Engineering:Shahed 131

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Short description: Iranian-made drone
Shahed 131
Orthographic projection of a Shahed-131/Geran-1
TypeOne-way attack drone
Place of origin Iran
Service history
Used by Iran
 Russia (as Geran-1)
Production history
DesignerShahed Aviation Industries
Specifications
Mass135 kg (298 lb)
Length2.6 m (8.5 ft)
Warhead weight15 kilograms (33 lb)
Wingspan2.2 m (7.2 ft)
Operational
range
900 km (559 mi)
Guidance
system
GNSS, INS

The Shahed 131 (Persian: شاهد ۱۳۱, literally "Witness 131"), or Geran-1 (Russian: Герань-1, literally "Geranium-1") in Russian service, is an Iranian-made one-way attack drone which came to prominence in October 2022 during the Russo-Ukrainian war,[1][2][3] when it was used by Russia to attack critical Ukrainian infrastructure and civilian targets.[4] It is powered by a Wankel engine model Shahed-783/788.[5]

Design

Photograph and sketch of a Shahed-131 recovered in the Middle East
A black Shahed-131 exhibitited in Iran next to the larger Shahed-136 in 2023

The Shahed-131 is powered by the Serat-1 Wankel engine, a 38-horsepower unit that is a copy of the Beijing Micropilot UAV Control System Ltd MDR-208 Wankel engine and is derived from the British AR 731 engine.[6][7] An engine of this type was used for the drone in the 2019 Aramco attack in Abqaiq,[7] which was referred to the UN Secretariat as part of the Resolution 2231 2020 investigations. The airframe is constructed from lightweight composite materials, including carbon fiber cloth or fiberglass with a honeycomb core, which contributes to its low radar cross-section.[8]

The Shahed-131 flight control unit was found to be able to connect with Iridium satellites, which in theory allows the flight path to be altered mid flight.[9][10] The flight controller has a backup inertial navigation system by MEMS gyroscope. Its primary instructions are derived from a commercial-grade GPS unit, which in later versions deployed by Russia has reportedly been modified with anti-deception algorithms to mitigate GPS signal alterations.[10]

Designs for the Kentron ARD-10 loitering drone were sold to Iran Aviation Industries Organization in 2004/5 and used by Shahed Aviation Industries to develop the Shahed 131 and Shahed 136 drones, according to Air Forces Monthly magazine.[11] However a Royal United Services Institute article states the origins of the Shahed 131 are obscure.[12]

The Shahed 131 is visually distinguished by having vertical stabilisers that extend only upwards from the ends of the wings, while on the larger Shahed 136 they extend both up and down.[13] It has a forward-mounted warhead compartment capable of accommodating 10 to 20 kg of explosives, enabling it to function as a kamikaze drone upon target impact. Warhead configurations observed include high-explosive charges with pre-formed fragmentation casings for area effects or shaped charge warheads for anti-armor capability.[3][12][14]

Operational history

It has been alleged the drone was first seen in the Arabian Peninsula when it was used to attack Saudi targets by the Houthi rebels.[1] However The Washington Post reported that other types of drone were used in that attack.[15]

Russo-Ukrainian war

It was used in the Russo-Ukrainian war,[5] under a Russian name Geran-1.[16] A simplified version is also called Geran-3 where the diesel[clarification needed] engine has been replaced with a DLE-60 twin gasoline engine.[17] The use of the Shahed-131/Geran-1 by Russia is part of a strategy to employ economical, expendable platforms for precision strikes, often launched in swarms to overwhelm air defenses.[8]

In addition to supplying these drones to Russia, Iran has trained thousands of Russian personnel to operate the Shahed 131 drones. This includes hundreds of Russian pilots, communications specialists, technicians, and handlers. Iran has also established specialized mobile command-and-control communications stations to assist Russia with efficiently using the drones across the vast space of Ukraine. A "relatively large" number of engineers and technicians have also accompanied the drones to Russia to handle equipment issues.[18] Prior to the war, Russia has had a history of underperforming drones in their military; the Russian indigenous drone fleet was "light and small", with low range and limited flight capacity. The initiation of the Ukraine war in February 2022 put them in dire need of various types of drones, including bombers, suicide (kamikaze) drones, and surveillance drones. Iran's provision of more advanced and versatile drones was therefore a great benefit to Russia in its military actions in Ukraine.[19]

Iran war 2026

See also: 2026 Iran war

Iran extensively used Shahed 131 along with Shahed 136 drones to carry out large scale attacks on U.S. bases along the Persian Gulf.[20]

Operators

  •  Iran: By IRGCASF/NEHSA and IRGCN/NEDSA
  •  Russia: Used as the Geran-1, with domestic production in the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) building upon Iranian designs.[21][22]

Non-state actors

Global impact

Iran's low-cost Shahed drones have created a global market for low-cost, high performing versatile drones that can be used in attritional combat scenarios. Shahed series drones appear to cost approximately US$20,000, whereas air-to-air missiles or ground-based interceptors cost between US$400,000 to US$1.2 million each.[28] Through the expansion of drone supplying via provision of drones to Russia, Iran has also expanded its global market share, gaining credibility for its military technology, along with increased reputation on the global scene.[29]

The sophistication and dissemenation of these drones in the global military marketplace, most notably seen in the Russo-Ukrainian war, are theorized by scholars to go beyond this specific conflict and cause Western powers to begin more advanced drone developments to keep up:

Just as with Western support for Ukraine, the Iranian drone build-up will have implications that go beyond this specific conflict. Iranian drones are increasing not only in number, but also sophistication and lethality, a development that concerns the United States and Europe. In response, we can expect Western actors to prioritise the production and export of low-cost defence systems able to counter the mass-produced drones directed by Iran, Iranian proxies, and other adversaries.[30]

See also

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Scollon, Michael. "Iranian Missiles Threaten To Boost Russia's Deadly Air Campaign In Ukraine". https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-missiles-russia-air-campaign-ukraine/32095930.html. 
  2. ↑ Kossov, Igor (October 24, 2022). "How Russia uses Iranian drones to try to overwhelm Ukraine's air defense". https://kyivindependent.com/national/russias-gambit-to-exhaust-ukraines-air-defense-with-iranian-kamikaze-drones. 
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 Panasovskyi, Maksim. "The AFU captured a kamikaze drone Shahed-131 - a smaller version of Shahed-136, weighing 135 kg, warhead weighing 15 kg and a launch range of 900 km". https://gagadget.com/en/180209-the-afu-captured-a-kamikaze-drone-shahed-131-a-smaller-version-of-shahed-136-weighing-135-kg-warhead-weighing-15-kg-and-a/. 
  4. ↑ "Russia increases arms trade with UN-embargoed nations to feed Ukraine war" (in en). 2024-11-18. https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-increases-arms-trade-with-un-embargoed-nations-to-feed-ukraine-war/7868778.html. 
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 "Russians began to use Shahed-131 kamikaze drones". mil.in.ua. 13 October 2022. https://mil.in.ua/en/news/russians-began-to-use-shahed-131-kamikaze-drones/. 
  6. ↑ "Takeaways from Iranian National Aerospace Exhibition 2014". www.uskowioniran.com. 25 November 2014. https://www.uskowioniran.com/2014/11/takeaways-from-iranian-national.html. 
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 Mehdi H. [@mhmiranusa] (19 December 2019). "New pictures by @Reuters from US report to @UN Security Council on the UAV used for Aramco attack in Abqaiq. Shows its engine & vertical gyro compared to the ones from Iranian Shahed-123 UAV and a far picture of that delta wing UAV in an IRGC exhibition. t.co/kJrMtb7goz" (in en). https://twitter.com/mhmiranusa/status/1207749048960245760. 
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 Rubin, Uzi (13 January 2023). "Russia's Iranian-Made UAVs: A Technical Profile". Royal United Services Institute. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-iranian-made-uavs-technical-profile. 
  9. ↑ "An Advanced Radio Communication Device on American Processors Found in the Shahed-136". Kyiv. 6 October 2022. https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/an_advanced_radio_communication_device_on_american_processors_found_in_the_shahed_136-4446.html. 
  10. ↑ 10.0 10.1 "Не тільки Shahed-136, з'явилось детальне дослідження ще одного іранського дрона камікадзе, який використовує РФ" (in uk). Kyiv. https://defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/ne_tilki_shahed_136_zjavilos_detalne_doslidzhennja_sche_odnogo_iranskogo_drona_kamikadze_jakij_vikoristovuje_rf-9033.html. 
  11. ↑ "South African heritage". Air Forces Monthly (Key Publishing Ltd): 23. December 2022. 
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 Rubin, Uzi (13 January 2023). "Russia's Iranian-Made UAVs: A Technical Profile". Royal United Services Institute. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/russias-iranian-made-uavs-technical-profile. 
  13. ↑ Binnie, Jeremy (29 September 2022). "Ukraine conflict: Details of Iranian attack UAV released". Janes (IHS). https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/ukraine-conflict-details-of-iranian-attack-uav-released. 
  14. ↑ "Shahed-131 series - Open Source Munitions Portal". https://osmp.ngo/model/shahed-131-series/. 
  15. ↑ Harris, Shane; Lamothe, Dan; Horton, Alex; DeYoung, Karen (20 October 2022). "U.S. has viewed wreckage of kamikaze drones Russia used in Ukraine". Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/10/20/russia-iran-kamikaze-drones/. "The Houthis claimed to have used Samad-3 drones to attack a refinery in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, last spring, and launched Samad-1 drones at Saudi Aramco facilities in other parts of the country. Those drones are distinct from the weapons used by Russia in Ukraine." 
  16. ↑ "A "Younger" Version Geran-1 (Shahed-131) Kamikaze Drone Spotted After Night Attack From Crimea | Defense Express". https://en.defence-ua.com/analysis/a_younger_version_geran_1_shahed_131_kamikaze_drone_spotted_after_night_attack_from_crimea-4624.html. 
  17. ↑ "First Deployment of Italmas or Geran-3 Drones in Ukraine Took Place Today, russians Say | Defense Express" (in en). https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/first_deployment_of_italmas_or_geran_3_drones_in_ukraine_to_place_today_russians_say-8341.html. 
  18. ↑ Farzin, Nadimi (August 1, 2022). "Iranian Drones to Russia: Capabilities and Limitations". Policy Analysis (The Washington Institute). 3634. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pdf/view/17563/en. Retrieved May 11, 2026. 
  19. ↑ Eslami, Mohammad (November 2022). "Iran’s Drone Supply to Russia and Changing Dynamics of the Ukraine War". Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 5 (2): 1-12. doi:10.1080/25751654.2022.2149077. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2022.2149077. Retrieved May 11, 2026. 
  20. ↑ "What We Know About Drone Use in the Iran War" (in en). 2026-03-02. https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2026/03/iran-drones-shahed-us-lessons. 
  21. ↑ "How Russia's Newest Drone Warhead Can Ruthlessly Destroy Energy Infrastructure in Ukraine". 24 February 2023. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a43043216/russia-using-iranian-shahed-131-drone-warhead/. 
  22. ↑ "Adversary Entente Cooperation at Russia's Shahed Factory Threatens Global Security". https://understandingwar.org/research/adversary-entente/adversary-entente-cooperation-at-russias-shahed-factory-threatens-global-security/. 
  23. ↑ "Yemeni Houthis Display Iranian Drones and Loitering Missiles - Defense Update". 27 September 2022. https://defense-update.com/20220927_yemeni-houthis-display-iranian-drones-and-loitering-missiles.html#.ZBhTYPZBy38. 
  24. ↑ Ari, Lior Ben (2024-05-15). "Terrorists in Iraq claim to launch Shahad 131 UAV toward Israel" (in en). Ynetnews. https://www.ynetnews.com/article/syoqn3b7r. 
  25. ↑ "Drone attack on Turkish bases in Iraq with Murad-6 drone! (Video) - Islamic World News" (in en-US). 2022-07-27. https://english.iswnews.com/24453/drone-attack-on-turkish-bases-in-iraq-with-murad-6-drone-video/. 
  26. ↑ "Ababil Brigades Pro-Iran Iraqi Militias showcase a "Murad-6" delta wing drone" (in en-US). 2022-07-27. https://cybershafarat.com/2022/07/26/ababil-brigades-pro-iran-iraqi-militias-showcase-a-murad-6-delta-wing-drone/. 
  27. ↑ "Pro-Iran Iraqi Militia Posts Video Showing Preparations For Drone Attack On Turkish Forces" (in en). https://www.memri.org/cjlab/pro-iran-iraqi-militia-posts-video-showing-preparations-drone-attack-turkish-forces. 
  28. ↑ Knights, Michael; Almeida, Alex (November 10, 2022). "What Iran’s Drones in Ukraine Mean for the Future of War". Washington D.C.. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/what-irans-drones-ukraine-mean-future-war. 
  29. ↑ de Henning Michaëlis, Satcha (January 2023). "Turkey’s And Iran’s Drone Supply In The War In Ukraine". Policy Report (Network for Strategic Analysis). 21. https://ras-nsa.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Policy-Report-21-Turkeys-And-Irans-Drone-Supply-In-The-War-In-Ukraine.pdf. Retrieved May 11, 2026. 
  30. ↑ Renic, Neil; Christensen, Johan (2024). DRONES, THE RUSSO‒UKRAINIAN WAR, AND THE FUTURE OF ARMED CONFLICT. Denmark: Djøf Publishing. p. 39. ISBN 9788757461978. https://cms.polsci.ku.dk/publikationer/droner-krigen-i-ukraine-og-fremtidens-konflikter/Drones__the_Russo-Ukrainian_War__And_the_Future_of_Armed_Conflict.pdf. Retrieved May 11, 2026. 

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