the missiles appeared to be a derivation from Hwasong-7 or Scud missile.[22]

History

It is believed North Korea obtained R-17 designs from Egypt, and possibly modified designs from China, allowing them to reverse-engineer them into a larger and longer-distance weapon. United States reconnaissance satellites first detected this type in May 1990 at the Musudan-ri test launch facility, in northeastern North Korea.[24] A test launch happened at the same time, but likely failed, since burn marks were captured by photographs at the launch site. Later, low-rate production started in January 1991 and North Korea conducted another test-fire of Hwasong-7 in May 1993. Also, between 1993 and 1994, North Korea had produced a sufficient number of Hwasong-7 missiles to be considered operational,[25] and five years later, Hwasong-7 became deployed.[9]

North Korea test-fired Hwasong-7 missiles in 2006, 2009,[17] as well as 2014, in which North Korea fires two missiles that flew 650 km (400 mi).[26][27]

Although it has an estimated range of 1,000–1,500 km (620–930 mi), launches in March 2014 flew only 650 km (400 mi), as the missiles flew to an altitude of 160 km (99 mi) because of lofted trajectory. The missiles achieved a maximum speed of Mach 7 (8,575 km/h). U.S. and South Korean Patriot PAC-2/3 interceptors are more specialized to hit ballistic missiles up to 400 km (250 mi).[14]

On 5 September 2016, North Korea fired three missiles into the Sea of Japan, these missiles achieved about 1,000 km (620 mi) range. Initially, these missiles were believed to be Hwasong-7,[28] however, it was later revealed that the missiles used for this launch were Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER).[22][29] The United States strongly condemned the launch.[28]

Exporting

The Hwasong-7's technology has been exported to foreign nations (such as Iran and Pakistan) in secrecy on the basis of mutual exchange of technologies, with Iran being one of the largest beneficiaries of such technology. Successful variants were tested and deployed by Iran after developing the Shahab-3 which is roughly based on Hwasong-7.[4][30] The May 1993 test of Hwasong-7 is believed to be observed by Iranian and Pakistani delegations.[25] Some press reports (including The Sunday Telegraph, Jerusalem Post, and Janes) claimed that Libya signed a contract for a total of 50 Nodong systems in October 1999, with the first batch delivered in July 2000, however such rumors proved to be false when Libya voluntarily dismantled its weapons of mass destruction programs in December 2003 and invited foreign inspectors to verify the disarmament process. In that same year, US inspectors learned that Iraq attempted to buy Nodong missiles, but the North Koreans never delivered the missiles and refused to refund the $10 million down payment.[31]

Operators

Current

Unconfirmed

  •  Egypt − Reportedly was interested in buying Nodong missiles, but photographic evidence only shows Scud-Bs or possibly Scud-Cs in use.[35]
  • Template:Country data Ba'athist Syria − Developed a localized version of the Nodong missile. Reportedly received 50 missiles and seven TELs from North Korea in 2000.[36] According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Syrian Arab Army doesn't operate MRBMs as of 2024.[37]

Failed bids

  •  Iraq − Prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Baghdad placed an order for Nodong missiles and made a $10 million down payment, but North Korea never delivered the missiles.[38]

See also

  • Strategic Rocket Forces (North Korea)
  • North Korean missile tests
  • North Korean defense industry
  • Military of North Korea

References

  1. ↑ Dominguez, Gabriel; Gibson, Neil (2016-08-16). "South Korea's military to increase number of Hyunmoo missiles, says report". http://www.janes.com/article/62967/south-korea-s-military-to-increase-number-of-hyunmoo-missiles-says-report. 
  2. ↑ DIBMAC 2017, p. 25.
  3. ↑ Elleman, Michael (2016-09-22). "North Korea-Iran Missile Cooperation" (in en). https://www.38north.org/2016/09/melleman092216/. 
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Brügge, Norbert (2 May 2020). "The North-Korean/Iranian Nodong-Shahab missile family". Norbert Brügge. https://b14643.eu/Spacerockets/Specials/Nodong/index.htm. 
  5. ↑ U.S. Department of Defense (2001). Proliferation: Threat and Response. DIANE Publishing. pp. 38. ISBN 1-4289-8085-7. https://fas.org/irp/threat/prolif00.pdf. 
  6. ↑ "How potent are North Korea's threats?". BBC News. 15 September 2015. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21710644. 
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Schiller, Markus (2012). Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat (Report). RAND Corporation. TR-1268-TSF. ISBN 978-0-8330-7621-2. https://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR1268.html. Retrieved 19 January 2013. 
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 Vick, Charles P.. "No-Dong 1 - North Korea". https://nuke.fas.org/guide/dprk/missile/nd-1.htm. 
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 Kim, Dueyon (1 July 2013). "Fact Sheet: North Korea's Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs". http://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-north-koreas-nuclear-and-ballistic-missile-programs/. 
  10. ↑ "Hàn Quốc lo ngại Triều Tiên lắp đầu đạn hạt nhân cho tên lửa tầm trung". Gia Lai Newspaper and Radio, Television. 2016-04-07. https://gialaitv.vn/han-quoc-lo-ngai-trieu-tien-lap-dau-dan-hat-nhan-cho-ten-lua-tam-trung/. 
  11. ↑ Schilling, John; Kan, Henry (2015). The Future of North Korean Nuclear Delivery Systems (Report). US-Korea Institute at SAIS. http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/NKNF_Delivery-Systems.pdf. Retrieved 30 April 2015. 
  12. ↑ Song, Sang-ho (2013-03-04). "Around 70% of N.K. missiles target S. Korea". https://www.koreaherald.com/article/5248. 
  13. ↑ "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat". National Air and Space Intelligence Center (Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency). April 2009. NASIC-1031-0985-09. http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/NASIC2009.pdf. 
  14. ↑ 14.0 14.1 "NK's March missile test aimed at evading interceptor systems: sources". Yonhap News Agency. 19 June 2014. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20140619004600315. 
  15. ↑ Yoo, Seungki (4 August 2016). "Shift in THAAD site in S. Korea nothing to solve controversies". Xinhua News Agency. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-08/04/c_135564043.htm. 
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 IISS 2024, p. 282.
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 "Hwasong-7 (Nodong 1)". Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2016-08-09. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/no-dong/. 
  18. ↑ "North Korean nuclear forces (2021)". p. 6. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRIYB22c10sIX.pdf. "Assuming that North Korea is able to produce a sufficiently compact warhead, independent assessments indicate that the size, range and operational status of the Hwasong-7 (Nodong or Rodong) MRBM make it the system most likely to be given a nuclear delivery role." 
  19. ↑ Krebs, Gunter D.. "Hwasong-7 ("Nodong") MRBM". https://space.skyrocket.de/doc_lau/nodong.htm. "The North Korean Hwasong-7, also known as Nodong (or Scud-D), missile is a North Korean development of the Scud technology [...] The Nodong designator is a western designation." 
  20. ↑ Cordesman, Anthony H.; Hess, Ashley (2013) (in en). The Evolving Military Balance in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia: Missile, DPRK and ROK Nuclear Forces, and External Nuclear Forces. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 10. ISBN 978-1-4422-2520-6. https://books.google.com/books?id=OH3yAwAAQBAJ. 
  21. ↑ Brügge, Norbert. "NADAS's [sic small launcher to testing a camera for reconnaissance satellite"]. Norbert Brügge. https://b14643.eu/Spacerockets/Specials/NADA's_small_launcher/index.htm. 
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 22.2 "The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database". 2024-11-12. https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/north_korea_missile_test_database.xlsx. 
  23. ↑ "NADA Conducts Important Test for Development of Reconnaissance Satellite". 19 December 2022. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2022/202212/news19/20221219-01ee.html.  For images, see 1 and 2.
  24. ↑ Bluth, Christoph (July 31, 2011). Crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Potomac Books Inc.. ISBN 9781597975773. https://books.google.com/books?id=QsB7WfdvNaQC&q=rodong+satellites+1990&pg=PT59. Retrieved 17 March 2017. 
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 Bermudez Jr., Joseph S. (1999). A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. pp. 21–22. https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/op2.pdf. Retrieved 2026-05-03. 
  26. ↑ "North Korea test-fires 'ballistic' missiles". BBC News. 26 March 2014. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-26743197. 
  27. ↑ Choe, Sang-Hun (25 March 2014). "North Korea Launches Two Midrange Missiles". New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/26/world/asia/north-korea-launches-two-midrange-missiles.html. 
  28. ↑ 28.0 28.1 Griffiths, James; Kwon, K.J. (2016-09-05). "North Korea fires 3 ballistic missiles; Japan calls it 'serious threat'". https://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/05/asia/north-korea-ballistic-missiles/. 
  29. ↑ Schiller, Markus; Schmucker, Robert H. (8 November 2016). "Flashback to the Past: North Korea's "New" Extended-Range Scud". https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Scud-ER-110816_Schiller_Schmucker.pdf. 
  30. ↑ DIBMAC 2017, p. 23.
  31. ↑ Pinkston 2008, pp. 20, 70.
  32. ↑ IISS 2024a, p. 354.
  33. ↑ International Institute for Strategic Studies (12 February 2025). The Military Balance 2025 (1st ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-1041049678. 
  34. ↑ IISS 2024, p. 301.
  35. ↑ Hinz, Fabian (16 June 2023). "After half a century Egypt's Scuds soldier on" (in en). International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2023/06/after-half-a-century-egypts-scuds-soldier-on/. 
  36. ↑ Cordesman, Anthony H.; Nerguizian, Aram; Popescu, Inout C. (2008) (in en). Israel and Syria: The Military Balance and Prospects of War. Bloomsbury Publishing USA. pp. 204−205. ISBN 978-0-313-35521-9. https://books.google.com/books?id=ooDDEAAAQBAJ&dq=nodong+missile+syria&pg=PA204. 
  37. ↑ IISS 2024a, p. 386.
  38. ↑ Pinkston 2008, p. 20.

Bibliography

Template:DPRK missiles



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