Software:GrapheneOS

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GrapheneOS
GrapheneOS home screen
GrapheneOS home screen
DeveloperGrapheneOS Foundation[lower-alpha 1] and contributors
Written inJava, Kotlin (UI), C (core), C++, Rust[4] and others
OS familyAndroid (Linux)
Working stateCurrent
Source modelOpen source
Initial releaseMarch 2016; 10 years ago (2016-03)[5]
Repositorygithub.com/GrapheneOS
Marketing targetPrivacy- and security-focused operating system
Update methodOver-the-air (OTA) or via USB (ADB sideloading)
Package managerAPK-based
Kernel typeMonolithic (Linux/Android kernel)
InfluencedDivestOS, secureblue
Influenced byOpenBSD, PaX
LicenseMIT, Apache License, various permissive open-source licenses
GrapheneOS Foundation
FormationMarch 17, 2023; 3 years ago (2023-03-17)
Registration no.1485757-7[2]
Legal statusNonprofit corporation
FocusMobile security, Defense in depth, Hardening, Attack surface reduction
HeadquartersToronto, Ontario, Canada
Directors
  • Khalykbek Yelshibekov
  • Daniel Micay
  • Dmytro Mukhomor
[2]
Website{{{1}}}

GrapheneOS[lower-alpha 2] (/ˈɡræfiːn.oʊˈɛs/) is an open-source mobile operating system focused on security and privacy, available for Google Pixel and future Motorola devices, including smartphones, tablets, and foldables. It is built on the Android Open Source Project (AOSP).
The project focuses on researching and improving the privacy and security of Android, primarily through defense in depth improvements and attack surface reduction.
The hardening includes low-level system components, as well as improvements to application sandboxing and the permission model.

GrapheneOS is free and open-source. The system components are mostly published under permissive licenses, such as the MIT License or Apache License 2.0, with some components using the GNU GPL-2.0 license. GrapheneOS can be installed using an intuitive web installer or a traditional command-line-based installation environment.

The nonprofit GrapheneOS Foundation was founded in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, by Daniel Micay, Dmytro Mukhomor, and Khalykbek Yelshibekov in March 2023. It received large contributions from donors such as Ethereum developer Vitalik Buterin and Twitter founder Jack Dorsey. As of April 2026, the operating system had approximately 400K active users.

History

The main developer, Daniel Micay, co-founded and originally worked on CopperheadOS until a schism over software licensing between the co-founders of Copperhead Limited led to Micay's dismissal from the company in 2018.[6] Micay continued working on the Android Hardening project, which was renamed to GrapheneOS and announced in April 2019 as the "true successor" to CopperheadOS, with the goal of restoring the same functions.[6][7] The project's website states that CopperheadOS was renamed to GrapheneOS.[8]

In March 2022, two GrapheneOS apps, "Secure Camera" and "Secure PDF Viewer", were released on the Google Play Store.[9]

Also in March 2022, GrapheneOS released Android 12L for Google Pixel devices before Google did, second to ProtonAOSP.[10]

In July 2025, the GrapheneOS Foundation stated it was pursuing a partnership with a "major Android OEM" with the goal of engineering devices with official GrapheneOS support that meet the project's extensive hardware and vendor support requirements.[11][12]
In March 2026, an official announcement was made, revealing that the partner is Motorola Mobility.[13]

As of April 2026, GrapheneOS developers reported they had around 400K active users. The figure is an inexact estimate based on statistics generated from the access logs of the update servers. This is the only way for the GrapheneOS Foundation to approximate the number of users, since no telemetry mechanism is included in the operating system.[14]

Features

File:GrapheneOS "Apps" app.png
GrapheneOS' default "App Store" (formerly known as just "Apps")

Sandboxed Google Play

By default, Google apps and services are not present on GrapheneOS,[15][16] but users can install a sandboxed version of Google Play Services from the pre-installed "App Store".[16] The sandboxed Google Play Services implementation allows access to the Google Play Store and apps dependent on it, along with features including push notifications (Firebase Cloud Messaging) and in-app payments.[16]

This differs from other custom Android distributions, such as CalyxOS, iodéOS, or /e/OS, that replace Google Play Services with microG. According to some analysts, the microG implementation is problematic because it can log users out of the Play Store and not allow them to download more apps.[17]

In December 2023, Android Auto support was added to GrapheneOS, allowing users to install it via the App Store.[18] The Sandboxed Google Play compatibility layer settings add a new permission menu with 4 toggles for granting the minimal access required for wired Android Auto, wireless Android Auto, audio routing, and phone calls.[19][20]

GrapheneOS provides stub implementations for multiple features of Google Play Services, including Wi-Fi positioning, geocoding, and reverse geocoding. By default, all location requests are rerouted to the regular AOSP geolocation subsystem, which uses Assisted GNSS (A-GNSS) data and performs the location calculations locally. The GrapheneOS Foundation provides proxy servers for both Secure User Plane Location (SUPL) and Predicted Satellite Data Service (PSDS).[21]

GrapheneOS improves the privacy of PSDS on devices using Qualcomm GNSS hardware by removing the User-Agent header containing unique hardware identifiers, such as the serial number of the chip.[1][22][23]

The use of the Google Wi-Fi positioning service can optionally be enabled in the settings if Sandboxed Google Play is installed.[24] Alternatively, the Apple Wi-Fi positioning system can be used, either directly or through a proxy hosted by the GrapheneOS Foundation. The GrapheneOS Foundation also hosts an instance of the Nominatim geocoder, which uses OpenStreetMap data.[25][21]

Security and privacy features

GrapheneOS introduces revocable network access and sensor permission toggles for each installed app.[15][26] It also adds a PIN scrambling option for the lock screen as well as a duress PIN/password, which will wipe all data and installed eSIMs on the device when entered on the lock screen instead of a regular PIN/password. The duress wipe is performed instantly and cannot be interrupted.[27][28]

GrapheneOS randomly generates a new MAC address every time a Wi-Fi connection is established, instead of the default Android behavior of randomizing the address per Wi-Fi network.[6][29]

GrapheneOS includes a feature that automatically initiates a reboot of the device when at rest for a set time period in order to revert from the after first unlock (AFU) state to before first unlock (BFU), wiping the cryptographic keys used for disk encryption from RAM. It aims to make brute-force attacks significantly more difficult by enforcing the throttling of unlock attempts through the secure element. The automatic reboot feature is enabled by default and configured to activate after 18 hours. The time period can be set to values between 10 minutes and 72 hours in the settings.[30][31] iOS 18 implemented a similar feature called Inactivity Reboot with a fixed time of 7 days. The time period was shortened to 72 hours in version 18.1.[32][33][34] It is not clear whether Apple was inspired by GrapheneOS.[35]

It also includes automatic Wi-Fi and Bluetooth disabling, along with software and hardware-level disabling of the USB-C port and pogo pins (as found on the Pixel Tablet). The USB interfaces can be operated in 5 modes, which can be configured in the settings:[21]

  • Off (disables charging to prevent the exploitation of possible USB-PD vulnerabilities; charging is still possible when the device is powered off)
  • Charging-only (disables all data connectivity)
  • Charging-only when locked
  • Charging-only when locked, except before first unlock
  • On (standard Android behavior)

By default, the Charging-only when locked setting is used.[21]

GrapheneOS can also disable the microphone, camera, and sensors for apps. Additionally, it offers the Contact and Storage Scopes feature, which allows users to select which specific contacts or files/folders an app can access.[21]

A hardened Chromium-based web browser and WebView implementation known as Vanadium is developed by GrapheneOS and included as the default web browser and system WebView.[26] It includes automatic updates, process and site-level sandboxing, disabling the V8 JavaScript just-in-time (JIT) compiler by default for attack surface reduction, and built-in ad and tracker blocking.[36] Vanadium enables JIT-less WebAssembly support through the DrumBrake interpreter originally developed by Microsoft and upstreamed into the Chromium project.[37]

Auditor, a hardware-based attestation app developed by GrapheneOS, which "provide strong hardware-based verification of the authenticity and integrity of the firmware/software on the device" is also included.[21] The app also includes an optional, scheduled remote verification feature, which runs in the background and performs regular verifications against the GrapheneOS attestation service. It can alert users via email if the device fails to provide valid attestations in time. The remote attestation interval and permitted time before an alert can be configured by the user using the web portal.[38] Both the Auditor app and the AttestationServer backend are open source and permissively licensed under the MIT license.[39]

Apps like Secure Camera and Secure PDF Viewer offer features such as automatic removal of Exif metadata and protection against malicious code in PDF files by opening them within a sandboxed PDF.js environment in the hardened Vanadium WebView.[40]

GrapheneOS also includes a hardened memory allocator (hardened_malloc) intended to provide substantial defenses against common classes of vulnerabilities such as heap memory corruption.[41] In addition, its Chromium-based browser/WebView (Vanadium) enables further exploit mitigations beyond upstream defaults (e.g., type-based control-flow integrity (CFI), stronger stack-smashing protection (SSP), or zero-initialization of variables).[21][24]

Unlike AOSP, the stock Pixel operating system, and other Android-based systems, GrapheneOS heavily makes use of the memory tagging extension (MTE) found in the processor cores of ARM chips using the ARMv8.5-A architecture or newer.[42][43] The first devices on the market featuring MTE-enabled processors were Google's Pixel 8 and Pixel 8 Pro models, released in October 2023.[44] GrapheneOS added support for the feature in November of the same year.[45] GrapheneOS developers noted that the feature could especially be of importance for instant messaging applications, such as WhatsApp or Signal, which use large amounts of memory-unsafe code for features like WebRTC and are common targets of attackers.[46]

In March 2024, the team reported that the use of hardware memory tagging helped it uncover a high-severity memory corruption vulnerability in an Android Bluetooth Low Energy system component.[47] The bug was acknowledged by Google and became known as CVE-2024-23694.[48] It was fixed in the May 2024 Pixel Update Bulletin.[49]

The underlying Linux kernel is covered by the hardware tag-based KernelAddressSanitizer (KASan).[50]

Hardware compatibility

GrapheneOS maintains an extensive list of hardware and OEM support requirements. These include bootloader requirements, such as Android Verified Boot with rollback protection, the ability to unlock the bootloader, and relock it with a custom signing key.[51]

A high-quality secure element is required in order to facilitate full disk encryption and storage of sensitive cryptographic secrets. The secure element must provide support for the Android StrongBox key storage mechanism, Weaver API, which handles the throttling of unlock attempts, insider attack resistance, i.e., requiring authentication before firmware updates can be applied to the secure element, and hardware-based key attestation (for example used by the built-in Auditor app).[52]

The USB controller must be configurable by the operating system via device drivers and must allow completely disabling USB at a hardware level in order to minimize the attack surface.[1]

The wireless hardware must fully support Wi-Fi anonymity, including MAC address and probe sequence number randomization, and shall not leak unique identifiers in other ways.[52]

JTAG or other debugging interfaces must be disabled when the device is locked to further reduce the attack surface.[1]

GrapheneOS mandates a minimum OEM support period of 5 years for smartphones and 7 years for tablets. This includes regular updates to firmware, drivers, hardware abstraction layers, and other device-specific code without delays longer than a week.[53][1]

Installation

File:GrapheneOS web installer screenshot.svg
GrapheneOS web installer

GrapheneOS is currently only compatible with Google Pixel devices,[54] due to specific requirements that GrapheneOS has for adding support for a new device, including an unlockable bootloader and proper implementation of verified boot.[55][12] In October 2025, GrapheneOS said that it was working with a "major" Android OEM on future devices that would support the OS on Qualcomm Snapdragon platforms, and that they will be the flagship devices, expected to appear in Q4 2026 or Q1 2027.[56] In March 2026, it was revealed that this partner is Motorola Mobility, and a device list will be released sometime later that year.[13]

The operating system can be installed from various platforms, including Windows, macOS, Linux, and Android devices. Two installation methods are available: a web-based installer, recommended for most users, and a command-line-based installer, intended for more experienced users.[57][58]

The web installer makes use of the WebUSB API and is based on the fastboot.js library, a JavaScript implementation of the Fastboot utility developed by Danny Lin. It has been inspired by Google's Android Flash Tool, which uses the same API for performing the installation in the browser. It is currently only supported in Chromium-based web browsers.[59] Unlike the command-line installation script, it does not require the installation of any additional software.[60][61]

Recommended post-installation steps include disabling OEM unlocking, which is automatically performed by the setup wizard, as well as verifying the Verified Boot hash of the installed OS image. The installation can additionally be verified using the Auditor app, either with the help of a second device or by using remote attestation.[61]

Jack Wallen of ZDNET described the installation process as follows: "It sounds difficult, but it's really not", and that it took him roughly ten minutes to complete the installation.[62]

Reception

Edward Snowden Twitter
@Snowden

Replying to @Snowden

If I were configuring a smartphone today, I'd use @DanielMicay's @GrapheneOS as the base operating system. I'd desolder the microphones and keep the radios (cellular, wifi, and bluetooth) turned off when I didn't need them. I would route traffic through the @torproject network.

September 21, 2019[63]

In 2019, Georg Pichler of Der Standard, and other news sources, quoted Edward Snowden saying on Twitter, "If I were configuring a smartphone today, I'd use Daniel Micay's GrapheneOS as the base operating system."[64][65][66]

In discussing why services should not force users to install proprietary apps, Lennart Mühlenmeier of netzpolitik.org suggested GrapheneOS as an alternative to Apple or Google.[67]

Svět Mobilně and Webtekno repeated the suggestions that GrapheneOS is a good security- and privacy-oriented replacement for standard Android.[68][69]

In a detailed review of GrapheneOS for Golem.de, Moritz Tremmel and Sebastian Grüner said they were able to use GrapheneOS similarly to other Android systems, while enjoying more freedom from Google, without noticing differences from "additional memory protection, but that's the way it should be." They concluded GrapheneOS cannot change how "Android devices become garbage after three years at the latest", but "it can better secure the devices during their remaining life while protecting privacy."[6]

Jack Dorsey, founder of Twitter and Bluesky, promoted GrapheneOS in January 2021.[70] According to the GrapheneOS Foundation, he later donated US$1 million to the project as part of his StartSmall initiative.[71]

In June 2021, reviews of GrapheneOS, KaiOS, AliOS, and Tizen OS were published in Cellular News. The review of GrapheneOS called it "arguably the best mobile operating system in terms of privacy and security." However, they criticized GrapheneOS for its inconvenience to users, saying "GrapheneOS is completely de-Googled and will stay that way forever—at least according to the developers." They also noticed a "slight performance decrease" and said, "it might take two full seconds for an app—even if it's just the Settings app—to fully load."[72]

In March 2022, writing for How-To Geek, Joe Fedewa said that Google apps were not included due to concerns over privacy, and GrapheneOS also did not include a default app store. Instead, Fedewa suggested, F-Droid could be used.[15]

In 2022, Jonathan Lamont of MobileSyrup reviewed GrapheneOS installed on a Pixel 3 after one week of use. He called the GrapheneOS install process "straightforward" and concluded that he liked GrapheneOS overall, but criticized the post-install as "often not a seamless experience like using an unmodified Pixel or an iPhone", attributing his experience to his "over-reliance on Google apps" and the absence of some "smart" features in GrapheneOS default keyboard and camera apps, in comparison to software from Google.[16]

In his initial impressions post a week prior, Lamont said that after an easy install, there were issues with permissions for Google's Messages app, and difficulty importing contacts; Lamont then concluded, "Anyone looking for a straightforward experience may want to avoid GrapheneOS or other privacy-oriented Android experiences since the privacy gains often come at the expense of convenience and ease of use."[73]

In July 2022, Charlie Osborne of ZDNET suggested that individuals who suspect a Pegasus infection use a secondary device with GrapheneOS for secure communication.[74]

In January 2023, a Swiss startup company, Apostrophy AG, announced AphyOS, which is a subscription fee-based Android operating system and services "built atop" GrapheneOS.[75][76] The GrapheneOS team dismissed the project being based on GrapheneOS as misleading marketing due to AphyOS being based on an earlier version of Android, using the LineageOS update client and other inconsistencies.[77]

Template:Quote tweet

Vitalik Buterin, developer of the Ethereum cryptocurrency, made two large donations to the GrapheneOS Foundation in July and December 2023. He donated 55 ETH, at the time worth around $110,000 USD, and 150 ETH, worth around $300,000, respectively. [78][79] Buterin recommended GrapheneOS on multiple occasions, including a tweet in July 2025.[80]

GrapheneOS is a popular choice within the DeGoogle movement.[81][82][31]

The operating system was reviewed by Jesse Smith of DistroWatch and by Jonathan Corbet of LWN.net in March and July 2025 respectively.[83][84]

Jack Wallen of ZDNET reviewed GrapheneOS in November 2025 in an article titled "I finally tried GrapheneOS on my Pixel, and it's the secure Android alternative I've been waiting for". He described that the development team "takes usability seriously", and that the operating system looks and feels like Android.[62]

In late 2025, GrapheneOS moved its infrastructure away from servers hosted by French provider OVHcloud over privacy and security concerns.[85][86] This not only applies to servers located inside France but also to servers in Canada and abroad owned by the company. The project stated, "France isn't a safe country for open source privacy projects. They expect backdoors in encryption and for device access too. Secure devices and services are not going to be allowed (in France)."
France voted in favor of a proposed, controversial EU measure commonly referred to as Chat Control, which could require providers to create and open a backdoor to their services to enable authorities to scan user content.[87][88]

GrapheneOS gained attention in the media in March 2026 after stating the project would not comply with planned and heavily criticized age verification laws such as the California Digital Age Assurance Act (Assembly Bill 1043) or Brazil's Digital Statute for Children and Adolescents (Law No. 15,211/2025), even if it meant that future Motorola devices that will come with the OS preinstalled couldn't be sold in these regions.[89]

See also

References and notes

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 "Frequently Asked Questions – GrapheneOS" (in en-US). https://grapheneos.org/faq#copyright-and-licensing. 
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 2.2 "Federal Corporation Information – 1485757-7". Government of Canada. 2025-12-09. https://ised-isde.canada.ca/cc/lgcy/fdrlCrpDtls.html?p=0&corpId=14857577. 
  3. ↑ "History – GrapheneOS" (in en-US). https://grapheneos.org/history. 
  4. ↑ "Memory Safe Languages in Android 13". https://security.googleblog.com/2022/12/memory-safe-languages-in-android-13.html. 
  5. ↑ "Legacy changelog - History - GrapheneOS". https://grapheneos.org/history/legacy-changelog. 
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 Tremmel, Moritz; Grüner, Sebastian (11 December 2019). "GrapheneOS: Ein gehärtetes Android ohne Google, bitte" (in de-DE). pp. 1–3. https://www.golem.de/news/grapheneos-ein-gehaertetes-android-ohne-google-bitte-1912-145383.html. 
  7. ↑ Baader, Hans-Joachim (9 April 2019). "Android Hardening wird zu GrapheneOS" (in de). https://www.pro-linux.de/news/1/26955/android-hardening-wird-zu-grapheneos.html. 
  8. ↑ De Rentiis, Katharina; Geus, Julian; Freiling, Felix (March 1, 2026). "The investigator's friend and foe: A forensic analysis of GrapheneOS". Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation. DFRWS EU 2026 – Selected Papers from the 13th Annual Digital Forensics Research Conference Europe 56. doi:10.1016/j.fsidi.2026.302048. ISSN 2666-2817. 
  9. ↑ Hazarika, Skanda (4 March 2022). "GrapheneOS brings its camera and PDF viewer apps to the Play Store" (in en-US). https://www.xda-developers.com/grapheneos-camera-pdf-viewer-google-play-store/. 
  10. ↑ Wilde, Damien (11 March 2022). "Privacy-focused GrapheneOS based upon Android 12L comes to Pixel 6 in latest beta" (in en-US). https://9to5google.com/2022/03/11/privacy-focused-grapheneos-based-upon-android-12l-comes-to-pixel-6-in-latest-beta/. 
  11. ↑ "GrapheneOS (@GrapheneOS@grapheneos.social)" (in en). 2025-07-19. https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/114882377812587721. "We're working with a major OEM towards a subset of their future devices meeting our hardware security and update requirements. The goal is for those to have official GrapheneOS support. Initially, these will only be flagship devices because SoC security features we care about are only on flagship SoC chips for now." 
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 "Which devices will be supported in the future? – Frequently Asked Questions" (in en-US). https://grapheneos.org/faq#future-devices. 
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 "Motorola's new partnership with GrapheneOS" (in en-US). 2026-03-02. https://motorolanews.com/motorola-three-new-b2b-solutions-at-mwc-2026/. 
  14. ↑ @GrapheneOS (2026-04-23). "We know we have at least around 400k users based on update downloads.". https://twitter.com/GrapheneOS/status/2047321144601071673. 
  15. ↑ 15.0 15.1 15.2 Fedewa, Joe (23 March 2022). "What Is GrapheneOS, and How Does It Make Android More Private?" (in en-US). https://www.howtogeek.com/790266/what-is-grapheneos-and-how-does-it-make-android-more-private/. 
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 16.2 16.3 Lamont, Jonathan (20 March 2022). "A week with GrapheneOS exposed my over-reliance on Google". Blue Ant Media. https://mobilesyrup.com/2022/03/20/using-grapheneos-for-one-week/. 
  17. ↑ Name; Milano, Matt (2025-02-28). "GrapheneOS Review: The Most Private and Secure Android OS" (in en). https://www.webpronews.com/grapheneos-review-the-most-private-and-secure-android-os/. 
  18. ↑ Schoon, Ben (2024-01-03). "GrapheneOS, a privacy-focused version of Android, is adding Android Auto support" (in en-US). https://9to5google.com/2024/01/03/graphene-os-android-auto/. 
  19. ↑ "2023123000 – Releases" (in en). https://grapheneos.org/releases#2023123000. 
  20. ↑ Popa, Bogdan (2024-01-04). "Goodbye, Android? Android Auto Launching on Alternative Operating System" (in en). https://www.autoevolution.com/news/goodbye-android-android-auto-launching-on-alternative-operating-system-227109.html. 
  21. ↑ 21.0 21.1 21.2 21.3 21.4 21.5 21.6 "Features overview" (in en-US). GrapheneOS. https://grapheneos.org/features. 
  22. ↑ "Smartphones With Popular Qualcomm Chip Secretly Share Private Information With US Chip-Maker | Nitrokey" (in en). https://www.nitrokey.com/news/2023/smartphones-popular-qualcomm-chip-secretly-share-private-information-us-chip-maker. 
  23. ↑ Okunytė, Paulina (2023-05-02). "Android phone chip provider was secretly collecting user data" (in en-US). https://cybernews.com/news/android-phone-chip-collecting-user-data/. 
  24. ↑ 24.0 24.1 "Usage guide". https://grapheneos.org/usage. 
  25. ↑ "GrapheneOS servers" (in en). https://grapheneos.org/articles/grapheneos-servers. 
  26. ↑ 26.0 26.1 Mascellino, Alessandro (2022-06-16). "What is GrapheneOS and how does it improve privacy and security?" (in en-US). https://www.androidpolice.com/what-is-graphene-os/. 
  27. ↑ Speight, Adam (29 Sep 2021). "This is why James Bond doesn't use an iPhone" (in en-GB). Wired UK. ISSN 1357-0978. https://www.wired.co.uk/article/james-bond-no-time-to-die-tech. Retrieved 2022-08-17. 
  28. ↑ Wankhede, Calvin (2025-08-10). "I use a duress PIN to protect my data — here's how it works and why everyone needs one" (in en). https://www.androidauthority.com/grapheneos-duress-pin-3584795/. 
  29. ↑ Valeri, Vitor (17 June 2022). "O que é o GrapheneOS? Como ele aumenta a segurança e a privacidade do celular?" (in pt-BR). https://www.oficinadanet.com.br/smartphones/41188-o-que-e-grapheneos. 
  30. ↑ Toulas, Bill (14 January 2024). "GrapheneOS: Frequent Android auto-reboots block firmware exploits" (in en-us). https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/grapheneos-frequent-android-auto-reboots-block-firmware-exploits/. 
  31. ↑ 31.0 31.1 Wankhede, Calvin (2023-03-26). "I ditched Google and installed the privacy-focused GrapheneOS on my Pixel" (in en). https://www.androidauthority.com/grapheneos-3287030/. 
  32. ↑ Cox, Joseph (2024-11-07). "Police Freak Out at iPhones Mysteriously Rebooting Themselves, Locking Cops Out" (in en). https://www.404media.co/police-freak-out-at-iphones-mysteriously-rebooting-themselves-locking-cops-out/. 
  33. ↑ Clover, Juli (2024-11-14). "iOS 18 Security Feature Causes iPhone to Reboot After Three Days of Inactivity" (in en). https://www.macrumors.com/2024/11/14/ios-18-3-day-iphone-reboot/. 
  34. ↑ Franceschi-Bicchierai, Lorenzo (2024-11-14). "New Apple security feature reboots iPhones after 3 days, researchers confirm" (in en-US). https://techcrunch.com/2024/11/14/new-apple-security-feature-reboots-iphones-after-3-days-researchers-confirm/. 
  35. ↑ "No credit given to others who deployed it and innovated with it much earlier but rather downplaying it and making misleading claims about it. It lowers our opinion of Apple's security team quite a lot. We got no credit for our July 2021 locked device auto-reboot when they did it in October 2024." (in en). 2025-09-09. https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/115176335895109564. 
  36. ↑ Goodwin, Richard (2024-04-04). "GrapheneOS 101: What You Need To Know" (in en-GB). https://www.knowyourmobile.com/phones/operating-systems/grapheneos-101-what-you-need-to-know/. 
  37. ↑ Norman, Johnathan (2022-02-16). "Introducing Enhanced Security for Microsoft Edge" (in en). https://microsoftedge.github.io/edgevr/posts/Introducing-Enhanced-Security-for-Microsoft-Edge/. 
  38. ↑ "Tutorial | attestation.app" (in en). https://attestation.app/tutorial. 
  39. ↑ "Source | attestation.app" (in en). https://attestation.app/source. 
  40. ↑ Wilde, Damien (16 April 2024). "GrapheneOS review: De-Googled goodness [Video"]. https://9to5google.com/2024/04/16/grapheneos-review-de-googled-goodness-video/. 
  41. ↑ Stefanski, Nicolas (2025-09-22). "Exploring GrapheneOS secure allocator: Hardened Malloc" (in en). https://synacktiv.com/en/publications/exploring-grapheneos-secure-allocator-hardened-malloc. 
  42. ↑ Bannister, Steve (2019-08-05). "Memory Tagging Extension: Enhancing memory safety through architecture". https://developer.arm.com/community/arm-community-blogs/b/architectures-and-processors-blog/posts/enhancing-memory-safety. 
  43. ↑ "GrapheneOS (@GrapheneOS@grapheneos.social)" (in en). 2023-11-10. https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/111383447206970886. "GrapheneOS on the Pixel 8 is the first platform using ARM MTE in production and it's such a massive improvement for exploit protection that it has to be considered a hard requirement going forward." 
  44. ↑ Brand, Mark (2023-11-03). "First handset with MTE on the market" (in en). https://projectzero.google/2023/11/first-handset-with-mte-on-market.html. 
  45. ↑ "GrapheneOS now has hardware memory tagging support in our Stable channel. Memory tagging greatly improves protection against targeted attacks. Thanks to hardware support on the Pixel 8 and Pixel 8 Pro, it's extremely low overhead despite the massive benefits it's able to provide." (in en). 2023-11-02. https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/111338677911401250. 
  46. ↑ "We mentioned Signal/WhatsApp because despite having end-to-end encryption, they both have a massive amount of remote attack surface, use tons of memory unsafe code for handling media, voice/video calls, etc. along with not using sandboxing. E2EE does no good if app is exploited." (in en). 2023-11-26. https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/111479318824446241. 
  47. ↑ "Our hardware memory tagging support for Pixel 8 and Pixel 8 Pro has uncovered a memory corruption bug introduced in Android 14 QPR2 for Bluetooth LE. We're currently investigating it to determine how to fix or temporarily disable the newly introduced feature as a workaround." (in en). 2024-03-09. https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/112066872276203917. 
  48. ↑ "Android security acknowledgements". https://source.android.com/docs/security/overview/acknowledgements. "Daniel Micay at the GrapheneOS Foundation CVE-2024-23694" 
  49. ↑ "Pixel Update Bulletin—May 2024". 2024-06-13. https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/pixel/2024-05-01. 
  50. ↑ "Kernel Address Sanitizer (KASAN) — The Linux Kernel documentation". https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/dev-tools/kasan.html. 
  51. ↑ "GrapheneOS-Supported Devices: A Complete List" (in en). 2025-07-26. https://www.cape.co/blog/grapheneos-supported-devices. 
  52. ↑ 52.0 52.1 Kuketz, Mike (2023-12-11). "Weshalb GrapheneOS aktuell nur Google Pixel-Geräte unterstützt" (in de). https://www.kuketz-blog.de/weshalb-grapheneos-aktuell-nur-google-pixel-geraete-unterstuetzt/. 
  53. ↑ Kuketz, Mike (2023-12-19). "GrapheneOS: Der Goldstandard unter den Android-ROMs" (in de). https://www.kuketz-blog.de/grapheneos-der-goldstandard-unter-den-android-roms-custom-roms-teil7/. 
  54. ↑ "Which devices are supported? – Frequently Asked Questions" (in en-US). https://grapheneos.org/faq#supported-devices. 
  55. ↑ Perkins, Stephen (2022-06-16). "GrapheneOS: Everything you need to know about the privacy-focused Android fork" (in en). https://www.androidpolice.com/grapheneos-guide/. 
  56. ↑ Multiple sources:
  57. ↑ "Install | GrapheneOS" (in en). https://grapheneos.org/install/. 
  58. ↑ Perkins, Stephen (2022-06-16). "How to install GrapheneOS" (in en). https://www.androidpolice.com/how-to-install-graphene-os/. 
  59. ↑ "WebUSB | Can I use... Support tables for HTML5, CSS3, etc". https://caniuse.com/webusb. 
  60. ↑ "How To Install GrapheneOS: A Step-by-Step Guide" (in en). 2025-07-20. https://www.cape.co/blog/how-to-install-grapheneos. 
  61. ↑ 61.0 61.1 "Web installer | Install | GrapheneOS" (in en). https://grapheneos.org/install/web. 
  62. ↑ 62.0 62.1 Wallen, Jack (2025-11-21). "I finally tried GrapheneOS on my Pixel, and it's the secure Android alternative I've been waiting for". in Picaro, Elyse Betters (in en). https://www.zdnet.com/article/i-finally-tried-grapheneos-on-my-pixel-and-its-the-secure-android-alternative-ive-been-waiting-for/. 
  63. ↑ Edward Snowden [@Snowden] (September 21, 2019). "If I were configuring a smartphone today, I'd use @DanielMicay's @GrapheneOS as the base operating system. I'd desolder the microphones and keep the radios (cellular, wifi, and bluetooth) turned off when I didn't need them. I would route traffic through the @torproject network.". https://twitter.com/Snowden/status/1175430722733129729. 
  64. ↑ Pichler, Georg (24 September 2019). "Wie Edward Snowden sein Smartphone einrichten würde" (in de-AT). https://www.derstandard.at/story/2000109011151/wie-edward-snowden-sein-smartphone-einrichten-wuerde. 
  65. ↑ "Edward Snowden da a conocer las condiciones de seguridad para usar su smartphone" (in es). 2 October 2019. https://www.larepublica.co/internet-economy/edward-snowden-da-a-conocer-las-condiciones-de-seguridad-para-usar-su-smartphone-2916554. 
  66. ↑ Rall, Philipp (23 June 2022). ""Ich würde zu Hause kein WiFi benutzen": Edward Snowden empfiehlt Alternativen" (in de). https://www.futurezone.de/netzpolitik/article182133/edward-snowden-abhoersicheres-handy.html. 
  67. ↑ Mühlenmeier, Lennart (19 July 2019). "Warum Post, Bank und Co. ihre Kunden nicht zwingen sollten, Apps zu benutzen" (in de-DE). https://netzpolitik.org/2019/warum-post-bank-und-co-ihre-kunden-nicht-zwingen-sollten-apps-zu-benutzen/. 
  68. ↑ Šlik, Jáchym (6 April 2019). "GrapheneOS chce napravit bezpečnostní prohřešky Androidu" (in cs). https://www.svetmobilne.cz/grapheneos-chce-napravit-bezpecnostni-prohresky-androidu/7510. 
  69. ↑ Kalelioğlu, Eray (3 April 2019). "Android Tabanlı İşletim Sistemi 'GrapheneOS' ile Tanışın" (in tr). https://www.webtekno.com/android-tabanli-isletim-sistemi-grapheneos-h66023.html. 
  70. ↑ Lee, Derrek (2021-01-30). "Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey tweets cryptic link to a custom Android ROM" (in en). https://www.androidcentral.com/twitter-ceo-jack-dorsey-tweets-cryptic-link-grapheneos. 
  71. ↑ @GrapheneOS (2026-03-12). "Jack Dorsey donated $1m to GrapheneOS as part of his StartSmall initiative providing no strings attached funding to non-profit organizations.". https://twitter.com/GrapheneOS/status/2032113895893094853. 
  72. ↑ Diane (2021-06-28). "GrapheneOS: A Hardened Android Alternative (Review)" (in en-US). https://cellularnews.com/mobile-operating-systems/grapheneos-review/. 
  73. ↑ Lamont, Jonathan (13 March 2022). "I replaced Android on a Pixel 3 with an Android-based privacy OS". Blue Ant Media. https://mobilesyrup.com/2022/03/13/replacing-android-with-grapheneos/. 
  74. ↑ Osborne, Charlie (May 30, 2024). "How to find and remove spyware from your phone". in Windsor, Alyson (in en). https://www.zdnet.com/article/how-to-find-and-remove-spyware-from-your-phone/. 
  75. ↑ Savov, Vlad (2023-01-16). "Swiss Startup Takes On Apple and Google With Privacy-First OS" (in en). Bloomberg News. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-16/apostrophy-and-aphyos-swiss-startup-takes-on-apple-and-google. 
  76. ↑ Savov, Vlad (17 January 2023). "Swiss startup takes on Apple and Google with privacy-first OS" (in en). https://www.thestar.com.my/tech/tech-news/2023/01/17/swiss-startup-takes-on-apple-and-google-with-privacy-first-os. 
  77. ↑ "Apostrophy mobile system, Punkt MC02". https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/18216-apostrophy-mobile-system-punkt-mc02/3. 
  78. ↑ "Transaction Details - Ethereum Transaction Hash: 0xc41c351975e1a3f8018fa5d461b396bbb6a34895d7946af81750918ff4bda7a7" (in en). https://etherscan.io/tx/0xc41c351975e1a3f8018fa5d461b396bbb6a34895d7946af81750918ff4bda7a7. 
  79. ↑ etherscan.io. "Transaction Details - Ethereum Transaction Hash: 0xd7bf89a1b308021563479eec619d0286bd8af492fe01386e6e365accdba0223e" (in en). https://etherscan.io/tx/0xd7bf89a1b308021563479eec619d0286bd8af492fe01386e6e365accdba0223e. 
  80. ↑ Solanky, Gopal (2025-07-08). "Vitalik Buterin Embraces GrapheneOS: What Is It and Why It’s Trending?" (in en-US). https://www.cryptotimes.io/2025/07/08/vitalik-buterin-embraces-grapheneos-what-is-it-and-why-its-trending/. 
  81. ↑ Palmer, Jordan (2022-08-13). "I tried completely de-Googled Android — here's what happened" (in en). https://www.tomsguide.com/features/i-tried-de-googled-android-again-heres-how-that-went. 
  82. ↑ Hadlee, Simons (2026-04-16). "This Google user data scandal shows why more people are using GrapheneOS" (in en). https://www.androidauthority.com/google-user-data-request-legal-complaint-3658092/. 
  83. ↑ Smith, Jesse (31 March 2025). "DistroWatch Weekly, Issue 1115". https://distrowatch.com/weekly.php?issue=20250331#grapheneos. 
  84. ↑ Corbet, Jonathan (2025-07-24). "Graphene OS: a security-enhanced Android build" (in en-US). LWN.net. https://lwn.net/Articles/1030004/. 
  85. ↑ Stöckel, Marc (2025-11-25). "GrapheneOS verlässt OVH: "Frankreich ist kein sicheres Land für Privacy-Projekte"". https://www.golem.de/news/grapheneos-verlaesst-ovh-frankreich-ist-kein-sicheres-land-fuer-privacy-projekte-2511-202570.html. 
  86. ↑ Butler, Georgia (2025-12-12). "GrapheneOS migrates workloads off of OVH, cites issues with France's digital privacy policy" (in en). https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/grapheneos-migrates-workloads-off-of-ovh-cites-issues-with-frances-digital-privacy-policy/. 
  87. ↑ Speed, Richard (28 Nov 2025). "GrapheneOS bails on OVHcloud over France's privacy stance". https://www.theregister.com/2025/11/28/grapheneos_ovhcloud/. 
  88. ↑ Thierry, Gabriel (2025-11-26). ""Pays de plus en plus autoritaire", GrapheneOS coupe les ponts avec la France après une polémique explosive" (in fr-FR). https://www.zdnet.fr/actualites/pays-de-plus-en-plus-autoritaire-grapheneos-coupe-les-ponts-avec-la-france-apres-une-polemique-explosive-485493.htm. 
  89. ↑ "GrapheneOS will remain usable by anyone around the world without requiring personal information, identification or an account. GrapheneOS and our services will remain available internationally. If GrapheneOS devices can't be sold in a region due to their regulations, so be it." (in en). 2026-03-20. https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/116261301913660830. 
  1. ↑ The developers have been referred to as the "GrapheneOS developers" or the "GrapheneOS project" on GrapheneOS' frequently asked questions page.[1] The Canadian nonprofit organization "GrapheneOS Foundation"[2] was created "in March 2023 to handle the intake and distribution of donations".[3]
  2. ↑ Briefly known by the working title Android Hardening or AndroidHardening during development



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