Short description : Publicly known attacks against cryptographic hash functions
This article summarizes publicly known attacks against cryptographic hash functions . Note that not all entries may be up to date. For a summary of other hash function parameters, see comparison of cryptographic hash functions .
Table color key
No attack successfully demonstrated — attack only breaks a reduced version of the hash or requires more work than the claimed security level of the hash
Attack demonstrated in theory — attack breaks all rounds and has lower complexity than security claim
Attack demonstrated in practice — complexity is low enough to be actually used
Common hash functions
Collision resistance
Main page: Collision attack
Hash function
Security claim
Best attack
Publish date
Comment
MD5
264
218 time
2013-03-25
This attack takes seconds on a regular PC. Two-block collisions in 218 , single-block collisions in 241 .[1]
SHA-1
280
261.2
2020-01-08
Paper by Gaëtan Leurent and Thomas Peyrin[2]
SHA256
2128
31 of 64 rounds (265.5 )
2013-05-28
Two-block collision.[3]
SHA512
2256
24 of 80 rounds (232.5 )
2008-11-25
Paper.[4]
SHA-3
Up to 2512
6 of 24 rounds (250 )
2017
Paper.[5]
BLAKE2s
2128
2.5 of 10 rounds (2112 )
2009-05-26
Paper.[6]
BLAKE2b
2256
2.5 of 12 rounds (2224 )
2009-05-26
Paper.[6]
Chosen prefix collision attack
Hash function
Security claim
Best attack
Publish date
Comment
MD5
264
239
2009-06-16
This attack takes hours on a regular PC.[7]
SHA-1
280
263.4
2020-01-08
Paper by Gaëtan Leurent and Thomas Peyrin[2]
SHA256
2128
SHA512
2256
SHA-3
Up to 2512
BLAKE2s
2128
BLAKE2b
2256
Preimage resistance
Main page: Preimage attack
Hash function
Security claim
Best attack
Publish date
Comment
MD5
2128
2123.4
2009-04-27
Paper.[8]
SHA-1
2160
45 of 80 rounds
2008-08-17
Paper.[9]
SHA256
2256
43 of 64 rounds (2254.9 time, 26 memory)
2009-12-10
Paper.[10]
SHA512
2512
46 of 80 rounds (2511.5 time, 26 memory)
2008-11-25
Paper,[11] updated version.[10]
SHA-3
Up to 2512
BLAKE2s
2256
2.5 of 10 rounds (2241 )
2009-05-26
Paper.[6]
BLAKE2b
2512
2.5 of 12 rounds (2481 )
2009-05-26
Paper.[6]
Length extension
Main page: Length extension attack
Vulnerable: MD5, SHA1, SHA256, SHA512
Not vulnerable: SHA384, SHA-3, BLAKE2
Less-common hash functions
Collision resistance
Hash function
Security claim
Best attack
Publish date
Comment
GOST
2128
2105
2008-08-18
Paper.[12]
HAVAL -128
264
27
2004-08-17
Collisions originally reported in 2004,[13] followed up by cryptanalysis paper in 2005.[14]
MD2
264
263.3 time, 252 memory
2009
Slightly less computationally expensive than a birthday attack,[15] but for practical purposes, memory requirements make it more expensive.
MD4
264
3 operations
2007-03-22
Finding collisions almost as fast as verifying them.[16]
PANAMA
2128
26
2007-04-04
Paper,[17] improvement of an earlier theoretical attack from 2001.[18]
RIPEMD (original)
264
218 time
2004-08-17
Collisions originally reported in 2004,[13] followed up by cryptanalysis paper in 2005.[19]
RadioGatún
Up to 2608 [20]
2704
2008-12-04
For a word size w between 1-64 bits, the hash provides a security claim of 29.5w . The attack can find a collision in 211w time.[21]
RIPEMD-160
280
48 of 80 rounds (251 time)
2006
Paper.[22]
SHA-0
280
233.6 time
2008-02-11
Two-block collisions using boomerang attack . Attack takes estimated 1 hour on an average PC.[23]
Streebog
2256
9.5 rounds of 12 (2176 time, 2128 memory)
2013-09-10
Rebound attack .[24]
Whirlpool
2256
4.5 of 10 rounds (2120 time)
2009-02-24
Rebound attack.[25]
Preimage resistance
Hash function
Security claim
Best attack
Publish date
Comment
GOST
2256
2192
2008-08-18
Paper.[12]
MD2
2128
273 time, 273 memory
2008
Paper.[26]
MD4
2128
2102 time, 233 memory
2008-02-10
Paper.[27]
RIPEMD (original)
2128
35 of 48 rounds
2011
Paper.[28]
RIPEMD-128
2128
35 of 64 rounds
RIPEMD-160
2160
31 of 80 rounds
Streebog
2512
2266 time, 2259 data
2014-08-29
The paper presents two second-preimage attacks with variable data requirements.[29]
Tiger
2192
2188.8 time, 28 memory
2010-12-06
Paper.[30]
Attacks on hashed passwords
Main page: Password cracking
Hashes described here are designed for fast computation and have roughly similar speeds.[31] Because most users typically choose short passwords formed in predictable ways, passwords can often be recovered from their hashed value if a fast hash is used. Searches on the order of 100 billion tests per second are possible with high-end graphics processors.[32] [33]
Special hashes called key derivation functions have been created to slow brute force searches. These include pbkdf2, bcrypt , scrypt , argon2 , and balloon.
See also
References
↑ Tao Xie; Fanbao Liu; Dengguo Feng (25 March 2013). Fast Collision Attack on MD5 . https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/170 .
↑ 2.0 2.1 Gaëtan Leurent; Thomas Peyrin (2020-01-08). SHA-1 is a Shambles: First Chosen-Prefix Collision on SHA-1 and Application to the PGP Web of Trust . https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/014.pdf .
↑ Florian Mendel; Tomislav Nad; Martin Schläffer (2013-05-28). "Improving Local Collisions: New Attacks on Reduced SHA-256" . Eurocrypt 2013. https://online.tugraz.at/tug_online/voe_main2.getvolltext?pCurrPk=69018 .
↑ Somitra Kumar Sanadhya; Palash Sarkar (2008-11-25). "New Collision Attacks against Up to 24-Step SHA-2". Indocrypt 2008. doi :10.1007/978-3-540-89754-5_8 .
↑ L. Song, G. Liao and J. Guo, Non-Full Sbox Linearization: Applications to Collision Attacks on Round-Reduced Keccak, CRYPTO, 2017
↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 LI Ji; XU Liangyu (2009-05-26). Attacks on Round-Reduced BLAKE . https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/238 .
↑ Marc Stevens; Arjen Lenstra; Benne de Weger (2009-06-16). Chosen-prefix Collisions for MD5 and Applications . https://documents.epfl.ch/users/l/le/lenstra/public/papers/lat.pdf .
↑ Yu Sasaki; Kazumaro Aoki (2009-04-27). "Finding Preimages in Full MD5 Faster Than Exhaustive Search". Eurocrypt 2009. doi :10.1007/978-3-642-01001-9_8 .
↑ Christophe De Cannière; Christian Rechberger (2008-08-17). "Preimages for Reduced SHA-0 and SHA-1" . Crypto 2008. https://online.tugraz.at/tug_online/voe_main2.getvolltext?pCurrPk=36848 .
↑ 10.0 10.1 Kazumaro Aoki; Jian Guo; Krystian Matusiewicz; Yu Sasaki; Lei Wang (2009-12-10). "Preimages for Step-Reduced SHA-2". Asiacrypt 2009. doi :10.1007/978-3-642-10366-7_34 .
↑ Yu Sasaki; Lei Wang; Kazumaro Aoki (2008-11-25). Preimage Attacks on 41-Step SHA-256 and 46-Step SHA-512 . https://eprint.iacr.org/2009/479 .
↑ 12.0 12.1 Florian Mendel; Norbert Pramstaller; Christian Rechberger; Marcin Kontak; Janusz Szmidt (2008-08-18). "Cryptanalysis of the GOST Hash Function" . Crypto 2008. https://online.tugraz.at/tug_online/voe_main2.getvolltext?pCurrPk=36649 .
↑ 13.0 13.1 Xiaoyun Wang; Dengguo Feng; Xuejia Lai; Hongbo Yu (2004-08-17). "Collisions for Hash Functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD" . Cryptology ePrint Archive . https://eprint.iacr.org/2004/199 .
↑ Xiaoyun Wang; Dengguo Feng; Xiuyuan Yu (October 2005). "An attack on hash function HAVAL-128" . Science in China Series F: Information Sciences 48 (5): 545–556. doi :10.1360/122004-107 . http://www.infosec.sdu.edu.cn/uploadfile/papers/An%20attack%20on%20hash%20function%20HAVAL-128.pdf . Retrieved 2014-10-23 .
↑ Lars R. Knudsen; John Erik Mathiassen; Frédéric Muller; Søren S. Thomsen (January 2010). "Cryptanalysis of MD2". Journal of Cryptology 23 (1): 72–90. doi :10.1007/s00145-009-9054-1 .
↑ Yu Sasaki; Yusuke Naito; Noboru Kunihiro; Kazuo Ohta (2007-03-22). "Improved Collision Attacks on MD4 and MD5". IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences E90-A (1): 36–47. doi :10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.1.36 . Bibcode : 2007IEITF..90...36S .
↑ Joan Daemen; Gilles Van Assche (2007-04-04). "Producing Collisions for Panama, Instantaneously" . FSE 2007. http://radiogatun.noekeon.org/panama/ .
↑ Vincent Rijmen; Bart Van Rompay; Bart Preneel; Joos Vandewalle (2001). "Producing Collisions for PANAMA" . FSE 2001. https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-81.ps .
↑ Xiaoyun Wang; Xuejia Lai; Dengguo Feng; Hui Chen; Xiuyuan Yu (2005-05-23). "Cryptanalysis of the Hash Functions MD4 and RIPEMD". Eurocrypt 2005. doi :10.1007/11426639_1 .
↑ RadioGatún is a family of 64 different hash functions. The security level and best attack in the chart are for the 64-bit version. The 32-bit version of RadioGatún has a claimed security level of 2304 and the best claimed attack takes 2352 work.
↑ Thomas Fuhr; Thomas Peyrin (2008-12-04). "Cryptanalysis of RadioGatun" . FSE 2009. https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/515 .
↑ Florian Mendel; Norbert Pramstaller; Christian Rechberger; Vincent Rijmen (2006). "On the Collision Resistance of RIPEMD-160" . ISC 2006. https://online.tugraz.at/tug_online/voe_main2.getvolltext?pCurrPk=17675 .
↑ Stéphane Manuel; Thomas Peyrin (2008-02-11). "Collisions on SHA-0 in One Hour". FSE 2008. doi :10.1007/978-3-540-71039-4_2 .
↑ Zongyue Wang; Hongbo Yu; Xiaoyun Wang (2013-09-10). "Cryptanalysis of GOST R hash function" . Information Processing Letters 114 (12): 655–662. doi :10.1016/j.ipl.2014.07.007 . https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/584 .
↑ Florian Mendel; Christian Rechberger; Martin Schläffer; Søren S. Thomsen (2009-02-24). "The Rebound Attack: Cryptanalysis of Reduced Whirlpool and Grøstl" . FSE 2009. https://www.iacr.org/archive/fse2009/56650270/56650270.pdf .
↑ Søren S. Thomsen (2008). "An improved preimage attack on MD2" . Cryptology ePrint Archive . https://eprint.iacr.org/2008/089 .
↑ Gaëtan Leurent (2008-02-10). "MD4 is Not One-Way" . FSE 2008. https://who.rocq.inria.fr/Gaetan.Leurent/files/MD4_FSE08.pdf .
↑ Chiaki Ohtahara; Yu Sasaki; Takeshi Shimoyama (2011). "Preimage Attacks on Step-Reduced RIPEMD-128 and RIPEMD-160". ISC 2011. doi :10.1007/978-3-642-21518-6_13 .
↑ Jian Guo; Jérémy Jean; Gaëtan Leurent; Thomas Peyrin; Lei Wang (2014-08-29). "The Usage of Counter Revisited: Second-Preimage Attack on New Russian Standardized Hash Function" . SAC 2014. https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/675 .
↑ Jian Guo; San Ling; Christian Rechberger; Huaxiong Wang (2010-12-06). "Advanced Meet-in-the-Middle Preimage Attacks: First Results on Full Tiger, and Improved Results on MD4 and SHA-2" . Asiacrypt 2010. pp. 12–17. https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/016 .
↑ "ECRYPT Benchmarking of Cryptographic Hashes" . https://bench.cr.yp.to/results-hash.html .
↑ "Mind-blowing GPU performance" . Improsec. January 3, 2020. https://improsec.com/tech-blog/mind-blowing-gpu-performance .
↑ Goodin, Dan (2012-12-10). "25-GPU cluster cracks every standard Windows password in <6 hours" . Ars Technica . https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2012/12/25-gpu-cluster-cracks-every-standard-windows-password-in-6-hours/ .
External links
Original source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hash function security summary. Read more