Engineering:KN-25

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The 600 mm multiple rocket launcher (Korean: 600㎜방사포), widely known outside North Korea by its United States's designation KN-25,[lower-alpha 1] is a weapon system that is referred to by North Korean state media as multiple rocket launcher, and by South Korea and the United States as short-range ballistic missile.

Description

Images of the KN-25
Salvo launch
KN-25's wheeled, four-tube launcher
KN-25's tracked, six-tube launcher
KN-25's wheeled, six-tube launcher

The KN-25 is developed as a hybrid weapon system between short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) and traditional multiple rocket launcher (MRL).[3] Officially described as a "super-large" MRL; however, KN-25 has characteristics of a ballistic missile.[4] Because of its larger size and greater range compared to traditional rocket artillery, the United States Forces Korea (USFK) categorizes it as a SRBM. It flies on a controlled ballistic trajectory. Missiles are estimated to be 600 mm (24 in) in diameter, 8.2 m (27 ft) long, and weigh 3,000 kg (6,600 lb). They have an unspecified guidance system and have six rotating rear fins, with four moving forward fins, which likely provide the attitude control of the rocket. They are mounted on multiple types of launcher, including a four-tube Tatra 813 8×8 wheeled transporter-erector-launcher (TEL),[5] a tracked chassis with 10 road wheels on each side, carrying six tubes,[3][6] or a six-tube, wheeled chassis.[7]

It is a battlefield weapon, suitable for deployment at battalion-level, to attack enemy rear-echelon targets and infrastructures, such as airfield and command center, out to 380 km (240 mi), with a conventional blast-fragmentation warhead.[8][9][10] In October 2022, the KN-25 was included in a statement among other missiles that North Korea claimed were part of its capability to deliver tactical nuclear weapons.[11] At a military parade in February 2023, the KN-25 was included among other missiles which the North Korean press collectively referred to these as "tactical nuclear weapons operation units."[12] In March 2023, North Korea confirmed that KN-25 can be equipped with the Hwasan-31 nuclear warhead.[13]

The six rotating rear fins are an unusual feature for rocket artillery, a considerable innovation of North Korea. Their purpose is to provide stabilisation of the rocket while in flight, compared to other rocket artillery rounds, which are usually spin stabilised by rotating the entire body. This method of stabilisation creates a more favourable environment for the guidance systems, as the rest of the missile does not rotate.[14] It is possible that the missile will be stabilised through rolling the missile when it enters the upper atmosphere, where the smaller control fins are unable to function optimally, and then stopping the spin as it re-enters into denser air.[5]

The missile possibly derives from the OTR-21 Tochka/Hwasong-11 (KN-02), which has a similarly sized motor, at 62 cm diameter. Connecting three such motor segments would result in a length similar to the KN-25 rocket.[15] It has a 300 kg heavy warhead and circular error probable accuracy of 80–90 m (260–300 ft).[16] The KN-25 is likely an indigenous project, as media coverage of this missile emphasises its research, using words such as "Juche projectiles" to describe it, unlike the Hwasong-11A (KN-23).[17]

Mass production of KN-25 and its launcher

On 1 January 2023, 30 TELs were presented as a gift to the plenary meeting of the Worker's Party of Korea, with Kim Jong Un attending and making a speech.[18] The system was described as "unprecedented", in both the munitions industry as having no equal and its presentation, being on the lawn of the party central committee.[19] 30 six-tube tracked launchers plus at least nine four-tube wheeled launchers publicly showcased in North Korea's possession, would give them the ability to fire up to 216 rockets, requiring many fewer launch vehicles than would be needed to fire a similar number of traditional ballistic missiles, to saturate South Korean ballistic missile defenses.[6]

In May 2025, it was revealed that KN-25's tracked launcher has undergone mass production.[20]

Cruise missile launcher

On 13 September 2021, North Korea announced they had conducted successful flight tests of a land-attack cruise missile (LACM) over the past two days. The mobile launcher appears to be the same vehicle used to carry KN-25 "oversized" rockets, both weapons likely being similar in diameter. The cruise missile could carry a conventional or nuclear warhead. It is claimed to have a range of 1,500 km (930 mi).[21] It was later revealed that the cruise missile is officially named Hwasal-1.[22]

List of tests

Attempt Date (Pyongyang Standard Time) Location Number of missiles tested Apogee Range Additional notes Reference(s)
1 31 July 2019 Possibly Wonsan 2 30 km (19 mi) 250 km (160 mi) 21-minute firing interval, dubious projectile; thin warhead, but different shape to the smaller KN-09 MRL. [8][23]
2 2 August 2019 Possibly Yonghung 2 25 km (16 mi) 220 km (140 mi) 24-minute firing interval. North Korea used tracked chassis. [8][23]
3 24 August 2019 Sondok Airport 2 97 km (60 mi) 380 km (240 mi) 17-minute firing interval. [8][23]
4 10 September 2019 Kaechon Airport 3 50 km (31 mi) 330 km (210 mi) The first two rockets were launched with a 19-minute firing interval between tests. The third rocket possibly failed to properly launch. [8][23]
5 31 October 2019 Sunchon Airport 2 90 km (56 mi) 370 km (230 mi) 3-minute firing interval. [8][23]
6 28 November 2019 Yonpo Airfield 2 97 km (60 mi) 380 km (240 mi) 30-second firing interval. [8][23]
7 2 March 2020 Anbyon County, Kangwon Province 2 35 km (22 mi) 240 km (150 mi) 20-second firing interval. Kim Jong Un oversaw the test. [8][23]
8 8 March 2020 Sondok, South Hamgyong Province 3 50 km (31 mi) 200 km (120 mi) North Korea also launched smaller MLRS missiles to accompany KN-25. [23]
9 29 March 2020 Hodo Peninsula, Kangwon Province 2 30 km (19 mi) 230 km (140 mi) The two rockets were launched with a 20-second firing interval between tests. [23]
10 29 September 2022 Sunchon, North Pyongan Province 2 50 km (31 mi) 350 km (220 mi) North Korea released information on 10 October 2022. [23][24]
11 5 October 2022 Samsok District, Pyongyang 1 100 km (62 mi) 350 km (220 mi) North Korea released information on 10 October 2022. A Hwasong-11A missile was launched about 15 minutes after the launch. [23][24]
12 8 October 2022 Munchon, Kangwon Province 2 90 km (56 mi) 350 km (220 mi) North Korea released information on 10 October 2022. The rockets were launched with a 6-minute firing interval between tests. [23][24]
13 3 November 2022 Unknown 2 50 km (31 mi) 350 km (220 mi) Information based on the images released by Korean Central News Agency on 7 November 2022. [25]
14 5 November 2022 Unknown 2 Unknown Unknown Information based on the images released by Korean Central News Agency on 7 November 2022. [25][26]
15 31 December 2022 Chunghwa County, North Hwanghae Province 3 100 km (62 mi) 350 km (220 mi) North Korea's Second Economic Commission fired the rockets. [23][27]
16 1 January 2023 Unknown 1 Unknown Unknown The rocket was fired by a long-range artillery sub-unit of the Korean People's Army. [27]
17 20 February 2023 Sukchon, South Pyongan Province 2 50–100 km (31–62 mi) 350–400 km (220–250 mi) The rockets were fired by a long-range artillery sub-unit of the Korean People's Army. [23][28]
18 18 March 2024 Samsok District, Pyongyang 6 50 km (31 mi) 350 km (220 mi) There were two heats of firing, each heat had three rockets. The second heat was fired after a 53-minute interval. Kim Jong Un oversaw the test. [23][29]
19 22 April 2024 Samsok District, Pyongyang 4 50 km (31 mi) 250 km (160 mi) Kim Jong Un guided the test. [23][30]
20 30 May 2024 Pyongyang International Airport 18 100 km (62 mi) 350 km (220 mi) Kim Jong Un guided the test. According to the Korean Central News Agency, these missiles hit the target 365 km (227 mi) away. United States condemned the launch. [23][31][32]
21 12 September 2024 Chunghwa County, North Hwanghae Province 3 100 km (62 mi) 350 km (220 mi) Kim Jong Un oversaw the launch. North Korea claimed the revelation of "new-type 600mm multiple rocket launcher". Image showed that KN-25 missiles were launched from a new wheeled launcher with six launch tubes. [23][33]
22 8 May 2025 Wonsan 5 to 8 Unknown Unknown Kim Jong Un oversaw the test. North Korea also fired at least one Hwasong-11A missile in the test. [34][35][36]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ South Korea also refers to KN-25 as 19-5 SRBM under its naming convention.[1][2]

References

  1. ↑ "韓国軍国防白書2020の北朝鮮ミサイル比較図から大きさ推定値" (in ja). 3 February 2021. https://news.yahoo.co.jp/expert/articles/50f17a7f826e7fd244df8d42a167c898a72fff7e. 
  2. ↑ Noh Ji-won (20 January 2020). "N. Korea’s “new large-caliber guided rockets” were actually SRBMs, S. Korean military says". https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/925128.html. 
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Đào Cảnh (2025-08-23). "Bí mật công nghệ pháo phản lực KN-25 600mm: Bắn loạt như mưa, xuyên thủng mọi lá chắn tên lửa?" (in vi). https://vietnamnet.vn/trieu-tien-tung-phao-phan-luc-kn-25-600mm-xuyen-thung-moi-la-chan-ten-lua-2434809.html. 
  4. ↑ Gwadera, Zuzanna (24 August 2024). "North Korea doubles down on short-range ballistic-missile production" (in en). https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2024/08/north-korea-doubles-down-on-short-range-ballistic-missile-production/. 
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 "Analysis of the KN-25 Multiple Rocket Launcher System after the 9 March 2020 DPRK Test". March 23, 2020. https://datayo.org/p/stories/8aILhAlEbecspf95/analysis-of-the-kn-25-multiple-rocket-launcher-system-after-the-9-march-2020-dprk-test. 
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Tianran Xu (13 February 2023). "Update on the DPRK's 600 mm Multiple Launch Rocket System". https://opennuclear.org/publication/update-dprks-600-mm-multiple-launch-rocket-system. 
  7. ↑ Colin Zwirko (13 September 2024). "Kim Jong Un tours uranium enrichment facility, demanding more nukes". https://www.nknews.org/2024/09/kim-jong-un-inspects-uranium-enrichment-facility-to-learn-about-nuke-production/. "Kim also oversaw a 600mm multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS) test [...] It is also known as the KN-25. Rockets were fired in quick succession from a new six-tube wheeled launch vehicle design [...]" 
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 "KN-25". Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2019-10-04. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kn-25/. 
  9. ↑ Michael Elleman (2020-03-06). "North Korea's Recent KN-25 Launches". https://www.38north.org/2020/03/melleman030620/. 
  10. ↑ Mai Hương (2025-05-05). "Quân sự thế giới hôm nay (5-5): Triều Tiên sản xuất hàng loạt bệ phóng tên lửa KN-25" (in vi). https://www.qdnd.vn/quan-su-the-gioi/tin-tuc/quan-su-the-gioi-hom-nay-5-5-trieu-tien-san-xuat-hang-loat-be-phong-ten-lua-kn-25-826941. 
  11. ↑ Vann H. Van Diepen (14 October 2022). ""A Strong Military Warning": Four Key Implications of North Korea's October 10 Missile Statement: More Political Than Military Significance". https://www.38north.org/2022/10/a-strong-military-warning-four-key-implications-of-north-koreas-october-10-missile-statement/. 
  12. ↑ Vann H. Van Diepen (15 February 2023). "North Korea's Feb. 8 Parade Highlights ICBMs and Tactical Nukes". https://www.38north.org/2023/02/north-koreas-feb-8-parade-highlights-icbms-and-tactical-nukes/. 
  13. ↑ Trà Khánh (11 April 2023). "Giải mã đầu đạn hạt nhân Triều Tiên khiến Mỹ và đồng minh lo sợ" (in vi). https://vtcnews.vn/giai-ma-dau-dan-hat-nhan-trieu-tien-khien-my-va-dong-minh-lo-so-ar763933.html. 
  14. ↑ Tianran Xu (18 October 2021). "Brief on the Defence Development Exhibition of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea". https://opennuclear.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/Xu-Brief%20on%20the%20Defence%20Development%20Exhibition%20of%20the%20Democratic%20People%E2%80%99s%20Republic%20of%20Korea-18%20Oct%202021%20%281%29.pdf. 
  15. ↑ Norbert Brügge. "Pukguksong MLRS". https://www.b14643.eu/Spacerockets/Specials/Pukguksong_MLRS/index.htm. 
  16. ↑ Delory, Stéphane; Bondaz, Antoine; Maire, Christian (2023). "North Korean Short Range Systems: Military consequences of the development of the KN-23, KN-24 and KN-25". Foundation for Strategic Research. https://www.nonproliferation.eu/hcoc/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/NORTH-KOREAN-SHORT-RANGE-SYSTEMS.pdf. 
  17. ↑ "A Tale of Two Missiles: Analysis of KCNA reports on North Korea's KN-23 and KN-24 short range ballistic missiles". https://datayo.org/p/stories/8jzzpJxnZhMCzDA6/a-tale-of-two-missiles-analysis-of-kcna-reports-on-north-koreas-kn-23-and-kn-24-short-range-ballistic-missiles. 
  18. ↑ "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Reply Speech at Ceremony of Donating 600mm Super-large Multiple Launch Rocket System". 2023-01-01. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2023/202301/news01/20230101-20ee.html. 
  19. ↑ "Gift of Loyalty to Plenary Meeting of Great WPK from Munitions Industrial Workers". 2023-01-01. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2023/202301/news01/20230101-19ee.html. 
  20. ↑ Thu Thủy (2025-05-06). "Tên lửa phóng loạt KN-25 bánh xích: Vũ khí đáng gờm đã được Triều Tiên sản xuất hàng loạt" (in vi). https://viettimes.vn/ten-lua-phong-loat-kn-25-banh-xich-vu-khi-dang-gom-da-duoc-trieu-tien-san-xuat-hang-loat-post185284.html. 
  21. ↑ Vann H. Van Diepen (2021-09-15). "Initial Analysis of North Korea's “New Type Long-Range Cruise Missile”". https://www.38north.org/2021/09/initial-analysis-of-north-koreas-new-type-long-range-cruise-missile/. .
  22. ↑ Vann H. Van Diepen (2023-03-01). "North Korea Launches Four “Hwasal-2” LACMs to Show Strong Deterrence and Rapid Response". https://www.38north.org/2023/03/north-korea-launches-four-hwasal-2-lacms-to-show-strong-deterrence-and-rapid-response/. 
  23. ↑ 23.00 23.01 23.02 23.03 23.04 23.05 23.06 23.07 23.08 23.09 23.10 23.11 23.12 23.13 23.14 23.15 23.16 23.17 "The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database". https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/north_korea_missile_test_database.xlsx. 
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 24.2 "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Military Drills of KPA Units for Operation of Tactical Nukes". 10 October 2022. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2022/202210/news10/20221010-01ee.html. 
  25. ↑ 25.0 25.1 "S/2023/171". 7 March 2023. p. 185. https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n23/037/94/pdf/n2303794.pdf. 
  26. ↑ "北朝鮮が11月2日～5日のミサイル大量発射を報告" (in ja). 2022-11-07. https://news.yahoo.co.jp/expert/articles/5652fd5b89ecf5d0d90bf6514f8957cb6b282c0f. 
  27. ↑ 27.0 27.1 "Test-fire of Super-large Multiple Rocket Launchers Held". 2023-01-01. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2023/202301/news01/20230101-16ee.html. 
  28. ↑ "Multiple Rocket Launching Drill by KPA". 2023-02-20. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2023/202302/news20/20230220-08ee.html. 
  29. ↑ "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Firing Drill of Artillery Units in Western Area". 2024-03-19. http://kcna.co.jp/item/2024/202403/news19/20240319-01ee.html. 
  30. ↑ "Report on Participation of 600 mm Super-large Multiple Rocket Sub-units in First Combined Tactical Drill Simulating Nuclear Counterattack - Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Combined Tactical Drill Simulating Nuclear Counterattack". 2024-04-23. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/9fe354c7044e64b2bd2739669e06d56e.kcmsf. 
  31. ↑ "Report on Power Demonstration Firing of 600mm Super-large Multiple Rocket Launcher Sub-Units - Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Oversees Power Demonstration Firing". 2024-05-31. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/0ed5601b620c10d50e1f2f6950834d18.kcmsf. 
  32. ↑ Đức Hoàng (2024-05-31). "Triều Tiên phóng 18 tên lửa cảnh báo Hàn Quốc về nguy cơ "tấn công phủ đầu"" (in vi). https://dantri.com.vn/the-gioi/trieu-tien-phong-18-ten-lua-canh-bao-han-quoc-ve-nguy-co-tan-cong-phu-dau-20240531073412566.htm. 
  33. ↑ "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Oversees Test-fire for Verifying Performance of New-type 600mm Multiple Rocket Launcher". 2024-09-13. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/d5a6198af96d278695d7978c6d8bd74f.kcmsf. 
  34. ↑ Colin Zwirko (2025-05-09). "North Korean missile test simulates nuclear attack on US-ROK forces: State media". https://www.nknews.org/2025/05/north-korea-simulates-nuclear-attack-on-us-rok-with-missile-test/. 
  35. ↑ "Joint Striking Drill of Long-range Artillery and Missile Systems of Sub-units of KPA on Eastern Front Conducted". 9 May 2025. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/0bf90f4d74cc557f997fc1289b9d8e55.kcmsf. 
  36. ↑ Vann H. Van Diepen (2025-07-31). "North Korea Continues to Improve Nuclear Posture". https://www.38north.org/2025/07/north-korea-continues-to-improve-nuclear-posture/. 

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