Social:Hybrid regime

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Short description: Regime combining autocratic and democratic features
Not to be confused with Mixed government.
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A hybrid regime[lower-alpha 1] is a type of political system often created as a result of an incomplete democratic transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one (or vice versa).[lower-alpha 2] Hybrid regimes are categorized as having a combination of autocratic features with democratic ones and can simultaneously hold political repressions and regular elections.

According to some definitions and measures, hybrid regimes are commonly found in developing countries with abundant natural resources such as petro-states.[10][8][11]

Scholars disagree about the durability of hybrid regimes. Some describe them as a persistent "gray zone" rather than a stage in a transition to democracy,[12] while quantitative studies find that regimes combining democratic and autocratic features are less durable than either democracies or autocracies[13][14] and more prone to civil war.[15] Most competitive authoritarian regimes identified in the early 1990s subsequently either democratized or were replaced by new autocracies.[11]

There has been a rise in hybrid regimes since the end of the Cold War.[16][17]

The term hybrid regime arises from a polymorphic view of political regimes that oppose the dichotomy of autocracy or democracy.[18] Modern scholarly analysis of hybrid regimes focuses attention on the decorative nature of democratic institutions (elections do not lead to a change of power, different media broadcast the government point of view, and the opposition in parliament votes the same way as the ruling party, among others).[19] While most maintain a veneer of democracy to appease international standards, some scholars contend these regimes deliberately imitate a full dictatorship to project strength and suppress internal dissent.[20][21]

Overall, there is no consensus among researchers about how hybrid regimes should be defined or measured. Accordingly, there is much disagreement about which countries are considered to be hybrid regimes, and any description of what typical hybrid regimes look like needs to be seen in the context of specific definitions and measures.[22] Democratic backsliding is the primary cause of the growth of hybrid regime typologies.[23]

Definition

Scholars vary on the definition of hybrid regimes based on their primary academic discipline.[24] According to Christoph Mohamad-Klotzbach, "Some scholars argue that deficient democracies and deficient autocracies can be seen as examples of hybrid regimes, whereas others argue that hybrid regimes combine characteristics of both democratic and autocratic regimes."[3] Scholars also debate if these regimes are in transition or are inherently a stable political system.[25][26] In 1995, Terry Karl introduced the notion of a "hybrid" regime, which was simply defined as "combining democratic and authoritarian elements".[27] According to Professor Matthijs Bogaards, hybrid types are:[28]

not diminished subtypes, since they do not lack the full development of a characteristic, but rather they exhibit a mixture of characteristics of both basic types, so that they simultaneously combine autocratic and democratic dimensions or institutions

Pippa Norris defined hybrid regimes as:[29]

a system characterized by weak checks and balances on executive powers, flawed or even suspended elections, fragmented opposition forces, state restrictions on media freedoms, intellectuals, and civil society organizations, curbs on the independence of the judiciary and disregard for rule of law, the abuse of human rights by the security forces, and tolerance of authoritarian values.

Henry E. Hale defined hybrid regimes as:[30]

a political regime that combines some democratic and some autocratic elements in a significant manner. It is not, however, a mere half-way category: hybrid regimes have their own distinct dynamics that do not simply amount to half of what we would see in a democracy plus half of what we would see in an autocracy.

Leonardo Morlino defined hybrid regimes as:[31]

a set of institutions that have been persistent, be they stable or unstable, for about a decade, have been preceded by authoritarianism, a traditional regime (possibly with colonial characteristics), or even a minimal democracy and are characterized by the break-up of limited pluralism and forms of independent, autonomous participation, but the absence of at least one of the four aspects of a minimal democracy

Professor Jeffrey C. Isaac defined hybrid regimes as:[32]

Hybrid regimes have the common feature that they all have competition, although the political elite in power deliberately rearranges state regulations and the political arena so as to grant itself undue advantages.

History

Countries autocratizing (red) or democratizing (blue) substantially and significantly (2010–2020). Countries in grey are substantially unchanged.[33][page needed]

The third wave of democratization from the 1970s onward has led to the emergence of hybrid regimes that are neither fully democratic nor fully authoritarian.[34][page needed] Neither the concept of illiberal democracy nor the concept of electoral authoritarianism fully describes these hybrid regimes.[35][18]

Since the end of the Cold War, such regimes gradually outnumbered the classical dictatorships.[36][37] Authoritarian regimes change, and when countries liberalize, limited elections tend to follow, sooner or later. "Liberal democracy" is often purported when, in fact, this process basically froze "halfway."[38] In relation to regimes that were previously called "transitional" in the 1980s, the term hybrid regime began to be used. According to Thomas Carothers:

the majority of "transitional countries" are neither completely dictatorial nor aspiring to democracy, and by and large they cannot be called transitional. They are located in the politically stable gray zone, changes in which may not take place for decades. Thus, he stated that hybrid regimes must be considered without the assumption that they will ultimately become democracies. These hybrid regimes were called semi-authoritarianism or electoral authoritarianism.[39]

Hybrid regimes have evolved to lean more authoritarian while keeping some democratic traits.[40] One of the main issues with authoritarian rule is the ability to control the threats from the masses, and democratic elements in hybrid regimes can reduce social tension between the masses and the elite.[41] After the third wave of democratization, some regimes became stuck in the transition to democracy, causing the creation of weak democratic institutions.[42] This results from a lack of institutional ownership during critical points in the transition period leading the regime into a gray zone between democracy and autocracy.[43]

These developments have caused some scholars to believe that hybrid regimes are not poorly functioning democracies, but rather new forms of authoritarian regimes.[44] Defective democratic stability is an indicator to explain and measure these new forms of autocracies.[45] Additionally, approval ratings of political leaders play an important role in these types of regimes, and democratic elements can drive up the ratings of a strongman leader, creating a tool not utilized previously.[46] As of the 2020s, 'hybrid regime' is a term used to explain a growing field of political development where authoritarian leaders incorporate elements of democracy that stabilize their regimes.[47]

Indicators

Global trend report Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2022[48]

According to Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, Larry Diamond, and Thomas Carothers, signs of a hybrid regime include:[26][49]

  1. The presence of external attributes of democracy (elections, multi-party system, legal opposition).
  2. A low degree of representation of the interests of citizens in the process of political decision-making (incapacity of associations of citizens, for example, trade unions, or that they are in state control).
  3. A low level of political participation.
  4. The declarative nature of political rights and freedoms (formally, there is in fact difficult implementation).[clarification needed]
  5. A low level of trust in political institutions by its citizenry.

Transition types

Autocratization

Since c. 2010, the number of countries autocratizing (blue) is higher than those democratizing (yellow).
This section is an excerpt from Democratic backsliding[ edit ]

Democratization

This section is an excerpt from Democratization[ edit ]

Measurement

Main article: Social:Democracy indices
There are various democratic freedom indices produced by academic researchers and intergovernmental non-governmental organizations that publish assessments of the world's political systems, according to their own definitions, and many of them include measures of hybrid regimes.[50][22] However, because these various indices use different definitions and methods,[51] they often disagree on which countries should be classified as hybrid regimes.[22]

Democracy Index

Democracy index types

According to the Democracy Index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit, there are 34 hybrid regimes, representing approximately 20% of countries, encompassing 17.2% to 20.5% of the world's population.[52] The EIU Democracy Index is "based on ratings across 60 indicators, grouped into five categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, political participation, and political culture."[50] The Democracy Index defines hybrid regimes with the following characteristics:[52]

  • Electoral fraud or irregularities occur regularly
  • Pressure is applied to political opposition
  • Corruption is widespread and rule of law tends to be weak
  • Media is pressured and harassed
  • There are issues in the functioning of governance
The 2024 Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index[52]

As of 2024, the countries considered hybrid regimes by the "Democracy Index" are:

  • Romania
  • Papua New Guinea
  • Senegal
  • Paraguay
  • Malawi
  • Zambia
  • Peru
  • Fiji
  • Bhutan
  • Liberia
  • Armenia
  • Hong Kong
  • Honduras
  • Madagascar
  • Mexico
  • Georgia
  • Ecuador
  • Tanzania
  • Bosnia and Herzegovina
  • Kenya
  • Morocco
  • Ukraine
  • Tunisia
  • El Salvador
  • Nepal
  • Guatemala
  • Uganda
  • Gambia
  • Bangladesh
  • Benin
  • Sierra Leone
  • Bolivia
  • Turkey
  • Ivory Coast
  • Nigeria
  • Angola

Global State of Democracy Report

According to the "Global State of Democracy Report" by International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), there are twenty hybrid regimes.[53] International IDEA compiles data from 12 different sources, including expert surveys and observational data, which includes the extent to which voting rights are inclusive.[50] IDEA defined hybrid regimes as:[54]

combining elements of authoritarianism with democracy ... These often adopt the formal characteristics of democracy (while allowing little real competition for power) with weak respect for basic political and civil rights

As of 2021 the countries considered hybrid regimes by the "Global State of Democracy Report" are:[55]

  • Angola
  • Benin
  • Côte d'Ivoire
  • Democratic Republic of the Congo
  • Ethiopia
  • Gabon
  • Jordan
  • Kuwait
  • Kyrgyzstan
  • Libya
  • Mauritania
  • Morocco
  • Mozambique
  • Nigeria
  • Serbia
  • Singapore
  • Tanzania
  • Togo
  • Tunisia
  • Turkey

V-Dem Democracy Indices

Map of V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index in 2024[56]

The V-Dem Democracy Indices compiled by the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg classify all political regimes worldwide into four primary types. The two intermediate categories, electoral autocracies and electoral democracies, lie in between the most democratic (liberal democracy) and most autocratic (closed autocracy).[57] In 2016, there were 118 countries in the electoral democracy and autocracy categories,[58]: 76–77  and in 2021 there were 115. The 115 countries in 2021 consisted of about 60% of the world's population.[59]: 985 

Freedom House

Freedom House ratings for European Union and surrounding states, in 2019[60]
  Free
  Partly free
  Not free

Freedom House measures the level of political and economic governance in 29 countries from Central Europe to Central Asia.[61] Freedom House assigns "scores to countries and territories across the globe on 10 indicators of political rights (e.g., whether there is a realistic opportunity for opposition parties to gain power through elections) and 15 indicators of civil liberties (e.g., whether there is a free and independent media)."[50] Freedom House classifies transitional or hybrid regimes as:[61]

Countries that are typically electoral democracies where democratic institutions are fragile and substantial challenges to the protection of political rights and civil liberties exist

In 2024, Freedom House classified 11 of 29 countries analyzed as "Transitional or Hybrid Regimes":[61]

  • Armenia
  • Georgia
  • Albania
  • Bosnia and Herzegovina
  • Kosovo
  • Ukraine
  • Hungary
  • Moldova
  • Serbia
  • North Macedonia
  • Montenegro

Characteristics

Human rights

The instability of anocratic regimes causes human rights violations to be significantly higher within anocracies than democratic regimes.[62][63][64] According to Maplecroft's 2014 Human Rights Risk Atlas, eight of the top ten worst human-rights-violating countries are anocracies.[65][66] In addition, the report categorized every current anocracy as "at risk" or at "extreme risk" of human rights offenses.[65]

The high correlation between anocratic regimes and human rights abuses denotes the nonlinear progression in a country's transition from an autocracy to a democracy.[67][68][69][70] Generally, human rights violations substantially decrease when a certain threshold of full democracy is reached.[63][71] However, human rights abuses tend to remain the same or even to increase as countries move from an autocratic to an anocratic regime.[64][72][73]

During the revolutions of the Arab Spring, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen, all of the countries made relative progress towards more democratic regimes.[74] With many of the authoritarian practices of their governments remaining, those states currently fall under the category of anocracies.[75] They are also listed as some of the most extreme human-rights-violating countries in the world.[65][66] The violations include torture, police brutality, slavery, discrimination, unfair trials, and restricted freedom of expression.[66][76] Research has shown that political protests, such as those that occurred during the Arab Spring, generally lead to an increase in human right violations, as the existing government tries to retain power and influence over governmental opposition.[64][67][77][78][79] Therefore, transitioning governments tend to have high levels of human rights abuses.[80][81]

In its annual Freedom in the World report, Freedom House scored states' violations of civil liberties on a seven-point scale, with a score of seven representing the highest percentage of violations.[82] Freedom House defined civil liberty violations as the infringement of freedom of expression, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and individual rights.[83] Most consolidated democracies received scores of one, but almost all anocracies were scored between four and six because of the high percentage of civil liberties violations in most anocratic regimes.[82]

Violence

Statistics show that anocracies are ten times more likely to experience intrastate conflict than democracies and twice as likely as autocracies.[84] One explanation for the increase in violence and conflict within anocracies is a hypothesis known as More Murder in the Middle (MMM).[67][85] The hypothesis argues that the unstable characteristics of anocratic regimes, which include the presence of divided elites, inequality, and violent challengers who threaten the legitimacy of the current social order, cause governing elites to resort to much more political repression or state terror than do democratic or authoritarian regimes.[67][81] That leads to high levels of what are termed "life-integrity violations",[67][80][81] which include state-sponsored genocide, extrajudicial executions, and torture.[67][72][73][80][81][86]

State life-integrity violations can be categorized as acts of state terror.[80][81][87] Acts of terrorism by both governmental and outside groups are generally higher in transitioning anocratic governments than in either democratic or authoritarian regimes.[88][89] Harvard Public Policy Professor Alberto Abadie argues that the tight control of an authoritarian regime is likely to discourage terrorist activities in the state. However, without the stability of a clear authoritarian rule or a consolidated democracy, anocracies are more open and susceptible to terrorist attacks.[89][90] He notes that in Iraq and previously Spain and Russia, transitions from an authoritarian regime to a democracy were accompanied by temporary increases in terrorism.[91]

According to the political terror scale (PTS), a data set that ranks state sponsored violence on a five-point scale, almost every anocracy is ranked as having a score between three and five.[92] On the scale, a score of three indicates that in a state, "there is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted."[92] States are ranked as a four when "civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas."[92] Scores of five are given to states if "terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals."[92] Although only eleven states were given scores of five in the 2012 Political Terror Scale report, four of those states, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan, were classified by the Polity data series as anocracies.[75][92]

Civil war

There are differing views on whether or not anocracy leads to civil war. It is debated whether or not transitions between government regimes or political violence lead to civil war.

Civil wars in unstable countries are usually the outcome of a country's inability to meet the population's demands.[93] The inability of the state to provide for the needs of the population leads to factionalism within the country.[93] When factions are not able to get what they want, they take up arms against the state.[93] Political scientist Barbara F. Walter has written that anocratic states are most at risk of civil war, with formerly dominant political groups more likely to start them than poorer and weaker groups.[94]

Former democracies that transition to anocracy have a greater risk of being embroiled in civil conflict.[95] The population's awareness of what rights they had as a democratic society may compel them to fight to regain their rights and liberties. On the other hand, autocracies that transition into anocracies are less likely to break out in civil war.[95] Not all anocracies are unstable. There are many countries that are stable but are classified as anocracies, such as Russia.[when?][95][75] It is the transitional qualities associated with some anocracies that are predictive of civil conflict.[95] The magnitude of the transition also affects the probability of a civil conflict. The higher the magnitude of the transition, the higher the likelihood of civil war.[95]

However, some international relations experts use the Polity data series in the formulation of their hypothesis and study, which presents a problem because the Polity IV system uses violence and civil war as factors in its computation of a country's Polity score.[96] Two components, "the degree of institutionalization, or regulation, of political competition",[96] and "the extent of government restriction on political competition",[96] are problematic to use in any study involving Polity IV and civil war in anocratic governments. In the numeric rating system of one of these parts of Polity IV, unregulated, "may or may be characterized by violent conflict among partisan groups."[96] The other component states that "there are relatively stable and enduring political groups – but competition among them is intense, hostile, and frequently violent."[96] The only thing that can be deduced concretely is that political violence tends to lead to civil war.[96] There is no solid evidence to support that political institutions in an anocracy lead to civil war.[96]

Broadness and complexity

While the first three characteristics capture the instability of anocracies, another feature of anocratic regimes is their broad descriptiveness. Anocracy describes a regime type with a mix of institutional characteristics that either constrains or promotes the democratic process, "encapsulating a complex category encompassing many institutional arrangements".[95][97] Although anocracies demonstrate some capacity for civil society and political participation, their autocratic and democratic counterparts show considerably more or less capabilities.[95][97]

Typology

Countries in green claim to be a type of democracy while countries in red do not. Only Afghanistan, Brunei, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Burkina Faso and the Vatican do not claim to be democratic.

Scholars organize hybrid regimes into several key sub-types and typologies based on where they fall in the "grey zone" between full democracies and closed autocracies.[98][99]

Electoral authoritarianism

Electoral authoritarianism means that democratic institutions are imitative and, due to numerous systematic violations of liberal democratic norms, in fact adhere to authoritarian methods.[100] Electoral authoritarianism can be competitive and hegemonic, and the latter does not necessarily mean election irregularities.[38] A. Schedler calls electoral authoritarianism a new form of authoritarian regime, not a hybrid regime or illiberal democracy.[38] Moreover, a purely authoritarian regime does not need elections as a source of legitimacy,[101] while non-alternative elections, appointed at the request of the ruler, are not a sufficient condition for considering the regime conducting them to be hybrid.[100]

This section is an excerpt from Electoral autocracy[ edit ]

Illiberal democracy

This section is an excerpt from Illiberal democracy[ edit ]

Dominant-party system

This section is an excerpt from Dominant-party system[ edit ]

Delegative democracy

This section is an excerpt from Delegative democracy[ edit ]

Dictablanda

This section is an excerpt from Dictablanda[ edit ]

Guided democracy

This section is an excerpt from Guided democracy[ edit ]

Liberal autocracy

This section is an excerpt from Liberal autocracy[ edit ]

Anocracy or semi-democracy

Map of the world published by Our World in Data in 2015, showing countries color-coded according to their regime type, which was based on their score in the Polity IV data set. Closed anocracies are shown in orange (scores between −5 and 0) and open anocracies are shown in yellow (scores between 1 and 5).[102]

The authors of the Polity data series use the term "anocracy" for hybrid regimes in general,[103] and for "cases where the regime cannot be easily identified, such as during interregnum, interruption, or transition."[104] The word anocracy is also used for hybrid regimes by some other authors,[105][96][97] using definitions including a "regime that mixes democratic with autocratic features",[97] and "a regime that permits some means of participation through opposition group behavior, but that has incomplete development of mechanisms to redress grievances".[95][106] The term "semi-democratic" is also used for hybrid regimes.[107][108]

Use of the word "anocracy" in English dates back to 1949, when R. F. C. Hull coined the term in his English translation of Martin Buber's 1946 work Pfade in Utopia (Paths in Utopia):

We see particularly clearly here that Kropotkin is ultimately attacking not State-order as such but only the existing order in all its forms; that his "anarchy", like Proudhon's, is in reality "anocracy" (ἀκρατία); not absence of government but absence of domination.[109]

Buber's original German text used the word Akratie, a modern neoclassical compound formed from the privative prefix a- ('without') and -kratie ('rule, power, domination'), which Buber used in the sense of "absence of domination" or "non-domination".[110] Hull chose to translate Akratie as "anocracy", inventing an English equivalent. In doing so, Hull also inserted the Ancient Greek word ἀκρατία akratia into parentheses, even though this word does not appear in Buber's original and in classical Greek actually means "lack of self-control" or "incontinence", not "absence of domination".

Defective democracy

This section is an excerpt from Defective democracy[ edit ]

Competitive authoritarian regimes

Competitive authoritarianism is a hybrid regime structure and a subtype of authoritarianism. This regime type was defined to encapsulate states that contain formal democratic institutions that rulers view as the principal means of obtaining and exercising legitimate political authority against real opposition and other semblances of democratic political society, in which officials violate election freedom and fairness in order to retain power. The officials interfere with opposition organisations, failing to respect minimum conventional standards of democracy.[111][112][113][114]

Three main instruments are used within competitive authoritarian regimes to maintain political power: the self-serving use of state institutions (regarding abuses of electoral and judicial institutions such as voter intimidation and voter fraud); the overuse of state resources (to gain influence and/or power over proportional representation media and use legal resources to disturb constitutional change); and the disruption of civil liberties (such as freedom of speech/press and association).[112] In the post-Soviet era, continuing into the 2010s, the number of competitive authoritarian regimes increased.[115][113]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ Scholars use a variety of terms to encompass the "grey zones" between full autocracies and full democracies.[1][page needed] Such terms include: competitive authoritarianism, semi-authoritarianism, hybrid authoritarianism, electoral authoritarianism, liberal autocracy, delegative democracy, illiberal democracy, guided democracy, semi-democracy, deficient democracy, defective democracy, and hybrid democracy.[2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]
  2. ↑ Debates over what can be called "hybrid" still exist, see Hybrid regime § Definition.

References

  1. ↑ Gagné, Jean-François (March 10, 2015), "Hybrid Regimes", Oxford Bibliographies in Political Science, Oxford University Press, doi:10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0167, ISBN 978-0-19-785914-8 
  2. ↑ Plattner, Marc F. (1969-12-31). "Is Democracy in Decline?". https://kipdf.com/is-democracy-in-decline_5ac6f5411723ddcc8fb724a7.html. 
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 "Hybrid Concepts and the Concept of Hybridity". 2019-09-07. https://ecpr.eu/Events/Event/SectionDetails/833. 
  4. ↑ Urribarri, Raul A. Sanchez (2011). "Courts between Democracy and Hybrid Authoritarianism: Evidence from the Venezuelan Supreme Court". Law & Social Inquiry (Wiley) 36 (4): 854–884. doi:10.1111/j.1747-4469.2011.01253.x. ISSN 0897-6546. 
  5. ↑ Göbel, Christian (2011). "Semiauthoritarianism". 21st Century Political Science: A Reference Handbook. 2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks California 91320 United States: SAGE Publications. pp. 258–266. doi:10.4135/9781412979351.n31. ISBN 978-1-4129-6901-7. 
  6. ↑ Tlemcani, Rachid (2007-05-29). "Electoral Authoritarianism". https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2007/05/electoral-authoritarianism?lang=en. 
  7. ↑ "What is Hybrid Democracy?". 2022-05-19. https://digitalsocietyschool.org/insight/what-is-hybrid-democracy/. 
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 Zinecker, Heidrun (2009). "Regime-Hybridity in Developing Countries: Achievements and Limitations of New Research on Transitions". International Studies Review ([Oxford University Press, Wiley, The International Studies Association]) 11 (2): 302–331. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2009.00850.x. ISSN 1521-9488. 
  9. ↑ "Index". 2017-09-23. https://www.democratic-decay.org/index. 
  10. ↑ Croissant, A.; Kailitz, S.; Koellner, P.; Wurster, S. (2015). Comparing autocracies in the early Twenty-first Century: Volume 1: Unpacking Autocracies - Explaining Similarity and Difference. Taylor & Francis. p. 212. ISBN 978-1-317-70018-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=3rNACwAAQBAJ&pg=PA212. Retrieved Nov 27, 2022. 
  11. ↑ 11.0 11.1 Carothers, Christopher (2018). "The Surprising Instability of Competitive Authoritarianism". Journal of Democracy 29 (4): 129–135. doi:10.1353/jod.2018.0068. ISSN 1086-3214. https://muse.jhu.edu/article/705723/summary. 
  12. ↑ Carothers, Thomas (2002). "The End of the Transition Paradigm". Journal of Democracy 13 (1): 5–21. doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0003. 
  13. ↑ Gates, Scott; Hegre, Håvard; Jones, Mark P.; Strand, Håvard (2006). "Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability: Polity Duration, 1800–2000". American Journal of Political Science 50 (4): 893–908. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00222.x. 
  14. ↑ Knutsen, Carl Henrik; Nygård, Håvard Mokleiv (2015). "Institutional Characteristics and Regime Survival: Why Are Semi-Democracies Less Durable Than Autocracies and Democracies?". American Journal of Political Science 59 (3): 656–670. doi:10.1111/ajps.12168. 
  15. ↑ Hegre, Håvard; Ellingsen, Tanja; Gates, Scott; Gleditsch, Nils Petter (2001). "Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992". American Political Science Review 95 (1): 33–48. doi:10.1017/S0003055401000119. 
  16. ↑ Levitsky, Steven; Way, Lucan (2002). "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism". Journal of Democracy (Project Muse) 13 (2): 51–65. doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0026. ISSN 1086-3214. 
  17. ↑ "Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War". https://politics.utoronto.ca/publication/competitive-authoritarianism-hybrid-regimes-after-the-cold-war/. 
  18. ↑ 18.0 18.1 Gagné, Jean-François (2015). "Hybrid Regimes". doi:10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0167. https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199756223/obo-9780199756223-0167.xml. 
  19. ↑ Mufti, Mariam (Jun 22, 2018). "What Do We Know about Hybrid Regimes after Two Decades of Scholarship?". Politics and Governance (Cogitatio) 6 (2): 112–119. doi:10.17645/pag.v6i2.1400. ISSN 2183-2463. 
  20. ↑ Schedler, Andreas (Aug 1, 2013). "Shaping the Authoritarian Arena". The Politics of Uncertainty. Oxford University Press. pp. 54–75. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199680320.003.0003. ISBN 978-0-19-968032-0. 
  21. ↑ Brooker, P. (2013). Non-Democratic Regimes. Comparative Government and Politics. Bloomsbury Publishing. p. 222. ISBN 978-1-137-38253-5. https://books.google.com/books?id=Xo9KEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA222. Retrieved Nov 27, 2022. 
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 22.2 Schmid, Jonas Willibald (2025). "Electoral autocracies, hybrid regimes, and multiparty autocracies: same, same but different?". Democratization 32 (6): 1565–1588. doi:10.1080/13510347.2025.2476183. ISSN 1351-0347. 
  23. ↑ Gagné, Jean-François; Mahé, Anne-Laure (2020). "Hybrid Regimes". The SAGE Handbook of Political Science. doi:10.4135/9781529714333.n50. ISBN 978-1-5297-1433-3. 
  24. ↑ Cassani, Andrea (September 3, 2013). "Hybrid what? Partial consensus and persistent divergences in the analysis of hybrid regimes". International Political Science Review (SAGE Publications) 35 (5): 542–558. doi:10.1177/0192512113495756. ISSN 0192-5121. 
  25. ↑
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 Подлесный, Д. В. (2016) (in ru). Политология: Учебное пособие. Kharkiv: ХГУ НУА. pp. 62–65/164. https://books.google.com/books?id=2Sc8DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA62. Retrieved 2019-08-13. 
  27. ↑ Colomer, J. M.; Beale, A. L. (2020). Democracy and Globalization: Anger, Fear, and Hope. Taylor & Francis. p. 180. ISBN 978-1-000-05363-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=9AfpDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT180. Retrieved 2022-12-27. 
  28. ↑ Bogaards, Matthijs (2009). "How to classify hybrid regimes? Defective democracy and electoral authoritarianism". Democratization 16 (2): 399–423. doi:10.1080/13510340902777800. ISSN 1351-0347. 
  29. ↑ Norris, Pippa (2017). "Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risks". SSRN Electronic Journal (Rochester, New York: Elsevier). doi:10.2139/ssrn.2933655. ISSN 1556-5068. https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=1514. Retrieved 2022-12-09. 
  30. ↑ Hale, Henry E. (2010). "Eurasian Polities as Hybrid Regimes: The Case of Putin's Russia". Journal of Eurasian Studies (SAGE Publications) 1 (1): 33–41. doi:10.1016/j.euras.2009.11.001. ISSN 1879-3665. 
  31. ↑ Hameed, Muntasser Majeed (2022-06-30). "Hybrid regimes: An Overview". IPRI Journal 22 (1): 1–24. doi:10.31945/iprij.220101. 
  32. ↑ Isaac, J. C. (1998). Democracy in Dark Times. Cornell University Press. p. 199. ISBN 978-0-8014-8454-4. 
  33. ↑ Newton, Kenneth; van Deth, Jan W. (2021). Foundations of comparative politics: democracies of the modern world. Cambridge, United Kingdom. ISBN 978-1-108-92494-8. OCLC 1156414956. 
  34. ↑ Huntington, S. P. (2012). The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century. The Julian J. Rothbaum Distinguished Lecture Series. University of Oklahoma Press. ISBN 978-0-8061-8604-7. https://books.google.com/books?id=IMjyTFG04JYC. Retrieved November 16, 2022. 
  35. ↑ Matthijs Bogaards. 2009. *How to Classify Hybrid Regimes? Defective Democracy and Electoral Authoritarianism". Democratization 16 (2): 399–423.
  36. ↑ Morlino, Leonardo; Berg-Schlosser, Dirk; Badie, Bertrand (6 March 2017). Political Science: A Global Perspective. SAGE Publications. pp. 112ff. ISBN 978-1-5264-1303-1. OCLC 1124515503. https://books.google.com/books?id=qhcjDgAAQBAJ&pg=PA112. Retrieved 16 November 2022. 
  37. ↑ Andreas Schedler, ed. (2006). Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner.
  38. ↑ 38.0 38.1 38.2 Yonatan L. Morse (January 2012). "Review: The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism". World Politics 64(1). pp. 161—198. .
  39. ↑ Dam, Caspar ten (February 17, 2017). Democratic Transition, Transformation and Development in times of War and Peace: Conceptualisations and Observations. 4. pp. 5–18. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/314114407. Retrieved Aug 22, 2024. 
  40. ↑ Authoritarianism: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 2018-09-04. ISBN 978-0-19-088020-0. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/authoritarianism-9780190880200?cc=us&lang=en&. Retrieved 2023-03-03. 
  41. ↑ "Foundations of Comparative Politics" (in en). https://www.vitalsource.com/products/foundations-of-comparative-politics-kenneth-newton-jan-w-van-v9781108934909. 
  42. ↑ Rocha Menocal, Alina; Fritz, Verena; Rakner, Lise (2008-06-01). "Hybrid regimes and the challenges of deepening and sustaining democracy in developing countries". South African Journal of International Affairs 15 (1): 29–40. doi:10.1080/10220460802217934. ISSN 1022-0461. 
  43. ↑ Stroh, Alexander; Elischer, Sebastian; Erdmann, Gero (2012). Origins and Outcomes of Electoral Institutions in African Hybrid Regimes: A Comparative Perspective (Report). German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA). 
  44. ↑ Ekman, Joakim (2009). "Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analyzing Hybrid Regimes". International Political Science Review 30 (1): 7–31. doi:10.1177/0192512108097054. ISSN 0192-5121. 
  45. ↑ Schmotz, Alexander (2019). "Hybrid Regimes". The Handbook of Political, Social, and Economic Transformation. pp. 521–525. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198829911.003.0053. ISBN 978-0-19-882991-1. https://academic.oup.com/book/7722/chapter/152849448. Retrieved 2023-03-03. 
  46. ↑ Treisman, Daniel (2011). "Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin". American Journal of Political Science 55 (3): 590–609. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00500.x. ISSN 0092-5853. 
  47. ↑ Morlino, Leonardo (July 2009). "Are there hybrid regimes? Or are they just an optical illusion?" (in en). European Political Science Review 1 (2): 273–296. doi:10.1017/S1755773909000198. ISSN 1755-7747. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-political-science-review/article/abs/are-there-hybrid-regimes-or-are-they-just-an-optical-illusion/9579E8628A2F0AD84889973B3577735D. Retrieved 2023-03-03. 
  48. ↑ "Global Dashboard". https://bti-project.org/en/reports/global-dashboard?&cb=00000. 
  49. ↑ "Nations in Transit Methodology". 2021-12-31. https://freedomhouse.org/reports/nations-transit/nations-transit-methodology. 
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  51. ↑ Seawright, Jason; Collier, David (2014). "Rival Strategies of Validation: Tools for Evaluating Measure of Democracy". Comparative Political Studies 47 (1): 111–138. doi:10.1177/0010414013489098. 
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  54. ↑ "FAQs – The Global State of Democracy Indices". 2021-12-31. https://www.idea.int/gsod-indices/faqs#How%20current%20are%20the%20data?. 
  55. ↑ International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2021). The Global State of Democracy 2021: Building resilience in a Pandemic Era. ISBN 978-91-7671-478-2. OCLC 1288461480. 
  56. ↑ "Democracy Report 2025, 25 Years of Autocratization – Democracy Trumped?". https://v-dem.net/documents/54/v-dem_dr_2025_lowres_v1.pdf. 
  57. ↑ "V-Dem Codebook". https://www.v-dem.net/documents/70/codebook_v16.pdf. 
  58. ↑ Lührmann, Anna; Tannenberg, Marcus; Lindberg, Staffan I. (March 19, 2018). "Regimes of the World (RoW): Opening New Avenues for the Comparative Study of Political Regimes". Politics and Governance (Cogitatio) 6 (1): 60–77. doi:10.17645/pag.v6i1.1214. ISSN 2183-2463. https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/download/1214/714. 
  59. ↑ Boese, Vanessa A.; Lundstedt, Martin; Morrison, Kelly; Sato, Yuko; Lindberg, Staffan I. (2022-05-23). "State of the world 2021: autocratization changing its nature?". Democratization 29 (6): 983–1013. doi:10.1080/13510347.2022.2069751. ISSN 1351-0347. 
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  62. ↑ Vreeland, James Raymond (2008). "The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy". Journal of Conflict Resolution 52 (3): 401–425. doi:10.1177/0022002708315594. 
  63. ↑ 63.0 63.1 Davenport, Christian; Armstrong, David A. (2004). "Democracy and the Violation of Human Rights: A Statistical Analysis from 1976 to 1996". American Journal of Political Science 48 (3): 538–554. doi:10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00086.x. 
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  68. ↑ Zanger, Sabine (March 2000). "A Global Analysis of the Effect of Political Regime Changes on Life Integrity Violations, 1977–93". Journal of Peace Research 37 (2): 213–233. doi:10.1177/0022343300037002006. 
  69. ↑ Davenport, Christian (1996). "'Constitutional Promises' and Repressive Reality: A Cross-National Time-Series Investigation of Why Political and Civil Liberties are Suppressed". Journal of Politics 58 (3): 627–654. doi:10.2307/2960436. http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/davenport/jop1996.pdf. 
  70. ↑ Gartner, S. S.; Regan, P. M. (1996). "Threat and repression: the non-linear relationship between government and opposition violence". Journal of Peace Research 33 (3): 273–288. doi:10.1177/0022343396033003003. 
  71. ↑ Dahl, Robert (1966). Political Opposition in Western Democracies. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-09478-7. https://archive.org/details/politicalopposit00dahl. 
  72. ↑ 72.0 72.1 Regan, Patrick M.; Henderson, Errol A. (2002). "Democracy, Threats and Political Repression in Developing Countries: Are Democracies Internally Less Violent?". Third World Quarterly 23 (1): 119–136. doi:10.1080/01436590220108207. 
  73. ↑ 73.0 73.1 King, John (1998). "Repression, Domestic Threat, and Interactions in Argentina and Chile". Journal of Political and Military Sociology 25 (2): 1–27. http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/1390754/repression-domestic-threat-interactions-argentina-chile. 
  74. ↑ Brown, Nathan J.; Hamzawy, Amr (2007). "Arab Spring Fever". The National Interest (91): 33–40. 
  75. ↑ 75.0 75.1 75.2 Marshall, Monty (6 June 2014). "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2013". http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 
  76. ↑ Williams, Paul; United Nations General Assembly (1981). The International bill of human rights. Entwhistle Books. ISBN 978-0-934558-07-5. https://archive.org/details/internationalbil00will. 
  77. ↑ Garretón, Manuel Antonio (1994). "Human Rights in Processes of Democratisation". Journal of Latin American Studies 26 (1): 221–234. doi:10.1017/s0022216x00018903. 
  78. ↑ Francisco, R. A. (1996). "Coercion and protest: An empirical test in two democratic states". American Journal of Political Science 40 (4): 1179–1204. doi:10.2307/2111747. 
  79. ↑ Lichbach, Mark Irving (1987). "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent". Journal of Conflict Resolution 31 (2): 266–297. doi:10.1177/0022002787031002003. http://www.gvpt.umd.edu/lichbach/publications/lichbach6.87.pdf. 
  80. ↑ 80.0 80.1 80.2 80.3 Poe, Steven C.; Tate, C. Neal; Keith, Linda Camp (1999). "Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993". International Studies Quarterly 43 (2): 291–313. doi:10.1111/0020-8833.00121. 
  81. ↑ 81.0 81.1 81.2 81.3 81.4 Lichbach, Mark (1984). "Regime Change and the Coherence of European Governments". American Political Science Review 80 (3): 1050–1051. doi:10.2307/1960595. 
  82. ↑ 82.0 82.1 "Freedom in the World 2014: Aggregate and Subcategory Scores". 14 March 2012. https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores#.VHJum1fF8o. 
  83. ↑ "Methodology". 13 January 2014. https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2014/methodology#.VHJvwFfF8oZ. 
  84. ↑ Gehem, M.; Marten, P.; Schellekens, M. (2014). "Balancing on the Brink: Vulnerability of states in the Middle East and North Africa". Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. http://www.hcss.nl/reports/download/146/2456/. 
  85. ↑ Hendrix, Cullen S.; Wong, Wendy H. (July 2013). "When Is the Pen Truly Mighty? Regime Type and the Efficacy of Naming and Shaming in Curbing Human Rights Abuses". British Journal of Political Science 43 (3): 651–672. doi:10.1017/s0007123412000488. 
  86. ↑ Spirer, H. F. (1990). "Violations of Human Rights—How Many?". American Journal of Economics and Sociology 49 (2): 199–210. doi:10.1111/j.1536-7150.1990.tb02272.x. 
  87. ↑ Gibney, Mark; Wood, Reed M. (2010). "The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A Re-Introduction and a Comparison to CIRI". Human Rights Quarterly 32 (2): 367–400. doi:10.1353/hrq.0.0152. http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/datafiles/hrq%20pts.pdf. Retrieved 25 November 2014. 
  88. ↑ Frey, Bruno S.; Luechinger, Simon (2 June 2008). "Three Strategies to Deal with Terrorism". Economic Papers 27 (2): 107–114. doi:10.1111/j.1759-3441.2008.tb01030.x. http://www.bsfrey.ch/articles/C_480_08.pdf. Retrieved 30 December 2021. 
  89. ↑ 89.0 89.1 "Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism". http://core.kmi.open.ac.uk/download/pdf/6708194.pdf. 
  90. ↑ Piazza, J. A. (2008). "Incubators of terror: Do failed and failing states promote transnational terrorism?". International Studies Quarterly 52 (3): 469–488. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.00511.x. 
  91. ↑ Abadie, A.; Gardeazabal, J. (2003). "The Economic Costs of Conflict: A Case Study of the Basque Country". American Economic Review 93 (1): 113–131. doi:10.1257/000282803321455188. 
  92. ↑ 92.0 92.1 92.2 92.3 92.4 "The Political Terror Scale". https://www.politicalterrorscale.org/. 
  93. ↑ 93.0 93.1 93.2 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Marshall_Cole_2014
  94. ↑ Spinelle, Jenna (2023-04-17). "Democracy Works: How civil wars start, and how to stop them". WPSU. https://radio.wpsu.org/opinion/2023-04-17/democracy-works-how-civil-wars-start-and-how-to-stop-them. 
  95. ↑ 95.0 95.1 95.2 95.3 95.4 95.5 95.6 95.7 Regan, Patrick; Bell, Sam (December 2010). "Changing Lanes or Stuck in the Middle: Why Are Anocracies More Prone to Civil Wars?". Political Science Quarterly 63 (4): 747–759. doi:10.1177/1065912909336274. 
  96. ↑ 96.0 96.1 96.2 96.3 96.4 96.5 96.6 96.7 Gandhi, Jennifer; Vreeland, James (June 2008). "Political Institutions and Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy". Journal of Conflict Solutions 52 (3): 401–425. doi:10.1177/0022002708315594. 
  97. ↑ 97.0 97.1 97.2 97.3 Fearon, James; Laitan, David (February 2003). "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War". American Political Science Review 97: 75–90. doi:10.1017/S0003055403000534. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/ethnicity-insurgency-and-civil-war/B1D5D0E7C782483C5D7E102A61AD6605. 
  98. ↑ "Hybrid Concepts and the Concept of Hybridity". https://ecpr.eu/Events/Event/sectiondetails/833. 
  99. ↑ Gagné, Jean-François (2015-03-10). "Hybrid Regimes". Oxford Bibliographies in Political Science. Oxford University PressNew York, NY. doi:10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0167. ISBN 978-0-19-785914-8. https://academic.oup.com/reference/62402/reference-article/555439410. Retrieved 2026-09-25. 
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  105. ↑ Quigley, Carroll (1983). Weapons systems and political stability: a history. University Press of America. p. 307. ISBN 978-0-8191-2947-5. https://books.google.com/books?id=L6e2AAAAIAAJ. Retrieved 20 May 2013. 
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  107. ↑ Montesquieu. "2–3". Spirit of the Laws. II. 
  108. ↑ Everdell, William R. (2000-04-15) (in en). The End of Kings: A History of Republics and Republicans. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-0-226-22482-4. https://books.google.com/books?id=HPEqlNkCGvcC. 
  109. ↑ Buber, Martin (1958). Paths in Utopia. Beacon Press. p. 43. https://books.google.com/books?id=MXGSnCcRaUwC&q=anocracy. 
  110. ↑ Buber, Martin (1946) (in de). Pfade in Utopia. Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider. p. 36. https://books.google.com/books?id=6zRKAAAAMAAJ&q=akratie. 
  111. ↑ Levitsky, Steven; Way, Lucan A. (April 2002). "Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism". Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 51–65. doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0026. ISSN 1086-3214. 
  112. ↑ 112.0 112.1 Levitsky, Steven; Way, Lucan A. (2010-08-16). Competitive Authoritarianism. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511781353. ISBN 978-0-521-88252-1. 
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  114. ↑ Diamond, Larry (April 2002). "Elections Without Democracy: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes". Journal of Democracy 13 (2): 21–35. doi:10.1353/jod.2002.0025. ISSN 1086-3214. 
  115. ↑ Mufti, Mariam (2018-06-22). "What Do We Know about Hybrid Regimes after Two Decades of Scholarship?". Politics and Governance 6 (2): 112–119. doi:10.17645/pag.v6i2.1400. ISSN 2183-2463. 

Sources

Further reading

Contemporary analysts

Research history

The researchers conducted a comparative analysis of political regimes around the world (Samuel Finer 1970), in developing countries (Almond and Coleman, 1960 ), among Latin America (Collier 1979) and West Africa regimes (Zolberg, 1966). Types of non-democratic regimes are described (Linz, 2000, originally published in 1975 and Perlmutter, 1981). Huntington and Moore (Huntington and Moore, 1970) discuss the one-party system issue Hermet (Guy Hermet, Rose, & Rouquie 1978) explores how elections are held in such authoritarian regimes, which are nominally democratic institutions.

"Hybrid regimes" (Diamond 2002), "competitive authoritarianism" (Levitsky and Way 2002 ) and "electoral authoritarianism" (Schedler, 2006) as well as how officials who came to power in an undemocratic way form election rules (Lust-Okar and Jamal, 2002 ), institutionalize electoral frauds (Lehoucq 2003 , Schedler 2002 ) and manipulate the economy (L. Blaydes 2006, Magaloni 2006) in order to win the election and stay in power.



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