Finance:Cursed equilibrium

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Short description: Solution concept in Game Theory
Cursed equilibrium
A solution concept in game theory
Relationship
Superset ofBayesian Nash equilibrium
Significance
Proposed byErik Eyster, Matthew Rabin

In game theory, a cursed equilibrium is a solution concept for static games of incomplete information. It is a generalization of the usual Bayesian Nash equilibrium, allowing for players to underestimate the connection between other players' equilibrium actions and their types – that is, the behavioral bias of neglecting the link between what others know and what others do. Intuitively, in a cursed equilibrium players "average away" the information regarding other players' types' mixed strategies.

The solution concept was first introduced by Erik Eyster and Matthew Rabin in 2005,[1] and has since become a canonical behavioral solution concept for Bayesian games in behavioral economics.[2]

Preliminaries

Bayesian games

Let I be a finite set of players and for each i∈I, define Ai their finite set of possible actions and Ti as their finite set of possible types; the sets A=∏i∈IAi and T=∏i∈ITi are the sets of joint action and type profiles, respectively. Each player has a utility function ui:A×T→ℝ, and types are distributed according to a joint probability distribution p∈ΔT. A finite Bayesian game consists of the data G=((Ai,Ti,ui)i∈I,p).

Bayesian Nash equilibrium

For each player i∈I, a mixed strategy σi:Ti→ΔAi specifies the probability σi(ai|ti) of player i playing action ai∈Ai when their type is ti∈Ti.

For notational convenience, we also define the projections A−i=∏j≠iAj and T−i=∏j≠iTj, and let σ−i:T−i→∏j≠iΔAj be the joint mixed strategy of players j≠i, where σ−i(a−i|t−i) gives the probability that players j≠i play action profile a−i when they are of type t−i.

Definition: a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) for a finite Bayesian game G=((Ai,Ti,ui)i∈I,p) consists of a strategy profile σ=(σi)i∈I such that, for every i∈I, every ti∈Ti, and every action ai* played with positive probability σi(ai*|ti)>0, we have

ai*∈argmaxai∈Ai∑t−i∈T−ipi(t−i|ti)∑a−i∈A−iσ−i(a−i|t−i)ui(ai,a−i,ti,t−i)

where pi(t−i|ti)=p(ti,t−i)∑t−i∈T−ip(ti|t−i)p(t−i) is player i's beliefs about other players types t−i given his own type ti.

Definition

Average strategies

First, we define the "average strategy of other players", averaged over their types. Formally, for each i∈I and each ti∈Ti, we define σ‾−i:Ti→∏j≠iΔAj by putting

σ‾−i(a−i|ti)=∑t−i∈Tipi(t−i|ti)σ−i(a−i|t−i)

Notice that σ‾−i(a−i|ti) does not depend on t−i. It gives the probability, viewed from the perspective of player i when he is of type ti, that the other players will play action profile a−i when they follow the mixed strategy σ−i. More specifically, the information contained in σ‾−i does not allow player i to assess the direct relation between a−i and t−i given by σ−i(a−i|t−i).

Cursed equilibrium

Given a degree of mispercetion χ∈[0,1], we define a χ-cursed equilibrium for a finite Bayesian game G=((Ai,Ti,ui)i∈I,p) as a strategy profile σ=(σi)i∈I such that, for every i∈I, every ti∈Ti, we have

ai*∈argmaxai∈Ai∑t−i∈T−ipi(t−i|ti)∑a−i∈A−i[χσ‾−i(a−i|ti)+(1−χ)σ−i(a−i|t−i)]ui(ai,a−i,ti,t−i)

for every action ai* played with positive probability σi(ai*|ti)>0.

For χ=0, we have the usual BNE. For χ=1, the equilibrium is referred to as a fully cursed equilibrium, and the players in it as fully cursed.

Applications

Trade with asymmetric information

In bilateral trade with two-sided asymmetric information, there are some scenarios where the BNE solution implies that no trade occurs, while there exist χ-cursed equilibria where both parties choose to trade.[1]

Ambiguous political campaigns and cursed voters

In an election model where candidates are policy-motivated, candidates who do not reveal their policy preferences would not be elected if voters are completely rational. In a BNE, voters would correctly infer that if a candidate is ambiguous about their policy position, then it's because such a position is unpopular. Therefore, unless a candidate has very extreme – unpopular – positions, they would announce their policy preferences.

If voters are cursed, however, they underestimate the connection between the non-announcement of policy position and the unpopularity of the policy. This leads to both moderate and extreme candidates concealing their policy preferences.[3]

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Eyster, Erik; Rabin, Matthew (2005). "Cursed Equilibrium". Econometrica 73 (5): 1623–1672. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00631.x. 
  2. ↑ Cohen, Shani; Li, Shengwu (2022). "Sequential Cursed Equilibrium". arXiv:2212.06025 [econ.TH].
  3. ↑ Szembrot, Nichole (2017). "Are voters cursed when politicians conceal policy preferences?". Public Choice 173 (1–2): 25–41. doi:10.1007/s11127-017-0461-9.