Social:Iranian principlists

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Short description: Right-wing political faction in Iran
Not to be confused with Principlism.
Principlists
Spiritual leaderGholam-Ali Haddad-Adel
Parliamentary leaderMohammad Bagher Ghalibaf
Political positionRight-wing to far-right[1]
ReligionShia Islam
Executive branch
PresidentNo
Ministers
6 / 19 (32%)
Vice Presidents
1 / 14 (7%)
Parliament
SpeakerYes
Seats
198 / 290 (68%)
Judicial branch
Chief JusticeYes
StatusDominant[2]
Oversight bodies
Assembly of Experts
59 / 88 (67%)
Guardian Council
6 / 12 (50%)
Expediency Council
38 / 48 (79%)
City Councils
Tehran
21 / 21 (100%)
Mashhad
15 / 15 (100%)
Isfahan
13 / 13 (100%)
Shiraz
9 / 13 (69%)
Qom
13 / 13 (100%)
Shiraz
13 / 13 (100%)
Tabriz
6 / 13 (46%)
Yazd
11 / 11 (100%)
Rasht
9 / 11 (82%)
^ A: "Ultraconservatives" are also referred to as "Neoconservatives" or "Neo-fundamentalists".[3]

Template:Conservatism in Iran Template:Politics of Iran The Principlists (Persian: اصول‌گرایان, romanized: Osul-Garāyān, lit. followers of principles[4] or fundamentalists[5][6]), also interchangeably known as the Iranian Conservatives[7][8] and formerly referred to as the Right or Right-wing,[8][9][10] are one of two main political camps in post-revolutionary Iran; the Reformists are the other camp. The term hardliners that some western sources use in the Iranian political context usually refers to the faction,[11] although the principlist camp also includes more centrist tendencies.[12] The faction rejects the status quo internationally,[13] but favors domestic preservation.[14]

Within Iranian politics, "principlist" refers to the conservative supporters of the Supreme Leader of Iran and advocates for protecting the ideological "principles" of the Islamic Revolution's early days.[15] According to Hossein Mousavian, "The Principlists constitute the main right-wing/conservative political movement in Iran. They are more religiously oriented and more closely affiliated with the Qom-based clerical establishment than their moderate and reformist rivals".[16]

A declaration issued by The Two Societies, which serves as the Principlists' "manifesto", focuses upon loyalty to Islam and the Iranian Revolution, obedience to the Supreme Leader of Iran, and devotion to the principle of Vilayat Faqih.[17]

The Principlists currently dominate the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Assembly of Experts, as well as non-elective institutions such as the Guardian Council, the Expediency Discernment Council, along with the Judiciary.[17]

They held the Presidency until the inauguration of Reformist Masoud Pezeshkian on 30 July 2024.[18]

Demographics

According to a poll conducted by the Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA) in April 2017, 15% of Iranians identify as leaning Principlist. In comparison, 28% identify as leaning Reformist.[19]

In April 2021, a joint public opinion survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and IranPoll found out that 19% of Iranians identified as Principlist while 7% were leaning Principlist, and if Reformists (21%) and leaning Reformist (10%) were still higher, they also noted that "the support base for the reformists has shrunk by about 8 percentage points since 2017, while the support base for the conservatives has grown by 4 percentage points."[20]

Factions

  • Ultra conservatives—also known as neoconservatives. This grouping is more aggressive and openly confrontational toward the West.[21] Many ultra- or neo-Principlists are laymen representing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) collectively.[21]
  • Traditional conservatives are a political faction that helped form the Revolutionary government and can point to personal ties with Ruhollah Khomeini.[21] These conservatives support the Islamist government and advocate for clerical rule. (See also: Clericalism in Iran)[22]
  • Deviant current are a political faction led by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that espouses Islamic populism and Iranian nationalism.

Election results

Presidential elections

Year Candidate(s) Votes % Rank
1997 Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri 7,248,317 24.87 2nd
2001 Ahmad Tavakkoli 4,387,112 15.58 2nd
2005/1 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 5,711,696 19.43 2nd
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf 4,095,827 13.93 4th
Ali Larijani 1,713,810 5.83 6th
Total 11,521,333 39.19 Runoff
2005/2 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 17,284,782 61.69 1st
2009 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 24,527,516 62.63 1st
Mohsen Rezaee 678,240 1.73 3rd
Total 25,205,756 64.36 Won
2013 Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf 6,077,292 16.56 2nd
Saeed Jalili 4,168,946 11.36 3rd
Mohsen Rezaee 3,884,412 10.58 4th
Ali Akbar Velayati 2,268,753 6.18 6th
Total 16,399,403 44.68 Lost
2017 Ebrahim Raisi 15,835,794 38.28 2nd
Mostafa Mir-Salim 478,267 1.16 3rd
Total 16,314,061 39.44 Lost
2021 Ebrahim Raisi 18,021,945 72.35 1st
Mohsen Rezaee 3,440,835 13.81 2nd
Total 21,462,780 86.16 Won
2024/1 Saeed Jalili 9,473,298 40.38 2nd
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf 3,363,340 14.34 3rd
Mostafa Pourmohammadi 206,397 0.88 4th
Total 13,043,035 55.60 Runoff
2024/2 Saeed Jalili 13,538,179 45.24 2nd

Parliament

Exclusive seats Election +/-
54 / 290 (19%)
 2000 Steady
196 / 290 (68%)
 2004 Increase 142
195 / 290 (67%)
 2008 Decrease 1
184 / 290 (63%)
 2012 Decrease 11
86 / 290 (30%)
 2016 Decrease 98
221 / 290 (76%)
 2020 Increase 135
199 / 290 (69%)
 2024 Decrease 22

Parties and organizations

  • Society of Pathseekers of the Islamic Revolution
  • Association of Islamic Revolution Loyalists
  • Fadayeen of Islam Society
  • Ansar-e Hezbollah
  • Front of Islamic Revolution Stability
  • Resistance Front of Islamic Iran
  • Progress and Justice Population of Islamic Iran
  • Modern Thinkers Party of Islamic Iran
  • YEKTA Front
  • Green Party
  • Combatant Clergy Association
  • Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom
  • Islamic Coalition Party
  • Islamic Society of Engineers
  • Islamic Association of Physicians of Iran
  • Islamic Society of Students
  • Islamic Society of Employees
  • Islamic Society of Athletes
  • Zeynab Society
  • Society of Devotees of the Islamic Revolution
  • Development and Justice Party

Alliances

  • The Two Societies (unofficial)
  • Front of Followers of the Line of the Imam and the Leader (founded in the 1990s)
  • Coordination Council of Islamic Revolution Forces (founded 2000)
  • Front of Transformationalist Principlists (founded 2005)
  • Resistance Front of Islamic Iran (founded 2011)
  • Popular Front of Islamic Revolution Forces (founded 2016)
Electoral
  • Alliance of Builders of Islamic Iran (2003, 2004)
  • Coalition of Iran's Independent Volunteers (2004)
  • Coalition of the Pleasant Scent of Servitude (2006)
  • Principlists Pervasive Coalition (2008)
  • United Front of Principlists (2008, 2012)
  • Insight and Islamic Awakening Front (2012)
  • Principlists Grand Coalition (2016)
  • Service list (2017)

Media

  • Kayhan
  • Resalat
  • Vatan-e-Emrooz
  • Abrar
  • Yalasarat
  • Partow-e Sokhan
  • Rajanews

See also

  • Anti-American sentiment in Iran
  • Antisemitism in Iran
  • Calls for the destruction of Israel
  • Death to America

References

  1. ↑ Barbara Ann Rieffer-Flanagan, ed (March 22, 2013). Evolving Iran: An Introduction to Politics and Problems in the Islamic Republic. Georgetown University Press. p. 69. "On the political spectrum neoconservatives, also sometimes referred to as hard-line conservatives or principlists, are on the far right. Reformists, sometimes called the Islamic left, are the furthest away from the neoconservatives, with pragmatic conservatives falling somewhere in between the two." 
  2. ↑ "Freedom in the World: Iran", Freedom House, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/iran, retrieved 25 May 2017 
  3. ↑ Mehdi Moslem (2002), Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran, Syracuse University Press, pp. 135, ISBN 9780815629788 
  4. ↑ Axworthy, Michael (2016), Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic, Oxford University Press, p. 430, ISBN 9780190468965 
  5. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Islamism
  6. ↑ Kevan Harris (2017). A Social Revolution: Politics and the Welfare State in Iran. Univ of California Press. p. 157. ISBN 9780520280816. "This discourse was eventually tagged with the Persian neologism osulgarāi, a word that can be translated into English as 'fundamentalist', since 'osul' means 'doctrine', 'root', or 'tenet'. According to several Iranian journalists, state-funded media were aware of the negative connotation of this particular word in Western countries. Preferring not to be lumped in with Sunni Salafism, the English-language media in Iran opted to use the term 'principlist', which caught on more generally." 
  7. ↑ Said Amir Arjomand; Nathan J. Brown (2013). The Rule of Law, Islam, and Constitutional Politics in Egypt and Iran. SUNY Press. p. 150. ISBN 978-1-4384-4597-7. "'Conservative' is no longer a preferred term in Iranian political discourse. 'Usulgara', which can be clumsily translated as 'principlist', is the term now used to refer to an array of forces that previously identified themselves as conservative, fundamentalist, neo-fundamentalist, or traditionalist. It developed to counter the term eshlahgara, or reformist, and is applied to a camp of not necessarily congruous groups and individuals." 
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 Randjbar-Daemi, Siavush (2012). "Glossary of the most commonly-used Persian terms and abbreviations". Intra-State Relations in the Islamic Republic of Iran: The Presidency and the Struggle for Political Authority, 1989–2009 (Ph.D. thesis). Martin, Vanessa (Supervisor). Royal Holloway, University of London. p. 11. 30px Open access material licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License.
  9. ↑ Haddad Adel, Gholamali; Elmi, Mohammad Jafar; Taromi-Rad, Hassan (2012-08-31). Political Parties: Selected Entries from Encyclopaedia of the World of Islam. EWI Press. pp. 108. ISBN 9781908433022. 
  10. ↑ Robin B. Wright, ed. (2010), The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy, US Institute of Peace Press, p. 37, ISBN 978-1601270849 
  11. ↑ Masoud Kazemzadeh (2008), "Intra-Elite Factionalism and the 2004 Majles Elections in Iran", Middle Eastern Studies 44 (2): 189–214, doi:10.1080/00263200701874867, "In Western sources, the term 'hard-liners' is used to refer to the faction under the leadership of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanehi. Members of this group prefer to call themselves Osul-gara. The word osul (plural of asl) means 'fundamentals', or 'principles' or 'tenets', and the verbal suffix -gara means 'those who uphold or promote'. The more radical elements in the hard-line camp prefer to call themselves Ommat Hezbollah. Ommat is a technical Arabic-Islamic term referring to people who are Muslim. Hezbollah literally means 'Party of Allah'. Before the rise of Ahmadinejad to the presidency in 2005, many official sources in the Islamic Republic referred to this group as mohafezeh-kar ('conservative'). Between 1997 and 2006, many Iranians inside Iran used the terms eqtedar-gara ('authoritarian') and tamamiyat-khah ('totalitarian') for what many Western observers have termed 'hard-liners'. Members of the reformist faction of the fundamentalist oligarchy called the hard-liners eqtedar-gara." 
  12. ↑ Banafsheh Keynoush (2012), "Iran After Ahmadinejad", Survival: Global Politics and Strategy (New York) 54 (3): 127–146, doi:10.1080/00396338.2012.690988, "What is important, however, is that the principlist camp now increasingly represents not just hard-liners, but also more centre-right factions." 
  13. ↑ Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named CI
  14. ↑ Etel Solingen, ed. (2012), Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation, Cambridge University Press, pp. 222, ISBN 9781107010444 
  15. ↑ "Iranians Celebrate Surprise Rohani Win as Reason for Hope". Bloomberg. June 16, 2013. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-15/rohani-clinches-iran-presidency-in-surprise-victory. 
  16. ↑ Seyed Hossein Mousavian (2012), The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, Brookings Institution Press, p. 486, ISBN 9780870033025 
  17. ↑ 17.0 17.1 SHAUL, BAKHASH (12 September 2011). "Iran's Conservatives: The Headstrong New Bloc". Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Tehran Bureau. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2011/09/irans-conservatives-the-headstrong-new-bloc.html. 
  18. ↑ "Masoud Pezeshkian sworn in as Iranian president" (in en-GB). https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20240731_N01/. 
  19. ↑ "Poll Results of Popular Leaning Towards Principlists and Reformists" (in fa), Iranian Students Polling Agency (ISPA), 28 April 2017, http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/659410/Politics/election, retrieved 1 June 2017 
  20. ↑ "Disappointed in Rouhani, Iranians Seek a Different Sort of Leader in June Elections". 9 April 2021. https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/disappointed-rouhani-iranians-seek-different-sort-leader-june. "According to other IranPoll results, the support base for the reformists has shrunk by about 8 percentage points since 2017, while the support base for the conservatives has grown by 4 percentage points. Still, more Iranians self-identify as a reformist (21%) or leaning reformist (10%) than identify as a “principlist” (19%) or leaning principlist (7%). Four in 10 (43%) have no preference." 
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 Sherrill, Clifton (2011). "After Khamenei: Who Will Succeed Iran's Supreme Leader?". Orbis 55 (4): 631–47. doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2011.07.002. 
  22. ↑ Thaler (2010). Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads: An Exploration of Iranian Leadership Dynamics. Sacramento, CA: RAND Corporation. ISBN 978-0-8330-4773-1. 

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