Social:Zhonghua minzu

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Short description: Political term in modern Chinese nationalism
A map of China in multiple colours showing the ethnic minorities in each region.
A map of China showing the ethnic minorities in each region. Collectively, these ethnic minorities (as well as the Han majority) are considered part of the Zhonghua minzu.
Zhonghua minzu
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Template:Names of China Zhonghua minzu is a political term in modern Chinese nationalism related to the concepts of nation-building, ethnicity, and race in the Chinese nationality. Collectively, the term refers to the 56 ethnic groups of China, but being a part of the Zhonghua minzu does not mean one must have Chinese nationality (Chinese: 中国国籍; pinyin: Zhōngguó guójí) and thus have an obligation to be loyal to the People's Republic of China (PRC).[1][2][3][4][5]

The Republic of China (ROC) of the Beiyang (1912–1927) period developed the term to describe Han Chinese (hanzu) and four other major ethnic groups (the Manchus, Mongols, Hui, and Tibetans)[6][7] based on Five Races Under One Union. Conversely, Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang (KMT) envisioned it as a unified composite of Han and non-Han people.[8][non-primary source needed]

The PRC adopted Zhonghua minzu after the death of Mao Zedong. It was used to describe the Han Chinese and other ethnic groups as a collective Chinese family.[1][4] Since the late 1980s, Template:Zhp replaced the term Template:Zhp, signalling a shift of nationality and minority policy from a multinational communist people's statehood of China to one multi-ethnic Chinese nation state with one single Chinese national identity.[5]

File:Qipao woman.jpg
Woman wearing a cheongsam or qipao, a typical ethnic fusion dress of Manchu origin absorbing Han and Mongol styles.

History

An older proto-nationalist term throughout Chinese history was Huaxia, but the immediate roots of the Zhonghua minzu lie in the Qing dynasty founded by the Manchu clan Aisin Gioro in what is today Northeast China.[9] The Qing Emperors sought to portray themselves as ideal Confucian rulers for the Han Chinese, Bogda Khans for the Mongols, and Chakravartin kings for Tibetan Buddhists.[10]

Lizheng Gate (麗正門) at the Chengde Mountain Resort. On the sign hanging over the gate there is written the letters used in the Qing Dynasty. From the left: Mongolian script, Chagatai Arabic script, Chinese, Tibetan, and Manchurian.[11] These five languages are collectively referred to as "Chinese languages".

Dulimbai gurun (Template:ManchuSibeUnicode) is the Manchu name for China. It has the same meaning as the Chinese name Template:Zhp.[12][13][14] The Qing adopted the Han Chinese imperial model[15] but considered the Manchu and Chinese names for "China" to be equivalent. It used "China" to describe the entirety of the state and its territory regardless of ethnic composition. The 'Chinese language' (Dulimbai gurun i bithe) referred to Chinese, Manchu, and Mongol languages. Zhongguo zhi ren (中國之人; Template:ManchuSibeUnicode Dulimbai gurun-i niyalma 'Chinese people') referred to all Han, Manchu, and Mongol subjects of the Qing.[16] The Qing used phrases like Template:Zhp or Template:Zhp to portray itself as a unifying force between the "inner" Han Chinese and the "outer" non-Han like the Mongols and Tibetans.[17]

These terms were used in official documents. "China" was commonly used in international communications and treaties such as the Treaty of Nanking.[15] A Manchu language memorial used Dulimbai gurun to proclaim the 1759 conquest of Dzungaria.[18][19][20] A Manchu language version of a treaty with the Russian Empire concerning criminal jurisdiction over bandits called people from the Qing as "people of the central kingdom (Dulimbai gurun)".[21][22][23][24] In the Manchu official Tulisen's Manchu language account of his meeting with the Torghut Mongol leader Ayuka Khan, it was mentioned that while the Torghuts were unlike the Russians, the "people of the Central Kingdom" (dulimba-i gurun) were like the Torghut Mongols, and the "people of the Central Kingdom" referred to the Manchus.[25]

Liang Qichao, who put forward the concept of Zhonghua minzu

Before nationalism, loyalty was generally to the city-state, the feudal fief and its lord or, in the case of China, to a dynastic state.[26] Some Han nationalists such as Sun Yat-sen initially described the Manchus as "foreign invaders" to be expelled,[27] and planned to establish a Han nation-state modelled closely after Germany and Japan; this was discarded because alienating non-Han groups potentially meant the loss of imperial territory. This development in Chinese thinking was mirrored in the expansion of the meaning of the term Zhonghua minzu to encompass Five Races Under One Union based on Qing ethnic categories; the term was originally created by the late-Qing philologist Liang Qichao and only referred to the Han Chinese.[28][29] This revision of Zhonghua minzu was used as early as 1912 by the Republic of China to supports claims of sovereignty over all Qing territories.{{citation needed|date=April 2024} ported the creation of a "Chinese nation" from the various ethnic groups.[30] This conflicted with the views of non-Han groups like the Mongols and Tibetans; they considered their fealty to be held by the Qing sovereign, and whose abdication left them independent and without obligations to the new Chinese state.[citation needed]

This term has continued to be invoked and remains a powerful concept in China into the 21st century. In mainland China, it continues to hold use as the leaders of China need to unify into one political entity a highly diverse set of ethnic and social groups as well as to mobilize the support of overseas Chinese in developing China. The term is included in article 22 of the Regulations on United Front Work of the Chinese Communist Party: "...promote national unity and progress, and enhance the identification of the masses of all ethnic groups with the great motherland, the Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu), Chinese culture, the Chinese Communist Party, and socialism with Chinese characteristics."[31] Zhonghua minzu is also one of the Five Identifications.[32]

In Taiwan, it has been invoked by former President Ma Ying-jeou as a unifying concept that includes the people of both Taiwan and mainland China without a possible interpretation that Taiwan is part the People's Republic of China.[33]

Implications

The adoption of the Zhonghua minzu concept may give rise to the reinterpretation of Chinese history. For example, the Qing dynasty was originally sometimes characterized as a conquest dynasty or non-Han regime. Following the adoption of the Zhonghua minzu ideology, which regards the Manchus as a member of the Zhonghua minzu, dynasties founded by ethnic minorities are no longer stigmatized.[citation needed]

The concept of Zhonghua minzu nevertheless also leads to the reassessment of the role of many traditional hero figures. Heroes such as Yue Fei and Zheng Chenggong, who were originally often considered to have fought for China against barbarian incursions, have been re-characterized by some as minzu yingxiong ('ethnic heroes') who fought not against barbarians but against other members of the Zhonghua minzu—the Jurchens and Manchus respectively.[34] At the same time, China exemplified heroes such as Genghis Khan, who became a national hero as a member of the Zhonghua minzu.[35]

Ambiguity

The concept of the Zhonghua minzu has sometimes resulted in friction with neighboring countries such as Mongolia, North Korea and South Korea, who claim regional historical peoples and states. For instance, Mongolia has questioned the concept of Genghis Khan as a "national hero" during the Republic of China period. Since the collapse of socialism, Mongolia has clearly positioned Genghis Khan as the father of the Mongolian nation.[36] Some Chinese scholars rejections of that position involve tactics such as pointing out that more ethnic Mongols live within China than Mongolia and that the modern-day state of Mongolia acquired its independence from the Republic of China which claimed the legal right to inherit all Qing territories, including Mongolia, through the Imperial Edict of the Abdication of the Qing Emperor.[37][38][39] There is also controversy between China and the Korean Peninsula regarding the historical status of Goguryeo.[40]

Resistance to Zhonghua minzu

The Xi Jinping administration, since Xi Jinping's appointment as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2012, has promoted the slogan of the "Great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation".

Reverence for the legendary ancestor of the Chinese people, the Yellow Emperor, has intensified, and in some regions such as Uyghur and Tibet, there are individuals who feel resentment toward being subsumed under the concept of the "Zhonghua minzu" [41].

Furthermore, resistance to Chinese nationalism also exists among Taiwanese independence advocates and the Hong Kong localist camp.[42] In response to this, Hong Kong nationalism emerged, and Taiwanese nationalism, advocated by Taiwanese historian Su Beng, gained traction. The theory that Hongkongers constitute a distinct ethnic group, known as Hong Kong ethnic theory, was also influenced by these ideas [43].

The concept of the Chinese nation has also been discussed in connection with territorial disputes, based on the notion that “the land inhabited by the Chinese nation should be governed by a single state” [44]. These ideas are referred to as Greater Chinese nationalism (ja), and in Hong Kong, supporters of such ideology are often mocked with the term Zhōnghuá jiāo (zh)[45]. The term “Greater China” itself originates from the traditional idea that China has historically been a unified civilization.

Liu Zhongjing (ja), a political theorist residing in the United States, has argued that the concept of the Chinese nation is a political fabrication and has advocated for the theory of Zhu-Xiaism (ja) (諸夏主義).

Chan Ho-tin stated that Peking claims the People’s Republic of China is a nation-state with a unified national identity called “Zhonghua Minzu” or the “Chinese race.”[46][47] This concept, used to serve political and imperial goals, includes diverse groups such as Tibetans, Mongolians, Shanghainese, Taiwanese, Hong Kongers, and the Chinese diaspora worldwide. According to Beijing’s official stance, all these groups are part of the “Zhonghua” race and thus owe loyalty to the central government.[46][47] While this is considered absurd by many scholars, it remains the party line. Chan Ho-tin criticized this nationalism as a cover for Chinese imperialism. He pointed to Beijing’s breaches of the Seventeen Point Agreement with Tibet, broken promises upon joining the WTO, and violations of the Sino-British Joint Declaration that have reduced freedoms in Hong Kong.[46][47]

Relations with Japan

Tang Chunfeng, a Chinese scholar specializing in Okinawan affairs, has expressed support for the Ryukyu independence movement and asserted that the Ryukyuan people are descendants of the Chinese nation.[48][49]

Zhao Dong of the Preparatory Committee for the Ryukyu Special Autonomous Region of China, which claims that Okinawa is Chinese territory, stated that "Ryukyu is part of the Chinese nation's domain".[50][51]

In August 1948, Kiyuna Tsugumasa, a former spy for the Republic of China, declared, “We are part of the Chinese nation and must support the liberation of our Ryukyuan brothers.” [52]

See also

Note: This topic belongs to "China" portal

Notes

References

Citations

  1. 1.0 1.1 Landis, Dan; Albert, Rosita D. (14 February 2012). Handbook of Ethnic Conflict: International Perspectives. Springer. pp. 182–. ISBN 978-1461404477. https://books.google.com/books?id=5EFihegRpmkC&pg=PA182. Retrieved 13 October 2016. 
  2. Zhao, Suisheng (2000). "Chinese Nationalism and Its International Orientations". Political Science Quarterly 115 (1): 1–33. doi:10.2307/2658031. 
  3. (in zh)Minzu Yanjiu 3: 20–29. 2007. https://www.ixueshu.com/document/707a828b3050b9d8cfc98c157055c2e3318947a18e7f9386.html. Retrieved 29 October 2019. 
  4. 4.0 4.1 Lawrance, Alan (2004). China Since 1919: Revolution and Reform: a Sourcebook. Psychology Press. pp. 252–. ISBN 978-0-415-25141-9. https://books.google.com/books?id=JWc9Ia7TcaMC&pg=PA252. Retrieved 13 October 2016. 
  5. 5.0 5.1 Bloxham, Donald; Moses, A. Dirk (15 April 2010). The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies. Oxford University Press. pp. 150–. ISBN 978-0-19-161361-6. https://books.google.com/books?id=xCHMFHQRNtYC&pg=PR150. Retrieved 13 October 2016. 
  6. Fitzgerald, John (January 1995). "The Nationaless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism". The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 33 (33): 75–104. doi:10.2307/2950089. ISSN 0156-7365. 
  7. Blum, Susan Debra; Jensen, Lionel M. (2002). China Off Center: Mapping the Margins of the Middle Kingdom. University of Hawaiʻi Press. pp. 170–. ISBN 978-0-8248-2577-5. https://books.google.com/books?id=pA_MP4Q11qgC&pg=PA170. Retrieved 13 October 2016. 
  8. Sun, Yat-sen (1994). "3.5 The Three Principles of the People [San-min chu-i"]. in Wei, Julie Lee; Myers, Ramon H.; Gillin, Donald G.. Prescriptions for saving China: Selected writings of Sun Yat-sen. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. pp. 223–225. ISBN 0-8179-9281-2. https://archive.org/details/prescriptionsfor0000suny/page/222/. 
  9. Wai-Chung Ho (2018). Culture, Music Education, and the Chinese Dream in Mainland China. Springer Nature Singapore. p. 38. ISBN 9789811075339. 
  10. Huiyun Feng (2020). China's Challenges and International Order Transition. University of Michigan Press. p. 151. ISBN 9780472131761. 
  11. Chagatai is the predecessor of Uyghur
  12. Hauer 2007 , p. 117.
  13. Dvořák 1895 , p. 80.
  14. Wu 1995 , p. 102.
  15. 15.0 15.1 Empire to nation: historical perspectives on the making of the modern world, by Joseph Esherick, Hasan Kayalı, Eric Van Young, p. 232
  16. Zhao, Gang (January 2006). "Reinventing China: Imperial Qing Ideology and the Rise of Modern Chinese National Identity in the Early Twentieth Century" (in en). Modern China 32 (1): 3–30. doi:10.1177/0097700405282349. ISSN 0097-7004. https://webspace.utexas.edu/hl4958/perspectives/Zhao%20-%20reinventing%20china.pdf. 
  17. Dunnell 2004 , pp. 76–77.
  18. Dunnell 2004 , p. 77.
  19. Dunnell 2004 , p. 83.
  20. Elliott 2001 , p. 503.
  21. Cassel 2011 , p. 205.
  22. Cassel 2012 , p. 205.
  23. Cassel 2011 , p. 44.
  24. Cassel 2012 , p. 44.
  25. Perdue 2009 , p. 218.
  26. "nationalism;Identification of state and people". http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/405644/nationalism. 
  27. French Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC) . (cf. by Tongmenghui adherent)
  28. Margaret Sleeboom (2004). Academic Nations in China and Japan. Taylor & Francis. p. 52. ISBN 9781134376148. 
  29. Christian P. Sorace (2019). Afterlives of Chinese Communism. ANU Press. p. 17. ISBN 9781760462499. 
  30. "Error: no |title= specified when using {{Cite web}}" (in zh). 4 November 2020. https://www.sunyat-sen.org/index.php/portal/article/index.html?id=24352&cid=19. 
  31. "Error: no |title= specified when using {{Cite web}}" (in zh). 2021-01-05. http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2021-01/05/content_5577289.htm. 
  32. Hayton, Bill (2020-10-13) (in English). The Invention of China. Yale University Press. pp. 131. ISBN 978-0-300-23482-4. https://books.google.com/books?id=4u8CEAAAQBAJ&dq=%22Five+Identifications%22+-wikipedia&pg=PA131. 
  33. See, e.g. Ma Ying-jeou, President of Republic of China inauguration speech , 20 May 2008: (Section 2, Paragraph 8)
  34. "What makes a national hero?". http://app1.chinadaily.com.cn/star/2003/0109/fe20-1.html. 
  35. The Chinese Cult of Chinggis Khan: Genealogical Nationalism and Problems of National and Cultural Integrity , City University of New York.
  36. "Modern Mongolia: Reclaiming Genghis Khan". Penn Museum. https://www.penn.museum/sites/mongolia/section2a.html. 
  37. Esherick, Joseph; Kayali, Hasan; Van Young, Eric (2006). Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 245. ISBN 978-0-742-57815-9. https://books.google.com/books?id=reKxAAAAQBAJ&q=complete+territories+of+manchu,+han,+mongol,+hui,+tibetan&pg=PA245. 
  38. Zhai, Zhiyong (2017) (in zh). City University of HK Press. p. 190. ISBN 978-9-629-37321-4. https://books.google.com/books?id=ziEwDwAAQBAJ&q=仍合滿、漢、蒙、回、藏五族完全領土為一大中華民國&pg=PA190. 
  39. Gao, Quanxi (2016) (in zh). City University of Hong Kong Press. p. 273. ISBN 978-9-629-37291-0. https://books.google.com/books?id=P46rDAAAQBAJ&q=仍合滿、漢、蒙、回、藏五族完全領土為一大中華民國&pg=PA273. 
  40. Shin, Gi-Wook; Gordon, Haley; Kim, Hannah June (February 8, 2022). "South Koreans Are Rethinking What China Means to Their Nation". The Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/south-koreans-are-rethinking-what-china-means-their-nation. 
  41. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named hokkaido-np1-0124959
  42. 大中華膠的懺悔
  43. 倉田, 徹. (2017). "雨傘運動とその後の香港政治―一党支配と分裂する多元的市民社会". アジア研究 63. doi:10.11479/asianstudies.63.1_68. https://doi.org/10.11479/asianstudies.63.1_68. 
  44. 論香港人之身份(戴毛畏) - 熱新聞 YesNews
  45. 大中華膠的懺悔 立場新聞
  46. 46.0 46.1 46.2 陳浩天於香港外國記者會演講全文 獨媒轉載 獨立媒體
  47. 47.0 47.1 47.2 陳浩天FCC演講全文 – 新傳網
  48. 中国での琉球独立の宣伝 唐淳風 – via YouTube.
  49. 中露海軍日本一周の意図:北海道はロシア領、沖縄を中国領に ソ連による終戦後の北方四島侵攻は「米英ソの密約」で行われた 2021.11.9(火)池口 恵観 jbpress
  50. 中華民族琉球特別自治区準備委員会のインタビュー動画 – via YouTube.
  51. 【亞視清盤】又有白武士 內地電子商人趙東願注資六千萬
  52. 齋藤道彦 (2015). 蔡璋と琉球革命同志会・1941年~1948年. 中央大学経済研究所年報 (Thesis). Vol. 46. 中央大学経済研究所. pp. 551–565. ISSN 0285-9718. NAID 120006639109.

Works cited

Template:Ethnic groups in China

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