Social:Middle power

From HandWiki
Short description: Type of state
Leaders of the G20 countries and others present at the 2008 G-20 Washington summit. Most members of the G20 are middle powers while some are great powers.
Part of the Politics series
Basic forms of government
Power structure
Separation
Federalism
Integration
Administrative division
Power source
Democracy
(rule by the people)
Oligarchy
(rule by few)
Autocracy
(rule by one)
Anarchism
(rule by none)
Power ideology
Monarchy vs. republic
(socio-political ideologies)
Authoritarian vs. libertarian
(socio-economic ideologies)
Global vs. local
(geo-cultural ideologies)
Politics portal

In international relations, a middle power is a sovereign state that is not a great power nor a superpower, but still has large or moderate influence and international recognition.

The concept of the "middle power" dates back to the origins of the European state system. In the late 16th century, Italian political thinker Giovanni Botero divided the world into three types of states: grandissime (great powers), mezano (middle powers), and piccioli (small powers). According to Botero, a mezano or middle power "has sufficient strength and authority to stand on its own without the need of help from others."[1]

History and definition

No agreed standard method defines which states are middle powers, aside from the broad idea that middle powers are states that have a 'moderate' ability to influence the behaviour of other states, in contrast to small power, which have 'little' ability to influence. Some researchers use Gross National Product (GNP) statistics to draw lists of middle powers around the world. Economically, middle powers are generally those that are not considered too "big" or too "small", however that is defined. However, economy is not always the defining factor. Under the original sense of the term, a middle power was one that had some degree of influence globally, but did not dominate in any one area. However, this usage is not universal, and some define middle power to include nations that can be regarded as regional powers.

According to academics at the University of Leicester and University of Nottingham:

Middle power status is usually identified in one of two ways. The traditional and most common way is to aggregate critical physical and material criteria to rank states according to their relative capabilities. Because countries' capabilities differ, they are categorized as superpowers (or great powers), middle powers or small powers. More recently, it is possible to discern a second method for identifying middle power status by focusing on behavioural attributes. This posits that middle powers can be distinguished from superpowers and smaller powers because of their foreign policy behaviour – middle powers carve out a niche for themselves by pursuing a narrow range and particular types of foreign policy interest. In this way middle powers are countries that use their relative diplomatic skills in the service of international peace and stability.[2]

According to Eduard Jordaan of Singapore Management University:

All middle powers display foreign policy behaviour that stabilises and legitimises the global order, typically through multilateral and cooperative initiatives. However, emerging and traditional middle powers can be distinguished in terms of their mutually-influencing constitutive and behavioural differences. Constitutively, traditional middle powers are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic and not regionally influential. Behaviourally, they exhibit a weak and ambivalent regional orientation, constructing identities distinct from powerful states in their regions and offer appeasing concessions to pressures for global reform. Emerging middle powers by contrast are semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recently democratised states that demonstrate much regional influence and self-association. Behaviourally, they opt for reformist and not radical global change, exhibit a strong regional orientation favouring regional integration but seek also to construct identities distinct from those of the weak states in their region.[3]

Another definition, by the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), a program of the Global Security Institute, is that "middle power countries are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that give them significant international credibility."[4] Under this definition however, nuclear-armed states like India and Pakistan, and every state participant of the NATO nuclear sharing, would not be middle powers.

Middle power diplomacy

According to Laura Neak of the International Studies Association:

Although there is some conceptual ambiguity surrounding the term middle power, middle powers are identified most often by their international behavior–called 'middle power diplomacy'—the tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems, the tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and the tendency to embrace notions of 'good international citizenship' to guide...diplomacy. Middle powers are states who commit their relative affluence, managerial skills, and international prestige to the preservation of the international order and peace. Middle powers help to maintain the international order through coalition-building, by serving as mediators and "go-betweens," and through international conflict management and resolution activities, such as UN peacekeeping. Middle powers perform these internationalist activities because of an idealistic imperative they associate with being a middle power. The imperative is that the middle powers have a moral responsibility and collective ability to protect the international order from those who would threaten it, including, at times, the great or principal powers. This imperative was particularly profound during the most intense periods of the Cold War.[5]

According to international relations scholar Annette Baker Fox, relationships between middle powers and great powers reveal more intricate behaviors and bargaining schemes than has often been assumed.[6] According to Soeya Yoshihide, "Middle Power does not just mean a state's size or military or economic power. Rather, 'middle power diplomacy' is defined by the issue area where a state invests its resources and knowledge. Middle Power States avoid a direct confrontation with great powers, but they see themselves as 'moral actors' and seek their own role in particular issue areas, such as human rights, environment, and arms regulations. Middle powers are the driving force in the process of transnational institutional-building."[7] At the same time, scholars have identified relations of antagonism and competition between middle powers, as well as their ability to use soft power to attain their goals, as in the case of Egypt-Israeli rivalry in Africa.[8]

Characteristics of middle power diplomacy include:[7]

  • Commitment to multilateralism through global institutions and allying with other middle powers.[9]
  • High degree of civil society penetration in the country's foreign policy.
  • A country that reflects and forms its national identity through a 'novel foreign policy': Peacekeeping, Human Security, the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Protocol

The Middle Powers Initiative highlights the importance of middle powers diplomacy. Through MPI, eight international non-governmental organizations are able to work primarily with middle power governments to encourage and educate the nuclear weapons states to take immediate practical steps that reduce nuclear dangers, and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. Middle power countries are particularly influential in issues related to arms control, being that they are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that gives them significant political credibility.

Self-defined by nation states

The term first entered Canadian political discourse after World War II. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent, for example, called Canada "a power of the middle rank" and helped to lay out the classical definition of Canadian middle power diplomacy. When he was advocating for Canada's election to the United Nations Security Council, he said that while "...the special nature of [Canada's] relationship to the United Kingdom and the United States complicates our responsibilities," Canada was not a "satellite" of either but would "continue to make our decisions objectively, in the light of our obligations to our own people and their interest in the welfare of the international community."[10] Canadian leaders believed Canada was a middle power because it was a junior partner in larger alliances (e.g. NATO, NORAD), was actively involved in resolving disputes outside its own region (e.g. Suez Crisis), was not a former colonial power and therefore neutral in anti-colonial struggles, worked actively in the United Nations to represent the interests of smaller nations and to prevent the dominance of the superpowers (often being elected to the United Nations Security Council for such reasons), and because it was involved in humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts around the world.

In March 2008, Australia n Prime Minister Kevin Rudd defined his country's foreign policy as one of "middle power diplomacy", along the lines of similar criteria. Australia would "influence international decision-makers" on issues such as "global economic, security and environmental challenges".[11]

Growing significance in the 21st century

American political analyst Cliff Kupchan describes middle powers as "countries with significant leverage in geopolitics" but that are "less powerful than the world’s two superpowers—the United States and China."[12] Nevertheless, Kupchan argues that middle powers—particularly in the Global South—have more power, agency, and "geopolitical heft" in the 21st century (namely the 2020s) than at any time since the Second World War. He identifies Brazil, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey as leading middle powers and describes them as "swing states" that are capable of creating new power dynamics due to their nonalignment with most great powers.[12] Among the shared characteristics of these six nations are membership in the G20; large and fast-growing economies; and active diplomatic involvement in major events, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and international climate action.[12]

Kupchan attributes the emergence of stronger middle powers to several historical developments in the international system, including the weaker bipolarity between the U.S. and China (as opposed to the stricter allegiances of the Cold War and the subsequent U.S. hegemony following the collapse of the Soviet Union) and the gradual trend of deglobalization, which has fostered regionalized geopolitical and geoeconomic relationships wherein middle powers have comparatively greater influence; for example, the fragmenting of the international energy market has purportedly given Saudi Arabia, a major energy exporter, far more weight in now-smaller regional markets. Kupchan also notes the ability of these middle powers to capitalize on rivalries between the major powers in order to further their own influence, interests, or foreign policy initiatives.

Overlaps between great powers and middle powers

The overlaps between the lists of middle powers and great powers show that there is no unanimous agreement among authorities.[13]

Nations such as China , France , Russia , the United Kingdom , and the United States are generally considered to be great powers due to their economic, military or strategic importance, their status as recognized nuclear powers and their permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council. Some academics also believe that Germany and Japan are great powers, albeit due to their large, advanced economies and global influence rather than military and strategic capabilities;[14] yet sources have at times referred to these nations as middle powers.[15][16]

Some in the field of international relations, such as John Kirton and Roberto Gimeno claim that Italy is a great power due to its status and membership in the G7 and NATO Quint.[17][18] Moreover, according to a 2014 report by the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), Italy is listed among the great powers.[19] Although broad academic support for India as a great power is uncommon, some in the field of political science, such as Malik Mohan and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, consider India to be a great power as well.[20][21] Likewise, Brazil is sometimes referred as a great power due to its economic power and influence,[22][23] with Italy at times being considered a great power due to these factors as well as its cultural power.

The following eight countries have at some point in the post–Cold War era been considered great powers but also middle powers by academics or other experts:

The United States [44][45] and China [46][47][48][49][50] are considered by many scholars to exceed the traditional criterion of great power, or instead to be superpowers, and are therefore not listed.[51][52][53][54]

List of middle powers

As with the great powers, there is no unanimous agreement among authorities as to which countries are considered middle powers. Lists are often the subject of much debate and tend to place comparatively large countries (e.g. Argentina ) alongside relatively small ones (e.g. Norway ).[55] Clearly not all middle powers are of equal status; some are considered regional powers and members of the G20 (e.g. Australia ), while others could very easily be considered small powers (e.g. Czech Republic).[56] Some larger middle powers also play important roles in the United Nations and other international organisations such as the WTO.

The following is a list of 54 countries that have been, at some point in time since the post–Cold War era, considered middle powers by academics or other experts (Members of the G-20 major economies are in bold font, except for the EU member states which are attended under a collective membership of the EU):

See also

References

  1. ↑ Rudd K (2006) Making Australia a force for good, Labor eHerald
  2. ↑ Hamill, James; Lee, Donna (April 2001). "A Middle Power Paradox? South African Diplomacy in the Post-apartheid Era" (in en). International Relations 15 (4): 33–59. doi:10.1177/004711701015004004. ISSN 0047-1178. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/004711701015004004. 
  3. ↑ Jordaan E (2003). The concept of a middle power in international relations. 
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Middle Powers Initiative (2004) Building Bridges: What Middle Power Countries Should Do To Strengthen the NPT , GSI
  5. ↑ Bishai LS (2000) From Recognition to Intervention: The Shift from Traditional to Liberal International Law
  6. ↑ Fox, Annette Baker, The Politics of Attraction: Four Middle Powers and the United States (Columbia University Press, 1977).
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Yoshihide, Soeya. "Middle Power Diplomacy". http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/tiberg/Poli%20322-2006-Middle%20Power%20Diplomacy.rtf. [|permanent dead link|dead link}}]
  8. ↑ Siniver, Asaf; Tsourapas, Gerasimos (2023). "Middle Powers and Soft-Power Rivalry: Egyptian–Israeli Competition in Africa". Foreign Policy Analysis 19 (2). doi:10.1093/fpa/orac041. ISSN 1743-8586. https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orac041. 
  9. ↑ Patrick James; Mark J. Kasoff (2008). Canadian studies in the new millennium. University of Toronto Press. p. 265. ISBN 978-0-8020-9468-1. https://books.google.com/books?id=7_LHcv89nW4C&pg=PA265. Retrieved 24 February 2016. 
  10. ↑ H.H. Herstien, L.J. Hughes, R.C. Kirbyson. Challenge & Survival: The History of Canada (Scarborough, ON: Prentice-Hall, 1970). p 411
  11. ↑ Shanahan D (2008) Time to go global, urges Rudd , The Australian
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 12.2 Kupchan, Cliff (2023-06-06). "6 Swing States Will Decide the Future of Geopolitics" (in en-US). https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/06/geopolitics-global-south-middle-powers-swing-states-india-brazil-turkey-indonesia-saudi-arabia-south-africa/. 
  13. ↑ Mehmet Ozkan. "A NEW APPROACH TO GLOBAL SECURITY: PIVOTAL MIDDLE POWERS AND GLOBAL POLITICS" Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs XI.1 (2006): 77–95
  14. ↑ "Encarta – The Great Powers". Encarta – The Great Powers. http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761590309/Great_Powers.html. 
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 P. Shearman, M. Sussex, European Security After 9/11(Ashgate, 2004) – According to Shearman and Sussex, both the UK and France were great powers now reduced to middle power status.
  16. ↑ Soeya Yoshihide, 'Diplomacy for Japan as a Middle Power, Japan Echo, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2008), pp. 36–41.
  17. ↑ Roberto Gimeno & Atelier de cartographie de Sciences Po, "La Russie et les grandes puissances (G8 et Chine)" Russia and the Great Powers (G8 and China), chart], Questions Internationales, No. 27 (septembre–octobre, 2007)
  18. ↑ "The Seven-Power Summit as an International Concert". http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/scholar/kirton198901/kcon1.htm. 
  19. ↑ "Why are Pivot states so Pivotal?". http://www.hcss.nl/reports/why-are-pivot-states-so-pivotal-the-role-of-pivot-states-in-regional-and-global-security/150/. 
  20. ↑ Strategic Vision: America & the Crisis of Global Power by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, pp 43–45. Published 2012.
  21. ↑ Malik, Mohan (2011). China and India: Great Power Rivals. United States: FirstForumPress. ISBN 978-1935049418. 
  22. ↑ Kwang Ho Chun (2013). The BRICs Superpower Challenge: Foreign and Security Policy Analysis. Ashgate. ISBN 978-1-4094-6869-1. https://books.google.com/books?id=LgDJNAEACAAJ. Retrieved 21 September 2015. 
  23. ↑ Heine J (2006) On the Manner of Practising the New Diplomacy, ISN
  24. ↑ "Especialistas reclamam reconhecimento do Brasil como potência mundial.". IBS News. 15 June 2011. http://www.ibsanews.com/pt/eeuu-eespecialistas-reclamam-reconhecimento-do-brasil-como-potecircncia-mundial/. 
  25. ↑ "Pela primeira vez Brasil emerge como potência internacional, diz Patriota". 10 May 2012. http://www.dci.com.br/pela-primeira-vez-brasil-emerge-como-potencia-internacional,-diz-patriota-id293466.html. 
  26. ↑ "Brazil – Emerging Soft Power of the World.". allAfrica.com. 15 September 2011. http://allafrica.com/stories/201109150218.html. 
  27. ↑ "Brasil ganha dos Estados Unidos em influência na América do Sul". The Economist. 2 September 2011. http://www.sidneyrezende.com/noticia/143872+brasil+ganha+dos+estados+unidos+em+influencia+na+america+do+sul. 
  28. ↑ 28.0 28.1 28.2 28.3 28.4 Éric-André Martin and Marie Krpata (October 2021) (in en). The Dilemma of Middle Powers: How AUKUS Has Reshaped the Potential for E3 Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. 166. Ifri, Notes du Cerfa. p. 20. ISBN 979-10-373-0432-2. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/martin_krpata_aukus_e3_cooperation_indopacific_2021.pdf. Retrieved 8 January 2022. "Countries such as Canada, Australia, South Korea, Japan, India and European powers like the UK, Germany and France can be considered as middle powers." 
  29. ↑ Otte M, Greve J (2000) A Rising Middle Power?: German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 1989–1999, St. Martin's Press
  30. ↑ Sperling, James (2001). "Neither Hegemony nor Dominance: Reconsidering German Power in Post Cold-War Europe". British Journal of Political Science 31 (2): 389–425. doi:10.1017/S0007123401000151. 
  31. ↑ "Asia Power Index 2021 Edition | India" (in en). https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/india/. ""The next tier of regional powers — Japan and India — have each lost more ground in 2021 than did China. Both countries have fallen just short of the major power threshold of 40 points in 2021... One result of greater bipolarity is that US allies, such as Japan and Australia, and even key balancing powers, such as India, have never been more dependent on American capacity and willingness to sustain a military balance of power in the region."" 
  32. ↑ 32.0 32.1 32.2 32.3 Tobias Harris, 'Japan Accepts its "Middle-Power" Fate'. Far Eastern Economic Review Vol. 171, No. 6 (2008), p. 45: 'Japan is settling into a position as a middle power in Asia, sitting uneasily between the U.S., its security ally, and China, its most important economic partner. In this it finds itself in a situation similar to Australia, India, South Korea and the members of Asean.'
  33. ↑ Charalampos Efstathopoulosa, 'Reinterpreting India's Rise through the Middle Power Prism', Asian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 19, Issue 1 (2011), p. 75: 'India's role in the contemporary world order can be optimally asserted by the middle power concept. The concept allows for distinguishing both strengths and weakness of India's globalist agency, shifting the analytical focus beyond material-statistical calculations to theorise behavioural, normative and ideational parameters.'
  34. ↑ Robert W. Bradnock, India's Foreign Policy since 1971 (The Royal Institute for International Affairs, London: Pinter Publishers, 1990), quoted in Leonard Stone, 'India and the Central Eurasian Space', Journal of Third World Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2, 2007, p. 183: 'The U.S. is a superpower whereas India is a middle power. A superpower could accommodate another superpower because the alternative would be equally devastating to both. But the relationship between a superpower and a middle power is of a different kind. The former does not need to accommodate the latter while the latter cannot allow itself to be a satellite of the former."
  35. ↑ Jan Cartwright, 'India's Regional and International Support for Democracy: Rhetoric or Reality?', Asian Survey, Vol. 49, No. 3 (May/June 2009), p. 424: 'India's democratic rhetoric has also helped it further establish its claim as being a rising "middle power." (A "middle power" is a term that is used in the field of international relations to describe a state that is not a superpower but still wields substantial influence globally. In addition to India, other "middle powers" include, for example, Australia and Canada.)'
  36. ↑ "Operation Alba may be considered one of the most important instances in which Italy has acted as a regional power, taking the lead in executing a technically and politically coherent and determined strategy." See Federiga Bindi, Italy and the European Union (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), p. 171.
  37. ↑ "Italy plays a prominent role in European and global military, cultural and diplomatic affairs. The country's European political, social and economic influence make it a major regional power." See Italy: Justice System and National Police Handbook, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: International Business Publications, 2009), p. 9.
  38. ↑ Marco Siddi (October 2018). "Italy's 'Middle Power' Approach to Russia" (in en). The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 54 (2): 123–138. doi:10.1080/03932729.2018.1519765. ISSN 0393-2729. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2018.1519765. "The definition of 'middle power' is contested and has been the subject of controversy among scholars. According to the Italian interpretation of this concept, Italy is a middle-ranking power with limited natural and military resources and one that can only achieve its foreign policy goals by expanding its influence in international organisations and through bilateral relations with larger powers.". 
  39. ↑ "Asia Power Index 2021 Edition | Japan" (in en). https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/Japan/. ""The next tier of regional powers — Japan and India — have each lost more ground in 2021 than did China. Both countries have fallen just short of the major power threshold of 40 points in 2021... One result of greater bipolarity is that US allies, such as Japan and Australia, and even key balancing powers, such as India, have never been more dependent on American capacity and willingness to sustain a military balance of power in the region."" 
  40. ↑ Robert W. Cox, 'Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order, International Journal, Vol. 44, No. 4 (1989), pp. 823–862.
  41. ↑ "Asia Power Index 2021 Edition | Russia" (in en). https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/russia/. 
  42. ↑ Neumann, Iver B. (2008). "Russia as a great power, 1815–2007". Journal of International Relations and Development 11 (2): 128–151 [p. 128]. doi:10.1057/jird.2008.7. "As long as Russia's rationality of government deviates from present-day hegemonic neo-liberal models by favouring direct state rule rather than indirect governance, the West will not recognize Russia as a fully fledged great power.". 
  43. ↑ Chalmers, Malcolm (May 2015). "A Force for Order: Strategic Underpinnings of the Next NSS and SDSR". Royal United Services Institute Briefing Paper (SDSR 2015: Hard Choices Ahead): 2. ""While no longer a superpower (a position it lost in the 1940s), the UK remains much more than a 'middle power'."". 
  44. ↑ From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (Published 2008), by Professor George C. Herring (Professor of History at Kentucky University)
  45. ↑ "Asia Power Index 2021 Edition | US" (in en). https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/united-states/. "The United States beat the regional downward trend, gaining points in five Index measures, and overtaking China in two critical rankings: for diplomatic Influence and future resources. But its gains are dogged by a rapid loss of economic influence." 
  46. ↑ Muldavin, Joshua (9 February 2006). "From Rural Transformation to Global Integration: The Environmental and Social Impacts of China's Rise to Superpower". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=851&prog=zch. 
  47. ↑ "A Point Of View: What kind of superpower could China be?". BBC. 19 October 2012. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19995218. 
  48. ↑ John, Emmanuel (13 June 2019). China: Emerging superpower. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333759875. 
  49. ↑ "China as a global power". China.usc.edu. 13 November 2007. http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=848. 
  50. ↑ "Asia Power Index 2021 Edition | China" (in en). https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/china/. "The country lost points in half of the Index measures. But this has not narrowed the country's lead over the rest of the region, with lower ranked countries succumbing to their own losses." 
  51. ↑ Yu, Katrina. "China-US: Relations fray between the two superpowers". https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/07/china-us-relations-fray-superpowers-200717183321246.html. 
  52. ↑ "Five big takeaways from the 2019 Asia Power Index" (in en). https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/power-shifts-fevered-times-2019-asia-power-index. 
  53. ↑ Welle (www.dw.com), Deutsche. "Many Germans believe China will replace US as superpower: survey | DW | 14 July 2020" (in en-GB). https://www.dw.com/en/germany-china-us-superpower/a-54173383. 
  54. ↑ Éric-André Martin and Marie Krpata (October 2021) (in en). The Dilemma of Middle Powers: How AUKUS Has Reshaped the Potential for E3 Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. 166. Ifri, Notes du Cerfa. ISBN 979-10-373-0432-2. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/martin_krpata_aukus_e3_cooperation_indopacific_2021.pdf. Retrieved 8 January 2022. "The (US) Department of Defense defined the Indo-Pacific as its "priority theater"...This tilt is an acknowledgment of China's increased role in world economics. China's share in world GDP has risen from 4% in 2000 to 16% today. Since it joined the WTO in 2001 and with the unfolding of the economic and financial crises in 2008–2009, which diminished the West's soft power and economic and financial strengths, China has become the world's powerhouse. This has increasingly led to what may be described today as great-power rivalry between China and the US." 
  55. ↑ 55.0 55.1 Solomon S (1997) South African Foreign Policy and Middle Power Leadership , ISS
  56. ↑ 56.0 56.1 Cabada, Ladislav (November 2005). "The New International Role of Small(er) States". The Journal of the Central European Political Science Association 1 (1): 30–45. https://politicsincentraleurope.eu/documents/file/2005_11.pdf. Retrieved 10 February 2020. 
  57. ↑ 57.0 57.1 57.2 Wurst J (2006) Middle Powers Initiative Briefing Paper, GSI
  58. ↑ 58.0 58.1 Cooper AF (1997) Niche Diplomacy - Middle Powers after the Cold War , palgrave
  59. ↑ 59.0 59.1 59.2 59.3 59.4 Bernard Wood, 'Towards North-South Middle Power Coalitions', in Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension, edited by Cranford Pratt (Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990).
  60. ↑ Martín, Lucas (5 June 2020). "Morocco and Algeria, the struggle for regional leadership". Atalayar. https://atalayar.com/en/content/morocco-and-algeria-struggle-regional-leadership. 
  61. ↑ 61.0 61.1 61.2 61.3 Andrew F. Cooper, Agata Antkiewicz and Timothy M. Shaw, 'Lessons from/for BRICSAM about South-North Relations at the Start of the 21st Century: Economic Size Trumps All Else?', International Studies Review, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Winter, 2007), pp. 675, 687.
  62. ↑ 62.0 62.1 Ploughshares Monitor (1997) Scrapping the Bomb: The role of middle power countries
  63. ↑ Gilley, Bruce (10 September 2012). "The Rise of the Middle Powers". The New York Times Company. https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/opinion/the-rise-of-the-middle-powers.html. 
  64. ↑ "Ethiopia: East Africa's Emerging Giant" (in en). https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ethiopia-east-africas-emerging-giant. 
  65. ↑ "5 reasons why Ethiopia could be the next global economy to watch" (in en). https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/09/5-reasons-why-ethiopia-could-be-the-next-global-economy-to-watch/. 
  66. ↑ Africa, Somtribune (2020-08-29). "Ethiopia Can Be Africa's Next Superpower" (in en-GB). https://www.somtribune.com/2020/08/29/ethiopia-can-be-africas-next-superpower/. 
  67. ↑ https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/morocco/overview
  68. ↑ 68.0 68.1 Mace G, Belanger L (1999) The Americas in Transition: The Contours of Regionalism (p 153)
  69. ↑ Kim, Jiye (2021). "Between a Regional Hegemon and a Middle Power: The Case of Nigeria". Awkward Powers: Escaping Traditional Great and Middle Power Theory. Global Political Transitions. pp. 221–241. doi:10.1007/978-981-16-0370-9_9. ISBN 978-981-16-0369-3. 
  70. ↑ Gladys Lechini, Middle Powers: IBSA and the New South-South Cooperation. NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 40, No. 5 (2007): 28-33: 'Today, a new, more selective South-South cooperation has appeared, bringing some hope to the people of our regions. The trilateral alliance known as the India, Brazil, and South Africa Dialogue Forum, or IBSA, exemplifies the trend ... The three member countries face the same problems and have similar interests. All three consider themselves "middle powers" and leaders of their respective regions, yet they have also been subject to pressures from 'Emerging Middle Powers' Soft Balancing Strategy: State and Perspective of the IBSA Dialogue Forum. Hamburg: GIGA, 2007.
  71. ↑ Peter Vale, 'South Africa: Understanding the Upstairs and the Downstairs', in Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War, edited by Andrew F. Cooper (London: Macmillan, 1997).
  72. ↑ Janis Van Der Westhuizen, 'South Africa's Emergence as a Middle Power', Third World Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1998), pp. 435-455.
  73. ↑ Pfister R (2006) The Apartheid Republuc and African States , H-Net
  74. ↑ Eduard Jordaan, 'Barking at the Big Dogs: South Africa's Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East', Round Table, Vol. 97, No. 397 (2008), pp. 547-549.
  75. ↑ Flemes, Daniel, Emerging Middle Powers' Soft Balancing Strategy: State and Perspectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum (1 August 2007). GIGA Working Paper No. 57. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1007692
  76. ↑ 76.0 76.1 76.2 76.3 76.4 76.5 76.6 76.7 Gilley, Bruce; O'Neil, Andrew (8 July 2014). Middle Powers and the Rise of China. Georgetown University Press. p. 30. ISBN 9781626160842. https://books.google.com/books?id=WVQ7BAAAQBAJ&q=austria%20middle%20power&pg=PA30. 
  77. ↑ https://www.eurasiareview.com/21082023-kenya-a-regional-power-in-africa-and-the-indo-pacific-analysis/
  78. ↑ https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ghana/overview
  79. ↑ https://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/what-does-tanzanias-move-lower-middle-income-status-mean
  80. ↑ 80.0 80.1 Yasmi Adriansyah, 'Questioning Indonesia's place in the world', Asia Times (20 September 2011): 'Countries often categorized as middle power (MP) include Australia, Canada and Japan. The reasons for this categorization are the nations' advanced political-economic stature as well as their significant contribution to international cooperation and development. India and Brazil have recently become considered middle powers because of their rise in the global arena—particularly with the emerging notion of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China).'
  81. ↑ 81.0 81.1 81.2 81.3 Behringer RM (2005) Middle Power Leadership on the Human Security Agenda , SAGE
  82. ↑ Crosby AD (1997) A Middle-Power Military in Alliance: Canada and NORAD, JSTOR
  83. ↑ Petersen K (2003) Quest to Reify Canada as a Middle Power, Dissident Voice
  84. ↑ 84.0 84.1 Inoguchi K (2002) The UN Disarmament Conference in Kyote
  85. ↑ Heine J (2006) On the Manner of Practising the New Diplomacy, ISN
  86. ↑ "THE UN DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE IN KYOTO". disarm.emb-japan.go.jp. http://www.disarm.emb-japan.go.jp/statements/Statement/kyoto020807.htm. 
  87. ↑ Heine, Jorge. "On the Manner of Practising the New Diplomacy". The Centre for International Governance Innovation. http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=EBFD6763-36B0-7571-5B36-97F6502F60DC&lng=en. 
  88. ↑ Louis Belanger and Gordon Mace, 'Middle Powers and Regionalism in the Americas: The Cases of Argentina and Mexico', in Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War, edited by Andrew F. Cooper (London: Macmillan, 1997).
  89. ↑ 89.0 89.1 Pierre G. Goad, 'Middle Powers to the Rescue?', Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 163, No. 24 (2000), p. 69.
  90. ↑ Pellicer O (2006) Mexico – a Reluctant Middle Power? , FES
  91. ↑ 91.0 91.1 91.2 91.3 91.4 91.5 91.6 Oosterveld, Willem; Torossian, Bianca. "A Balancing Act: The Role of Middle Powers in Contemporary Diplomacy". Strategic Monitor 2018-2019. Clingendael Institute. https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2018/strategic-monitor-2018-2019/a-balancing-act/. 
  92. ↑ McKercher, B. J. C. (2012) (in en). Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft. Routledge. ISBN 9781136664366. https://books.google.com/books?id=EtCoAgAAQBAJ. "a Middle Power like Peru lack the diplomatic and other resources..." 
  93. ↑ "Asia Power Index 2021 Edition | North Korea" (in en). https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/north-korea/. 
  94. ↑ "Asia Power Index 2021 Edition | Indonesia" (in en). https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/indonesia/. "Indonesia has for the first time reached a top-ten placement in the Index. Jakarta now outranks Singapore as the most diplomatically influential player in Southeast Asia." 
  95. ↑ 95.0 95.1 Jonathan H. Ping, Middle Power Statecraft: Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Asia Pacific (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2005).
  96. ↑ Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnesbusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Power in a Penetrated Regional System (London: Routledge, 1997).
  97. ↑ Samhat, Nayef H. (2000). "Middle Powers and American Foreign Policy: Lessons for Irano-U.S. Relations". Policy Studies Journal 28 (1): 11–26. doi:10.1111/j.1541-0072.2000.tb02013.x. 
  98. ↑ Ahouie M (2004) Iran Analysis Quarterly , MIT
  99. ↑ Foreign Affairs Committee (2006) Iran
  100. ↑ 100.0 100.1 100.2 100.3 Buzan, Barry (2004). The United States and the Great Powers. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity Press. p. 71. ISBN 0-7456-3375-7. 
  101. ↑ "www.lrb.co.uk". http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/mear01_.html. 
  102. ↑ "www.acronym.org.uk". http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd76/76actg.htm. 
  103. ↑ "Kazakhstan and the struggle over Central Asia". 5 June 2019. https://spectator.us/kazakhstan-struggle-central-asia/. 
  104. ↑ Zholdasbekova, Aidar Kurmashev, Dana Akhmedyanova, Houman Sadri, Akbota (1 October 2018). "Kazakhstan's Middle Power Response to Terrorism". Insight Turkey. https://www.insightturkey.com/articles/kazakhstans-middle-power-response-to-terrorism. 
  105. ↑ "Asia Power Index 2021 Edition | Malaysia" (in en). https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/malaysia/. 
  106. ↑ Kim R. Nossal and Richard Stubbs, 'Mahathir's Malaysia: An Emerging Middle Power?' in Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War, edited by Andrew F. Cooper (London: Macmillan, 1997).
  107. ↑ "Asia Power Index 2021 Edition | Pakistan" (in en). https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/pakistan/. 
  108. ↑ Barry Buzan (2004). The United States and the great powers: world politics in the twenty-first century. Polity. pp. 71, 99. ISBN 978-0-7456-3374-9. https://books.google.com/books?id=XvtS5hKg9jYC&pg=PR8. Retrieved 27 December 2011. 
  109. ↑ "Asia Power Index 2021 Edition | Philippines" (in en). https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/philippines/. 
  110. ↑ 110.0 110.1 110.2 Jonathan H. Ping Middle Power Statecraft (p 104)
  111. ↑ Cooper, Andrew F.. "Middle Powers: Squeezed out or Adaptive?". Public Diplomacy Magazine. http://publicdiplomacymagazine.com/middle-powers-squeezed-out-or-adaptive/. 
  112. ↑ Kamrava, Mehran. "Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy". http://www18.georgetown.edu/data/people/mk556/publication-61175.pdf. 
  113. ↑ "Asia Power Index 2021 Edition | South Korea" (in en). https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/south-korea/. 
  114. ↑ Armstrong DF (1997) South Korea's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era: A middle power perspective
  115. ↑ Gilbert Rozman, 'South Korea and Sino-Japanese Rivalry: A Middle Power's Options Within the East Asia Core Triangle', Pacific Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2007), pp. 197-220.
  116. ↑ Woosang Kim, 'Korea as a Middle Power in Northeast Asian Security', in The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues, and New Order, edited by G. John Ikenbgerry and Chung-in Moon (Lantham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).
  117. ↑ Sheridan, Greg (27 November 2008). "The plucky country and the lucky country draw closer". The Australian. http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24712289-7583,00.html. 
  118. ↑ "Kawaguchi asks Saudi Arabia to put pressure on Iraq Japan Policy & Politics". http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0XPQ/is_2002_Sept_23/ai_92080737. 
  119. ↑ "Saudi Surprise". 26 August 2004. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4349. 
  120. ↑ "Asia Power Index 2021 Edition | Singapore" (in en). https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/singapore/. "Uneven economic impacts and recoveries from the pandemic will likely continue to alter the regional balance of power well into the decade. Only Taiwan, the United States and Singapore are now predicted to have larger economies in 2030 than originally forecast prior to the pandemic." 
  121. ↑ 121.0 121.1 Schweller, Randall. The Concept of Middle Power. Ohio State University. https://www.academia.edu/7493871. Retrieved 8 February 2020. 
  122. ↑ "Middle Powers,Norms, and Balancing: ROK's and ASEAN's Normative Balancing against Rising China". Chung-Ang University. http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/CEEISA-ISA-LBJ2016/Archive/af8c46fb-30e2-4b6e-8aff-d4d36e0906dc.pdf. 
  123. ↑ de Swielande, Tanguy Struye; Vandamme, Dorothée; Walton, Dorothée; Wilkins, Thomas (2018). "Chapter 14: The Singapore paradox: The "little red dot" as a "middle power"". in Peng Er, Lam. Rethinking Middle Powers in the Asian Century: New Theories, New Cases. Routledge. ISBN 9780429873843. https://books.google.com/books?id=Qs5wDwAAQBAJ&q=asian%20middle%20power&pg=PT347. 
  124. ↑ "Asia Power Index 2021 Edition | Taiwan" (in en). https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/taiwan/. "Uneven economic impacts and recoveries from the pandemic will likely continue to alter the regional balance of power well into the decade. Only Taiwan, the United States and Singapore are now predicted to have larger economies in 2030 than originally forecast prior to the pandemic." 
  125. ↑ Jacobs, Bruce (22 January 2016). "Taiwan signals its readiness to join the world's democratic powers". the sydney morning herald. https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/taiwan-signals-its-readiness-to-join-the-worlds-democratic-powers-20160122-gmbk9b.html. 
  126. ↑ "Asia Power Index 2021 Edition | Thailand" (in en). https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/thailand/. 
  127. ↑ Meltem Myftyler and Myberra Yyksel, 'Turkey: A Middle Power in the New Order', in Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War, edited by Andrew F. Cooper (London: Macmillan, 1997).
  128. ↑ Laipson, Ellen (3 September 2014). "The UAE and Egypt's New Frontier in Libya". The National Interest. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-uae-egypt%E2%80%99s-new-frontier-libya-11184. 
  129. ↑ Evans, Gareth (29 June 2011). "Middle Power Diplomacy". http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech441.html. 
  130. ↑ "Asia Power Index 2021 Edition | Vietnam" (in en). https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/vietnam/. ""Three middle powers — Vietnam, Australia and Taiwan — were the only countries to gain in comprehensive power in 2020. When neither the United States nor China can establish undisputed primacy in Asia, the actions and choices of middle powers will become more consequential."" 
  131. ↑ "Middle Powers, Joining Together: The Case of Vietnam and Australia". https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/middle-powers-joining-together-the-case-of-vietnam-and-australia/. 
  132. ↑ 132.0 132.1 132.2 132.3 "A Balancing Act: The Role of Middle Powers in Contemporary Diplomacy". The Hague Center for Strategic Studies. https://www.hcss.nl/pub/2018/strategic-monitor-2018-2019/a-balancing-act/. 
  133. ↑ Lauber, Volkmar (17 September 2019). Contemporary Austrian Politics. Routledge. ISBN 9780429720987. https://books.google.com/books?id=1U2wDwAAQBAJ&q=austria%20middle%20power&pg=PT150. 
  134. ↑ 134.0 134.1 134.2 Taylor, Ian (2001). Stuck in Middle GEAR: South Africa's Post-apartheid Foreign Relations. London: Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 19. ISBN 9780275972752. https://books.google.com/books?id=3tfjkiq0b7sC&q=romania+middle+power&pg=PA19. 
  135. ↑ Caplan G (2006) From Rwanda to Darfur: Lessons learned?, SudanTribune
  136. ↑ John, Ravenhill (1988). "Cycles of middle power activism: Constraint andchoice in Australian and Canadian foreign policies". Australian Journal of International Affairs 52 (3): 309–327. doi:10.1080/10357719808445259. http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Cycles-of-middle-power-activism-Constraint-and-choice-in-Australian-and-Canadian-foreign-policies.pdf. Retrieved 10 February 2020. 
  137. ↑ 137.0 137.1 137.2 137.3 Pratt C (1990) Middle Power Internationalism, MQUP
  138. ↑ 138.0 138.1 I. Handel, Michael (1990). Weak States in the International System. Taylor & Francis. pp. 28. ISBN 9780714640730. https://books.google.com/books?id=sOELm3YduxQC&q=finland%20middle%20power&pg=PA28. 
  139. ↑ Thanos Veremēs (1997) The Military in greek Politics "Black Rose Books"
  140. ↑ Higgott RA, Cooper AF (1990) Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building
  141. ↑ Pratt, Cranford (1990). Middle Power Internationalism: The North-South Dimension. Montreal: McGill–Queen's University Press. p. 32. ISBN 9780773507258. https://books.google.com/books?id=eaLmKPmFnLgC&q=ireland+middle+power&pg=PA32. 
  142. ↑ Tonra, Ben; Ward, Eilís (2002). "Chapter 1: Ireland, Peacekeeping and Defence Policy: Challenges and Opportunities". in Murphy, Ray. Ireland in International Affairs: Interests, Institutions and Identities. Dublin, Republic of Ireland: Institute of Public Administration. pp. 20–21. ISBN 9781902448763. https://books.google.com/books?id=fFicRmV_LcIC&q=ireland%20middle%20power&pg=PA20. 
  143. ↑ Gillespie, Paul (17 January 2015). "Representing Ireland – multitasking in a multilateral world". The Irish Times. https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/representing-ireland-multitasking-in-a-multilateral-world-1.2068867. 
  144. ↑ Ishizuka, Katsumi (23 April 2014). "Four: Ireland's peacekeeping policy in the post-Cold War era". Ireland and International Peacekeeping Operations 1960-2000. Routledge. p. 136. ISBN 9781135295264. https://books.google.com/books?id=CSxpAwAAQBAJ&q=ireland%20middle%20power&pg=PA136. 
  145. ↑ Bolton, Matthew; Nash, Thomas (7 May 2010). "The Role of Middle Power–NGO Coalitions in Global Policy: The Case of the Cluster Munitions Ban". Global Policy (Wiley) 1 (2): 172–184. doi:10.1111/j.1758-5899.2009.00015.x. 
  146. ↑ 146.0 146.1 Spero, Joshua (2004). Bridging the European Divide. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 206. ISBN 9780742535534. 
  147. ↑ Kirton J (2006) Harper's Foreign Policy Success?
  148. ↑ 148.0 148.1 according to Yves Lacoste, Géopolitique, Larousse, 2009,p. 134, both Spain and Portugal exert a real influence in Africa and in the Americas.
  149. ↑ 149.0 149.1 Turkish Policy Quarterly, Volume 4. Turkey: Big Art. 2005. https://books.google.com/books?id=1TktAQAAIAAJ&q=romania+middle+power. 
  150. ↑ Wood, Bernald (1 June 1988). The middle powers and the general interest. Ottawa: The North-South Institute. ISBN 9780920494813. https://archive.org/details/middlepowersgene0000wood. 
  151. ↑ Rudengren J, Gisle P, Brann K (1995) Middle Power Clout: Sweden And The Development Banks
  152. ↑ "South African Foreign Policy and Middle Power Leadership - Fairy God-mother, Hegemon or Partner? In Search of a South African Foreign Policy - Monograph No 13, 1997". 26 April 2015. http://www.issafrica.org/Pubs/Monographs/No13/Solomon.html. 
  153. ↑ "Asia Power Index 2021 Edition | Australia" (in en). https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/australia/. ""Three middle powers — Vietnam, Australia and Taiwan — were the only countries to gain in comprehensive power in 2020. When neither the United States nor China can establish undisputed primacy in Asia, the actions and choices of middle powers will become more consequential."" 
  154. ↑ Hazleton WA (2005) Middle Power Bandwagoning? Australia's Security Relationship with the United States , allacademic
  155. ↑ "Asia Power Index 2021 Edition | New Zealand" (in en). https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/new-zealand/. 

Further reading

External links



Retrieved from "https://handwiki.org/wiki/index.php?title=Social:Middle_power&oldid=3301298"